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Abstract. 
In this thesis I trace the origins, morphology, and attributes of a particular strain of anti-
materialism in the Western literary and cultural imagination of the second half of the twentieth 
century. I demonstrate that this strain relies on what Raymond Williams termed “organic form”, 
the fallacious belief that human society can and should follow a set of rules which can be 
objectively deducted from nature. I argue that this anti-materialism should be placed within the 
context of a long established anti-enlightenment tradition. Through an analysis of such writers 
as George Orwell, Aldous Huxley, JRR Tolkien, Edward Abbey, James Howard Kunstler, Chuck 
Palahniuk, Brian Aldiss and others I show how a common feature of this anti-materialism is a 
distrust of, and reaction against, modern technology. More specifically, I am interested in this 
thesis with examining the way in which this reaction allows for a curious confluence and 
convergence of progressive and reactionary tendencies. I argue that anti-technologism is a 
distinct and detectable mood in Western literature, and I trace its origins and influences. 
Without claiming to provide a functionalist analysis, I consider the role of anti-technologism in 
Western literature which I see as broadly facilitating an exploration and discussion of themes of 
cultural vitality and cohesion in the increasingly cosmopolitan and technologically advanced 
societies of the West. In pursuance of this, I focus in each chapter on a particular aspect of anti-
technologism, to draw out its defining characteristics. By reference to other fictional and non-
fictional texts I analyse and situate these characteristics to show how anti-technologism is the 
survival and mutation of earlier dogmas. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
In the summer of 2011, Adbusters, a radically anti-consumerist magazine with an alternative Left, 
politically progressive editorial line (perhaps best known for starting the “Occupy Wall Street” 
campaign) ran excerpts from the newly translated work of Finnish environmentalist, Pentti 
Linkola. Adbusters introduced him as a radical voice on the environmental crisis whose work is 
“intentionally provocative”.1 Sandwiched between shots of industrial landscapes with a slogan 
asking “Is this the West?” the excerpt fitted in well with Adbusters’ avowedly anti-corporate, 
anti-materialist and anti-consumerist stance.  Modern civilisation and overpopulation, the 
excerpt declared, weren't just causing environmental damage, but cultural homogenisation and 
loss of diversity as well: 
I’m not just talking about the suffocation of life due to the population explosion, 
or that life and the Earth’s respiratory rhythm cry out for the productive, 
metabolic green oases they so sorely need everywhere, between the areas razed 
by man. I also mean that humanity, by squirting and birthing all these teeming, 
filth-producing multitudes from out of itself, in the process also suffocates and 
defames its own culture (Linkola, excerpt from Can Life Prevail? 55). 
Provocative indeed. But what the introduction didn’t inform its readers of was that whilst Linkola 
shared their concerns about the environment, corporatization, cultural identity, and 
overpopulation, he arrived at this position not from an alternative Left analysis but instead from 
the Far Right and a belief that inequality and exclusion were natural and democracy and 
                                                 
1 For Adbusters and the launch of the Occupy movement see Jeff Sommer: “The War Against Too Much of 
Everything” New York Times. December 22, 2012. Web. 
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egalitarianism a sham. Rather than locating the source of the problem in exploitation, neo-
colonialism, and inequality, Linkola, in the excerpted book, blames technology and liberal 
democracy which combined (he claims) have allowed overpopulation and fostered materialism, 
even as they weakened cultural identity.  His website summarises his views: “Linkola is one of 
the few voices who advocates (1) No immigration (2) Downsize population (3) Kill defectives (4) 
Stop rampant technology” (Linkola “Ideas”). Hardly a creed that would usually merit inclusion in 
a progressive publication.  
Linkola, then, is no ordinary environmentalist, but rather a Far Right extremist for whom 
environmental degradation is a result of the degeneracy of the multicultural modern world.2 
How was it, then, that such extreme right wing views were being aired without context or 
analysis in a supposedly progressive, anti-corporate magazine such as Adbusters? How did a 
publication that would never normally countenance giving such extremely regressive views a 
venue justify printing Linkola's “A Demographic Plan” which included the assertion that “the 
quality of the population must in all cases be taken into account” and therefore the right to have 
children must be “denied to homes deemed genetically inadequate” (59)? This is by no means 
an isolated or even particularly unusual case; I cite many more examples from literature and 
popular culture throughout this thesis where the most extreme reactionary ideals are explored 
within a putatively liberal, progressive setting. In every case, as I show in this thesis, it is 
antipathy towards technology and technological modernity that provides the justification for this 
otherwise inexplicable transfer of ideas from one end of the political spectrum to the other. 
What is it, then, about antipathy towards technological modernity that seems to license the 
                                                 
2 Indeed, as Adam Carter observes, “despite its claims that it is interested solely in unifying a variety of 
perspectives against the modern world” Arktos / Integral Tradition (Linkola’s publishers for the English 
language market) publishes Far Right and Fascist literature with an emphasis on neo-paganism, and has 
links to notorious neo-Nazis in Britain, Sweden, and New Zealand (Carter NP).  
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discussion and dissemination of extreme reactionary views within a progressive milieu?   
This question and the underlying issues and complexities have fascinated me for several 
years now.  Born in 1972, I grew up against a background of widely held concern over 
militarization, environmental degradation, overpopulation, and social disintegration. As I started 
to develop a personal interest in these issues, I began reading The Ecologist, which billed itself as 
"The Journal of the Post-Industrial Age" and was one of the most influential publications dealing 
with such matters at the time (Wilson). Whilst it didn't strike me as unusual at the time, The 
Ecologist combined a progressive, broadly New Left stance on environmental, defence and 
business issues with what I later realised was a highly reactionary stance on societal 
organisation, one that blamed technology for its disruptive effects and was concerned above all 
else with the idea of social stability. Reviewing the collection of articles from the journal 
republished in The Great U-Turn (1988), for example, shows  articles on "The Ecology of War" 
and "Can Pollution be Controlled?" next to "Education: What For?" which argued against 
universal education, and "The Fall of the Roman Empire" which argued that "foreign influences 
were undoubtedly the first cause of the changes which overcame Roman society" and drew 
numerous parallels between the fall of ancient Rome and modern Western civilisation 
(Goldsmith 9). The more I considered it, the more this disparity intrigued me and my initial 
researches led me to Meredith Veldman's Fantasy, the Bomb, and the Greening of Britain: 1945-
1980 (1994) which first got me thinking seriously about unacknowledged influences and the 
cross-pollination of ideas and beliefs from conservatism to the newly emergent ideologies of the 
post war period.3  
                                                 
3 I use both conservatism and reactionary interchangeably in this thesis to refer to an ideology and 
worldview which is distrustful of the idea of either revolutionary or progressive change, is concerned 
with themes of national and cultural identity and purity, and is preoccupied with the idea of social 
stability. 
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In the research that follows I identify a tradition of cross-pollination of ideas between 
progressive and reactionary ideologies that coalesced around a theme of resistance to 
technology in the literature of the second half of the twentieth century and I develop an analysis 
of a mood in twentieth century literature which I define as "anti-technologism". With reference 
to the works of such writers as Aldous Huxley, George Orwell, Edward Abbey, James Howard 
Kunstler, Brian Aldiss and others, I argue that anxiety or antipathy regarding technology and 
technological society is often a displacement of concerns and anxieties regarding the stability of 
modern mass society under liberal democracy, and the perceived threat of cultural and physical 
degeneration.4 I put forward the hypothesis that technology comes to serve as a kind of marker 
or metaphor for mass society under liberal democracy as it allows distinctions to be drawn 
between the supposedly natural and native, and the supposedly artificial and foreign or 
degenerate. Such a dynamic, I propose, draws on well-established and deeply conservative anti-
materialist ideologies, as analysed by Zeev Sternhell in The Anti-Enlightenment Tradition (2010).5 
I do not claim to offer an exhaustive analysis of the trajectory and manifestation of such 
reactionary ideologies into the Post World War Two era. Instead, my thesis argues that such 
ideologies survive in literature even in an increasingly progressive era, and it delineates one 
particular manifestation of this. 
                                                 
4 In talking about "modern mass society" and "liberal democracy" I am referring in the first instance to 
modern Western democracies, but also to the discussion of how such Western democracies should 
respond to global problems as well. The anxieties and responses which first occurred on "home 
territory" as it were, are, as I see it, applied and projected on to a global stage. Thus, concerns about a 
growing population of the poor and "unfit" in England or America, for example, initiates a set of 
anxieties and responses whose basic form and dynamic is then replayed on a worldwide scale.  
5 Following Sternhell, I use "anti-materialist" here not in an epistemological or ontological sense, but 
rather a cultural and political sense to refer to an ideology that rejects materialism and material 
possessions as a measure of progress. Thus, both communism and laissez-faire capitalism were 
rejected in traditional conservative ideology because they were in large part materialist philosophies 
which were predicated on increasing the availability and accessibility of material goods to the greatest 
number. In contrast, conservative ideologies typically stressed spiritual and hierarchical values with a 
strong geographical bent (that is, attachment to place).  
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For these reasons, I situate my thesis with reference to studies concerned more with 
intellectual and ideological history than those explicitly concerned with technology and its 
representations in literature. An example of this latter type of analysis would be Leo Marx's The 
Machine in the Garden (1964) which deals with the idea of the intrusion of industrialism as 
represented by the machine in American literature. More recently, Nicholas Daly's Literature, 
Technology, and Modernity, 1860-2000 (2008) expands upon the theme of intrusion to explore 
representations of impact between machine and human as symbolic of anxieties regarding the 
erasure of difference between human and machine. Such studies consider the impact of 
technology on society and on the psyche, both collectively and individually. Other approaches to 
technology and literature stress the role of mass culture on shaping society, others on the role of 
technology in conditioning our view of nature and the environment. All of these approaches are 
perfectly valid, of course, and deal with different aspects of the immense changes wrought by 
technological innovation. They are, however, only tangentially connected with my interests in 
this thesis. 
Here, I am concerned rather with resistance to technology in literature as an arena for 
discussion and exploration of otherwise unacceptable anxieties. Therefore, I locate my argument 
with reference to works such as Raymond Williams' Culture and Society (1958), Patrick 
Brantlinger's Bread and Circuses: Theories of Mass Culture as Social Decay (1983), and Zeev 
Sternhell’s The Anti-Enlightenment Tradition (2010). Following Williams and Brantlinger, I take a 
broadly historicist approach, seeking to place anti-technologism within a wider tradition, and 
emphasising the extent to which it was and is a continuation of a long-established discussion 
regarding mass society and concerns about decline and degeneration.  I want to note very 
clearly at this early juncture that I do not see anti-technologism as fundamentally a response to 
post- World War Two concerns regarding nuclear war, environmental degradation, or the loss of 
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privacy and autonomy in technological society. Though the works I refer to in this thesis often 
make use of these themes, I believe that this is substantially a matter of narrative and context 
rather than content. Therefore, I try to contextualise the themes I discuss within an established 
literary and intellectual heritage, particularly in the introduction and conclusion to this thesis, in 
order to try and show the lineage of ideas that anti-technologism draws upon. In this way, I hope 
to make clearer the way in which I see anti-technologism as a sublimated or displaced discourse.  
I hope that this approach will also help clarify why certain authors who have written 
about the dangers posed by technology are not dealt with in this thesis. Two names which might 
suggest themselves in this respect are those of Lewis Mumford and JG Ballard, both of whom 
have written extensively on the dangers of technology. Whilst I would argue that certain 
elements of their writing reflect certain themes which I identify with anti-technologism, I do not 
class either of these authors as anti-technologist in outlook as I believe both of them, despite 
their evident concerns regarding technology and society, are ultimately liberal rationalists in 
their outlook and as such do not fall prey to the misconceptions which I believe characterise 
anti-technologism.  
 Ballard, for example, is clearly deeply interested in exploring the role of technology in 
modern society and its effect not only on society as a whole, but on individual communities and 
even our individual psyches. Many of Ballard’s novels, such as High Rise (1975) or Hello America 
(1983) deal with themes which superficially might seem to mirror anti-technological concerns: 
the decline of civilisation, the reversion to more traditional or primitive way of living, and even 
the idea of history moving in cycles of rise, decline, and fall. Yet it is noticeable that what is 
missing from these dystopian visions is a sense of satisfaction in the collapse of technological 
modernity. Ballard does not revel in the reversion to the primitive, he explores it. The atavistic 
behaviour of the inhabitants of the tower block in High Rise when communal living collapses is 
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not a joyful communion with a regained instinct long repressed by modern society, but rather a 
horrific breaking-out of instincts that had been held in check by modern society. Ballard, the 
concentration camp survivor, asks the question: what if technological society is only a thin 
veneer on dark, primal urges which might resurface if the complex machinery of modern society 
were to break down? Thus, though his concerns overlap with those explored in anti-technologist 
literature, his perspective and attitude is very different.  
 
Mumford, as his biographer Donald L. Miller notes, was heavily influenced by Spengler 
and his perception of culture and history as organic and cyclic in The Decline of the West, 
choosing it in 1939 as his selection for Malcom Cowley and Bernard Smith's Books That Changed 
Our Minds (300). As Miller notes, though Mumford found Spengler's thesis persuasive he was 
too much of a rational optimist to subscribe entirely to the Spenglerian worldview of cyclic rise 
and collapse and instead "put forward a philosophy to harmonize democracy and planning, the 
machine and the human spirit, a conception of change encompassing personal as well as 
institutional regeneration" (302). Thus, whilst Mumford was not immune to one of the more 
seductive intellectual currents of his time he was able to synthesise it with a rationalistic 
outlook.  
 
 Writers like Ballard and Mumford demonstrate the truth of the assertion that it is 
perfectly possible to have a critique of technology and society that does not reference or 
legitimate the kind of dubious analogies and arguments which I examine in this this thesis. It is 
of course merely a truism to say that technology massively altered western society, especially in 
the twentieth century, and that a great deal of thought and literature will be rightly devoted to 
working out the causes, effects, and patterns of that change. The writers I am interested in in 
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this thesis, though, differ in that their concern about the societal changes wrought by society 
implicitly or explicitly perceive these changes as a deviation, a degeneration from a previous, 
better and more natural way of life. With this distinction being drawn, then, I would like to begin 
with Raymond Williams and Culture and Society (1958). 
 In Culture and Society Williams looks at the reaction to industrialisation in English 
literature and culture, and observes that it is a reaction "compounded of very different and at 
times even directly contradictory elements" (Williams 20). Williams perceives the reaction as a 
hybrid ideology that, in resisting the disruption of technology, takes elements of both 
conservative and liberal thought and combines them, often without acknowledgement or 
analysis of the fundamental precepts which underpin them.  Williams cites the example of John 
Ruskin, one of the great socialist Victorian reformers, who inveighed against the depredations of 
the machine age and argued forcefully for a society not only closer to agrarian ideals, but based 
on the example nature provided. Though Ruskin was politically progressive, even radical, William 
argues that in applying the aesthetic ideal of "organic form" taken from nature to society, Ruskin 
was, consciously or not, echoing the arch-conservative thinker, Thomas Carlyle. Williams sees 
this as a fundamental flaw in Ruskin's philosophy that caused Ruskin to abandon the ideal of 
equality in favour of a pseudo-naturalistic vision of society ordered in a supposedly natural 
hierarchy: 
 
The basic idea of 'organic form' produced, in Ruskin's thinking about an ideal 
society, the familiar notion of a paternal state. He wished to see a rigid class-
structure corresponding to the idea of 'function' . . . [therefore] democracy must 
be rejected: for its conception of the equality of men was not only untrue; it was 
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also a disabling denial of order and 'function'. The ruling class must be the 
existing aristocracy, properly trained it its function. (146) 
Williams' notion of the "organic form" as a result of the synthesis of paternalistic progressive 
impulses, agrarian idealism, and subsumed or unacknowledged conservative ideology is crucial 
to my argument in this thesis. The idea that nature provides a pattern, example, or ideal for 
society is one of the fundamental attributes of anti-technologism as I analyse it here.  Therefore, 
before proceeding with the literature review part of this introduction, I would like to open out 
what is meant by the use of the organic form and some of the implications that follow on from 
it. As stated earlier, I draw my examples from the first half of the twentieth century here in order 
to demonstrate an established literary and intellectual heritage for the anti-technologism of the 
second half of the century. 
 
The idea of organic form taken from nature and applied to human society and history is 
an attractive if invalid analogy common to many cultures and civilisations, not least because the 
appeal to "nature" very often turns out to be "merely a generic designation for the valid norm of 
human life" (Lovejoy & Boas 13). It gives the status quo (or the desired structure) a veneer not 
only of rationality but inevitability. If a certain way of life is natural, then by definition any 
deviation from it is artificial and unnatural, and must sooner or later come to grief. Of course, 
technology is the ultimate expression of this perceived artificiality, and its disruption of the 
natural order led some early writers to embrace fascism as a means of reconciling the world as 
they found it with their belief in the imperative of the organic form. Orwell, for example, very 
clearly identifies this mood in Yeats: 
 
11 
 
Translated into political terms, Yeats's tendency is Fascist. Throughout most of his 
life, and long before Fascism was ever heard of, he had had the outlook of those 
who reach Fascism by the aristocratic route. He is a great hater of democracy, of 
the modern world, science, machinery, the concept of progress — above all, of 
the idea of human equality. Much of the imagery of his work is feudal, and it is 
clear that he was not altogether free from ordinary snobbishness. (Orwell “W B 
Yeats” 176) 
As Orwell observes, this tendency was often (in the early twentieth century) found paired with an 
interest in the occult and the cyclic theory of history, as "if it is true that 'all this', or something 
like it, 'has happened before', then science and the modern world are debunked at one stroke 
and progress becomes forever impossible" (Orwell “W B Yeats” 177). In the writing I examine 
from the second half of the twentieth century an interest in the occult is mostly exchanged for 
an insistence on the unsustainability of modern society by reference to the collapse of previous 
civilisations, though the impulse is the same.6 Belief in a cyclical version of history (instead of the 
traditional Western linear view) allows not only denunciations of bourgeois notions of 
“progress” in material terms of comfort and health, but also gives credence to the idea that the 
decline and degeneration writers like Yeats saw all around them were the paradoxical but 
inevitable result of such material progress, an idea Patrick Brantlinger (see below) has termed 
                                                 
6 A distinction needs to be made here between legitimate criticisms of modern resource use and 
pollution and the employment of spurious arguments from analogy which use extrapolation to turn a 
relatively short-term trend into a civilization-ending phenomenon. The classic example of this latter 
tendency would be the panic over the demographic transition that accompanied the industrialisation 
of non-Western countries which I consider in the chapter on anti-technologism and overpopulation. 
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"negative classicism".7 
Yeats was only one of the prominent writers of the first half of the twentieth century 
who misused the organic form fallacy and consequently came to defend or justify inequality and 
exclusion. TS Eliot was another. His Page-Barbour lectures to the University of Virginia in 1933 
(published under the title After Strange Gods) are worth pausing over as they exemplify the way 
in which the belief that society should in some way be based on nature precipitates a further 
series of conflations and false analogies about what is natural and what is artificial and hence 
what should be proscribed and excluded, a discussion that occurs frequently in anti-
technological texts. Furthermore, it provides an early and particularly clear demonstration of the 
way in which the organic metaphor, whilst anti-capitalist and ecological in tone, is concerned 
above all else with the idea of nature as both continuity and renewal, a counterbalance to the 
wrenching societal changes wrought by technology. 
In his lectures, Eliot is concerned to lend his support to a group of writers from the old 
Confederate American states that came to be known as the New Agrarians for their rejection of 
industrialism and defence of tradition, as collected in 1930 in I'll Take My Stand (Twelve 
Southerners). Eliot chooses to make his case for tradition and agrarianism in Virginia not only for 
this literary reason but also because he sees Virginia as potentially more fertile ground for his 
argument because "you are farther away from New York; you have been less industrialised and 
less invaded by foreign races; and you have a more opulent soil" (16). Eliot argues that the 
"happiest" lands are those in which "the landscape has been molded by numerous generations 
                                                 
7 As John Carey notes, much of Yeats' fascistic tendencies sprang from his eugenicism and belief 
that improvements in science, technology, and medicine were allowing the survival and multiplication 
of the supposedly less fit. Thus, Carey paraphrases Yeats’ conviction in his  1939 work, On the Boiler, 
that "the principal European nations are all degenerating in body and mind, though the evidence for 
this has been hushed up by the newspapers lest it harm circulation" (Carey 13,14). 
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of one race, and in which the landscape in turn has modified the race to its own character", a 
claim which shows Eliot's Spenglerian influences very clearly (17). Eliot's declared target here is 
"economic determinism" which he believes has led to both the decline of the family farm as a 
way of life and its associated traditions and culture (17). Rather than subsequently engaging in a 
materialist analysis based on class or economics though, Eliot locates the root of the problem in 
an intellectualism that fails to recognise and acknowledge the importance of the cultural 
traditions that he believes are the outwards representations that affirm "the blood kinship of 
'the same people living in the same place'" (18). Employing the organic metaphor to bolster 
rhetorically the organicism of his beliefs here, Eliot claims that we become aware of the 
importance of these representations of tradition and culture "only after they have begun to fall 
into desuetude, as we are aware of the leaves of a tree when the Autumn winds begin to blow 
them off - when they have ceased to be vital" (18).  
Having singled out disinterested intellectual enquiry, "economic determinism" and 
estrangement from the soil as causes of the decline in cultural vitality that he perceives, Eliot 
offers his prescription for a return to a society ordered along the organic lines championed by 
the New Agrarians. "Stability is obviously necessary" according to Eliot, because the movement 
or migration of people from place to place dissolves the connections between people and place, 
and therefore make the revitalisation of culture and tradition difficult: 
The population should be homogenous; where two or more cultures exist in the 
same place they are likely either to be fiercely self-conscious or both to become 
adulterate. What is still more important is unity of religious background; and 
reasons of race and religion combine to make any large number of free-thinking 
Jews undesirable. There must be a proper balance between urban and rural, 
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industrial and agricultural development. And a spirit of excessive tolerance is to 
be deprecated. (19, 20) 
The interplay between the oppositions set up by Eliot here neatly exemplifies the way in which 
the organicist conception of society is fundamentally an irredentist one concerned with cultural 
purity and vitality (the two are intimately connected in anti-technologism).8 The emphasis on 
"stability" and "balance" are hallmarks of the organicist perception which encode an argument 
for the subordination of individualism and liberalism in the interests of the vitality and health of 
the social body as a homogenous whole.9 As such, they are an important and frequently 
recurring theme in anti-technologism.  
The use of the organic form is also picked up on by Patrick Brantlinger in Bread and 
Circuses: Theories of Mass Culture as Social Decay (1983). Brantlinger builds on William's analysis 
to develop a theory of negative classicism: the belief that the rise of the masses and mass 
culture portends the decline of culture and civilisation, that historical evidence for this can be 
found by reviewing the fate of previous civilisations such as ancient Rome, and that such decline 
and decadence arises when individual rights and freedom of expression take precedence over 
social cohesion and homogeneity. Like Williams, Brantlinger also sees negative classicism as a 
deeply contradictory impulse that arose out of the belief that the prosperity brought by 
technological progress was leading paradoxically to the breakdown of society. A corollary of this 
                                                 
8  I use the term “irredentist” to refer to ideologies that base claims to territory or land on ethnic and 
cultural grounds and that emphasise a close connection between a people and a territory. Irredentism 
is perhaps most succinctly described in the phrase “blood and soil”.   
 
9 Returning to my initial example of the crossover of reactionary and progressive ideologies in 
Adbusters, they reproduce Brett Steven's introduction to Linkola's work which cites Michel 
Houellebecq's novel Atomised (1998)in support of the idea that the root cause of environmental 
degradation is the Enlightenment ideal of individual autonomy: "Our civilization understands itself not 
as a product of history and maker of future history but as a facilitation - like a big shopping mall with a 
legal system" (96). The interests of the individual are set in spurious opposition to those of society.  
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belief, Brantlinger observes, is that it "substitutes a catastrophic or cyclic view of history for a 
progressive one" because it posits a form of social entropy  in which increasing prosperity and 
egalitarianism lead to a diffusion of perceived societal goals, the dilution of social cohesion, and 
eventually to irrationality and the return of barbarism (51).  
Noting the bipartisan appeal of this seductive mythology, Brantlinger traces the rise in 
influence of this idea to Oswald Spengler and his immensely influential work The Decline of the 
West (1918), though as he rightly points out, the idea has numerous antecedents. Spengler's 
thesis of an organic form or morphology of history, consisting of the rise of culture, its reification 
into the forms of civilisation, its expansion in its late imperial phase and eventual ossification, 
decline and dissolution influenced not only other historians such as Arnold Toynbee but also 
psychologists like Sigmund Freud, critical theorists of the Frankfurt School such as Adorno and 
Horkheimer, and writers such as DH Lawrence, James Joyce, and W B Yeats.10 I make extensive 
use of Brantlinger's theory of negative classicism in this thesis as it points to an important and 
often unacknowledged aspect of modernity, namely the extent to which catastrophism and the 
sense of apocalypse underpin not just the texts which I examine here, but much of modern 
culture itself. As the cultural critic Christopher Lasch put it in 1984, "the rhetoric of crisis now 
pervades discussion of race relations, prison reform, mass culture, fiscal management, and 
everyday personal 'survival'" (63). 
Lasch, like many other critics, traces this sense of decline and crisis back to World War 
Two and its aftermath, to the atomic bomb, the horror of Nazi concentration camps, and the 
                                                 
10 As Peter Fjågesund points out in The Apocalyptic World of DH Lawrence (1998), the Spenglerian 
themes of civilisation in decline and decay pervade Lawrence's thought and writing, as the critic Henry 
Miller grasped: "Doom! Lawrence sees it written all over the universe. Even more forbidding, more 
devastating than Spengler sees it. Not just an Occidental culture, not just the Faustian man, the Gothic 
soul, but man everywhere . . . he returns to it eternally" (qtd in Fjågesund 45).  
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realisation of the damage being done to the environment and human health. Whilst it is a truism 
to state that World War Two and its aftermath as well as the threat of nuclear annihilation 
during the cold war caused a re-evaluation of modernity and the idea of progress, it is an 
important part of my argument that anti-technologism as I define it pre-dates this. Hence I make 
it in an integral aspect of my thesis, and particularly the introduction and the first chapter, to 
show that anti-technologism has literary and intellectual roots from significantly before World 
War Two and the atomic bomb.  
Meredith Veldman, whose work most closely anticipates my own, albeit from a slightly 
different perspective, considers this continuity in her work Fantasy, the Bomb, and the Greening 
of Britain: Romantic Protest 1945-1980 (1994).  As the subtitle of her work suggests, she is 
concerned with what she terms "romantic protest", a term she admits is somewhat ambiguous 
but argues that it is useful as a descriptor for "certain common patterns and themes . . . a shared 
series of affirmations and denials" that she observes in the fantasies of conservative writers such 
as C S Lewis and JRR Tolkien, and the post-war protest movements such as the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament and the nascent Green movement, particularly in Britain (1). This common 
attribute, Veldman argues, was unease and even distrust of technological, technocratic 
modernity and a sense that society had lost its organic wholeness or unity. In this belief, she 
proposes, conservative writers like Tolkien and Lewis significantly influenced the new counter-
cultural protest movement which, 
affirmed and sought to strengthen the bonds between humanity and the natural 
world, endeavored to restore the ties between individual human beings and their 
histories, and struggled to rebuild community life and spirit in a society they 
believed to be increasingly atomized . . . Asserting that material, empirical reality 
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did not encompass the whole of truth, they [the participants in the progressive 
and alternative movements] looked for ways to acknowledge and expand 
intuitive, emotional, and spiritual assumptions of contemporary society, and 
sought, in very different ways, to save their worlds from decay and destruction. 
(1,2) 
Veldman's mention of a shared attempt between conservative writers such as Tolkien and Lewis 
and progressive movements to forestall perceived decay is acute, and it is a shame that she does 
not really engage with an analysis of this aspect in particular. This is an aspect which I shall 
return to later in my discussion of Paul Monaco's conception of "reactionary consciousness".  
Essentially, Veldman appears to accept at face value the themes of cultural identity, 
community cohesion, and the forestalling of societal decay in the works of Lewis, Tolkien and 
others, as well as in the early counter-cultural movements and chooses not to enquire too 
deeply into the fundamental preconceptions which underlie them. She notes, for example, that 
the tradition she analyses adopts the "organic form" perception of society and even cites 
Williams in this context, but fails to note William's observation of the strong illiberal tendencies 
such a view licensed (11-14). In part such an emphasis stems from Veldman's evident sympathy 
with the idea of organic form, as with romantic protest as a whole, but it leads her to gloss over 
or omit important distinctions, particularly where issues of class inequality and racial exclusion 
are concerned. For example, in sketching out the historical roots of romantic protest Veldman 
briefly discusses the Romantic poets but begins individual case studies with Thomas Carlyle. She 
notes that a large part of Carlyle's influence lay in his approach to history not as a bald recitation 
of facts and events but "as a storehouse of moral and spiritual wisdom" that a properly poetic 
historian should interpret in ways which informed the conduct and ordering of contemporary 
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society. She observes that for Carlyle, faith in the idea of progress was not only "wrongheaded 
and dangerous" but "part of the intrusion of the Machine into all aspects of life" and closes her 
review of Carlyle's importance to the romantic protest tradition by commenting that his "social 
and cultural critique offered a vision of the preindustrial past as a repository of much needed 
wisdom and an example of authentic community" (16).  
All of this is fine as far as it goes, but it omits entirely any discussion of Carlyle's counter-
Enlightenment views and how this informed his dim view of democracy and his belief in 
inequality as an unalterable law of nature - a strange omission in a work which undertakes to 
look at an aspect of the history of protest and social criticism. Carlyle's "Occasional Discourse on 
the Nigger Question" goes entirely unmentioned, even though it launches the most blatant and 
grotesque defence of slavery and inequality on the entirely spurious grounds of natural 
hierarchy. Such considerations are no mere curiosities, nor are they merely inevitable examples 
of a generalised racism and classism prevalent at the time, rather they are absolutely 
fundamental to Carlyle's attempt to "save his world from decay and destruction" (14). To say 
that Carlyle rebelled against the reform movement because it was an "intrusion of the Machine" 
- an attempt to reduce human affairs and happiness to equations of material prosperity – merely 
glides over the fundamental preconceptions which underpinned this antipathy. As Sternhell 
notes, Carlyle's animus against reformism, as against rationalism and the Enlightenment, lay 
precisely in the fact that he believed they upended the proper organic form of society: 
Carlyle saw the universe as both a monarchy and a hierarchy, governed by the 
Almighty with an eternal justice; this was the model for all "Constitutions". The 
laws of nature, of which democracy is precisely the opposite, require superior 
people, nobles, to lead the less noble, and that is the reason why democracy is an 
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imposture  . . . Thus [for Carlyle] inequality is natural and universal suffrage 
absurd. (219) 
Hence, Veldman's analysis of the charges Carlyle leveled against the idea of progress is 
not necessarily incorrect, but it is certainly incomplete. Carlyle's rejection of "the intrusion of the 
Machine" is not a motivating cause of his rejection, as she seems to treat it, but a symptom of a 
far more fundamental organicist philosophy which saw in nature proof of the eternal inequality 
of human society, and thus the unsustainability of attempts to ameliorate that inequality. 
Similarly, in discussing the role of early twentieth century Guild Socialism as a precursor 
to later anti-materialist progressive movements, Veldman omits discussion of its hierarchical and 
reactionary aspects in favour of a portrayal of a movement guided by a search for communal 
values not based on the cash nexus. She notes that the movement was founded by AJ Penty as 
an alternative to the more materialist concerns of Fabian Socialism, but after a brief mention of 
Penty's founding vision of a non-materialist socialism that tried to "recapture cohesion and 
vitality" she moves on immediately to claim GDH Cole as "Guild Socialism's foremost thinker and 
activist" before devoting the next three pages to Cole's vision of Guild Socialism and its influence 
on later romantic protest (24). However, in the same context Philip Conford's History of the 
Organic Movement (2001) gives Cole only a single passing mention as one of the members of 
the first executive of the National Guilds League and focuses instead on AJ Penty and AR Orage 
as the prime figures in the movement. So far as Penty as the founder of the Guild Socialist 
movement is concerned, Conford remarks that "Penty's career provides an excellent example of 
the stages by which a man of the radical Left might end up on the far Right" (154). Veldman does 
not consider Penty's path from disillusionment with the materialism of traditional Socialism to 
the neo-feudalism of Guild Socialism to his eager defence of Italian fascism as a regenerative 
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force. Yet this progression is once again no mere historical curiosity but an outcome of pre-
existing fundamental preconceptions, not least Penty's hierarchical organicism, his belief that 
the most pressing matter facing society at the time was "not primarily a question of the 
redistribution of wealth, necessary as that may be, but of how to get the social pyramid to rest 
again foursquare upon its base instead of upon its apex as it currently does" (32). Like Ruskin, 
Eliot, Carlyle, and other organicist thinkers, Penty's primary concern was "stability" and 
"balance", the reversion to a traditional hierarchy based on land ownership and agricultural 
production. Similarly, Tom Gibbons (1974) notes of AR Orage, the other important figure in Guild 
Socialism and founder of the New Age and New English Weekly journals (of which Eliot was later 
the editor), "Orage's guild socialism, despite its evolutionist and Nietzschean trappings, is 
basically a program for neo-feudalism, with its roots in that pervasive Victorian nostalgia for an 
idealized medieval society" (1143-4). 
Penty believed that the "pyramid" of society had been upended by the imposition of 
machinery and the search for efficiency in the name of profit and consumerism. This, he felt, was 
the cause of the malaise he detected all around him. "Society" he declared, "can only be in a 
stable and healthy condition when its manufactures [sic] rest on a foundation of agriculture and 
home-produced raw material and when its people share a common life in the family, the guild 
and locality" (33). Not only would international trade lead to economic instability, Penty argued, 
but also psychological instability as well because "insofar as the opposite ideal of 
cosmopolitanism comes to prevail, people become uprooted, and once they are uprooted they 
begin to find themselves at loose ends" (33). Like Eliot, he identified technology with speculative 
international finance, cosmopolitanism, arid intellectualism, and - most importantly - with the 
decay of shared cultural values. 
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In failing to acknowledge what we might think of as the darker side of romantic protest, 
Veldman weakens an otherwise perspicacious and highly original thesis. Whilst she draws many 
highly illuminating connections between pre-war movements, thinkers, and writers, and post-
war progressive and counter-cultural movements, she makes only cursory nods towards the 
more problematic elements of these pre-war movements and writers and is perhaps a little too 
quick to accept the thought that romantic protest was purely a positive movement to revive 
community cohesion and a sense of shared identity.  This is not to condemn what is an 
otherwise excellent work, but rather to point out that there is a need for an exploration of this 
darker side of romantic protest, the attraction of organic form and its attendant theme of anti-
technologism. 
In making the case for the need for a review of this darker side of romantic protest I will 
begin by arguing that romantic protest can be traced back to the counter-enlightenment attack 
on individualism and I will propose that the anti-technologism of the second half of the 
twentieth century was a manifestation of what I identify as the deeply contradictory nature of 
this movement which simultaneously sought to advance the sphere of human experience whilst 
also limiting it with reference to the bounds of nature, environment, ethnicity, and culture. I 
begin by adopting Paul Monaco's conception of the "reactionary consciousness" in Modern 
European Culture and Consciousness 1870-1980 (1983).  
In his thesis Monaco distinguishes between three essential ways of thinking in modern 
Europe, three consciousnesses: individualistic, revolutionary, and reactionary. The first two types 
can be identified to a substantial degree with the ideals of the Enlightenment, individual 
consciousness emerged via the ideal of the renaissance human, Diderot's encyclopedic human, 
Proust's fully realized individual and, later, existentialism; Revolutionary consciousness was the 
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embodiment of this idea of the fully realised self as achieved through collective action. Arising in 
the French revolution, revolutionary consciousness may be thought of as the idea that progress 
demanded not incremental reform but systematic change. Reactionary consciousness Monaco 
defines as  
a state of awareness that is in rebellion against the loss of community, the loss of 
identity, and the loss of a sense of transcendence. Reactionary consciousness 
rebels against loneliness and anomie, against rationalism and materialism, and 
against the artifices of human progress and technology. In seeking to ameliorate 
the condition of spiritual and emotional impoverishment brought on by modern 
life in industrial societies, reactionary consciousness marks an atavistic flight from 
nearly any aspect of experience that may be called modern. In this flight, the 
pursuit of a return to nature, or the embrace of instinct over reason, or the quest 
to recognize links between people which are racial rather than historical, are 
common. (91)11 
 
If we compare this to Veldman's analysis of romantic protest cited earlier, we can see that the 
two are almost identical. The only real difference is Monaco's additional identification of the 
desire to find racial links between people as a common theme, and his labeling of this mindset 
as reactionary. This is highly significant because it points to a dichotomy: an important part of 
Veldman's argument is that the alternative movements in Post-war Britain such as the "New 
Left", the Green Party, and other protest movements should be placed within this tradition of 
                                                 
11 I think it needs to be made clear here that Monaco's mention of historical rather than racial links 
between people refers purely to the existing facts of history, that is, to the events that resulted in 
nations and other forms of alliance. It is not, at least as I interpret it, a claim for the primacy or 
righteousness of determining links between people by reference to their historical antecedents. In 
other words, Monaco refers to actually existing links between people, and not to an ideal.  
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romantic protest, an argument which she makes a very convincing and well-documented case 
for. Yet Monaco identifies these same themes and concerns not with progressivism, but with the 
reactionary consciousness. How, then, can this circle be squared? 
 
Providing a full answer to such a question would require a thesis in itself, and would 
certainly take me far beyond the restricted area of interest I have demarcated for this thesis. 
However, I believe some headway can be made here if we recognise two essential elements. 
First, that Veldman's romantic protest and Monaco's reactionary consciousness are two ways of 
looking at and thinking about permutations of the counter-enlightenment tradition. Second, that 
the counter-enlightenment tradition is best thought of not as "anti-modern" or an utter refusal 
or denial of modernity, but rather a product of modernity itself. That is to say, all counter-
enlightenment movements, whether the Romantic poets, the Victorian medievalists, fin de siècle 
thinkers such as Croce, Taine, Spengler and Ortega, or the anti-technologism which I discuss in 
this thesis, are best conceived of as modernity struggling with its own contradictions. The 
problem with this, as Monaco points towards, and which I explore in this thesis, is that rebelling 
against the materialism and rationalism of the modern world, in the often honest attempt to 
ameliorate anomie and atomisation, frequently leads to xenophobia, racism, irrationality, and a 
distasteful and often disastrous quest for cultural purity. Most of the writers I examine in the 
chapters would normally be considered politically progressive, or at least are often associated 
with politically progressive causes, yet as I will show, their work often exhibits a paradox 
whereby the quest to affirm non-materialistic ties between people leads to sympathetic 
treatment and even recommendation of exclusionary and repressive policies.  
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Exploring the attributes of anti-technologism and how it enables this synthesis of 
progressive and reactionary attitudes will be the work of this thesis, but for now I want to begin 
opening out a consideration of how anti-technologism allows anxieties regarding mass society 
and liberal democracy to be discussed, making use of John Carey's work in The Intellectuals and 
the Masses: Pride and Prejudice Among the Literary Intelligentsia, 1880-1939 (1992). Having 
done that, I will then sketch a brief alternative history of the romantic protest movement that 
complements Veldman's work by showing that there were significant reactionary elements at 
play in the early progressive movements. I show how these reactionary elements can be 
identified by their antipathy towards technology and their use of the organic form metaphor for 
society, and briefly discuss their influence both on the early progressive movements and more 
specifically on anti-technologism in literature. 
  
Carey's work focuses on the rise of mass democracy and egalitarianism in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and attempts by literary and artistic elites to draw 
superficially convincing distinctions between themselves and the public. Much of Carey's work 
focuses on the influence of Nietzsche and the cult of vitalism and "natural aristocracy" for artists, 
writers and intellectuals, together with a concomitant rewriting of the bulk of humanity in 
dehumanizing terms which emphasised its purported indistinguishability and "massness" (71).12 
                                                 
12 Here we come up against one of the many contradictions of anti-technologism and the thinking 
behind it: as my reference to Eliot and his desire to exclude "free-thinking Jews" showed earlier, and as 
many of the examples in this thesis attest to, intellectuals and intellectualism are blamed as one of the 
root causes of degeneration because they question the cultural underpinnings and beliefs of society. 
Of course, Eliot was by any definition an intellectual, as was Nietzsche, Spengler, Ortega and many of 
the other writers and thinkers who criticised intellectuals and intellectualism. Once again, this seeming 
contradiction can, I believe be traced back to the tension between enlightenment and counter-
enlightenment thought. Counter-enlightenment thinkers, stressing the importance of cultural, ethnic, 
and historical ties and contexts accused enlightenment thinkers and intellectuals of abstract and 
metaphysical thinking, divorced from specific realities. It is, then, not intellectualism as such that is 
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This rewriting, Carey remarks, used vitalistic and organicist metaphors to draw invidious but 
superficially convincing distinctions between the mobile and "artificial" inhabitants of industrial 
cities and the traditional and stable hierarchies of peasants, aristocrats, and intellectuals. 
 
Parallel with this desire to reclaim individualism by drawing spurious distinctions 
between artists, intellectuals and aristocrats on one hand, and the great bulk of humanity on the 
other was a rising interest in eugenic theory, which gave the appearance of scientific validity, 
inevitability, and even a sort of philanthropic paternalism to fantasies of eliminating large 
swathes of the population (or at least, denying their essential humanity). Carey cites D H 
Lawrence's letter to Blanche Jennings of 1908 in which Lawrence fantasises about a solution to 
the problem of the poor, sick and crippled of London: 
 
If I had my way, I would build a lethal chamber, as big as the Crystal Palace, with a 
military band playing softly, and a Cinematograph working brightly; then I'd go 
out in the back streets and main streets and bring them all in, all the sick, the 
halt, and the maimed; I would lead them gently, and they would smile me a 
weary thanks; and the band would softly bubble out the “Hallelujah Chorus”. (qtd 
in Carey 12) 
  
It is telling that an important element of Lawrence’s fantasy here is the use of mass media and 
popular music, not only as a final concession to the masses, but also as a final identification of 
                                                                                                                                                 
being attacked, but rationalism. As Sternhell puts it, for counter-enlightenment thinkers, "rationalism 
was the source of the evil: it led to 'materialism', to utopias . . . it killed instinct and vital forces; it 
destroyed the almost carnal connection between the members of an ethnic community and made one 
live in an unreal world" (24).  
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their disposability as products of mass-production, the detritus of machine civilisation. Lawrence 
seems to feel that the existence of such people shows that technological society perverts 
nature's law of survival of the fittest and therefore institutes its own decline. Thus at the end of 
his 1923 semi-autobiographical novel Kangaroo (which, as Kermode notes, "offers a surprisingly 
naked self-portrait") the hero proclaims that "I'm the enemy of this machine-civilisation and this 
ideal civilisation. But I'm not the enemy of the deep, self-responsible consciousness in man, 
which is what I mean by civilisation" (Kermode 99 and Lawrence 383).13 
 
Neither is the case of Lawrence a particularly egregious example, either then or now, as 
many of the examples in this thesis affirm. Indeed, as Carey observes, the horrors perpetrated by 
Hitler, whilst seen in retrospect as an unfathomable aberration were in many aspects the 
instantiation of contemporary fears and fantasies which many writers and intellectuals 
subscribed to and which set up pseudo-naturalistic oppositions between fit and unfit 
populations. The spurious division between “fit” and “unfit” populations using biological 
metaphors, for example, was not restricted to Nazi propaganda, but as Carey points out, was a 
common theme among many writers and intellectuals in the first half of the twentieth century.  
 
All these elements manifested in vitalistic labels and metaphors which either explicitly or 
implicitly declared some people to be more alive or more vital than others. Robert Proctor’s 
research on metaphors of organicism and pollution in The Nazi War on Cancer (1999) 
                                                 
13 Lawrence manifests this diminution of people to disposable masses in Kangaroo when the hero, 
Richard Somers, reads of twenty young bullocks following each other into a mud pit and drowning. 
Lawrence, as Somers, presents this as a parable on mass civilisation and democracy: "That, thought 
Richard at the close of the day, is a sufficient comment on herd-unity, equality, domestication, and 
civilisation. He felt he would have liked to climb down into that hole in which the bullocks were 
drowning and beat them all hard before they expired, for being such mechanical logs of life" (307). 
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demonstrates that the counterpart to the dehumanisation and genocide of "unfit" or 
"unnatural" populations was an intense interest in natural foods and medicines for the "fit" 
populations. As he notes, whilst images of industrial-scale extermination, of bodies being 
bulldozed into open pits, are well-known, it is less well known that prisoners at Dachau 
cultivated herbs for use in alternative medicine and research and produced organic honey, or 
that bakeries in Germany were required by law to bake only wholegrain bread (4, 56). Here, in 
horrific fact, is the division between the "illegitimate" and "artificial" masses, identified with 
mass-production and systematically disposed of, and "legitimate" populations, the conception of 
whom is increasingly invested with a kind of vitalism which affirms their connections (and hence 
their claim) to the soil. Under such an ideology the concept of growth attains a bizarre duality, in 
which the fertility of legitimised populations is identified with nature and welcomed as natural, 
wholesome growth, whilst that of delegitimised and "artificial" populations is seen as parasitic 
and unsustainable.14 
 
 Robinson Jeffers' 1937 poem "Decaying Lambskins" exemplifies the literary 
representation of these elements as well as the transfiguration of the masses into mass-
produced technological artifacts. As such, he represents a mid-point between the explicit stance 
of the likes of Yeats and Lawrence, and the more sublimated discourse of later anti-
technologism. He reprises the same themes, but also begins to shift the discourse away from 
literalism and into metaphor and representation. Jeffers argues in the poem that even though 
our technology is much more advanced – "Our engineers have nothing to learn from Rome's" 
and our science "can hardly / Lean low enough, sun-blinded eagle, to laugh at the strange / 
                                                 
14 I analyse anti-technologism’s treatment of this theme in my chapter on Tolkien and in my chapter on  
over-population. 
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astronomies of Babylon" – ours is in truth not an admirable but rather a sick and decaying 
civilisation (3, 5-7). We are not "boastful" but instead "wearily ashamed" he declares, because, 
 
What is noble in us, to kindle 
The imagination of a future age? We shall seem a race of cheap 
Fausts, vulgar magicians. 
What men have we to show them? but inventions and appliances. 
Not men but populations, mass-men; not life 
But amusements; not health but medicines . . . .(12-19) 
 
Jeffers wonders if the same technology that brought such debilitating ease might also be part of 
the solution through war, and therefore whether it might be "almost time to let our supreme 
inventions begin to work" and "the exact, intelligent guns" to "wheel themselves into action" - 
but unfortunately he finds no solace in the prospect of any imminent revitalising catastrophe 
there either: "Our civilization, the worst it can do, cannot yet destroy itself / But deep-wounded 
drag on for centuries" (24-26, 31-2). Like Lawrence, what seems to anger Jeffers particularly is 
the thought that technology is subverting nature's law of survival of the fittest, thereby allowing 
superfluous populations to not only survive but even impose a measure of control, thus 
preventing heroic men from assuming command.  
 
The idea of organic form, that society should mirror the processes of nature, then, leads 
to an extended series of subsequent beliefs and ideals. A common factor, though, is the idea of 
degeneration and decline in technological society. On the one hand, intellectualism (more 
specifically, rationalism) and science are blamed for a moral and cultural decline as they loosen 
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the beliefs, shared cultural values, and respect for tradition and authority that bind traditional, 
hierarchical society together. On the other hand technology is condemned for a physical and 
mental decline in the overall health of a nation, as the checks and balances of nature on society 
are circumvented. Such anxieties became translated in the literature of the interwar years into 
metaphors that portray organic wholeness and purity being infiltrated by some foreign and 
sinister agent. Henry Williamson (author of Tarka the Otter and Salar the Salmon) in his 
autobiographical work, The Story of a Norfolk Farm (1941), blamed the new chemical pesticides 
for his mother's cancer, but makes the cancer representative of a more fundamental sickness in 
society: “I put my hand on her brow, thinking how small it was, and childlike, with the thin faded 
hairs, and the dark suffering eyes. Was this dread thing that was killing her due to white bread, 
to wrong values, to industrialism, to unnatural ideas which had come upon European man?” 
(48). 
 
Though he cannot cure his mother's cancer and make her whole again, Williamson holds firm to 
the hope that the cancer he identifies in society might be removed once the unsustainable 
technological world collapses and society returns to its traditional homogenous organic 
structure: 
 
I longed to say, Mother dear, do not be afraid, the children will be so happy and 
fearless, strong and confident to make the New World out of the wreckage of the 
Old, in which you, a tiny unit, are perishing; and I, too, perhaps, in my time. 
Mother, the salmon dies after spawning, and the floods of spring wash its 
dislustred body to the great sea again, to dissolution and return to the fount of 
life, even as the eggs are hatching in the pure gravel beds of its racial origin.  And 
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so your children, through me your son, will live the happier because they are 
natural on their native land. (48) 
 
 Williamson differentiates between, and translates into metaphor, two different types of growth: 
the unnatural and exponential growth of cancer, identified with technology and urbanism, which 
expands relentlessly and unsustainably until it ultimately collapses, and the organic growth of 
nature and life lived in accordance with nature's laws, which is cyclical and draws sustenance 
from the death of the old life to sustain the new. Again, the idea of growth is given a bizarre 
duality, in which a dubious distinction is set up between natural and desirable growth and 
artificial and sinister growth which is identified with science and technology in the service of 
international capitalism. 
 
Given that a return to the type of society Williamson and others believed was necessary 
would incur a wholesale return to the land and traditional relationships, it was highly unlikely 
that any democracy would institute the types of remedial policies that were supposedly needed. 
Therefore, Williamson and many writers and intellectuals sought solace in the theory that 
history, as well as society, had an organic form, that civilisations arose, grew, matured and then 
decayed and died. Anti-technologism embodies and instantiates this theory in two important 
respects. Firstly, it holds a contradictory attitude, bemoaning evidence of decline, and warning of 
catastrophe, yet at the very same time also desiring it on some level as the point at which the 
old civilisation is finally ended and the new culture and civilisation can begin again.15 Secondly, it 
                                                 
15 Ronald Wright's 1997 novel, A Scientific Romance (the title is a nod to the influence of HG Wells) 
exemplifies the continuation of this tendency into the last quarter of the twentieth century when the 
narrator of the novel declares that "civilizations, like individuals, are born, flourish, and die . . . the very 
qualities which bring them into being - their drive, their inventions, their beliefs, their ruthlessness - 
become indulgences that in the end will poison them" (82-3).   
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venerates "primitive" people, not for who they actually are in themselves, but for what they 
supposedly represent: perfect symbiosis with nature according to its laws, survival of the fittest, 
leadership of the best, and absolute cultural and ethnic homogeneity. The primitive in anti-
technologism represents living proof of humanity's original state and the continuing possibility 
of organic society, of living according to the rules of nature rather than democracy.16 
 
In this introduction so far I have used texts from the first half of the twentieth century to 
exemplify the themes of anti-technologism, because I am concerned to clearly establish a 
literary and intellectual precedent for anti-technologism that predates both the environmental 
and anti-war movements of the period following World War Two. As well as establishing anti-
technologism within a tradition in Western literature I have also been concerned to demonstrate 
that anti-technologism explores the same themes and anxieties as these earlier works. In 
addition, while showing that the particular antipathy towards technology that I analyse here was 
not simply a reaction to the threat of nuclear war or environmental disaster I also want to lay the 
foundations for the argument that anti-technologism facilitates the cross-pollination and 
synthesis of progressive and reactionary attitudes because it speaks to some of modern society's 
current fears, such as environmental degradation, but does so within an entirely different and 
largely unspoken intellectual framework.  What I would like to do now is to give a specific 
example of the reactionary themes I've discussed here being discussed in a putatively 
progressive milieu of the early environmental and Green movement in Britain in the 1970s.  My 
                                                 
16 A curious consequence of this, as I show repeatedly in this thesis, is that very often xenophobia or even 
outright racism is combined with admiration for primitive tribes and societies. Their cultural and ethnic 
homogeneity is praised as an example of the desirability of cultural and ethnic homogeneity generally in 
each distinct population. The praise of diversity and the admiration of different cultures often found in 
anti-technological writers is perfectly sincere, and yet is predicated on the desire to maintain (or advance) 
cultural and ethnic homogeneity at home. The "diversity" praised by anti-technologism is, as I will show in 
this thesis, a diversity of separate entities, each strictly homogenous; not a commingled diversity but a 
plurality of purities. 
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example focuses on two men: Edward Goldsmith, founder and editor of The Ecologist, and his 
close friend, naturalist, zoo owner and casino owner, John Aspinall.  
 
In her work on romantic protest, Veldman notes that The Ecologist was "the leading eco-
activist journal in the early 1970s [and] was significant in the early Green movement for a 
number of reasons" (227). This assessment is supported by Bramwell (1989) who observes that 
"the intellectual core of the British ecological movement during the 1960s and 1970s was with 
The Ecologist, a journal edited and financed by the brother of Sir James Goldsmith, the multi-
millionaire businessman” (218).17 Tom Burke, one of the directors of Friends of the Earth (UK) 
during the 1980s called The Ecologist's 1972 publication, Blueprint for Survival, “the seminal 
document for the birth of the modern environment movement. It created a framework of ideas 
for the first time" (qtd in Lamb (1996) 45). 
 
The hugely successful Blueprint for Survival, which called for a new ecological sensibility 
and the imposition of austerity to conserve resources was launched at the Clermont Club and 
Casino, owned by Edward Goldsmith's close friend, John Aspinall (famous for his private zoo and 
his practice of "going in" to the animal enclosures). Together with his brother, James Goldsmith, 
and Aspinall, Edward Goldsmith had significant and substantial influence on the direction of the 
early Green movement.18 
                                                 
     17 Bramwell seems to have made an error here, as The Ecologist was founded in 1970.  
18 As Eric Krebbers of the Dutch anti-fascist organisation Der Faabel observes, apart from the use of 
The Ecologist as a forum for his ideas, this influence was exercised mainly through funding "actions 
against gene-technology, nuclear power and the supposed 'globalization'" (Krebbers, Westerink, and 
Schoenmaker 2003 97). Robert Lamb (1996) gives an example of this when he notes how Graham 
Searle, one of the founders of Friends of the Earth (UK) raised funds for the organisation by "dining 
with the devil" in the early 1970s: "At the playful invitation of society gambler and zoo owner John 
Aspinall, [Searle] attended a private dinner in Belgravia along with some of the wealthiest industrialists 
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The Ecologist, which billed itself as "The Journal of the Post-Industrial Age" (a phrase 
coined by Penty) was founded at a meeting of the Primitive People's Fund (later renamed 
Survival International) which campaigned for the rights of tribal people worldwide (Veldman 
228).19 Thus, as Veldman observes, Goldsmith and other members of The Ecologist "came to an 
ecological awareness via anthropological concerns” and this "hunter-gatherer ideal shaped the 
main ideas of A Blueprint for Survival, one of the key texts of the early Green movement" (229, 
230). In his introduction to The Great U-Turn (1988) Goldsmith summarises this approach and 
begins by arguing that "the development of science, technology, industry, the global market 
system and the modern state" are the cause of our problems and that these problems "can only 
be solved by reversing these developments" (Introduction n. pag.). In this he looks to traditional 
societies which he claims were and are free of such problems and provide the only proven 
blueprint for a sustainable and stable society: "for to postulate an ideal society for which there is 
no precedent within the human experience . . . is very much like postulating an alternative 
biology without reference to the sort of biological structures that have so far proved viable" (n. 
pag.). It is from his study of traditional societies that Goldsmith took his policy of "no growth" 
both industrially and in terms of population. Gosldmith saw both of these as examples of 
                                                                                                                                                 
in Britain, including Teddy Goldsmith's multi-millionaire brother, Sir James Goldsmith, and Lord 
Rothschild, owner of the banking group". Searle later described the dinner as a "'bear-baiting' session" 
at which he was questioned extensively on the aims of the new organisation. As Lamb notes, after 
questioning, cheques totalling £14,000 were donated, "more than the organisation's whole first year's 
expenditure" (91).   
19 Wilson (2008) has Edward Goldsmith as a founding member of the Primitive Peoples Fund, whilst 
Veldman, Bramwell and others do not (3,4). Whether or not Goldsmith or Aspinall were founding 
members, what seems indisputable is that they were both intimately connected with the founding and 
early years of this organisation. 
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unnatural growth, and frequently compared their growth to the spread of cancer.20 Only 
primitive societies, he believed, were stable societies, in balance with nature. 
 
What comes though very clearly here is Goldsmith's organicism, his adherence to the 
idea of organic form, which he believes primitive societies exemplify. The conclusions he draws 
from this primary assumption demonstrate how this initial belief leads to extreme reactionary 
positions being adopted whilst pursuing the putatively progressive aims of environmental 
protection, respect for tribal cultural integrity, anti-imperialism, and ameliorating social 
alienation. The Way (1998), Goldsmith’s final and most comprehensive exposition of his 
philosophy reveals a preoccupation with the idea of degeneration in modern society and the 
extent to which this preoccupation was based on readings of texts from the early twentieth 
century. For example, in chapter sixty-two (suffused with Lawrencian terminology about 
"increasing the stock of 'vital force'" in "vernacular man") Goldsmith argues that tribal societies 
have escaped degeneration and alienation by observing the rules of nature's hierarchical 
structure: 
 
The relationship between things and beings at different echelons in the hierarchy 
of the cosmos is not symmetrical. Vital power flows downwards to vitalise and 
hence sanctify things and beings at the lower echelons, though it will only do so 
                                                 
20 As I note in my chapter on overpopulation, the comparison of population growth to cancer 
continues to this day to be a much-used trope, implying as it does that the rise in population is 
somehow unnatural and a malady which is symptomatic of a systemic sickness. It conveys the 
unspoken assumption that Western technology and food production is somehow upsetting the 
“natural” balances of non-Western nations and causing artificial and therefore unhealthy and 
unsustainable growth. In doing so it once more resurrects the old division of natural and unnatural 
(population) growth. 
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if the latter fulfill their obligations towards the higher echelons and hence 
towards the cosmos as a whole. 
 
It is thus understandable that so many of the rituals and ceremonies of a 
traditional people – and indeed, their whole way of life – should be designed to 
maintain the correct distribution of vital force at each level in the cosmic 
hierarchy. In this way they can maintain the critical order and stability of the 
cosmos, and thereby follow the Way. (The Way n. pag.)21  
 
As well as their vitality and cosmically ordained subservience to the natural hierarchy, 
primitive people were also admired by Goldsmith and Aspinall for their cultural homogeneity 
and masculine sense of pride and willingness to defend this homogeneity. Thus both defended 
apartheid and ethnic cleansing as merely the resolution of a problem created by the artificial 
modern state which paid no attention to cultural or ethnic boundaries which Goldsmith and 
Aspinall argued were, in more primitive societies, aligned naturally along ecological, bioregional 
boundaries. In the tense and fractious period before the collapse of apartheid, for example, 
Aspinall spoke at an Inkatha Freedom Party rally at the invitation of his friend, Zulu chief 
Buthelezi. At this rally Aspinall urged the Zulu to defend their Bantustans rather than integrate, 
exhorting them to "sharpen your spears and fall on the Xhosas", the traditional ethnic rivals of 
                                                 
21 Goldsmith was by no means the only one propounding this type of hierarchically structured vitalism as 
an alternative to technological society. EF Schumacher, author of the classic low-technology (or 
appropriate technology) text Small is Beautiful (1974), also held similar views. In A Guide for the 
Perplexed (1977) he claims that whilst there are no set limits to what an individual could potentially 
comprehend of the cosmos, "what he will actually grasp depends on each person's own Level of Being 
[sic]. The 'higher' the person, the greater or richer is his or her own world". Unsurprisingly, 
Schumacher identifies people whose worldview is "materialistic scientism" as being lower types whose 
world is "a meaningless wasteland unfit for human habitation" (45). I owe the example here from The 
Way to Krebbers (“Goldsmith’s Gaian Hierarchy”).  
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the Zulu (Draper and Mare 555). Unperturbed by his failure to incite genocide, Aspinall then 
wrote to South Africa's president, FW De Klerk, urging him to abandon the planned transition to 
democracy and instead divide the country up along ethnic lines (that is, to split South Africa up 
into several smaller countries on the basis of ethnicity and tribe). Aspinall's reasoning here can 
be directly traced back to Goldsmith and Aspinall's organicism as Draper and Mare remark: 
 
[Aspinall's] justification of unnatural eugenic selection was that it was better than 
no selection at all. His material support of a select group of animals, together 
with what he perceived as the elite warrior-caste of Zulus, has to be understood 
in this light. He must have believed that he was assisting those whom he thought 
were the fittest to gain the ascendancy in South Africa . . . Is it too fanciful to 
suggest that, in Aspinall's world, by feeding Zulu ethnic ambitions and stoking 
conflict in South Africa, he was helping nature to take its course? Perhaps not. He 
once, in a typically outrageous speech, celebrated the chimpanzee practice of 
dividing into rival armies and extracting large mutual mortalities as “beneficial 
genocide”. (563) 
 
Aspinall and Goldsmith sought rejuvenation of society, a rejuvenation which they believed could 
never occur as long as technology perverted the laws of nature, fostering an artificial and 
corrupt society.  Though assessing their influence is fraught with difficulties, what is certain is 
that they substantially reinforced certain reactionary aspects and elements of "romantic protest" 
by employing the organic metaphor for society as explanation for the malaise and discord of the 
1970s, and by continual use of the language of decline and crisis as justification for the more 
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heterodox claims.22 As the historian Martin Wiener (1981) commented, describing the rise of a 
new mood in the 1970s which fused these elements: 
 
A new cultural phenomenon came of age in the 1970s: explicit and organized 
opposition to the results of technical and material advance. This was of course 
part of a development embracing the entire industrialized world, where 
antigrowth and antitechnology [sic] movements had taken root among left-wing 
university students and had become a force to be reckoned with in public life. 
The ranks of English critics of progress extended far beyond the universities or 
the Left; these critics tended to see their mission as inseparable from English 
patriotism - to save traditional English life from unwelcome change. (165) 
 
Ironically, then, The Ecologist, the foremost journal advocating anti-technologism among left-
wing university students and others, was a forum for propagating long established conservative 
and even far-right reactionary beliefs. Though it campaigned on environmental protection, 
overpopulation, alienation, and rights for indigenous communities, the philosophy which 
informed it was not the new, largely Left-wing environmental movement, but far older and 
longer established preconceptions of a hierarchical and stable society and world which had been 
                                                 
22 As Aspinall put it in a coda to his autobiography, "I believe that wilderness is Earth's greatest 
treasure" and that "there is an outside chance to save the earth" which "must grasped with gambler's 
hands". Therefore, Aspinall felt, given such existential stakes, inflaming tensions and heightening fears 
and passions to halt the modern world's destruction of life was not only justified but required: "I 
believe that terrible risks must be taken and terrible passions roused before these ends can hope to be 
accomplished. If a system is facing extreme pressures, then only extreme counter-pressures are 
relevant, let alone likely to be effective" (qtd in Masters 252). As Masters, Aspinall's biographer, notes, 
the publishers balked at printing this part of the coda and cut it by half, leaving it as merely a 
declaration of Aspinall's belief in the rights of animals and plants as well as humanity. 
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upended by technology and mass democracy which had turned it into an anarchy and the 
resources of the world into a free-for-all. 
 
However, just as it would be a gross error to conflate these unsavoury beliefs with 
modern environmentalism I would argue, it would also be a mistake to imagine that the 
ecological sensibilities of Goldsmith, Aspinall, and of anti-technologism generally are merely a 
ruse, a guise with which to smuggle in justifications for some kind of reactionary utopia. Instead, 
what I try and show in this thesis is that when environmentalism, the New Left, the counter-
culture and other elements of progressive politics came to prominence in the latter half of the 
twentieth century there was already a well-established philosophy, complete with numerous 
texts and persuasive and prominent writers and thinkers, which superficially at least appeared to 
share the views and values of the new progressive politics. Like the new progressive movements, 
this philosophy despised laissez-faire capitalism and was strongly anti-imperialist in feeling. 
Similarly, it decried the alienation and anomie of the cities and of modern, technological society 
and it stressed the value of the natural world. Less obviously, but perhaps even more 
significantly, it was also decentralist in tone, echoing the new themes of community and the 
rejection of the state being pioneered by New Left thinkers at the time. Where the counter-
culture envisaged communes and self-organising communities, this philosophy saw a return to 
smaller, localised, hierarchical communities based on land ownership, but couched in terms of a 
nurturing relationship with the land that had broad appeal. Once again, in its broadest 
antecedents, this philosophy can be traced back to the counter-enlightenment tradition.  
 
Thus, when (as Veldman notes) the New Left, the Greens, and other progressive 
movements after World War Two rejected the Enlightenment veneration of rationalism and 
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objectivism which they blamed for militarism and the destruction of nature, communities, and 
local cultures, they found numerous texts and numerous writers that seemed to coincide with 
and validate not only their primary beliefs but the foundational rejection of oppressive 
rationalism and the overly metaphysical and judicial conception of human society which they felt 
served the powerful. Is it any wonder, then, that references to natural selection or preventing 
cosmopolitanism and the decline of society were tolerated as eccentricities: curious but 
irrelevant personal vestiges from a less (so to speak) enlightened era? Many of the authors I 
identify with anti-technologism in this thesis seem to contain both of these tendencies, and their 
work manifests a resulting mixture of tendencies: technological society, mass culture, and even 
liberal democracy are still attacked, either as unsustainable or as a sham, a hollow carapace, but 
this condemnation draws upon themes of environmental degradation and the militarism of large 
governments and is clearly aimed at an audience sympathetic to such charges. 
 
The counter-enlightenment assertions of natural hierarchy and inequality embodied in 
anti-technologism also, I believe, explain at least in part its ability to synthesise reactionary and 
progressive ideologies to make them superficially acceptable. Anti-technologism appeals to the 
belief that the reader is a reasonable and restrained individual, willing to do what is necessary 
for the common good, but that the vast bulk of humanity – the masses – are stupid, slovenly, 
and unreasonable, and would rather have a larger fridge than save society or even the planet.23 
                                                 
23 Ronald Wright's novel, A Scientific Romance (1997), the fictionalisation of themes he later explores in 
his essay A Short History of Progress (2004), exemplifies this tendency. The hero discovers a (literally) 
Wellsian time machine and travels a millennium into the future when Britain is deserted and semi-tropical, 
civilisation having collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions. The hero is somewhat dismayed 
to find no human inhabitants (for most of the book) and spends much of the time reminiscing elegiacally 
on his own past as an undergraduate at Cambridge, punting on the Cam and sipping port in rooms. 
Despite his loneliness though, there is still a very obvious sense of satisfaction at the wiping out of the 
greedy, bovine masses who thought that their own ease and luxury could continue forever, that medicine 
could solve every health problem when of course "six billion hundredweight of overcrowded ape meat 
was a free lunch waiting for the wily microbe - as you and I know only too well . . ." (105). As with many 
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This attidue is amplified to near rage in American anti-technological writers such as Edward 
Abbey and James Howard Kunstler, but is still very much evident in the works of English writers 
such as Edward Cooper and takes a particularly acerbic twist in the later writings of Aldous 
Huxley who at times seems positively pleased at the thought of the harsh lessons nature will 
mete out in regard to the organisation of society. The condemnation of the masses and the 
denial of their agency and ability to effect directed change is a constant theme in anti-
technologist thought and writing, and one most frequently portrayed as being solved by nature 
in some way that indicates an unanswerable judgment on society's attempt to do away with 
observing the natural order and hierarchy. Thus, for those readers who believe themselves to be 
liberal, but are concerned and perhaps angered that most people just don't "get it", the 
reactionary themes of anti-technologism offer a powerfully seductive allegory and narrative.  
 
In introducing the chapters of this thesis, then, I would like to re-emphasise the extent to 
which anti-technologism, for all its invocations against machine civilisation, is a phenomenon of 
modernity, and contains paradoxes and even contradictions as an integral part of its internal 
dynamic. As such, it draws upon the same anxieties and concerns about urbanism and ruralism, 
change and stasis that have been so ably analysed by Williams, Leo Marx, and many others. Its 
difference, I would argue, lies in its emphasis on nature as a guide for the organisation of society 
and its implicit belief in a natural order or hierarchy, deviation from which is portrayed as leading 
inevitably to degeneration, decline, and eventual collapse.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
other anti-technological works, the influence of writers from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
is evident. The title of the story is an obvious nod to HG Wells, and High Tory naturalist and writer Richard 
Jeffries’ is quoted, as is MP Shiels, an author who perhaps more directly than any other dealt with themes 
of degeneration and decline in machine civilisation. The entire mood of the novel could be condensed 
down into the thought that in the destruction of consumerism and crass individualist materialism the 
masses got exactly what they deserved.  
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I begin with a chapter that looks at attitudes towards technology and society in the years 
leading up to World War Two as a means of opening out and contextualising the heritage of 
some of the themes of anti-technologism as discussed in this introduction. I focus on two works 
by Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier (1937) and the novel, Coming up for Air (1939). Whilst these 
works obviously pre-date the post-World War Two period on which I am focusing in this thesis, I 
believe that their inclusion is not only warranted but necessary given not only the immense 
influence of Orwell on twentieth century literature and culture, but also as a way of 
understanding the influence of eugenic theory and concerns about technological society's 
supposedly dysgenic effect and how deeply that understanding affected writers of this period. In 
particular, I look at the representation of food and how it represents concerns not just about the 
dysgenic effects of technology, but also about the masses themselves. An important element of 
my focus on this representation is the way that a division is made between natural and 
processed or "artificial" foods. I discuss how this division came to be identified with ideas of a 
people having "roots" in a particular region without which they somehow degenerated into 
something less than fully human and alive in a spiritual as well as physical sense. I show how 
tinned food came to be identified with mass production and mass society, with the implication 
that this was the wretched and worrying result of mass democracy. 
 
In the second chapter, I focus entirely on JRR Tolkien's Lord of the Rings trilogy, which, I 
argue, more effectively than almost any other text romantacised and transmitted the idea of a 
natural order and the Spenglerian conception of organic form from pre-war to post-war culture 
and society. I analyse and discuss some anti-technological themes in the trilogy and then 
consider how they came to exert a powerful influence on the countercultural movement and 
alternative progressive politics, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s. I show individuals involved 
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with progressive movements of the time came to model aspects of their life or personal 
philosophies on Tolkien’s story and I argue that in so doing they imbibed many of the reactionary 
elements that the trilogy contained. In particular, I examine the idea of "false fertility", the idea 
that there are different types of growth: a natural, organic growth in accordance with nature, 
and an artificial and sinister, exponential expansion identified with technology and 
overpopulation which echoed earlier concerns about the rise of the masses. I relate Tolkien's 
influential division of growth here to Spengler's morphology of history, where he conceives of 
history (as the record of civilisations) having organic form, rising from cultures rooted in the soil, 
before eventually losing this vital connection and as a result becoming ossified, arid and entering 
a period of degeneration and decline. I also show how this conception of unnatural or artificial 
growth is rooted in right-wing ecological tropes of pollution as an insidious foreign agent 
infiltrating the holistic and organic whole of the nation or culture and I briefly discuss how this  
manifests in Tolkien’s trilogy. 
 
I continue this consideration of anti-technologism's two types of growth in the third 
chapter, on anti-technologism and overpopulation. As I show there, the theme of 
overpopulation is a popular one in anti-technologism and is linked in a fundamental sense to 
fears of degeneration and deracination in industrialised Western nations together with an 
artificially-fostered population boom in non-Western nations, raising fears of invasion and 
reverse colonisation whereby still virile non-Westerners overrun a West grown too weak (both 
physically and culturally) to repel them. This is one of the most important chapters in my thesis, 
as the theme of unnatural and unsustainable growth is central to anti-technologism, and I 
consider in some depth the heritage and nature of the preconceptions behind it, as well as 
considering how anti-technologism enables discussion of these reactionary fears of 
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degeneration and differential population growth between ethnicities in a superficially 
acceptable manner. I also develop my analysis of anti-technologism's Spenglerian view of 
civilisation and history, by discussing the way anti-technological treatments of overpopulation 
manifest Spengler's condemnation of imperialism not on ethical grounds, but as a symptom of 
the expansionary drive that dooms Western society. Just as Spengler argued that the expansion 
of imperialism would lead to what we would today refer to as reverse colonisation, that anti-
technologism’s treatment of overpopulation manifests this sense of reversal and directionality. 
 
In the same chapter, I also look at how fears of technology’s fostering of "unnatural" growth in 
population also gave rise to the co-option of the idea of limits on resource use in ways that 
justified cultural and ethnic separatism and exclusion. I examine the way that anti-technological 
literature, viewing the population boom as a result of society deviating from nature's immutable 
laws proposes a return to cultural purity and separation as a "natural" way to impose limits on 
growth. With reference to Daniel Quinn's Ishmael (1992) I show how anti-technologism uses 
pseudo-naturalistic analogies to legitimise cultural exclusion on the grounds that it preserves 
"diversity" and limits population growth, thus preserving the stable society the desire for which 
lies at the root of anti-technologism. 
 
My fourth chapter is on the use of catastrophe in anti-technological literature. As I note 
there, catastrophe in anti-technologism is ambiguous. Anti-technologism is concerned with 
detecting and forestalling decline and degeneracy, and so must logically work towards arresting 
the perceived slide towards the final undoing represented by catastrophe, yet at the same time 
catastrophe offers the final resolution of the problems of corrupted modern society and the 
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chance for a revivified culture aligned once more with the natural hierarchy.24 Though this 
chapter is less concerned with conceptual development than some of the others, some ideas 
important to my larger argument are still covered here, particularly in my consideration of how 
anti-technologism sees catastrophe as a result of societal degeneration and subsequently as a 
necessary natural purgative to cleanse a corrupted culture of its gross materialism and the part 
of the population identified as degenerate and artificial. Among other texts I review Edmund 
Cooper's The Overman Culture (1971) and James Howard Kunstler's World Made by Hand 
(2008). I also relate this latter fictional work to Kunstler's treatise on technology and society, Too 
Much Magic (2012) to show how anti-technologism's use of the catastrophe disguises a desire to 
return to a hierarchical society.25 
 
I then devote my fifth chapter to what I analyse as the anarcho-libertarian variant of 
anti-technologism. Whereas, in my thesis up to this point I have advanced a theory of anti-
technologism concerned with managing the perceived dangers and instabilities of mass 
democracy and technological civilisation, anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism essentially 
                                                 
24 Lasch points to this function of catastrophe adroitly when he observes that “”the apocalyptic vision 
appears in its purest form not in the contention that the nuclear arms race or uninhibited technological 
development might lead to the end of the world but in the contention that a saving remnant will 
survive the end of the world and build a better one” (83). Catastrophism, in anti-technologism at least, 
functions as an extreme form of culling, allowing a new, purified culture to rise from the ashes of the 
old one. 
25 Kunstler's Too Much Magic exemplifies the translation or transfiguration of concerns over decline 
into quasi-ecological and putatively progressive treatments of social disintegration. Touring the 
deserted summer "camp" (actually a mansion) belonging to an ex-girlfriend, Kunstler admires the 
simplicity and self-contained nature of the house which took a substantial staff of servants to maintain. 
Mournfully noting the loss of such a home, Kunstler declares that "the sad gestalt of the situation put 
me in a mood to reflect on the current state of American society. The United States, like the house on 
Tongue Mountain, had become a kind of wreck. Nobody took care of anything. The whole nation was 
sliding into dereliction and ineptitude" (220). In particular, Kunstler bemoans the fact that "If you 
wanted household help you pretty much had to hire an illegal alien, and that didn’t work so well since 
a certain quasi-familial allegiance is needed to cement mutual trust" (220). In this way, the myth of 
feudal obligations and care in a hierarchical society is resurrected and its loss is related to decline and 
degeneration.  
45 
 
advocates bypassing the administrative reproduction of nature's hierarchy onto society and 
instead abolishing all advanced technology so that nature itself imposes its own limits and 
structures. Thus, whilst anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism subscribes to the same fallacies 
about society that administrative anti-technologism does (the organic form and other pseudo-
naturalistic analogies) it also calls for the direct and unintermediated imposition of such 
limitations and controls on society by reversion to a primitive state. As I show in this chapter, 
though, ideas about degeneration and culture are still never far from the surface, as is an 
irredentist conception of land rights and a celebration of cultural purity based on spurious 
ecological or "bioregional" grounds. I base my analysis in this chapter on the work of Edward 
Abbey, author of The Monkey Wrench Gang (1975) and other novels and essays. I use my 
analysis of his works to try and draw out the way in which anti-technologism, and particularly 
anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism looks to nature to validate irredentist ideals of nativism as 
well as licensing a quasi-Nietzschean ideology of natural aristocracy achieved by an assertion of 
masculinity and physical fitness.   
 
In the sixth and final chapter before the conclusion, I once again take a more conceptual 
look at anti-technologism and diagnose what I see as its use of the fascist aesthetic, with 
reference to Chuck Palahniuk's novel Fight Club (1996). In essence, what I hope to achieve with 
this chapter is a consideration of anti-technologism’s roots in counter-enlightenment's anti-
materialism, and to show how the novel (and anti-technologism in general) deals in fascistic 
themes of revitalisation through an irrationalist embrace of violence as a transcendent force and 
the rejection of stultifying materialism. I select Fight Club as a text here as I see it as an excellent 
example of how the sublimated themes of anti-technologism and its counter-enlightenment 
heritage are translated and represented. The rejection of technological society in the novel is 
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symbolic but also absolute: the narrator literally destroys all of his possessions in self-engineered 
explosion in order to free himself from the grip of materialism. Only once he has so utterly 
renounced the logic of technological society and its measurement of progress in material 
possessions can he begin the process of revitalisation and revivification, which he does through 
violent male on male contact (thus signaling his return to the observance of nature's hierarchical 
structure where the "fittest" survive and prosper).  
 
In the work that follows, then, I hope to give a clear demonstration that the themes of 
degeneration and concerns over mass society and mass democracy did not die out in the first 
half of the twentieth century, but were continued in a transfigured form in which criticism of 
technology allowed discussion of these themes in a sublimated discourse which made them 
acceptable. Furthermore, I hope to show how such a discussion exerted a powerfully seductive 
appeal which masked its reactionary basis by appeal to progressive concerns over loss of 
community, ecological degradation, and social alienation. 
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Chapter One: Orwell’s Troubling Syllogism.  
As I noted in the introduction, the anti-technologism that, in Martin Weiner’s phrase, “came of age” 
in the 1970s is not simply a response to contemporary fears over nuclear war, uninhibited 
technological development, overpopulation, or environmental degradation, but also drew 
substantially on long established themes present in literature and culture. In this chapter I want to 
start opening out some of these themes, in particular the way that anti-technologism facilitates a 
subtle but important shift in writing about and discussing the masses. I use the term “metaphorise” 
both here and elsewhere in this thesis to describe the transfiguration of the masses in literature 
from the people they are to the artefacts associated with them, but really that is too blunt a term for 
what is a much more subtle process whereby the negative qualities associated with mass production 
were projected on to the masses who both produced and consumed the manufactures of 
inustrialism. What I want to show in this chapter is the way in which fears of degeneration in the 
population, identified with the shift from an agrarian to an almost entirely industrial and 
technological society, were projected onto technological artefacts such as tinned food, and I want to 
show that this was a complex form of metonymy in which technological artefacts came to stand for 
the attributes associated with technological society and the urban masses. I will argue that with 
George Orwell this transfiguration is used to discuss his anxiety that technological society’s 
homogenising effects would create a devitalised and homogenous urban population. I suggest that 
Orwell’s anxiety about this can be tied in with his pessimistic view of the possibility of real progress 
by either revolutionary or incremental means. I further argue that although Orwell’s anti-
technologism was tempered by his realisation that only increasing mechanisation offered any real 
chance of materially improving the common welfare, his deep-seated belief that the agrarian way of 
life was ultimately the natural way of life led him to be pessimistic about the possibility of real 
progress.  
In this chapter I use two of Orwell’s earlier works to show how this elision of the masses and 
mass-production functioned. I do this for a number of reasons. First, because I see Orwell as perhaps 
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the most representative writer of the twentieth century whose writing reflects the tensions and 
contradictions of that century (as Timothy Garton-Ash (1998) memorably put it, “anyone who wants 
to understand the twentieth century will still have to read Orwell” [14]). Second, because of Orwell’s 
status as a progressive writer whose dystopian vision of technology in 1984 has been highly 
influential, particularly on the anti-materialist outlook of the New Left. Though the New Left’s 
relationship with Orwell has often been a fractious one, there can be no doubt that he still exercised 
a powerful influence on the direction of progressive thinking in the 1950s and 60s particularly, an 
influence summed up in John Rodden’s comment that “the connection between Orwell and the 
emergence of the British New Left is tangled and indirect, yet vital” (191). As Rodden (1989) notes, 
New Left writers like Raymond Williams in his Culture and Society are engaged to a significant degree 
in an attempt to come to terms with Orwell and his influence. This consideration leads me to the 
final reason for beginning my thesis with Orwell, which is his complete absence from Meredith 
Veldman’s work. Surprisingly, Veldman simply does not mention Orwell or his ambivalence regarding 
socialism as a materialist philosophy, even in passing.  Given his considerable influence not just on 
the New Left but on the protest movements of the 1960s and 70s, as well as his ambivalent attitude 
towards technology, this is a problematic omission which I hope to partially redress here. 
 
I begin with a look at Orwell’s attack on technology in The Road to Wigan Pier (1937) as an 
example of the way technology was seen by some of the most influential progressive writers and 
intellectuals of the first half of the twentieth century as the root cause of many of the problems in 
society. As I will show, Orwell’s criticism of technology was predicated largely on fears of intellectual, 
moral, and physical degeneracy in the population, and was significantly concerned with reshaping 
socialism into a more ameliorative and pacificatory force, one that acknowledged middle-class 
concerns over the breaking down of class distinctions and hierarchies. From here, I move to a 
discussion of how eugenics and associated theories were substantially a reaction to perceived 
problems caused by technology and urbanisation and were not solely a reactionary, right-wing 
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response but also embodied a significant reformist element which sought to apply scientific 
solutions to problems supposedly caused by science. I look at Orwell’s attack on processed food to 
try and show how some of the vitalistic ideas of rural rootedness and vitality versus urban 
degeneration and corruption manifested themselves in this avowedly progressive writer and I finish 
by discussing, with reference to Monaco and his theory of reactionary consciousness, Orwell’s 
organicism and how it may have influenced his jaundiced view of progress. 
 
In 1935 Orwell’s publishers approached him with a proposal to research and write a book 
about the conditions of the working classes in the industrial north of England. The result, published 
in 1937, was The Road to Wigan Pier.26 Whilst the first half of the book was a compassionately 
written, if not ground-breaking reflection of the daily lives of the people who worked in the mines 
and mills of Lancashire, the second half was a much more personal and idiosyncratic look at 
socialism, the problems of what Orwell referred to as “machine civilization” and the prospects for 
the future. In many ways, it was something of an interior dialogue between two halves of the 
author’s psyche: the middle-class Englishman who revered tradition, loyalty, and order, and the 
more rational, forward-thinking intellectual who believed that socialism offered the most reliable 
means of defeating the threat of fascism and advancing the cause of equality and fairness in society. 
In attempting to resolve the opposition between the two, Orwell seems at times to almost grind to a 
halt, and examining the nature of this disparity will be my avenue to an examination of the broader 
elite response to technology and society before the World War Two. 
 
In Road, Orwell is wrestling with what might perhaps best be thought of as a troubling 
syllogism. He believed that socialism necessarily implied urbanisation and the extensive use of 
machinery in order to increase the availability of goods. “Any world in which Socialism actually 
existed,” he declares, would be at least as mechanized as the USA and “probably much more so . . . 
                                                 
26 Cited hereafter as Road. 
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no Socialist would think of denying this” (Road 165).27 But whereas Marx believed that machinery 
had brought about the end of feudalism, and offered a way to relieve the hardships, dangers, and 
drudgery of the working classes, Orwell takes a remarkably contrary stance.28Rather than denying 
that technology could ameliorate physical labour and hardship, he worries that it would do precisely 
this, and that the result would be physical, intellectual, and cultural decline. He argued that “the 
truth is that many of the qualities we admire in human beings can only function in opposition to 
some kind of disaster, pain, or difficulty; but the tendency of mechanical progress is to eliminate 
disaster, pain, and difficulty” (Road 170). The transition from horses to cars, for instance, Orwell sees 
as encouraging “an increase in human softness,” and the tendency of technology to become more 
fool-proof may well mean “a world inhabited by fools” (Road 171). Indeed, he questions whether 
“progress” is something to be sought after at all, as “softness is repulsive; and thus all progress is 
seen to be a frantic struggle towards an objective which you hope and pray will never be reached . . . 
what is usually called progress also entails what is usually called degeneracy” (Road 172). Thus, as 
socialism implied machine civilisation and progress (in material terms), but machine civilisation and 
progress led to softness and degeneracy, Orwell was faced with the troubling thought that in 
advocating socialism, he was also advocating a route that would lead to degeneracy. 
 
Orwell attempts to resolve the problem by reference to the even greater threat of fascism, 
and by arguing that as machine civilisation and its attendant degeneracy were already a reality, the 
only possible option for any decent, educated person was to support socialism and machine 
civilisation for the time being, but to be ready to call for a reassessment of socialism as a political 
                                                 
27 It is worth noting here that for Orwell socialism was “bound up, more or less inextricably, with the idea of 
machine-production” but that machine-production, whilst it implied collectivism, did not necessarily imply 
socialism, indeed it could conceivably lead to “the Slave-State of which Fascism is a kind of prophecy” (Road 
164-5). 
28 See Marx and Engel’s Communist Manifesto of 1848 which saw machinery and urbanisation as offering a 
route out of the “idiocy of rural life” for the proletariat. As Orwell himself (see note 2 above) acknowledges 
Socialism to be tied to urbanism and machine-production, I take this point to be unexceptionable. 
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ideology based on a materialist conception of progress when the danger had passed. “The beehive 
state is here” he argued: 
 
The job of the thinking person, therefore, is not to reject Socialism but to make up 
his mind to humanize it. Once Socialism is in a way to being established, those who 
can see through the swindle of “progress” will probably find themselves resisting. In 
fact, it is their special function to do so. In the machine-world they have got to be a 
sort of permanent opposition, which is not the same thing as being an obstructionist 
or a traitor. But in this I am speaking of the future. For the moment the only possible 
course for any decent person, however much of a Tory or an anarchist by 
temperament is to work for the establishment of Socialism. Nothing else can save us 
from the misery of the present or the nightmare of the future. To oppose Socialism 
now, when twenty million Englishmen are underfed and Fascism has conquered half 
Europe, is suicidal. It is like starting a civil war when the Goths are crossing the 
frontier. (Road 193. Emphasis in original) 
 
This is a particularly interesting passage, in view of Orwell’s previous self-deprecatory description of 
his early self as a “Tory anarchist” (Claeys 188). Orwell uses the imagery of negative classicism here, 
comparing modern Britain to ancient Rome beset by marauding hordes, in an appeal to the “thinking 
person” to support socialism “for the moment”. Once the immediate threat has receded, however, 
the task will become one of resistance to the “swindle” of progress and machine civilisation – a form 
of civilisation which Orwell believed was a prerequisite for a socialist state. This resistance, he sees 
as the “special function” of the educated, professional classes (for whom Orwell was writing here) 
who would resist the encroachment of machine civilisation and subsequent degeneracy, urging 
instead a return to a “simpler, harder, probably agricultural way of life” as soon as was possible 
(Road 184).  
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What we have, then, is a cascading series of threats, which are to be played off against each 
other. Fascism’s ability to motivate, organise, and mobilise entire nations to new forms of total 
warfare meant that only a political system which could achieve the same levels of coordination and 
popular feeling (namely socialism, in Orwell’s opinion) could possibly defeat it. But this form of 
government, with its attendant requirement for mass organisation, mechanisation, and 
subordination of the individual to the collective, would, Orwell worried, lead to degeneration and 
thus potentially to totalitarianism. The task of the educated elite, then, is to support socialism and 
the changes in society it requires for now, in view of the greater threat of fascism, but later to act as 
a sort of “permanent opposition” when it is safely established, in order to try to ameliorate the 
worst effects of machine civilisation. “The choice is not, as yet, between a human and an inhuman 
world” Orwell counsels the thinking person, “it is simply between Socialism and Fascism, which, at 
its very best is Socialism with the virtues left out” (Road 193). Effectively, then, technology is 
identified as the underlying ailment of society, enabling the rise of the collective state, but as 
technological knowledge cannot simply be wished away, the next best approach is for the class 
Orwell writes for to become “a sort of permanent opposition” to “the machine-world”, continually 
emphasising the vitalistic virtues of the agrarian life in order to stave off national degeneration and 
the threat of totalitarianism. 
 
Orwell’s equivalence of socialism with “machine civilisation” and his ambivalence regarding 
the desirability of its achievement is palpably Wellsian in tone, hardly surprising since Wells was such 
an obvious influence on Orwell’s early writing (Hunter).29 Like Wells, Orwell seems to recognise that 
technology and mechanisation hold out the promise of improving the living and working standards 
of most people, and that this must be welcomed by anyone claiming to be democratic in their 
                                                 
29 Like Orwell after him, Wells was doubtful about the notion of eugenic selection, arguing that it was an 
impossibility to select individually for complex traits such as intelligence on the same basis that pigs were bred 
for more meat or cows for more milk. However, Wells, like many other writers of the first half of the twentieth 
century, was concerned about dysgenics: the possibility that unnatural environmental influences were causing 
a steady degeneration in various characteristics on the level of the population in general. 
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sympathies. Yet at the same time, like Wells, he is intensely concerned about the implications for 
society of making life too easy and giving people too much leisure. Similar views were also expressed 
by other influential writers and intellectuals in the interwar years. Aldous Huxley had summed up 
the general mood of disillusionment with technology only the previous year (1936), claiming that 
“the disease from which our civilisation suffers may be described in a few words. Since the accession 
of Queen Victoria there has been enormous and accelerating technological progress. Machines and 
the arts of organisation have been developed out of all recognition” (“If We Survive” 215).30 
 
 Likewise, in 1932 the influential architect, writer, and proponent of guild socialism, Arthur 
Penty, quoting Ruskin’s contention that merely material progress brought “illth” instead of wealth, 
launched an attack on the “Quantitative Standard of industrialism” on the grounds that mass 
production inevitably meant that “you must accept the taste and standards of the average man at 
any given moment as your standard” and to necessarily exclude “the best men and things” (47-8). 
Therefore, “in the long run” Penty warned, technological advancement and industrialisation, are 
“fatal to society, for unless average men are in contact with persons and things higher than 
themselves, they tend, progressively, to degenerate. Society loses its salt by being deprived of true 
leadership, and because of this the theory of averages in industry, as in politics, leads to an ever 
lower level” ( 48). Penty’s complaint here – about the degeneration of artistic taste – may seem to 
be categorically different from Orwell’s concerns about degeneration caused by loss of physical 
labour in the fields and the effects of eating processed food, but as I will show this is not the case. 
Whether the complaint was about physical, cultural, or artistic degeneration, the underlying concern 
was the issue of degeneracy and decline in technological society in a much broader sense, based on 
anxieties about the effects of deviating from a supposedly natural paradigm.  
                                                 
30 Huxley’s immediate reference here is to World War Two which was looming on the horizon. However, he 
uses the threat of war as a starting point for a much broader discussion on the implications of technology. 
Questioning the use of medical advances, for example, he claims that “the market is flooded with new drugs” 
and wonders if “this is one of the reasons why the number of doctors has doubled since the beginning of the 
century, while the population has increased by only about a fifth?” (216). 
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 Orwell’s concerns over the threat of degeneration, and his appeal to the “thinking person” 
to push for a post-War return to “simpler, harder, probably agricultural way of life” must be 
assessed within the context of his time, which as the comments above show was characterised by 
the influence of eugenic ideas, combined with fears of degeneration reinforced by a literary heritage 
which dwelt on such fears without every explicitly confronting them. As RB Kershner (1986) remarks, 
“never given complete expression because of its very amorphousness – not to mention its 
irrationality –  the fear of degeneration lurks behind fictions of Joyce, Wells, Kipling, Conrad, Robert 
Louis Stevenson, Arthur Machen, and other, lesser writers of the period” (420). In part, this was due 
to copious mis-readings of Darwin and his theory of evolution, but also in large part to the influence 
of Nietzsche and similar mis-readings which attempted to synthesise Nietzschean ideals of the 
ubermensch with reformism.  Before continuing with my analysis of Orwell and his concerns over 
degeneracy in machine civilisation, I want to briefly contextualise the issue by outlining some of the 
more salient elements that fed in to degeneracy fears of the time.31 
 
In 1914, surveying the state of scientific and philosophical knowledge, Bertrand Russell 
commented on what he saw as the motivating spirit of the age: 
 
Evolutionism, in one form or another, is the prevailing creed of our time. It 
dominates our politics, our literature, and not least our philosophy.  Nietzsche, 
pragmatism, Bergson, are phases in its philosophic development, and their 
popularity far beyond the circles of professional philosophers shows it consonance 
with the spirit of the age. (qtd. by Gibbons 1141) 
                                                 
31 My aim here is to briefly delineate how, in a era of improving health and nutrition, even during the 
Depression years, it came to be widely accepted that physical and mental health were declining and that the 
discussion was not so much about the truth of this, but about the causes and how to deal with it. Though, as 
Charles Webster (1982) has documented, the official records showing steady improvement should not be taken 
at face value, nevertheless, it was undoubtedly the case that there was at least no decline in overall physical 
health in the population. Thus, the fears of degeneration must be symptomatic of broader concerns (“Healthy 
or Hungry Thirties?”).  
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Russell’s association of the influence of evolutionary theory with Nietzscheism points to the 
hierarchical manner in which evolutionary theory was then perceived, with survival of the fittest 
taken by many to be consonant with survival of the best. It was the combination of the Nietzschean 
Romantic ideal of the “superman” who rose above the common herd by his own virtues with the 
pseudo-scientific application of evolutionary theory to improving humanity and society by selective 
breeding that allowed the synthesis of reformism with elitism and belief in a natural hierarchy. Thus, 
even Havelock Ellis, one of the most progressive thinkers of the time, could argue that preventing 
the poor from breeding was actually a radically philanthropic position: “the superficially sympathetic 
man flings a coin to the beggar; the more deeply sympathetic man builds an almshouse for him so 
that he need no longer beg; but perhaps the most radically sympathetic of all is the man who 
arranges that the beggar shall not be born” (qtd in Bradshaw xv). As David Bradshaw notes, such a 
view, whilst repugnant to us today, was “typical of the progressives’ point of view” in the 1930s. 
Though such an argument is seen as repugnant today, such was the widespread acceptance of quasi-
Darwinian and Nietzschean notions of hierarchy and the inequality of nature, that preventing the 
propagation of the supposedly unfit was broadly accepted by both conservative and progressive 
thinkers – the argument was more about methodology than anything else.  
 
Eugenics allowed the elite and the professional classes to rationalise asserting the need for 
an elite guiding and directing society on the grounds that modern civilisation was enabling the 
survival and growth of the unfit and undesirable. Indeed, Aldous Huxley’s eugenicist views that the 
most important thing was to ensure that the top 0.5% of the population dominates the rest of 
society have been described by one critic as “typical of left-leaning British intellectuals in the inter-
war period” (Woiak 106). George Bernard Shaw, another reformer, showing the links between 
eugenics, fears of degeneration, and negative classicism, argued that “there is now no reasonable 
excuse for refusing the face the fact that nothing but a eugenic religion can save our civilization from 
the fate that has overtaken all previous civilizations” (Galton  21).  
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Such chilling statements were made by possible by the belief that they were necessary, that 
progress in the shape of science and technology was leading ineluctably to the degeneration of the 
population in advanced western society. Whilst it is often assumed today that the purpose of 
eugenics was to fashion a race of Nietzschean supermen, a significant camp in the debate was more 
concerned with preventing the dysgenic effects of modernity, rather than selecting for perfection, as 
H G Wells’ perspective shows: “the way of nature has always been to slay the hindmost, and there is 
still no other way, unless we can prevent those who would become the hindmost being born. It is in 
the sterilization of failures, and not in the selection of successes for breeding, that the possibility of 
an improvement of the human stock lies” (qtd in Galton 11).32 Thus, eugenic theorising was not 
restricted to those who wanted to selectively breed a “higher” race of humans, but was also 
involved in fears about the perceived decline in physical and mental ability.   
 
Whilst Orwell’s complaint against technology was not quite as crass and simplistic as this, 
the influence of eugenic ideas regarding technology and science’s pernicious effects on the “quality” 
of the population is just as evident. He bemoans the “physical degeneracy” of modern Britain and 
asks “where are the monstrous men with chests like barrels and moustaches like the wings of eagles 
that strode across my childhood’s gaze twenty or thirty years ago?” (Road 87-8). The dysgenic 
influence of World War One is considered, but Orwell insists in tracing the beginning of the decline 
back much further than this, arguing, just as Henry Williamson would do, that the growing 
degeneracy “must be due ultimately to unhealthy ways of living, i.e. to industrialism”. In particular 
Orwell singles out that metonym for the masses, tinned food, as the proximate cause of physical 
degeneracy in the working classes, concluding darkly that “we may find in the long run that tinned 
food is a deadlier weapon than the machine gun” (88).33 The idea that deviation from an agrarian 
                                                 
32 Wells’ speech was one of a number given at a presentation organised by Galton and recorded in a paper 
authored by Galton and submitted to the American Journal of Sociology.  
33 Such a charge was not uncommon at the time. Jenks (1950) cites a report of a group of doctors concerned 
that “probably half our work is wasted, since our patients are so fed from the cradle, indeed before the cradle, 
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lifestyle to an urban, technological lifestyle was responsible for degeneration was a widely 
disseminated idea that speaks to anxieties about the rise of mass society and the decline in 
standards and “taste” (in both senses of that term). The American author and advocate of organic 
farming, Weston A. Price, for instance, in the introduction to his Nutrition and Physical Degeneracy 
(1938) attempted to give a veneer of scientific validity to this dysgenic fear: 
 
The origin of personality and character appear in the light of the newer data to be 
biologic products and to a much less degree than usually considered pure hereditary 
traits. Since these various factors are biologic, being directly related to both the 
nutrition of the parents and to the nutritional environment of the individuals in the 
formative and growth period any common contributing factor such as food 
deficiencies due to soil depletion will be seen to produce degeneration of the masses 
of people due to a common cause. Mass behavior therefore, in this new light 
becomes the result of natural forces, the expression of which may not be modified by 
propaganda but will require correction at the source. Nature has been at this process 
of building human cultures through many millenniums and our culture has not only 
its own experience to draw from but that of parallel races living today as well as 
those who lived in the past. This work, accordingly, includes data that have been 
obtained from several of Nature's other biologic experiments to throw light on the 
problems of our modern white civilization. (4) 
 
What Price exemplifies is the connections being made at the time between physical degeneration, 
supposedly caused by tinned food and other evils of machine civilisation, and the idea of cultural 
decline and degeneration in modern society. A decline in “taste” caused by eating mass-produced 
food is linked to a decline in “taste” in sense of acceptance of and adherence to commonly held 
                                                                                                                                                        
that they are certain contributions to a C.3 nation[sic]. Even our country people share the white bread, tinned 
salmon, dried milk regime”(qtd in Jenks 129). 
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standards of behaviour. In this way, not only were technology and mass society blamed for the 
decline many saw all around them, but some form of a return to an agrarian society was seen as 
essential for restoring the natural vitality supposedly found there.  
 
Whilst Orwell never advocated eugenics, and appears to pillory it as a tool of repression in 
1984 (where reproduction is by artificial insemination) the influence of eugenic theory is 
unmistakable in his earlier works in the identification of processed food with physical degeneration 
and natural food with not just physical but cultural revitalisation. Though he rejects the selective 
breeding of positive eugenics he is clearly concerned about the supposedly dysgenic effects of 
modern technology as evidenced by his sombre allusion to tinned food being a greater danger than 
the machine gun to the health of the nation. Here again, in Orwell’s allusion to tinned food we see 
evidence of his conflicting views of technology and its effects on the masses. In his attack on “tinned 
food” – on mass-production and mass-produced food – that, as I will now show, Orwell attacks the 
technological world which he sees as debasing the solid yeoman that had previously populated 
England into a superficial and corrupted facsimile of its former self. 
 
 As Carey has commented, tinned food and false teeth were commonly used and well 
recognised tropes signifying elite disdain for modern mechanised mass culture in the interwar years 
used by authors including EM Forster, TS Eliot, Graham Greene, Knut Hamsun, John Betjeman, and 
HG Wells. The symbolic identification became widely understood by the literary and artistic elite 
after the Second World War as well. So much so, that in 1962, when Warhol exhibited his famous 
paintings of Campbell soup cans, a painting of something which had sustained him daily as a 
struggling artist, more than one critic could see no other rationale behind it than an unequivocal 
condemnation of machine civilisation: “What appears to be a painting of an innocent everyday 
object is in reality a subtle but powerful criticism of the decay of modern civilization . . . it reflects 
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the low level to which our urbanized and mass-producing civilization with its bourgeois values has 
fallen” (Sontag “Warhol at Bennington” 238). 
 
This interpretation exemplifies the extent to which tinned food, false teeth, and other 
accoutrements of modern life had come to be codified and understood within literary and artistic 
discourse. Orwell is open about the identification in his 1939 novel, Coming Up For Air, in which the 
everyman protagonist, George Bowling, goes to visit a faux-American diner. Biting into a hot dog (the 
epitome of Americanised, mass-produced food) gives a taste of “horrible soft stuff” that “gave me 
the feeling that I’d bitten into the modern world and discovered what it was really made of” (24). 
The ersatz food is the counterpart to the fat, flabby and degenerate figure of Bowling, who makes 
his living through the “swindle” of selling insurance and has exchanged pride and physical strength 
for the comforts of a car, and a home with inside bathroom (11). Mass-produced food and clerical 
instead of physical work have left Bowling with a pot belly, wasted muscles, and – most tellingly of 
all – false teeth with which to eat his false food34. This is all contrasted with the slickness and 
shininess of the diner, a sort of “propaganda” for the modern world, which is all “slick and 
streamlined, everything made out of something else. Celluloid, rubber, chromium-steel everywhere” 
(22, 24). Machine civilisation is seen as leading to a culture of mass mediocrity, in which lack of 
physical toil and cheap, mass-produced food are tied to physical and cultural degeneracy. Everything 
is superficial, and based on mass appeal and a vaguely American, cosmopolitan aesthetic. 
 
It is instructive, in this context, to compare Orwell’s characterisation of the modern world 
with that of Henry Williamson, best known for his nature books Tarka the Otter  
(1927) and Salar the Salmon (1935). Williamson, like Orwell, despised what he saw as the swindle of 
progress, which he ascribed to capitalism, but (except for a youthful flirtation with Leninist 
                                                 
34 It is not for nothing that the novel, which deals with one man’s forlorn attempt to escape the modern world 
and go back to his childhood haunts, begins with “The idea really came to me the day I got my new false teeth” 
(3). It is the sight of his false teeth staring up at him whilst he looks at his pudgy reflection in the mirror that 
sets the protagonist of the novel to questioning where his life is going, and what it all means. 
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communism) was an ardent fascist, believing that socialism was the incarnation of modern machine 
civilisation, and that only strong leadership could prevent its triumph.35 In his semi-autobiographical 
novel, The Phoenix Generation (1965), set in the years immediately prior to the Second World War, 
Williamson describes modern Western civilisation in very similar tones, but more explicitly, with 
degenerate modern machine civilisation identified with egalitarianism and cosmopolitanism: 
 
They reached the area left ugly by the maulings of London: speculative hire-purchase 
housing “estates” – all trees cut down – tens of thousands of cubic yards of coke-
breeze blocks and pink heaps of fletton bricks piled up. Life is big business, 
fornication, and death. Civilisation is chromium fittings, radio, love with pessary, 
rubber girdles, perms, B.B.C. gentility and the sterilising of truth, cubic international-
type architecture. Civilisation is white sepulchral bread, gin, and homosexual jokes in 
the Shaftesbury Avenue theatres. Civilisation is world-citizenship and freedom from 
tradition, based on rootless, eternal wandering in the mind that had nothing to lose 
and everything to gain including the whole world. Hoardings, brittle houses, 
flashiness posing as beauty, mongrel living and cosmopolitan modernism. (373) 
 
In Williamson’s characterisation of modern civilisation, as in Orwell’s, superficiality is blinding people 
to the decay all around them, moral, cultural, and physical. Mass-produced food (“white sepulchral 
bread”) is both cause and symptom of decay, of a world which had forsaken tradition and hierarchy 
for the superficial promise of ease, comfort, and excitement. Though at opposite ends of the political 
spectrum, there is a distinct similarity of complaint against modernity in both Orwell and Williamson, 
which stems from their shared belief that technology, driven by predatory capitalism, was corroding 
the traditional structure of society. Both accuse modern technological society for what they see as 
                                                 
35 As I argue later on in this chapter, part of Orwell’s fear of fascism in England was that it understood the 
appeal, perhaps even (in Orwell’s eyes) the need for people to identify with tradition and country, rather than 
simply with class. Thus, though Orwell believed fascism was a return to the dark ages, he understood only too 
well its attraction.  
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pandering to the base wants and desires of the urban masses rather than providing them with what 
would actually be in their own best interests. Orwell and Williamson’s attack  on white bread is 
emblematic of this attitude, with the displacement of hand-produced wholegrain breads by factory-
made white bread symbolising tacky and shoddy mass-production, falling standards, physical 
degeneracy, and above all a sense of superficiality, a feeling that modernity was superficial and 
lacked roots and authenticity.  
 Such beliefs clearly stem from the eugenic thinking of the time, as well as the more 
generalised fear of degeneration which I have already mentioned. Eugenic ideas about the effects of 
technology on the population were pervasive and were disseminated in literary as well as scientific 
circles. Alfred Orage, editor of the putatively socialist journal The New Age, and writer, psychologist, 
and social reformer, Havelock Ellis, both saw eugenics as an integral part of redressing the perceived 
deleterious effects of urbanism and machine civilisation on society. Orage and others put forward 
the idea of “guild socialism” on Morrissian lines that would reverse the trend towards mass 
production by machine and institute a society of small business and craftsmen guided by an elite 
who would ensure fairness and equality in distribution. As historians of the movement have noted, 
the guild socialism put forward in The New Age was essentially neo-feudalistic, an attempt to replace 
capitalism and modern society with the imagined mutuality and stability of the medieval guild 
system. Selective breeding would be used to ensure that there was never a surplus population of 
workers to become a new urban proletariat. Eugenics would therefore play a crucial role in ensuring 
social stability in a world where “quality” would take precedence over “quantity”: 
 
Elitist notions of the kind encouraged by the eugenicists are clearly reflected in the 
thought of Ellis, Wells, and Orage, all of whom looked forward to a socialistic 
corporate state led by a new and “highly gifted race of men”. Orage’s guild socialism 
was a program for a hierarchically structured society led by an evolutionary nobility, 
while for Ellis, writing in The Task of Social Hygiene in 1913, the breeding of a new 
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elite is synonymous with the creation of socialism: “The question of breed, the 
production of fine individuals, the elevation of the ideal of quality in human 
production over that of mere quantity, begins to be seen, not merely as a noble ideal 
in itself, but as the only method by which Socialism can be enabled to continue on its 
present path”. (Gibbons 1143) 
 
 Though he is little remembered today, Orage’s influence was remarkably deep and wide-
ranging in the first half of the twentieth century. In the 1920s, together with George Bernard Shaw, 
Orage purchased a failing journal called the New Age which furthered his medievalist vision under 
the slogan “An Independent Socialist Review” and published and encouraged writers such as 
Katherine Mansfield, John Middleton Murry, Herbert Read, TE Hulme, Edwin Muir and others 
(Conford 172). Though it proclaimed itself as an alternative socialist review, the New Age combined 
both progressive and highly reactionary ideals in its columns, particularly in its disdain for what it 
saw as the false promise of industrialisation and mass democracy. Indeed, one historian describes it 
as providing perhaps the most important forum of the time for bringing together radical right and 
left wing opinion, observing that “nearly all” of its contributors “advocated the (sometimes violent) 
overthrow of liberal democracy while rejecting virtually every emancipatory aspect of modernity” 
(Ferrall 15).  Later, in 1932, Orage founded the New English Weekly with TS Eliot on the editorial 
committee. Though boasting the slogan of being the “Monthly Forum for Socialist Discussion” the 
New English Weekly had a truly remarkable number of far-right and fascist writers on its staff, 
working alongside regular left-wing contributors such as George Orwell (Marks 277). These included 
Anthony Ludovici, its arts editor and author of Jews and the Jews in England (1938), promoter of 
eugenics, and the most important pre-World War Two translator of Nietzsche’s work into English, as 
well as other far-right figures such as the historian and Nazi apologist Arthur Bryant, and Jorian 
Jenks, Secretary of Agriculture for the British Union of Fascists (until his death in 1963 Jenks was also 
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editor of Mother Earth, the journal of the Soil Association, which promoted organic farming and a 
return to the soil).  
Of course, most mainstream intellectuals who were concerned about the deleterious effects 
of modern machine civilisation did not go so far as to call for the overthrow of liberal democracy but 
took a more managerial and ameliorative approach, but one based nevertheless on a return to a 
more structured society where the old established order of settled workers overseen by a guiding 
elite was maintained. Bertrand Russell, for example, in a 1949 article tellingly entitled “Can a 
Scientific Society be Stable?” argued that unless world population was managed and enforced by a 
global authority made up of educated administrators, civilisation may well be threatened and that 
such a conclusion was “completely evident on Darwinian principles” (Russell 1309). Though Russell 
had by this time dropped any references to outright eugenic theory, there is the same anxiety over 
stability, the same mistaken application of evolutionary theory to human society, and the belief that 
the growth in urban populations was actually a problem that was amenable to resolution by 
controlling breeding. In his earlier engagement with guild socialism, Russell (showing the influence of 
Ruskin) had laid out his vision of a stable society where jobs would be matched to workers on the 
basis of their abilities, overseen by a ruling clerisy. Such a system, he felt, would be more equable 
and fulfilling for the average worker than the modern, mechanised world, and would ensure that 
everyone would have the satisfaction of knowing their place. Russell realised that in every society 
there would be some work that no one relished, but he promised that “for entirely inferior work 
negroes will be employed wherever possible” (qtd. by Ironside 191).  
 
The idea of the “stable society”, then, can be seen as resulting from the confluence of 
eugenic theory (whether positive eugenics or merely fears of modernity’s dysgenic effects) with the 
conception of society’s organic form: it saw people as born to fulfil a certain role or position, and 
sought to remove the vagaries and dangers of a mobile and individualistic technological society by 
administrating the allocation of worker to their task. Jorian Jenks’ argument in his treatise on organic 
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agriculture, From the Ground Up (1950), demonstrates the thinking behind the need to return to a 
putatively “natural” hierarchy. Attacking the trend towards liberalism and individualism in society, 
and claiming to detect a longing for a return to stability, Jenks argued that 
 
This renewed emphasis on security and justice indicates a widespread, if largely 
unformulated, desire for a return to a social order in which every member has a 
recognized place, with appropriate duties and rewards. Effective socialism in fact, 
though this would probably be denied by so-called social democrats, postulates very 
much the hierarchic type of society and authoritarian type of government against 
which liberalism was so emphatic a protest. (135) 
 
This argument, which Jenks had previously put forward in the pages of the New English Weekly, 
shows the fluidity of ideas and ideologies at the time, and the way that reactionary ideologies were 
already being propagated by analogy with nature and reference to dire social and ecological need. 
Conford observes that Orwell who “worked closely with [NEW editor Philip] Mairet in the late 
1930s” declared “unequivocally that the NEW was not pro-fascist” but Conford remains 
unconvinced, arguing that structurally, “an outlook which attaches such importance to the earth and 
to the organic components of human life is likely to tend in religion to paganism and in politics to 
Fascism” (186).  
 
 Regardless of the fundamental ideologies of the NEW and other journals of the period, what 
is clear is that Orwell and other progressive writers were exposed to, and working within, a 
professional and intellectual environment in which the metaphor of organic form was prevalent. This 
conception permeates Orwell’s writing, as in 1984, in which a rare moment of optimism overcomes 
Winston Smith when he watches one of the “proles” hanging out washing. As Carey notes, 
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Orwell surrounds her with images of countryside and farmyard. She is like a mare, 
with powerful buttocks, and like the rose hip that follows the rose, and like a turnip 
(linking her, perhaps, with the friendly turnip-sowing farm-hands little Orwell knew). 
She must, Winston thinks, have had many children – swelling like a fertilized fruit. 
She evokes a ‘mystical reverence’ in him. She has, he realizes, no mind, only strong 
arms, a warm heart and a fertile belly. But it is people like her who are “storing up in 
their hearts and bellies and muscles’ the power that will one day overturn the world”. 
(44) 
 
Williams’ point about this passage, that it portrays the proletariat as not yet conscious but with the 
potential to one day awaken, is well made, but I would argue still mis-conceptualises this scene by 
locating it as a kind of Marxist parable about the masses waiting to be awoken one day to 
revolutionary fervour (Culture and Society 293). Orwell is quite clear in his use of imagery and 
metaphor here: this is not the hope of some spark of political ideology being passed on, but rather of 
endurance and return. Though Orwell was clearly contemptuous of the cyclic and occultist theories 
of history Yeats and others espoused, he still takes solace in the thought that eventually all empires 
and all civilisations fall, and that after their fall the people will return to the land and the way of life 
that had prevailed for generations before the rise of empires and civilisation. Thus Orwell portrays 
the possibility of hope represented by the prole woman in terms of natural fertility, the cycle of the 
seasons, and local food gathered from the fields and hedgerows. The description of the woman in 
terms of the foods not only of the field but also of the hedgerow is strongly reminiscent of Bowlings’ 
reverie about eating rose hips and other wild foods in Coming Up for Air when he says “I do 
remember different seasons, because all my memories are bound up with things to eat, which varied 
at different times of the year (38).  
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The identification of the prole women with such seasonal foods and the agrarian cycles of 
planting and harvesting (the plough horse, the turnips) is couched in a more vitalistic language than 
tends to be characteristic of Marxist intellectualism and identifies the cycle of the seasons with 
natural fertility. The potential to overturn the world embodied in the rose-hipped prole woman is 
surely not intellectual fervour or even physical power as such, but rather the belief in fertility and 
the peasant ability to simply endure the passing of another ruler, another empire or civilisation. By 
translating the prole woman out of the urban, industrial society she lives in back to an idealised rural 
past Orwell not only conveys his sense that machine civilisation is unnatural, but conversely that the 
fixed, agrarian way of life is the natural order of things and that one day people will return to it. 
   
This ruralised vision of the eternal peasant in Orwell’s 1984 stands in stark contrast to one of 
the few occasions where Orwell is unreservedly dismissive and contemptuous of the lower classes, 
his description, in Road, of the Brookers, landlord and lady at a boarding house in the north of 
England. The Brookers do not even have the sweat of honest toil to redeem them and live entirely 
on the proceeds of the new, travelling salesmen who represent increasing commercialism. As such, 
Orwell finds no redeeming qualities in their dirt, which is mere filth, representative of machine 
civilisation and its “massness”: 
 
It is no use saying that people like the Brookers are just disgusting and trying to put 
them out of mind. For they exist in tens and hundreds of thousands; they are one of 
the characteristic by-products of the modern world. You cannot disregard them if you 
accept the civilization that produced them. For this is part at least of what 
industrialism has done for us .  . .  this is where it has all led . . . to labyrinthine slums 
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and dark back kitchens with sickly, ageing people creeping round and round them like 
blackbeetles. (15-6)36 
 
Orwell’s mention of “back kitchens” here in association with his uncharacteristically sweeping 
comparison of the “hundreds of thousands” of people in urban centres to “blackbeetles” is 
revealing, as is his depiction of them as “sickly” and “ageing”. Whilst he is of course alert to poor 
housing, hard labour, and long hours, his anxiety over the degenerative effects of machine 
civilisation centres around the organicist linking of food with vitalism, and thus he makes processed 
food representative of mass society and mechanisation. Orwell s condemnation of the Brookers and 
their type focuses on the food they serve to an almost obsessive degree, discussing the tinned pies 
and the tasteless biscuits they served (14).  
 
Along with Orwell’s genuine dismay here at the effects of industrialism there is also a very 
vivid sense of the “Tory anarchist” side of his nature struggling with the contradictions he saw 
between improving the material standard of living for the masses and the degeneration he saw 
arising from that improvement. Orwell admits that the poor now have food to eat whereas in earlier 
times they may well have literally starved, but is disturbed by what he perceives to be its low 
nutritional and cultural value. At times, his concern regarding the diet of the working classes is so 
intense that (as I will shortly explore) it is difficult not to conclude that what is really being discussed 
is not simply the diet of the urban masses but their cultural values. It would seem that the issue of 
food, of nutrition, formed a kind of psychic release for Orwell, allowing him to resolve this tension by 
believing that if people could (and would) only eat natural food they might recover not only their 
                                                 
36 Compare Orwell’s description of the Brookers as the “by-products of the modern world” with Winston 
Smith’s thought in 1984 that “The ideal set up by the Party was something huge, terrible and glittering – a 
world full of steel and concrete, of monstrous machines . . . The reality was decaying, dingy cities where 
underfed people shuffled to and fro in leaky shoes, in patched up nineteenth century houses that smelt always 
of cabbage and bad lavatories” (77).  
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natural health but also their natural culture. Thus, malnutrition and health become conflated in 
Orwell’s thinking and writing with issues of cultural and national regeneration, as I will now consider. 
 
A considerable proportion of Road is spent considering the “all-importance of food” which 
Orwell believes is more important than changes of dynasty or religion for the national psyche and 
constitution, and he bemoans the increasing consumption of mass-produced food which is cheap, 
relatively tasty, and (thanks to canning and preservatives) long lasting without refrigeration (82). 
Orwell, having taken the trouble to experience life from the perspective of the urban poor, is not 
insensitive to these reasons for the popularity of mass-produced food, and admits that when you’re 
poor you want something quick and tasty not bland and nutritious. However, “the results of all this” 
Orwell claims, “are visible in a physical degeneracy which you can study directly, by using your eyes . 
. . . In Sheffield you have the feeling of walking among a population of troglodytes” (86). Orwell 
asserts that “the physical average has been declining all over England for a long time past, and not 
merely among the unemployed in the industrial areas”. This cannot be proved statistically, Orwell 
admits, but it is a conclusion that is forced upon you if you use your eyes” even, he claims “in a 
prosperous town like London” (87).  
 
Like Williamson, Eliot, and other writers of the time, Orwell believed that part of the 
problem was that machine civilisation was not only leading to a physical decline in the population 
through poor nutrition, but a mental and cultural decline as well.  Examining this belief shows how 
influential the fallacy of organic form is in shaping perceptions about society and what is and is not 
“natural”. Orwell declares in Road that part of the problem is that machine civilisation is altering 
people’s tastes in unnatural ways. “The number of people who prefer tinned peas and tinned fish to 
real peas and real fish must be increasing every year” he asserts, though it’s not clear what he bases 
this belief on, or his belief that the tinned version is of less nutritional worth than the fresh (and 
expensive) versions, merely remarking that it is a shame that “for lack of a proper tradition” people 
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choose the tinned food over the natural (89, 90).  This observation being made, Orwell turns his 
attentions elsewhere, but it is not long before he is drawn back to discussing the tension between 
the desire for progress and the danger of degeneration such progress inevitably entails, and this 
discussion leads him back to the issue of a denatured populace. I would like to quote Orwell’s 
argument here at length because it is here, towards the end of his text, that he finally and 
definitively makes the leap from arguing that mass-produced food causes physical degeneration to 
arguing that mass civilisation, machine civilisation, causes a similar decline in mental, spiritual and 
cultural terms which reinforces the physical decline in a downward spiral. It also shows, very clearly, 
how the fallacy of the organic form leads to irredentist assertions of national superiority, even in a 
progressive writer such as Orwell, ever alert to the dangers of xenophobia and jingoism. 
 
Orwell begins this argument much as he began his plea for sensitive people to accept 
socialism and the mechanised state “for the moment”, asserting that though we must use the 
machine for now, we should view it as a drug because “like a drug, the machine is useful, dangerous, 
and habit-forming” (176). He then warns of the results of allowing ourselves to succumb to machine 
civilisation, which he predicates, significantly, on grounds of taste, literal and figurative, thus giving 
the appearance of objective statement to subjective judgments: 
 
You only have to look about you at this moment to realize with what sinister speed 
the machine is getting us into its power. To begin with, there is the frightening 
debauchery of taste that has already been effected by a century of mechanization . . . 
. In the highly mechanized countries, thanks to tinned food, cold storage, synthetic 
flavouring matters, etc., the palate is almost a dead organ. As you can see by looking 
at any greengrocer’s shop, what the majority of English people mean by an apple is a 
lump of highly-coloured cotton wool from America or Australia . . . . It is the shiny, 
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standardized, machine-made look of the American apple that appeals to them; the 
superior taste of the English apple is something they simply do not notice. (178-9) 
 
Of course, such assertions are purely subjective and have no basis in objective fact, but what is 
telling is that Orwell defends the English apple on grounds of “superior” intrinsic qualities (taste) and 
identifies the foreign products not only with technological society, but with debasement and a 
general decline in standards. As in the description of Bowling’s meal at the Americanised diner in 
Coming Up for Air, it is all surface appeal with no intrinsic quality.  
 
From foods associated with mass-production Orwell then presses on with the analogy, 
arguing that “what applies to food applies also to furniture, houses, clothes, books, amusements, 
and everything else that makes up our environment” (179). In other words, from the basis of an 
attack on mass-produced food on the nutritional grounds of its supposedly leading to physical 
degeneracy, Orwell now advances the argument that this is only one aspect of a wider debasement 
that is leading to an unhealthy and distinctly un-English homogenisation of taste and culture. Here 
he reverses the direction of the argument, arguing that machine civilisation creates its own 
consumers, de-natured, de-vitalised, and dependent on technology: 
 
The mechanization of the world could never proceed very far while taste, even the 
taste-buds of the tongue, remained uncorrupted, because in that case most of the 
products of the machine world would be simply unwanted. In a healthy world there 
would be no demand for tinned foods, aspirins, gramophones, gaspipe chairs, 
machine guns, daily newspaper, telephones, motor-cars, etc . . . Mechanization leads 
to the decay of taste, the decay of taste leads to the demand for machine-made 
articles and hence to more mechanization, and so a vicious circle is established. (179-
80) 
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Orwell’s organicism here leads him to conflate sensory taste with aesthetic taste, reinforced by the 
invocation of the idea that the pre-mechanised world was “a healthy world” and that it took 
mechanisation to create the demand for mechanised goods.  
 
 Orwell’s attack on machine civilisation, then, is not simply based on disgust at the poor 
conditions of the working classes in cramped inner city housing, or the despoliation and pollution of 
the land. It is much more fundamental than that. Orwell conceives of technological society as a sick 
society and an agrarian, pre-mechanised society as “a healthy world”, implying that there is a natural 
order to society that has been deviated from. Though mechanisation is the root of the problems, it is 
not the externalities of the mechanised world, the factories and urban housing, as the degeneration 
of taste and culture in a mechanised society. In Orwell’s perception, the effects of machine 
civilisation are almost impossible to escape, because it changes culture as well as the human body 
and psyche.  
 
 Orwell’s troubling syllogism regarding the relationship between socialism, machine 
civilisation and degeneracy, and his comments on the degeneration of taste in machine civilisation, 
lead ineluctably to the gloomy conclusion that there may very well be no turning back or away from 
the course set by machine civilisation towards mental, physical, and cultural degeneracy and the 
tyranny of the “beehive state” where the individual is crushed underfoot in the name of the 
collective good. Orwell’s organicism leads him to emphasise the importance of attachment to place 
and “genuine” culture (for Orwell this means local, folk culture not high culture) – hence the 
extensive reminiscences on growing up in the South of England in Coming up for Air which serve as a 
paean to tradition and locale. For the urban masses, rootless and severed from a meaningful 
connection with a specific natural environment, their tastes and their psyche are, Orwell believes, 
formed by the artificial and degraded world of mechanisation and mass-production. Just as Spengler 
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argued that Western, Faustian culture, like all cultures, arose from the interaction of a particular 
population of people with a particular landscape, so Orwell seems to feel that authentic culture and 
taste are formed when people are born and bred in their own natural environment. The more we 
become an urban-dwelling people, reliant on technology, he fears, the more we will lose touch with 
our “true” nature. Therefore, the attempt by the born urbanite to move out to the country and 
reconnect with nature in the hope of reclaiming meaning and authenticity is doomed to end in a 
forlorn pastiche of genuine culture. Being raised in the artificial world of the city, their tastes and 
their psyche have been irreparably degraded. 
 
Hence, in Coming Up for Air, when Bowling looks for his favourite childhood fishing spot, he 
finds it desecrated by a distinctly middle-class cluster of semi-rural homes for people consciously 
seeking a way of life more in tune with nature. But their idea of communing with nature, Bowling 
feels, is a sham, a mere lifestyle choice in place of anything real and authentic: 
 
I knew the type. Vegetarianism, simple life, poetry, Nature-Worship, roll in the dew 
before breakfast . . . Do you know these faked-up Tudor houses with the curly roofs 
and the buttresses that don’t buttress anything, and the rock-gardens with concrete 
bird-baths and those red plaster elves you buy at the florists’? You could see in your 
mind’s eye the awful gang of food-cranks and spook-hunters and simple-lifers with 
£1,000 a year that lived there. (228) 
 
In a final identification of these “simple-lifers” with the urbanism and machine civilisation they’re 
fleeing, they stand condemned for filling Bowling’s old fishing pool up with discarded tin cans. 
Though there is a sense of loss and even anger at the destruction of the pool and the woods, more 
than anything else, these newcomers are guilty of inauthenticity. Even their beliefs are presented as 
a pot-pourri of New Age eclecticisms without any tradition or authenticity.   They have no ties to the 
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land there, renaming the remaining local copse “the pixy glen” in a final act of indignity which 
infuriates Bowling: 
 
The Pixy Glen. And they’d filled my pool up with tin cans. God rot them and bust 
them! Say what you like – call it silly, childish, anything – but doesn’t it make you 
puke sometimes to see what they’re doing to England, with their bird-baths and their 
plaster gnomes, and their pixies and tins cans where the woods used to be?  
Sentimental you say? Anti-social? Oughtn’t to prefer trees to men? I say it depends 
what trees and what men. (229-30) 
 
The imagery Orwell employs here and throughout the novel present machine civilisation and 
mass democracy as not only artificial and superficial, but crucially as lacking roots and therefore 
lacking authenticity. Hence, Bowling’s retort, “I say it depends what trees and what men” draws a 
division between natural, rooted populations and inauthentic newcomers, identified with machine 
civilisation and lacking “real” culture and tradition. Orwell, of course, recognises the futility of trying 
to halt or reverse progress, and has Bowling realise with sadness but acceptance that he can’t return 
to his boyhood. Similarly, Orwell’s call for thinking people to lead a movement for a return to 
“simpler, harder, probably agricultural” way of life is clearly a forlorn hope and he more or less 
admits as much in Road more than once. What his agonising over the issue reveals, though, is how 
rooted his antipathy to technology was not just in anxieties of physical degeneration but also 
cultural degeneration and national decline, and, even for a writer as progressive as Orwell, a 
palpable anxiety over the rise of the masses and the direction of society.  
 
Orwell’s fear, then, can be conceived of as the fear that technological society would prove 
the undoing of humanity not only as a possible tool of surveillance and repression, as through a 
continual and relentless degeneration both physical and cultural (“taste”) so that the masses would 
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not even be aware of what they were being deprived off. As I remarked earlier, Orwell saw socialism 
as inextricably tied in with machine civilisation, and it is perhaps this more than anything else which 
influenced his decision to make the dystopia of 1984 a socialist dystopia, albeit one with clearly 
fascistic overtones.37 As Paul Monaco points out in his discussion of the reactionary consciousness, 
1984 can be read as a powerful debunking of the idea of the ability of liberal individualism and 
progress: 
 
1984 is so effective because it ties the undermining of consciousness itself to the 
spread of technology. Its own consciousness in the novel is antiauthoritarian, and 
that with a vengeance. On the other hand, it provides an extraordinarily negative 
view of the masses. If democratization leads in the direction of mass society, then 
1984 is antidemocratic . . . the myth of revolutionary change resulting in human 
liberation is debunked; so is the modest liberal or progressive faith in human reason, 
scientific advancement and technology. (113-4)38 
 
As Monaco observes here, Orwell’s pessimism regarding technology leads him to take an extremely 
negative view of the possibility of mass democracy. In adhering on some level, emotional or 
otherwise, to the idea of organic form Orwell inevitably comes to the conclusion that there is a 
natural order and that deviation from it must ultimately be a mistake that can only be corrected by 
eventual return.  As I noted earlier, citing Carey, one of the rare moments of optimism in 1984 
occurs with Smith’s contemplation of a female “prole”, depicted as the eternal peasant, completely 
unintellectual, even mindless, yet retaining a sense of vitality and rootedness that will surely outlast 
                                                 
37 It bears remarking that in Road Orwell warns that fascism poses a real danger in England because of what he 
sees as socialism’s focus on progress in material terms without due consideration to tradition. “As a result” 
he cautions, “Fascism has been able to play upon every instinct that revolts against hedonism and a cheap 
conception of ‘progress’” (188). 
38 Northrop Frye (1946) also hints at this perception of Orwell in his brief review of Animal Farm when he 
remarks “as far as he [Orwell] is concerned some old reactionary bromide like ‘you can’t change human nature’ 
is as good a moral as any other for his fable” (49).   
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the repressive technocracy. Redemption in 1984 lies not in revolution, but in the possibility of 
eventual return; in the hope, however forlorn, of some kind of cultural regeneration rooted in 
agrarianism or at least the genetic memory of the countryside. 
 
In Orwell we see an undoubtedly progressive writer and intellectual wrestling with 
contradictions inherent in modernity which his rational mind is simply unable to resolve. Williams 
memorably described the totality of Orwell’s work as a paradox and traces this back to Orwell as 
exile, someone who had renounced empire, class privilege, and “the past” to throw in his lot with 
socialism and mass society, yet who could not help feeling the pull of his original home within him 
(Culture and Society 286-9). Intellectually, Orwell recognises that machine civilisation is a 
prerequisite for a socialist society. Yet on a deeper, emotional level, there is an anxiety that 
technology will prove not only physically but also culturally degenerative and this fear is tied in 
subtly but inextricably to anxieties over national decline. Orwell’s anti-technologism causes him to 
question on a fundamental level the idea and possibility of progress, and though he was acute 
enough to realise that the idea of returning to some mythical rural idyll is merely a reactionary 
illusion, he still returns longingly to this theme.    
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Chapter Two: Blood and Soil: Cultural Identity and Locality in The Lord of the Rings. 
 
Tolkien once remarked to me that the feeling about home must have been quite 
different in the days when a family had fed on the produce of the same few miles of 
country for six generations, and that perhaps this was why they saw nymphs in the 
fountains and dryads in the woods . . . We of course . . . are really artificial beings and 
have no connection (save in sentiment) with any place on earth. We are synthetic 
men, uprooted. The strength of the hills is not ours.  
 CS Lewis, qtd in Veldman 57 
 
As once the microcosm Man against Nature, so now the microcosm Machine is 
revolting against Nordic Man. The lord of the World is becoming the slave of the 
Machine, which is forcing him – forcing us all, whether we are aware of it or not – to 
follow its course.  
Spengler Man and Technics 90 
 
In my consideration of George Orwell in the previous chapter I discussed the figurative role that food 
played in anti-technological literature, allowing representation and discussion of concerns over 
degeneracy and instability in an increasingly urban, technological world. As I demonstrated, tinned 
and mass-produced food became a kind of cultural marker for concerns over softness and 
degeneracy in the increasingly urbanised and technological societies of the West. An associated 
anxiety over the migration of the working classes from the countryside to the cities was also 
explored in relation to the same trope. With increasing industrialisation, including the mechanisation 
of agriculture, people were no longer tied to the land, and many migrated to the cities. The 
seemingly relentless growth in a mobile and often disaffected urban population gave rise to 
anxieties that modern society was inherently unstable and unsustainable. I briefly explored how 
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various remedies were proposed, at least in part, to resolve this perceived problem, such as Guild 
Socialism, which stressed the necessity of a holistic and hierarchical approach to society which 
recognised vitalistic links between people, the soil, and the food they ate. As I observed, “natural” 
foods such as locally grown and consumed vegetables served to represent contrary ideals of 
authenticity, identity, rootedness, and perhaps most importantly vitality and regeneration.  
 
Implicit in this idealisation was a hostility to something that might be termed “false fertility”, 
a notion that the seeming abundance of technological society was a dangerous illusion that relied on 
an unsustainable, expansionary logic which was ultimately self-defeating. By defying the limits of 
nature and breaking the vital link between man, food, and soil, technological society’s prolific 
growth was not a sign of its success, but a kind of carcinoma, drawing sustenance from the 
countryside to fuel uncontrolled growth in population in the urban centres. The paradox was that in 
ignoring or forgetting the importance of spiritual and cultural links to native soil in pursuit of 
materialistic gratification, technological Western society was ensuring not only its decline, but also 
perhaps its own future sterility in the midst of seeming abundance. In this chapter I want to expand 
on this idea, and show how it relates to broader concerns over post-imperial decline and reverse 
colonisation and advances notions of cultural purity and identity. I will do so through an examination 
of JRR Tolkien’s epic fantasy, The Lord of the Rings (1954). I choose this work for two primary 
reasons: first because of the immense impact the novel had on the counter-culture of the 1960s and 
70s of which anti-technologism was a part; second because I believe it offers an excellent 
opportunity to trace how a reactionary ideology is transmitted (and in that process transmuted) by 
literature in such a way that the basic direction of the ideology is maintained, whilst the antecedents 
and ultimate goal of that ideology is forgotten or ignored. Two caveats need to be made here in this 
regard, before I begin. I am not arguing or supposing that this transmission was intended – I am 
concerned here with how a particular world-view (to use that term for the moment) shapes an 
author’s conception, and in turn their work and subsequently how the world-view embodied in their 
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fiction conveys certain attitudes and beliefs. I also want to stress that the analysis I offer here of 
Tolkien’s masterpiece makes no claims to exclusivity; that is to say, this chapter looks at one aspect 
of the novel from a particular analytical standpoint which does not claim to invalidate any other 
view.39 
 
I begin this chapter by looking at the influence of JRR Tolkien on progressive thought in the 
second half of the twentieth century, before briefly examining two opposing critical views of his epic 
fantasy, The Lord of the Rings, as they relate to my subsequent study: Michael Moorcock’s 
condemnation of its reactionary agenda, and Patrick Curry’s later defence of it as progressive and 
ecologically-minded. In contradistinction to these diametrically different views, I want to argue that 
it is both reactionary and progressive inasmuch as it displays a non-materialistic, holistic view of 
society which, in its rejection of materialism, necessarily grounds itself in irredentist and vitalistic 
notions of culture and society. This position, I will propose, is consonant both with modern 
ecological ideas of bioregionalism and with discredited notions of blood and soil.  Structurally, my 
approach in this chapter will be to examine The Lord of the Rings in depth to analyse the relationship 
it constructs between culture, identity, and the soil, and how it presents technology as a disruptive 
and debasing force on this most fundamental connection.  
 
The Lord of the Rings, after an initially lukewarm and sometimes bewildered response from 
critics, was enthusiastically received in Britain, taken up primarily by a middle-class audience, 
growing in popularity with the growth in university education in both Britain and America in the 
nineteen sixties.40 In the mid nineteen-sixties, it was also proving extremely popular on campuses in 
American universities, spreading mainly by word of mouth. Curry observes that although exact 
figures are not easy to find The Lord of the Rings is “probably the biggest-selling work of fiction this 
                                                 
39 I refer here to other critical readings of Tolkien, but also to his assertion that the primary aim of most authors 
in writing fiction is to tell a story in a way that will be enjoyed by the reader.  
40 See Meredith Veldman’s chapter “Challenge and Response” for a well-documented review of the critical and 
popular reception of Tolkien’s work (Veldman 91-111). 
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century” with sales as of 2004 standing at around fifty million copies, plus of course the numerous 
radio and film adaptations (Curry 2).41 What is particularly noteworthy for our purposes is the way in 
which this work by a staunchly conservative Roman Catholic was enthusiastically taken up by those 
involved with progressive politics and the burgeoning protest movement in the nineteen sixties and 
seventies.42 According to Veldman, this can be at least partially ascribed to the novel’s obvious 
championing of small-scale individualism over faceless and monolithic entities, though as Veldman 
observes the underlying ideal was very different: 
 
Middle-earth, the philological wonderland of a politically disengaged right-wing 
Roman Catholic, coincided in its deepest structures with the vision of a participatory 
political life that shaped the New Left. Middle-earth is, of course, no democratic 
utopia; even the unpretentious Shire has a clear social hierarchy. In The Lord of the 
Rings, individuals act, but they act within the context of a clearly defined community 
and as part of an all-embracing supernatural plan. Neither Tolkien’s hierarchical 
vision nor his conservative religious commitment cohered with the New Left ideal. 
Nevertheless, the New Left, like Tolkien, protested against an increasingly 
bureaucratic, export-oriented, mass society. (109) 
 
Certainly, the influence of Tolkien’s work as a kind of ideological or even mythological 
template of resistance against the impersonal technological state can be clearly seen in the accounts 
of many who were active in the protest movements of the nineteen sixties and seventies. The 
founders of Greenpeace, for example, used to refer to the area of British Columbia, Canada, where 
they lived as “The Shire” in affirmation of its unique culture and progressive ethic. Recalling the 
                                                 
41 Curry is referring to the twentieth century here, but seemingly extending it to 2004. 
42 This is not to ignore the way in which many far-right ideologues also used the mythological apparatus in the 
novel. See Bramwell, Ecology in the Twentieth Century 130-32 and 232, for a brief but insightful discussion of 
the use and convergence over texts such as Rings by both the New Left and the neo-fascist Nouvelle Droite 
movement, see the entry for the European New Right in World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopaedia: Vol. 1 ed. 
by Cyprian Blamires, s.v. “ENR”. 
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decision of the US Government to stop nuclear testing in the nearby Amchitka Islands, Rex Wyler, 
one of the co-founders of Greenpeace, characterised the triumph of the then nascent protest 
movement over the military-industrial complex in terms borrowed from Tolkien’s novel, saying “The 
upstarts from the Shire had brought the Lord of Mordor to account for his treacheries” (Wyler 132). 
At a time when technology had become associated in the popular imagination with war, pollution, 
and ruthless corporate businesses exploiting natural resources, many drew parallels between the 
idea of evil in the novel, and technology itself. This was not unwarranted, either, for Tolkien clearly 
intended some equivalency between technology and the unwholesome and corrupting desire for 
power and instant gratification. “Both sides” in the novel, Tolkien wrote, 
 
live mainly by ‘ordinary’ means. The Enemy, or those have become like him, go in for 
‘machinery’ – with destructive and evil effects – because ‘magicians’, who have 
become chiefly concerned to use magia for their own power, would do so (do do so). 
The basic motive for magia – quite apart from any philosophic consideration of how 
it should work – is immediacy: speed, reduction of labour, and reduction also to a 
minimum (or vanishing point) of the gap between the idea or desire and the result or 
effect. (Tolkien Letters 200) 
 
Machinery in The Lord of the Rings is the physical manifestation of the desire for power, for 
dominance, and for the immediate realisation of desire, without reflection. Saruman’s fall into 
wickedness is characterised by Treebeard as stemming from his “. . . plotting to become a Power. He 
has a mind of metal and wheels; and he does not care for growing things, except as far as they serve 
him for the moment” (Tolkien Rings 494). In its depiction of the possibility that a willing renunciation 
of power could defeat even great power the novel offered inspiration to a new generation who felt 
that humanity was unleashing forces that threatened to destroy the world, or at the least to 
homogenise and impoverish society and culture. 
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              Some sense of the range of critical responses to Lord of the Rings can be gained by looking 
on the one hand at Moorcock’s acerbic denunciation in his 1987 essay, “Epic Pooh”, and on the 
other at Curry’s Defending Middle Earth. Tolkien: Myth and Modernity (2004). Whilst there are other 
criticisms and apologies of Tolkien’s epic fantasy these two amply represent a distillation of the 
opposing views of Tolkien as a dyed-in-the-wool reactionary and, contrarily, an ecologically-minded 
progressive writer who was ahead of his time in warning of the destruction wrought by the modern 
world. My aim is to examine the elements in the novel which these two critics see as either 
reactionary or progressive, and then ask if the disparity between the two contrary views might be 
resolved by taking a fresh look. 
 
Moorcock’s objection to The Lord of the Rings is primarily to what he identifies as the mood 
of the writing. This is characterised as one of “stuffy self-satisfaction, typical of the second-rate 
schoolmaster” carrying a “hidden aggression” and a “deep-rooted hypocrisy” (184). The novel, 
Moorcock complains, is “a pernicious confirmation of the values of a morally bankrupt middle class” 
with Sauron and his minions representing the “worst aspects of modern urban society represented 
as the whole [sic] by a fearful, backward-yearning class” (185-6). In this analysis, the novel is fantasy 
not just as escapism, but as a flat rejection of modernity and egalitarianism. It is flight from the 
realities and complexities of the modern world, with all their attendant compromises and 
imperfections, moral grey areas and venalities, to an imagined pseudo-history where the distinctions 
between right and wrong, the virtuous and the evil, are clearly delineated. The Lord of the Rings, as 
Moorcock sees it, is literally reactionary. The whole mood and ethos of the novel is a twilight 
nostalgia for the sunlit glory of Empire and the verities that came with it: 
 
I sometimes think that as Britain declines, dreaming of a sweeter past, entertaining 
few hopes for a finer future, her middle classes turn increasingly to the fantasy of 
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rural life and talking animals, the safety of the woods that are the pattern of the 
paper on the nursery-room wall. Hippies, housewives, civil servants share in this 
wistful trance; eating nothing as dangerous or exotic as the lotus, but chewing 
instead on a form of mildly anaesthetic British cabbage. (203) 
 
For Moorcock, then, there is nothing progressive about the novel, as it denies the idea of progress, 
turning instead to fantasies of power and glory, the inherent virtue of nobility, and the 
unquestionable good of social stability rooted in attachment to the land. The historian and critic 
Martin Weiner has noted that rural fantasies stress “stability and tranquillity” and provide a “psychic 
balance and refuge” from change (51). It is this desire for stability and loathing of change that 
Moorcock clearly despises most of all in the novel, as a small-minded and reactionary attitude that is 
at least partially responsible for instilling a belief in the possibility of denial, rather than dealing with 
the world as it actually is. 
 
It would barely be an oversimplification to say that Curry’s view of Lord of the Rings is 
diametrically different; ironically Curry sees the novel as progressive for broadly the same reasons 
Moorcock sees it as reactionary. Indeed, Curry’s defence of Lord of the Rings emphasises the same 
elements, but offers a very different interpretation of what they signify. Moorcock attacks what he 
perceives as Tolkien’s rejection of modernity as reactionary nostalgia; Curry defends it as a form of 
“radical nostalgia” that anticipates the ideals of deep ecology and bioregionalism. He praises it for 
situating people “inextricably in and of their natural and geographical locales” and offering an 
alternative to the “impersonal forces of runaway modernity” (18-19). Claiming that “the only place 
in Middle-Earth which is industrialised, imperialistic, and possessed of an all-powerful state is 
Mordor” Curry notes that this model of society is presented as an “alien invader” which is not 
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properly “native” to the imagined world Tolkien created (22).43  In this analysis, the novel may be 
read as a story of cultural diversity pitted against the forces of homogenising industrialism and 
imperialism. “The whole implicit project” of The Lord of the Rings, Curry proposes, is “the 
resacralization (or re-enchantment) of experienced and living nature, including human nature, in the 
local cultural idiom” (19. Emphasis in original). To perceive it as racist and reactionary longing for the 
glories of imperialism is, for Curry, not only a misapprehension of Tolkien’s intentions, but a failure 
to comprehend the message the work has for us today, that we must somehow find a way to 
reinvest our immediate environment with genuine meaning to avoid environmental catastrophe and 
increasing disillusionment and ennui. 
 
Is the novel, then, a paean for the days of imperial splendour and a glorification of 
established hierarchy? Or is it a prescient call to reassert local colour and cultural identity as a way of 
averting ecological disaster and resisting the homogenising effects of technology and the urban way 
of life? Does it deserve its place as a touchstone for many in the protest movement for its message 
of determination against might and ecological awareness, or should it be condemned for advancing 
a racist or xenophobic attitude that characterises foreigners as a threat, and preaches social 
immobility? What part does technology really play in the novel and what might this tell us about 
perceptions of technology, both in Tolkien’s day, and subsequently following the widespread 
recognition and influence of his work? In answering this, I want to begin by locating Lord of the Rings 
within the context of a strain of anti-imperialism which referred not to ideals of international 
brotherhood, but to nationalism and a rejection of the cosmopolitanism which followed imperialist 
adventuring.  
 Discussing the rise of the literature of rural fantasy in the early years of the twentieth 
century Martin Weiner notes the arguments made by some that the Boer War was in many ways a 
                                                 
43  Curry’s claim here is inaccurate, as Saruman turns Isengard into a hellish model of industrialism and 
imperialism in pursuit of his own desire for power. Presumably Curry means up to the point at which Saruman, 
by communicating with Sauron via the palantir seeing-ball, falls prey to his own baser desires and embarks on 
a process of rapid industrialisation and imperialism for his own ends. 
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clash between “a cosmopolitan industrial society versus a traditional, rural ‘folk’ society” that forced 
questions of which side better encapsulated the character and objectives of “real” Englishness (59). 
The war had served to intensify existing anxieties about degeneracy, raising fears that the English, 
thanks to the effects of urbanism and technology, were now too physically degenerate to wage the 
kind of campaigns which the maintenance of empire required (Greenslade). Indeed, it is to the 
soldiers of the Boer War that Orwell (in 1937) referred in his lamentation for the disappearance of 
“the monstrous men with chests like barrels and moustaches like the wings of eagles that strode 
across my childhood’s gaze twenty or thirty years ago” who had vanished thanks to the evils of 
industrialism and its avatar, tinned food (Road 87-8). The degeneracy crisis caused a wider 
reassessment of whether Britain was on the right path, intensifying already extant anxieties over the 
increasing urbanisation of the population and the effects on health and social stability. As William 
Greenslade (1994) observes, there was no single degeneracy crisis in the years between the Boer 
War and World War Two, but rather a series of intensifying crises that contrasted increasingly 
industrialised warfare with an agrarian idealism which stressed the harmony, hierarchy, and above 
all the natural health, of the rural way of life: 
 
In a collection of essays, After-War Problems (1917), compiled by W. H. Dawson while 
the long battles of the war were still being fought, a hankering for a “natural” way of 
life based on a rural economy was unmistakable . . . . ‘”We have realized how 
important the countryman is as a soldier, a better soldier than his town brother”. This 
leitmotif of urban degenerationism [sic], which had reached a crescendo at the time 
of the Boer War is sounded once again. A back to the land policy is put forward, 
enshrining a vision in which “England will be provided with a virile and happy rural 
population, able to enjoy its happiness in peacetime and defend it in the terrible hour 
of war . . . .” [The countryman’s] healthy virility is effortlessly translated, in 
instrumental terms, into a eugenically desirable quality of racial worth: “Help the 
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countryman to raise a large and healthy family and England will be safe”. And the 
familiar, dysgenic racial consequences of urbanism are now counterpoised with the 
health-giving properties of rural life: “Why should you concentrate such masses in 
towns, with the evils of factory life impairing the health of the future of the race? . . . 
Attach the people to the country, breed a stronger race. The soil is more patriotic 
than the street”. (241) 
 
As this extract shows, agrarian romanticism stressed the ideals of identification with the local soil 
and national health and virility and opposed them to the industrialism of wars fought abroad, 
arguing that if Britain returned to a rural economy, such foreign adventuring would not be needed. 
Thus, in reaction to the myth of industrial and imperial supremacy, there were many writers and 
critics who forecast the rise of a literature of anti-imperialism that would stress national pride rather 
than international power and replace what they saw as the false (and largely foreign) materialist 
values with truer English values of tradition and contentment: 
 
Soon after the Boer War, a young literary and social critic, CFG Masterman . . . 
complained that the literature of Imperialism had “neglected and despised the 
ancient pieties of an older England, the little isle set in a silver sea”. Greatness had 
become equated with bigness. In contrast, Masterman discerned the rise of a new 
literature that was anti-Imperial yet not cosmopolitan – a literature of “nationalism”. 
. . . Masterman anticipated the character of the coming zeitgeist: “It will proclaim 
always a particular concern in the well-being of England and the English people; a 
pride in its ancient history, its ancient traditions, the very language of its grey skies 
and rocky shore”; it would be democratic; and it would be concerned with restoring 
the moral and material health of English society, which had been undermined by the 
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new dissolvents of the nineteenth century: urbanism, industrialism, and 
cosmopolitanism. (Weiner 59-60) 
 
It is not difficult to see how this might apply to the mood of The Lord of the Rings and how 
understanding this mood offers a means to reconcile those who see it as irremediably reactionary 
with those who see it as a key progressive tract. Tolkien wanted to create a literary world “redolent 
of our ‘air’ . . . the clime and soil of the North West” and “purged of the gross” which would echo 
Arthurian legends, but also speak of the people of Britain as well as its “soil” (Tolkien Letters 144). 
Confronted with the rise of political demagoguery and propaganda he harked back to what he saw 
as the relative stability of nations ruled by distant and inefficient monarchs, whilst recognising that 
in the modern world there was “nowhere to fly to” as in the modern world even the remote Siberian 
tribesman probably had “tinned food and the village loudspeaker telling Stalin’s bed-time stories 
about democracy and the wicked Fascists” (Tolkien Letters 64). The triumph of “Americo-
cosmopolitanism” that would follow an Allied victory in World War Two was a prospect Tolkien 
found “very terrifying” and scarcely a worse outcome than an Axis victory (Tolkien Letters 64). In 
their use of machinery, mass-production, and propaganda, the Allies were in severe danger of 
becoming evil themselves, entranced by power for its own sake, and so even in victory would fail in 
defence of true freedom. “We are attempting to conquer Sauron with the Ring,” Tolkien wrote in an 
airgraph to his son serving in South Africa with the RAF, “And we shall (it seems) succeed. But the 
penalty is, as you will know, to breed new Saurons, and slowly turn Men and Elves into Orcs” 
(Tolkien Letters 78).  
 
Rings is a fantasy that equates true greatness not with “bigness” but with renunciation, 
where the logic of imperialist conquest is rejected at the same time that nationalistic cultural purity 
and pride based on the mythology of the virtues of a stable rural hierarchy is asserted. EM Forster 
had warned in Howard’s End (1910) that although the imperialist may seem to be an admirable and 
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sturdy type like the countryman, in reality he was a “destroyer” as empire “paved the way for 
cosmopolitanism” and therefore cultural decay (Qtd in Bradshaw 161).44 In Rings, imperial expansion 
paves the way for subsequent cosmopolitanism, depopulation, and eventual collapse. The imperial 
projects of Gondor’s past are now, in its decline, turned against it as the “cursed Southrons” come 
marching to attack “up the very roads that craft of Gondor made” (686).  This invasion is recounted 
as the result of imperial conquest and trade. Ever susceptible to evil, the Southrons now come to 
plunder the riches of the former imperial power, now reduced to little more than a hollow shell of its 
former self. The template here is that of negative classicism again. It would be perhaps overly 
simplistic to make too direct a comparison of Gondor with Rome, but certainly Tolkien had some 
degree of identification in mind, remarking in a letter that the resolution of the novel results in 
something akin to “the re-establishment of an effective Holy Roman Empire with its seat in Rome” 
(376). Significantly, it is a “Holy Roman Empire” that is achieved at the end of Rings rather than 
renewed Roman Empire, because it is grounded in notions of culture and identity, rather than 
materialist expansion. 
 
 I have already noted, in the introduction, the immense influence of Oswald Spengler’s 
Decline of the West and its permeation of Western thought. I will now argue that understanding 
Tolkien’s anti-imperialism as a longing for the sort of return to rural hierarchy discussed above 
requires an understanding of the scale and pervasiveness of Spengler’s influence on Western 
thinking in the twentieth century, and more specifically, on Tolkien’s conception of history in Rings. 
Spengler placed the blame for the West’s decline on technology and its impetus towards urbanism 
which led to the growth of what he termed “the world-city” and its inevitable outcome, imperialism. 
In the world city, instead of the “type-true people, born of and grown on the soil” there existed a 
                                                 
44 Howard’s End, as Bradshaw’s essay explores, is another novel of the first half of the twentieth century which 
deals with themes of urban degeneration juxtaposed with images of rural virility and eugenic fitness. Thus, 
Forster’s anti-imperialism is based on the same isolationist longing for a return to a self-contained rural 
economy as that noted by Greenslade, Weiner, and others and broadly the same as the mood I detect in 
Tolkien’s Rings.  
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cosmopolitan “mob” without real culture or roots. (Spengler Decline 25). As cultures grew, they gave 
rise to civilisation – the city – but the city itself gave rise to the expansionary necessity of empire at 
the expense of culture. Imperialism was thus the final stage of a civilisation which would soon fall 
victim to cosmopolitanism by neglecting its own internal culture in external pursuit of imperial gain. 
The outward trappings of success only masking the increasing hollowness and petrifaction at the 
heart of empire: 
 
Here, then, I lay it down that Imperialism . . .is to be taken as the typical symbol of 
the end. Imperialism is civilisation unadulterated. In this phenomenal form the 
destiny of the West is now irrevocably set. The energy of culture-man is directed 
inwards, that of civilization-man outwards . . . The expansive tendency is a doom, 
something daemonic and immense, which grips, forces into service, and uses up the 
late mankind of the world-city stage . . . . (Spengler Decline 28. Emphasis in original) 
 
In this late stage of civilisation, Spengler remarks, materialism and the desire for amusement and 
luxury (bread and circuses) replace the virtues of culture, probity, and the production of the next 
generation. This is especially pronounced in Western civilisation, according to Spengler, who 
characterises it as “Faustian” – relentlessly expansionary, seeking to bring closer that which is far. 
The telescope, for instance, is described as “a truly Faustian discovery” as it “penetrates into space 
which is hidden from the naked eye, and thereby increases the universe that we ‘possess’” (174).45 
                                                 
45 Though Spengler condemns imperialism and materialist expansion, he also seems enamoured of the idea of 
a Holy Roman Empire claiming that “The type of the very priesthood is Faustian; think of those magnificent 
bishops of the old German Empire who on horseback led their flocks into battle” (180). As Sternhell (2010) 
notes in his chapter on “The Intellectual Foundations of Nationalism” this contradiction is a hallmark of 
counter-enlightenment thinking, exemplified by Johann Herder in Another Philosophy of History (1774) which 
Spengler, as Sternhell notes, follows “almost to the letter” in distinguishing between imperialism and 
nationalism. In essence, in counter-enlightenment thought admiration for the Holy Roman Empire is 
admiration for unifying cultural force purged of imperialism’s expansionary materialism and intellectualism. 
Thus Herder, for example, praises the Gothic tribes that took over Rome as they despised the Roman’s “luxury 
and refinement which had wrought havoc on mankind” and replaced them with “nature [and] a healthy 
northern intelligence” and in place of the centrality of Rome as central megalopolis had “built up the land” to 
ensure a “healthy and therefore happy people” (qtd in Sternhell 288). 
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In arguing that Tolkien’s conception of history is Spenglarian, I want to show that Rings is saturated 
with Spenglarian ideology, thematics and symbolism, regardless of whether or not Tolkien 
consciously intended it. In making this argument, I want to begin with Frye’s use of analogy to show 
how pervasive Spengler’s influence was, using Frye’s example of one of the twentieth century’s most 
seminal poems, TS Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922). 
 
 In his 1974 essay on Spengler, Frye is interested in showing that in a very real sense “we are 
all Spenglarians” as Spengler’s thesis of history and culture had so deeply influenced Western 
thought in the first half of the twentieth century that all Western thought was affected by it whether 
consciously or not (7). In pursuing this argument, Frye gives the example of The Waste Land. Though 
the work was written “without reference to Spengler,” Frye points to the imagery of the poem to 
show its fidelity to Spengler’s conception of history, civilisation, and culture - 
spring/summer/autumn/winter; morning/noon/evening/night; youth/maturity/age/death (7). His 
point is that Eliot’s use of Spenglarian symbolism is less remarkable than his avoidance of it would 
have been, such was the extent to which it had come to pervade Western intellectual and literary 
discourse. “If we do not acquire our knowledge of Spengler’s vision from Spengler,” Frye observed in 
1974, “we have to get it out of the air, but get it we will; we have no choice in the matter” (7. My 
emphasis). People, whether they had even heard of The Decline of the West or not, thought in 
organicist, geo-political terms of “Western Culture” and of that culture being “old, not young” (6). 
Indeed, to an important extent such thinking remains with us to this day, disseminated through our 
literature. 
 
 If we look at Rings, we can see how these ideas permeate the novel. It is the desire for 
knowledge that leads Saruman into error and evil, brooding on the roof of his tower where he was 
“accustomed to watch the stars” (278). Saruman embodies the Faustian spirit which seeks to 
penetrate and apprehend, to negate distance by seeing further through inventions such as the 
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telescope than is possible with the naked eye. Indeed, Saruman’s “downfall” is precisely this 
Faustian desire to exceed natural limits causing him to gaze into the palantir (“The name meant that 
which looks far away” as Gandalf informs Pippin) and so becoming entranced by his desire to see 
further and further (621). The prime symbol of evil in Rings is of course the lidless eye, the image of 
Sauron which gazes ever outward seeking to capture by surveillance, to see everything, and by 
seeing everything, dominate everything.46 Sauron embodies the essence of this Faustian lust for 
dominance by apprehension, his tower of Barad-dur topped with the unsleeping eye recalling 
Spengler’s symbolic conceptualisation of Faustian Western culture as “a center [sic] with radiating 
points” (Frye 1974 4). Sauron’s “expansive tendency” is indeed something “daemonic and immense” 
and directed ever outwards. We are given no real motivation for Sauron’s imperialism because, like 
the pursuit of power in Orwell’s nightmare technocracy of 1984 there is no motivation beyond the 
desire for power, it is the working out of a deep, primal motivation and needs no further rationale. 
The “primary symbolism” of the novel, as Tolkien wrote in a letter to a prospective publisher, lies in 
the ring “as the will to mere power, seeking to make itself objective by physical force and 
mechanism” (Tolkien Letters 160). The symbolism of the ring provides the dynamic underlying the 
myth of Middle-earth and the novel is therefore necessarily “mainly concerned with Fall, Mortality, 
and the Machine” (Tolkien Letters 145).47 
 
 Throughout the novel, this desire to see more than the naked eye can take in is perilous. 
Though the wise in Rings also make use of the ability to see far away, they use this ability sparingly, 
aware that “seeing is both good and perilous” because of the temptation to try and apprehend or 
                                                 
46 The eye of Sauron is described as though its sight has a quasi-physical ability to fix and capture by perceiving. 
In the chapter “The Breaking of the Fellowship” Frodo, having put the ring on, feels the eye “almost like a 
finger” searching for him: “Very soon it would nail him down, know just exactly where he was” (421).  
47 The relation of this to the Spenglarian idea of the desire to capture by apprehension is even more apparent 
in Tolkien’s definition of the desire for power as the desire “for making the will more quickly effective, - and so 
to the machine (or magic)” (Letters 145). 
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alter that which they see (382).48 This theme is returned to again in Faramir’s recounting of Gondor’s 
decline, where “in secret chambers withered men . . . in high cold towers asked questions of the 
stars”.49  In seeking external knowledge beyond their place, Gondor “brought about its own decay” 
and thus, as Faramir complains in distinctly Spenglerian terms, “we are a failing people, a springless 
autumn” (704). The quest for external knowledge and power in Rings leads eventually to internal 
petrifaction, sclerosis and decay. Civilisation engenders a change in the race from feeling with their 
heart (“blood”) to thinking in abstract terms (“intellect”); the inhabitants become the “final men,” 
more concerned with intellectual wanderings than raising a family (Spengler 250). At this stage, 
Spengler warns, an era begins of “appalling depopulation” begins as the inhabitants of the city fail to 
reproduce and the “best blood” of the countryside is sucked in to replenish the city, eventually 
draining the nation (251). 
 
 Again, we can see this theme made explicit in Rings, where it is linked to barely concealed 
symbols of fertility, race, and soil. When Pippin is first brought to Gondor by Gandalf he notices that 
the fields surrounding the venerable city are depopulated as by now most of the “people of Gondor 
lived in the seven circles of the City” (780). On reaching the city of Minas Tirith itself, he notices that 
despite its greatness it is “falling year by year into decay” and already “lacked half the men who 
could have dwelt at ease there” (Rings 782). Clearly, it is a city and civilisation in its autumn or 
twilight years. In Spenglarian terms, the great cities of late civilisation falter because they forget the 
“soul-root” of the race, its vital and vitalistic ties to the native soil (Spengler 245). In Rings, this “soul-
root” is reaffirmed with the return of the King of “the race of the West unmingled” who plants the 
                                                 
48 Compare with page 622. Also Denethor’s (the steward of Gondor) doom, driven mad by staring into the 
palantir (890). When Galadriel offers Sam and Frodo the opportunity to look far away (in both space and time) 
she does so by using a reflective pool, “the Mirror of Galadriel,” thus symbolically differentiated from Faustian 
apprehension and identified with internal reflection as well as feminine qualities of fertility and renewal (381). 
49 It is worth remarking here that Saruman’s tower, Orthanc, is said to have been built long ago by the 
Numenoreans (277). Thus Saruman is not the first to use the tall tower to gaze at the stars and to try and see 
further.  
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white tree once more in his ancestral soil (1007).50 On the King’s return, he refuses the “white rod” 
of office, thus symbolically renouncing a materialist conception of power and attends instead to the 
health of the nation and the race (1003). The city is reconciled with the countryside, and thus the 
cycle of civilisation is begun anew and fertility restored: 
 
In his [Aragorn’s] time the City was made more fair than it had ever been, even in its 
days of first glory; and it was filled with trees and with fountains . . . and all was 
healed and made good, and the houses were filled with men and women and the 
laughter of children, and no window was blind nor any courtyard empty; and after 
the Third Age of the world into the new age it preserved the memory and the glory 
of the years that were gone. (1004) 
 
If my analysis of Rings as a work influenced (directly or indirectly) by Spengler is valid, then it 
offers a possible reconciliation between those who see the work as irremediably racist and those 
who see it as a forerunner of modern environmentalist thought and reject charges of racist intent in 
the novel (as indeed Tolkien did in his lifetime). This reconciliation lies in grasping Spengler’s 
conception of racial characteristics being largely determined by the soil rather than genetic 
inheritance. In his words, “A race has roots. Race and landscape belong together” and hence, “a race 
does not migrate. Men migrate, and their successive generations are born in ever-changing 
landscapes; but the landscape exercises a secret force upon the plant-nature in them, and eventually 
the race-expression is completely transformed by the extinction of the old and the appearance of a 
new one” (254). Though there are, of course, inherited racial characteristics, Spengler argued that 
environment was a far more powerful and immediate influence than was realised. The territory 
which a people inhabited shaped them, just as they shaped the territory. As I will now argue, this 
conception of race permeates the mythology of Middle-earth, and understanding it helps us to 
                                                 
50 The strong implication of race fertility here is underscored by Gandalf’s admonition to Aragorn over this tree: 
“Remember this. For if ever a fruit ripens, it should be planted, lest the line die out of the world” (1008). 
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understand both Tolkien’s antipathy towards technology, and variant readings of Rings as 
embodying either reactionary or progressive ideals. It is also helps explicate some of the inherent 
tensions and contradictions which I believe lie at the heart of anti-technologism. 
 
As Niels Werber (2005) has noted, examining what he defines as the geo- and bio-politics of 
Tolkien’s Middle-earth: “in a purely geopolitical context [in Rings], one is taught that the differences 
between the territories of these races should be considered results [sic] of intense interactions 
between the cultivating nations and their soil” (228). In light of my argument that Tolkien was 
influenced by Spenglarian ideals, I will go further here, and propose the inverse as well: that the 
races should also be considered the results of the territories they inhabit. Thus, racial and cultural 
identity and supremacy is asserted primarily as a result of occupation of territory and not vice versa. 
This relationship, and the irredentist ideology underpinning it, forms a powerful theme repeated 
throughout the novel. There is a palpable identification of territory with the races that inhabit it in 
Rings. Not only in terms of the characteristics (the quiet, unassuming hobbits and the gently rolling 
hills of the shire, the wild, hard men of the mountains, the stony dwarves and the willowy elves), but 
at a deeper, mystical level. In the elder races, such as the elves, this identification is so strong that, 
as Sam wonders in Lothlorien, it is hard to say “whether they’ve made the land, or the land’s made 
them” (Tolkien Rings 380). Even speech seems to be formed by relationship to the land, so that the 
language of the Rohirrim, the horsemen, is said to be “like to this land itself; rich and rolling in part, 
and else hard and stern as the mountains” (530).  
 
If we analyse the idea of race and land in Middle-earth in these terms, it resituates the 
debate away from connotations of skin colour and its simplistic representation in Rings (as in the 
black Riders for example) and towards notions of native and foreign which have far greater salience 
and valence in the novel. Curry’s defence of Tolkien against charges of reactionary racism, and his 
counter-claim that the novel upholds ecological ideals is indeed apposite here, although not perhaps 
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in the way he intended, as the races of Middle-earth are portrayed as “inextricably in and of their 
natural and geographical locales” (18). To adopt modern ecological terminology for the moment, 
each race is a product of a distinct bio-region, just as a sub-species of animal is the result of 
adaptation to its surrounding environment.51 It is not, then, a question of skin colour and genetics, 
but more a claim to land by virtue of symbiotic evolution. The land shapes the people, and the 
people shape the land. 
 
However, though this anticipates modern ideals of bioregionalism, and helps in the defence 
of Tolkien against simplistic charges of racism based on skin colour, it remains problematic inasmuch 
as it is structurally nativist. As peoples or races are products of the land they inhabit, those who do 
not belong are necessarily irremediably foreign and quite literally out of place; they are a violation. It 
is here that, in failing to recognise and address this problem, Curry’s defence of Tolkien fails. For 
example, Curry claims that Rings has an inclusionary ethos where one stands “in a village pub in 
multiracial company”, a clear reference to the Hobbit’s stop at the inn at Bree (8). Pace Curry, this is 
tantamount to misrepresentation: there are indeed a mixture of races present at the inn when the 
Hobbits visit, but this is clearly depicted as a sign of trouble, not of a happy multicultural existence. 
The patrons are described as “plainly not very ready to take a large number of strangers into their 
little land” and are distinctly displeased at the presence of so many foreigners in their local inn 
(Tolkien Rings 172). Thus, though Curry is correct in stating that the novel has what we would 
recognise today as an ecological or bioregional viewpoint, it is a distinctly right-wing one that 
conflates the foreign with pollution, as something which should not naturally be there. I would now 
like to explore this as it relates to my current topic, beginning with Jonathon Olsen’s analysis of 
                                                 
51 For example, Tolkien describes in the prologue to Rings how hobbits became “divided into three somewhat 
different breeds” with the small, “neat and nimble” Harfoots adapting to the highlands, the Stoors “broader 
and heavier” with large, flat feet preferring “flat lands and riverlands” and  the Fallohides, taller and slimmer, 
“lovers of trees and of woodlands” (15). The influence works both ways (land to people, and people to land), 
but the ideology is one of natural adaptation to environment and thus an identity rooted in deep connection to 
the soil rather than manufactured culture or politics. 
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twentieth century right-wing ecology and its influence on our conception of pollution in Nature and 
Nationalism (1999).  
 
Olsen argues that the very conception of pollution as we employ that term today is 
grounded in earlier twentieth century ideas about what is natural and native versus what is foreign 
and hence unnatural: 
 
On closer examination it becomes clear that, in the West, our limiting of pollution to 
the natural world has merely concealed, but certainly not erased, the older 
understanding of this term. For in the modern and physical as well as the traditional 
and social understanding of pollution, pollution signifies something that does not 
belong, is foreign, strange, or out of place – be it dirt or matter or be it another 
human group and its practices. (35) 
 
Native and foreign in this view are perceived as deriving from bio-geographical and ecological 
imperatives, and therefore the Enlightenment ideal of universalism which sees territories as purely 
human and political constructs is to be rejected as contradictory to the natural order: 
 
Within a right-wing ecological framework, therefore, the key to solving ecological 
problems lies in a rejection of Enlightenment universalism and the recovery of the 
natural and the rooted – that is to say the ethnic and/or culturally pure nation. In 
short, within right-wing ecology our feeling of belonging to a certain place is 
naturalized, made into an ecological determinant. (35. Emphasis in original)52 
                                                 
52 The enlightenment definition of nationhood was an individualist and above all legal definition, as seen in 
Diderot and Alembert’s formulation: “a considerable number of people who live in a certain stretch of territory 
enclosed within certain limits and obeying the same government” (qtd in Sternhell 277). In contrast, according 
to Sternhell, the counter-enlightenment definition of a nation was much more organicist, emphasising 
historical, ethnic, and cultural connections between people and between people and land.  
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 In Rings this naturalisation of race and land, and the concomitant idea of the foreign as 
pollution is a frequent motif. It is, as Elana Gomel puts it, part of a “grammar of bodily (im)perfection 
where evil is tied to physical ugliness and goodness to health and beauty” (140). Lothlorien, “the 
heart of Elvendom on earth,” is pure and clean by virtue of its long occupation by the elves, and 
disease or degeneracy is hence unknown: “No blemish or sickness or deformity could be seen in 
anything that grew upon the earth. On the land of Lorien there was no stain” (371 & 369). The 
presence of Orcs in the healing waters of the river that flows through the land is seen literally as 
pollution (“curse their foul feet in its clean water!” 364). Purity ensures the prevention of 
degeneracy, and this symbolism is perhaps stronger here in the land of “the Tree-People” than 
anywhere else in the novel because the “Tree-People” are more closely identified with the land than 
any other, more rooted in the soil (359). Like the tall, slim, fair-haired elves, the white trees of 
Lothlorien are “beautiful in their shapely nakedness . . . arrayed in pale gold” (369). This is 
contrasted with their former home of Mirkwood, now part of Sauron’s industrial empire. There, in 
the “dark fir,” we are told that now “the trees strive one against another and their branches rot and 
wither” (370).53 The foreign pollution is – more or less – equivalent to degeneracy, and as such a 
threat to fertility as well as purity. It represents a deviation from the natural order of things, and 
must be utterly scoured and cleansed before order and fertility can be restored.  
 
Similarly, the “scouring of the shire” at the end of the novel requires the removal of the 
“squint-eyed and sallow-faced” foreigners with their “ugly new houses” and factories full of 
“outlandish contraptions” that “pour out filth” threatening to turn the Shire into “a desert” (1041 
and 1051).54 The message is clear and unequivocal: industrialism and urbanism are foreign and 
                                                 
53 Once again, the symbolism of trees for the ideal of ethnic and cultural rootedness is apparent here. Compare 
the idea of purity and degeneracy here with the tale of the white tree of Numenor which is described as having 
“withered” as “the blood of the Numenoreans became mingled with that of lesser men” (Rings 262). 
54 The trope of desertification, whilst there is not space to explore it here, is an important one, current at the 
time Tolkien began writing the novel (around 1937) and tied in with metaphors of sterility and the need for 
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unnatural concepts and constitute pollution which must be scoured from the land for fertility to be 
restored. “This isn’t your country and you’re not wanted” as the representative Shire figure of 
Farmer Cotton tells the foreigners. After the homeland has been cleansed, fertility returns in a 
suitably organic fashion, with Sam planting his seed given to him by the elves in the soil at the centre 
of the Shire, and by so doing restoring purity and health to the race: “all the children born or 
begotten in that year, and there were many, were fair to see and strong, and most of them had a 
rich golden hair . . . and no one was ill . . .” (1061). Thus, just as Winston Smith in 1984 hoped that 
the prole woman might represent the promise of eventual return to agrarian simplicity, so in Rings 
the Spenglarian ideal of the “eternal peasant” who endures by virtue of his connection with his own 
soil is upheld: “The timeless village and the ‘eternal’ peasant reappear, begetting children and 
burying seed in Mother Earth – a busy, easily contented swarm, over which the tempest of soldier-
emperors passingly blows” (Spengler 381). 
 
What I hope has been noticeable in the preceding analysis of Rings is the extent to which it 
shares many of the features, themes, and concerns of the anti-technological works referred to in the 
first chapter. There is the immense importance placed on the idea of rootedness: where Orwell and 
others used the metaphors of locally grown vegetables and “real” food versus mass-produced tinned 
food, Tolkien has the even more powerful and direct metaphor of trees to represent the importance 
of rootedness and connection to the soil. As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, the ideal of 
rootedness in anti-technological texts carries with it the idea of false fertility, the criticism that the 
abundance of technology and the modern, urban lifestyle is something of a pyramid scheme, reliant 
on ever greater expropriation of resources to survive, and doomed eventually to catastrophic failure.  
If we compare the themes examined so far in Rings with a comment made by the influential Tory 
writer on rural affairs, HJ Massingham, we can see that this nationalistic anti-imperialism, anti-
                                                                                                                                                        
cultural regeneration. See, for example, the overtly phallic imagery Steinbeck uses to describe the rape of the 
land by mechanised implements in The Grapes of Wrath (1939), and the way it is very clearly portrayed as 
symbolic of a wider cultural malaise. 
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technologism and anti-cosmopolitanism were different aspects of the same ideology for many in the 
first half of the twentieth century. 
 
 In his autobiography, Massingham reflected on how he came to believe in the necessity of 
turning away from mechanisation back towards a more localised, agricultural way of life: 
 
I perceived that agriculture lies at the heart of civilization, and that a civilization that 
neglects it is foredoomed to extinction. To acquire this view I needed no arguments. I 
had but to read what had happened to the Roman Empire through and from that 
neglect. The ascendency of urban capitalism exhausted the soil and degraded the 
peasantry, while the exploitation of virgin lands overseas was the means of feeding a 
Roman proletariat subsisting on slave-labour in place of our machines. That Roman 
story is frightening . . . . (Massingham 1942, qtd. by BD Knowles) 
 
The influence of the organicism and negative classicism of writers like Spengler and José Ortega Y 
Gasset is apparent here, as it is in Rings itself. As in the anti-technological works examined in the first 
chapter, the degeneration of an urban population due to machinery is a concern. This is analogised 
with the imperialism of ancient Rome, and the unsustainability of expropriating resources from 
other lands to feed an unproductive and degenerate population at home. In opposition to the 
expansionary, outward-looking imperialist mind-set, Massingham stresses the importance of looking 
inwards and regenerating culture based on a close relationship to native soil.55   
                                                 
55 Arch-Conservative writers such as Massingham and their use of the organic form continue to be influential in 
anti-technological works that combine progressive and reactionary ideals to this day. For example, Paul 
Kingsnorth, a former staff member at The Ecologist, as well as a writer for progressive publications The New 
Statesman and The Guardian, is also the author of the Uncivilisation document that forms the manifesto of the 
“Dark Mountain” group of anti-technological writers and artists. His book, Real England (2008), whilst 
emphasising Green ideals of local food production and anti-globalisation, also declares that it is “about the sort 
of country I live in and the sort of people who inhabit it. It is about the wiping out of its culture and character . 
. . it is . . . a call to arms” (10). In this context, Kingsnorth approvingly quotes Massingham’s claim that the 
inhabitants of industrial cities like Manchester are “populations rather than persons. They do what their 
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 In Rings, this ideology is appropriately mythologised and the unsustainability of expansion is 
seen in the effects of the centralising industrialism of Sauron’s empire. When Frodo and Sam make it 
into Mordor they find a land “ruinous and dead, a desert burned and choked” and wonder “how the 
Lord of this realm maintained and fed his slaves and armies” (Rings 958). The answer, of course, is by 
ever greater exploitation and expropriation of other lands – it is Tolkien’s representation of the 
expansionary logic of machine civilisation and imperialism in action. The centralising force of 
technological imperialism is sucking the life out of an ever-widening swathe of land to sustain its 
growth: 
 
Neither he [Sam] nor Frodo knew anything of the great slave-worked fields away 
south in this wide realm, beyond the fumes of the mountain by the dark sad waters 
of Lake Nurnen; nor of the great roads that ran away east and south to tributary 
lands, from which the soldiers of the Tower brought long waggon-trains of goods and 
booty and fresh slaves. Here in the northward regions were the mines and the 
forges, and the musterings of long-planned war . . . . (Rings 959) 
 
Though Mordor is a wasteland, pockmarked with the ejecta and effluvia of industrialism, its 
inhabitants are dangerously fecund. At the start of the novel, we are told that they are “multiplying” 
and by the time we get to Helm’s Deep, the first major battle of the story, they are like “swarming 
flies”, a “dark tide” that makes the valley seem to be “boiling and crawling with black shapes” (57, 
565 and 556). Such imagery, as Connelly notes, comes from a long-established European fear of the 
Asiatic masses who were depicted in literature “as a nameless, faceless force of nature through such 
images as a flood, tidal wave or, alternatively, as ants, bees, etc.” (Connelly 2006 302).56 The long 
                                                                                                                                                        
industrial economy tells them to do” (11). Even in the twenty-first century, organicism leads to the conflation of 
environment with culture and the division of legitimate and artificial populations.  
56 The enduring effect of such imagery is still apparent today in the way migrants or refugees are frequently and 
unashamedly referred to in such dehumanising terms. So common is the trope, that it has become almost a 
dead metaphor, and no longer raises any comment at all. 
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held fear was that the Asian masses would inevitably someday industrialise and negate the 
technological and military advantage of the West.57 
 
However, though Tolkien may have used the language of Western anxiety over the Asiatic 
masses, I do not believe his intention was consciously or deliberately racist or based on any simple 
identification of class. Rather, I believe that insofar as it is legitimate to assign symbolism to the Orcs, 
they represent simply a race of people deracinated, debased and degenerated by industrialism and 
the “slaves” of the “technological and instrumental power embodied in Sauron” (Curry 14).58 The 
“industrial, imperialistic” empire of Mordor is presented as the only country or realm in Middle-
earth which is not properly native, but instead “essentially an alien invader” (Curry 22). By contrast, 
as Curry observes, ‘the various races of people in Middle-earth are rooted to and unimaginable . . . 
without their natural contexts” (51). As per Olsen’s analysis of right-wing ecology, the sense of 
belonging to a place is naturalised and made an ecological determinant.  
 
 This has disturbing implications, which we can see actuated in the narrative. After battles, 
those races which have a homeland are explicitly pardoned and released on the understanding that 
they return there and do not become involved with imperialist adventuring again (Rings 568 and 
1005). The Orcs, on the other hand, as the alien invaders, have no homeland to go to. They are, to 
use CS Lewis’s expression “artificial beings” – something which becomes quite literally true with the 
breeding of the gruesome Uruk-Hai, created by Saruman crossbreeding humans and Orcs. They are 
not “a type-true people, born of and grown on the soil” but instead a formless and indistinguishable 
mob “cohering unstably in fluid masses” (Spengler 25). Having no culture, they have no authentic 
identity and deserve to be wiped out: “as when death smites the swollen brooding thing that 
                                                 
57 See, e.g., Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China (1904).  
58 The fact that Tolkien thought of the elves in a similar way (as representing “Men with greatly enhanced 
aesthetic and creative faculties”), suggests that this reading is more likely than a straightforward racial or class-
based reading (Letters 176). 
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inhabits their crawling hill and holds them all in sway, ants will wander witless and purposeless and 
then feebly die, so the creatures of Sauron, Orc or troll or beast spell-enslaved, ran hither and 
thither mindless . . . .” (985). 
 
After the battle at Helm’s Deep, we are told that “no Orcs remained alive” (in contrast to the 
hill men who fought alongside them and are released). Instead their bodies are “piled in great 
heaps” and left to rot. Cultural identity is seen as coming from connection to the soil, and thus 
industrialism and those identified with it are unnatural, synthetic, and a violation of the natural 
order – they are pollution. Eternal vigilance is required against any such contamination and this is 
explicitly couched in organicist metaphors relating agriculture to culture – as Gandalf informs the 
Lords of the West, it is necessary that they continue “uprooting the evil in the fields that we know, 
so that those who live after may have clean earth to till” (913). 
 
 The blood and soil relationship is thus the marker and of authenticity and guardian of purity 
and vibrancy of culture, keeping all life – spiritual, political, and even individual – in check. The desire 
to transgress and exceed these bounds, the refusal to recognise inherent limits, is the root of all evil 
in Tolkien’s world. Technology, of course, does just that. Technology by definition is disruptive, it 
changes individual behaviours, social relationships, even the face of the land people live on. In 
Western Europe, undoubtedly the biggest change it wrought for most people in the twentieth 
century was the move from the country to the city, a huge centralising force, drawing people in. 
Tolkien loathed this tendency, and worried that “the bigger things get the smaller and flatter the 
globe gets” (Tolkien Letters 65). In opposition to technology’s materialism and centralising tendency, 
Tolkien invented a world which we would now see describe as decentralised. The victory of the 
West, in Rings, is therefore ultimately couched as a cleansing that will lead to a revivified and 
purified culture, rather than a victory that will lead to power and dominance over other lands. 
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 Such a world encapsulates and offers both progressive and reactionary ideals, as I have 
shown in this chapter. Though it speaks to modern ideas regarding bioregionalism and the 
importance of safeguarding cultural identities against the homogenising tendencies of technology 
and capitalism, it does so by grounding culture in ties to the soil and places them within an organicist 
conception of civilisation and history which can serve opposite and contradictory ends. As such, it 
shows that Tolkien’s influence on romantic protest, as considered by Veldman, must be recognised 
as introducing, or certainly reinforcing, tendencies which accentuate the paradox of “reactionary 
consciousness” at the heart of progressive ideology. Tolkien’s Rings embodies Monaco’s description 
of “an atavistic flight from nearly any aspect of experience that may be called modern” and 
exemplifies “the pursuit of a return to nature [and] the embrace of instinct over reason” (91). The 
extent to which it licenced a similar view of people as products of the landscape they were born in is 
obviously much more debatable, but certainly it romanticised and re-popularised the idea of 
mystical connection between people and place that had become unacceptable in post-World War 
Two Western society. 
 
As it rejects the mass culture of modern society, then, the reactionary consciousness has to 
ground cultural identity in ideals of stability and order (hierarchy) based on analogy to the natural 
world. As Massingham put it in the introduction to a collection of essays published in 1945 entitled 
The Natural Order such an order was truly “ecological” because “The pattern of life worked out by 
pre-industrial rural society was an unconscious obedience to ecological laws because the 
independent nuclei of the pattern as a whole were localized” (7-8). When such “natural order” 
prevailed, Massingham claimed, “the country speech, the songs and rituals, the objects made, and 
the buildings all obeyed another law, the law of beauty” (10). As worked out in Rings, obedience to 
natural laws brings stability, purity, and beauty; defying them, whilst successful in the short-term 
soon leads to degeneration, blemish, and collapse. It is noticeable, for example, that in retrospect 
the first deviation from the natural order in the Shire is made not by outsiders but by native 
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inhabitants, and is linked to industrialism, the exporting of agricultural produce for profit, and 
speculative finance from unspecified foreign investors: “It all began with Pimple, as we call him” 
Farmer Cotton tells Frodo, “He’d funny ideas, had Pimple . . . he was always grabbing more, though 
where he got the money from was a mystery” (1049). The trouble really starts in the Shire when 
“Pimple” seeks to employ technological means towards greater efficiency and so knocks down the 
old mill: “then he brought in a lot o’ dirty-looking Men to build a bigger one and fill it full o’ wheels 
and outlandish contraptions . . . . Pimple’s idea was to grind more and faster . . .” (1050). Thus, in the 
blatantly physically degenerate character of “Pimple” deviation from the natural order is explicitly 
identified with commercialism, machine civilisation, and pollution of the native soil. 
 
 Rings romanticised and reinforced the feeling for a post-World War Two generation that 
there was such a thing as a natural order which applied to human society and culture, and which we 
ignored at our peril. It conveyed in mythological form the belief that the expansionary nature of 
technology violated inherent limits to growth and this was not only destructive to the natural world, 
but injurious to society and individual well-being. In the natural order, as exemplified in the novel, 
the different pure races fulfil a role that is harmonious, or – to put it another way, rightful – in 
respect to their immediate environment and thus bring their culture and society into line with 
nature and its inviolable laws. It is only the impure, debased, and cross-bred Orcs of Sauron’s 
technological imperialism that sought to range across the earth, ignoring or ignorant of such natural 
laws of place. Technology in Rings, then, is conflated with pollution and impurity. It is identified with 
expansionism, and enables and encourages violations of the natural order which, unless resisted, will 
“slowly turn Men and Elves into Orcs” (Tolkien Letters 78).  
 
  The symbolism and worldview that such a conception offered to the counter-cultural 
movements of the 1960 and 70s is obvious. The New Scientist magazine in 1979 remarked that 
“Middle Earth first appeared on the campuses of the west sloganizing against technopia” (Robinson 
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610). As disillusionment with the possibilities of revolutionary change set in, many in the counter-
culture took the ideal of rural simplicity and regionalism in Rings to heart and moved away from the 
cities to pursue a self-sufficient, low-tech life as “hobbits” in the countryside.59 Veldman makes the 
particularly acute observation that in rejecting overtly economic and political solutions in favour of 
personal inner awakening it accorded perfectly with the feeling that the personal was political. Yet it 
was not simply an escapist text, but an inspirational one. Greenpeace activists imagined themselves 
as “Hobbits” facing the might of Mordor, Friends of the Earth (London) met in the “Middle Earth” 
café opposite their headquarters to discuss strategy (Lamb 59). The original “angry young man,” the 
writer Colin Wilson, declared that Rings “is at once an attack on the modern world and a credo, and 
a manifesto. It stands for a system of values; that is why teenagers write ‘Gandalf lives’ on the walls 
of London tubes” (1974, qtd. by Veldman 110).  In an era of rebellion against centralising 
governments, multi-national corporations, materialism, and homogenising mass culture, the novel 
offered an anti-materialist vision of redemption through harmony with nature, and – perhaps 
counter-intuitively for a fantasy novel – an ideal of authenticity, of rootedness.  
 
 These then, were the oppositions that Rings set up in the affluent, post-war West: 
regionalism versus globalism, cultural purity versus the homogenisation of mass culture, the 
desirability of a simple, fundamentally rural lifestyle versus urban living, and – perhaps most of all – 
a sustainable “natural order” versus an unsustainable and rapacious technological expansionism. It is 
of course extremely difficult, if not impossible, to clearly delineate the scope and extent of influence 
that any one work of fiction has on the culture and thought of its time, but I think the examples 
given in this chapter show that in writing a work that championed the ideals of nationalism over 
imperialism, influenced by negative classicists like Spengler who saw such imperialism as a symptom 
                                                 
59 See, for example, Glenn Loney, “Hippy Home in Walden Pond West” LIFE magazine, 24th Nov. 1967, pp. R2-4. 
Loney reports a visit to a “hippy commune” modelled explicitly on the Shire, with homes called “The Hobbit 
House” and cats named “Frodo” and so on. In place of agitation and campaigning, Rings provided a mythology 
and romantic rationale for withdrawal and self-containment, an attempt to create an alternative community 
rather than trying to alter the world as it was. 
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of an “expansive tendency” that would be the “doom” of the Western World, Rings communicated 
certain fundamental reactionary counter-enlightenment ideas and ideals current in the early 
twentieth century into the progressive culture of the late twentieth century. 
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     Chapter Three: Anti-Technology and Over-Population. 
 
. . . Whether or not the Green Revolution can increase food production as much as its 
champions claim is a debatable but possibly irrelevant point. Those who support this 
well-intended humanitarian effort should first consider some of the fundamentals of 
human ecology. Ironically, one man who did was the late Alan Gregg, a vice president 
of the Rockefeller Foundation. Two decades ago he expressed strong doubts about 
the wisdom of such attempts to increase food production. He likened the growth and 
spread of humanity over the surface of the earth to the spread of cancer in the human 
body, remarking that "cancerous growths demand food; but, as far as I know, they 
have never been cured by getting it”. 
- Garret Hardin, “Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor” (n. pag.). 
 
“‘Mother Culture’ tells us to increase food production to feed the hungry. But this will 
mean more people. Will we extract a promise not to breed? No”.  
 
“So what will happen if you feed the starving millions?” 
 
“They’ll reproduce and our population will increase”.  
  
- Daniel Quinn, Ishmael (136).  
 
In the previous chapter I looked at the way Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings identified technology as 
an aspect of the expansionary mood of imperialism, and noted some parallels between the novel 
and Oswald Spengler’s thesis in his seminal work, The Decline of the West. I noted the way in which 
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technology was seen to have a debasing and deracinating effect at the same time as it enabled an 
artificial and false fecundity which threatened to overwhelm the stable and rooted life exemplified 
in the novel by The Shire. I also discussed the role of the right-wing ecological trope of pollution as 
the intrusion of the foreign, and the role technology was seen as performing in engendering this 
pollution. In this chapter I want to extend and elaborate on these themes in examining the 
relationship between anti-technologism and Post-World War Two fears of over-population which 
reached an apogee in the 1960s and ‘70s. Though my focus on literature will be on these two 
decades, a crucial part of my argument in this chapter will be that the relationship between anti-
technology and neo-Malthusianism is systemic; hence the relationship both pre-dates this period 
and remains very much alive to this date. I will therefore be referring to publications from before 
World War Two to the present day in making my case. 
 
 This chapter will be of a more conceptual nature than the previous one, concerned as much 
with discerning and delineating the ideological links between anti-technologism and Neo-
Malthusianism as with explication of particular texts. This is necessary, I believe, as I see anti-
technologism as being substantially interested at a deep, structural level with over-population, 
stemming in large part from earlier fears regarding urban degeneration and the proliferation of 
“unfit” populations. This chapter will be largely concerned with opening out certain systemic or 
structural facets of anti-technologism and its division of “false” and “natural” fertility, in order to 
facilitate better understanding and analysis of anti-technological texts in later chapters. A key 
concern here will be to argue that anti-technologism served to express and explore sublimated 
Western fears over the loss of hegemony, the numerical supremacy of the other, and reverse 
colonisation. In order to foreground these fears and explore how anti-technologism conceptualised 
them, I will be referring throughout to Jean Raspail’s infamous racist dystopic novel, The Camp of the 
Saints (1975).60 I propose that the atavistic fears and ideology made explicit in Raspail’s novel are 
                                                 
60 Cited hereafter as Saints. 
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very much implicit in anti-technologism’s concern with over-population and distrust of “growth” 
generally. After laying out the terms of reference for this chapter I begin with a brief synopsis of 
Saints and consider the reception this overtly racist and xenophobic work has received. I then use 
this as an avenue to examine some aspects of the increasing concern over over-population in the 
West, the way it which it arose from eugenic concerns over differential breeding, and the way in 
which fears of non-Western industrialisation and competition were largely sublimated from open 
discussion into literary representation. 
 
  The tremendous growth in population during the twentieth century was undoubtedly one 
of the defining trends of the era. The world population at the start of the twentieth century was less 
than two billion, but approaching seven billion by the end of the century. This massive increase was 
the result not of increased birth rates but of a decrease in mortality brought about by advances in 
science, knowledge, technology, and the industrialisation of agriculture (Connelly Fatal 
Misconception). As I observed in the first chapter, such advances gave rise to eugenic fears of 
degeneration and of the proliferation of the less fit in the absence of “natural” checks on their 
survival. These trends will form an important strand of my argument in this chapter that the anti-
technological obsession (I use the term advisedly) with Malthusianism can and should be seen as the 
extension and evolution of this eugenic concern. There is not space here to discuss the history of 
concerns regarding over-population and its links to eugenicism, but a good critical summary of 
Malthusianism and its modern variants can be found in John Bellamy Foster’s “Malthus’ Essay on 
Population at Age 200: A Marxian View”.61 In this chapter I also rely on the left-libertarian 
perspective to be found in Frank Furedi’s Population and Development: A Critical Introduction 
                                                 
61 I cite this analysis not least because I believe that Marx and Engel’s criticisms of Malthus are directly relevant 
to my discussion here.  Marx’s analysis of Malthus recognised that fear of a flourishing underclass was a prime 
motivating factor and that the real object of Malthusians was to justify the withholding of efforts to materially 
improve the living standards of the poor, just as modern day Malthusians such as David Attenborough 
condemn food shipments to the starving in places like Ethiopia as “barmy” on the grounds that any such 
attempted circumvention of nature is foredoomed to fail (Furness “Sir David Attenborough: If We Do Not 
Control Population, the Natural World Will”. n. pag.).  
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(1997), as well as the comprehensive history of the subject to be found in William Connelly’s Fatal 
Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population (2008). What follows is an extremely 
truncated overview of the discussion since the time of World War Two, foregrounding those aspects 
of it which are salient to this chapter.  
 
 As Furedi observes, modern Malthusianism (after World War Two) has its roots in Pre-War 
eugenic concerns over differential rates of procreation between the rich and the poor. Whereas 
previously this concern had tended to focus on differential population growth within Western 
nations, as non-Western countries began to follow the path of industrialisation similar anxieties 
began to emerge over differential rates of population growth between countries. As Frank Notestein 
one of the leading demographers of the twentieth century later recalled “we did not know whether 
to be worried about overriding population growth or incipient population decline in the Western 
world. But we were quite sure that we should be worried and that, whatever the trends, changes in 
the biological and social heritage might well threaten the quality of the population” (qtd in Connelly 
305). Aldous Huxley was one of the first to raise such concerns over differential growth between 
nations and the threat to Western hegemony. In a letter to the writer Norman Douglas in 1925 
Aldous Huxley confided his worries regarding a future in which the West would have neither 
numerical nor technological supremacy: 
 
One winter, I shall certainly go and spend some months there [in Tunisia], about the 
time of the date harvest—tho’ I have no doubt that the sight of the Arabs picking and 
packing the dates w[oul]d be enough to make one’s gorge turn every time one set 
eyes on that fruit for the rest of one’s life. How tremendously European one feels 
when one has seen these devils in their native muck! And to think that we are busily 
teaching them all the mechanical arts of peace and war which gave us, in the past, 
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our superiority over their numbers! In fifty years’ time, it seems to me, Europe can’t 
fail to be wiped out by these monsters. (Letters of Aldous Huxley 250-1) 
 
Allied to the fear of non-Western nations gaining technological equality was the argument 
that it was the use of Western technology and scientific knowledge abroad that was fostering the 
growth in population which posed a threat to the West. As per the previous chapter’s examination 
of Rings, this fear was often expressed in terms of an artificial and foreign technology upsetting a 
somehow “natural” balance. William Vogt’s highly influential Road to Survival (1949) gives a good 
example of this mind-set.62 Vogt (an American) castigates the British imperialists in India not for their 
subjugation of the population, but for their importation of Western technology, medicine, and 
sanitation. “While economic and sanitary conditions were being ‘improved’” Vogt complains, “the 
Indians went their accustomed way, breeding with the irresponsibility of Codfish” (226-7). Once 
more the imperialist is seen to be a “destroyer” and Vogt grimly warns of the potentially 
catastrophic implications for the West of upsetting the natural balance: 
 
A heavily industrialized India, backed up by such population pressure, would be a 
danger to the entire world. Disorders following the British withdrawal seem to be 
imposing once more the Malthusian checks that held the pre-British population 
within reasonable bounds. It appears probable that the turmoil will also stultify any 
considerable industrial development. This is a result piously to be desired . . . . (228) 
 
The development of industry in countries such as India and China, according to Vogt, citing unnamed 
authorities, posed the greatest danger to world peace, and therefore extensive famines in such 
countries “from the world point of view” might be “not only desirable but indispensible” (238). 
                                                 
62 Cited hereafter as Survival. The work was translated into eleven languages and had an estimated audience of 
between twenty and thirty million people in book form, as well as reaching a still larger audience after 
publication in condensed form in Readers’ Digest (Desrochers and Hoffbauer 2009 39).  
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Showing the influence and confluence of earlier eugenic fears of differential population growth, he 
also recommended that in developed nations “sterilization bonuses” be paid to marginal members 
of society, arguing that it was better to pay them to be sterilized rather than “support their hordes 
of offspring that, by both genetic and social inheritance, would tend to perpetuate their 
fecklessness” (282-3).63 
 
Publications such as Vogt’s and Our Plundered Planet by Fairfield Osborn were remarkably 
successful in shaping the debate over demographics and introducing a distinctly nativist element to 
the nascent environmental movement64. Indeed, as Allen Chase notes in The Legacy of Malthus: The 
Social Costs of the New Scientific Racism, both books became mandatory reading for many college 
courses and influenced a whole generation (381). Moreover, it was not by coincidence that Paul 
Ehrlich’s chose to open his massively popular book The Population Bomb with the author really 
feeling the population explosion for the first time “one stinking hot night in New Delhi” which 
inspired him to write of the need to address the “cancer of population growth” (15 and prologue).65 
Faced with the seemingly inevitable industrialisation of non-Western nations and their 
overwhelming numbers, the spectre of the foreign hordes invading and contaminating the West was 
once more resurrected. In 1963 Julian Huxley (then Director of UNESCO) warned that 
overpopulation in poor nations was leading to the “invasion” of Western nations, a process he 
claimed was, 
                                                 
63 Such fears were surprisingly enduring and pervasive, affecting many disparate aspects of life in the Twentieth 
century. Supreme Court Justice, Ruth Bader, for instance, recently remarked that at the time of the momentous 
Roe V. Wade decision on abortion rights in America she naturally assumed the background to the case being 
brought before the Supreme Court was substantially about differential population growth: “Frankly I had 
thought that at the time Roe was decided, there was concern about population growth and particularly growth 
in populations that we don’t want to have too many of” (Emily Bazelon “The Place of Women On The Court”).  
64 For further discussion and contextualisation of the history of nativist attempts to influence and co-opt the 
environmental movement see Betsy Hartmann “The Greening of Hate: An Environmentalist’s Essay” available 
on the website of the Southern Poverty Law Center at http://www.splcenter.org/greenwash-nativists-
environmentalism-and-the-hypocrisy-of-hate/the-greening-of-hate-an-essay. Also Levison et al. “Apply The 
Brakes: Anti-Immigrant Co-option of the Environmental Movement” available on the website of the Center for 
New Community at http://www.newcomm.org/content/view/2138/120/ . 
65 Like Vogt before him, Ehrlich also saw industrialisation of poorer countries as an existential threat, and urged 
his readers to write to their Senators and Representatives to argue (amongst other things) that “Not all 
countries can be industrialized” and “D[eveloped] C[ountries] cannot feed U[ndeveloped] C[ountries]” (178). 
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comparable to what happens in human cancers, where unlimited multiplication 
produces what are called metastases – groups of cells that migrate to another part of 
the body and start trouble there.  I would say it is perfectly legitimate to compare 
the invasions of Puerto Ricans in New York and of Jamaicans in London and other 
parts of Britain to metastases in cancer. (Julian Huxley 71)66 
 
Like Vogt and others, Julian Huxley was at pains to stress the inadvisability of non-Western 
nations seeking to follow Western nations in industrialising their economies, a process he argued 
was futile anyway until they curtailed their population growth. This argument was echoed in the 
same year by his brother, Aldous Huxley, who also warned that population growth in under-
developed nations would lead to the invasion of the West and “may bring irretrievable ruin to the 
one-third of the human race now living prosperously in highly industrialized societies” (“The World 
Population Problem” 329). The danger, he cautioned, was that “the science and technology which 
have given the industrial West its cars, refrigerators, and contraceptives have given the people of 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America only movies and radio broadcasts, which they are too simpleminded 
to be able to criticize, together with a population explosion . . .” (325). Similarly, Ehrlich in The 
Population Bomb reminded his readers that in poorer countries “people have gotten the word about 
the better life. They have seen colored pictures in magazines of the miracles of Western technology . 
. . they are not going to be happy” (23). “Will they starve gracefully, without rocking the boat?” 
Ehrlich asked, adopting Hardin’s “lifeboat” metaphor for the position of the rich countries, “Or will 
they attempt to overwhelm us in order to get what they consider to be their fair share?” (133). 
 
                                                 
66 Likewise in Australia in 1947 the Nobel prize-winning microbiologist Sir Macfarlane Burnet wrote to the 
government urging the development of “infectious diseases” and other biological weapons as “the most 
effective counter-offensive to threatened invasion by overpopulated Asiatic countries”. The government 
responded positively to such a suggestion, but nothing concrete seems to have come of it for technical reasons. 
See Brendan Nicholson, “Burnet’s Solution: The Plan to Poison S-E Asia” in The Age 10th March 2002.  
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By the 1960s and 70s, then, such perspectives and ideologies had permeated to mainstream 
thinking and led to largely unquestioning acceptance of the underlying nativist Neo-Malthusian 
themes as more or less axiomatic truths. Robert L. Heilbroner’s work, An Inquiry into the Human 
Prospect (1974) gives a good example of this, as well as demonstrating the extent to which the 
widespread diffusion of technology across the globe was blamed for instigating the crisis. Heilbroner 
proposes a “unifying proposition” which could explain the major threats of war, overpopulation, 
resource depletion, and environmental degradation: “The population explosion that looms with such 
horrifying possibilities is directly traceable to the consequences of new techniques of science and 
technology in the area of medicine and public health” (56). Illustrating the way in which (as Furedi 
and others have pointed out) such fears arose out of the perception of differential population 
growth rather than overall growth per se, Heilbroner later goes on to argue that of course “the 
problem of population growth must be discussed in terms of the differential rates of growth of the 
developed and the underdeveloped lands” (79). Such a differential, it was widely understood, was 
leading to resentments and pressures that were escalating into numerous wars, and may well end in 
all-out nuclear war. It is crucial to note that an essential part of this eschatological thinking was that 
as technology caused the problem, it could not possibly solve the problem (by increased crop yields 
for example). Indeed, such attempts were viewed with dismay and even anger by many. Heilbroner, 
for example, warns that an additional problem looming was “the danger that the Malthusian check 
[in developing countries] will be offset by a large increase in food production, which will enable 
additional hundreds of millions to reach childbearing age” (35).  
 
As I will show throughout this chapter, the ideological thread running through these and 
similar publications in Post-World War Two Western society was that science, technology and 
modern medicine had upset the natural equilibrium that had previously prevailed and led to a 
population explosion whilst at the same time corrupting impressionable natives with aspirational 
ideas of a Western lifestyle. In short, it was a reprisal of earlier fears regarding degeneracy, of 
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anxieties about burgeoning, rootless and unstable urban masses being created by technology, 
urbanism and materialism. As I argued in my analysis of Rings, technology was perceived to be 
fostering artificial and unnatural growth of degenerate foreign populations which would inevitably 
overflow the boundaries of their own lands and seek to expropriate new territories. As I have 
previously noted, technology in such a worldview is perceived as fostering not a real, rooted growth, 
but an unnatural and cancerous multiplication that presents a danger to “civilisation” (which 
frequently, as I will show, seems to stand as a euphemism for the western world). As the diplomat 
and environmentalist, Sir Crispin Tickell, put it in his 2001 Linacre lecture at Oxford University 
warning of the dangers of overpopulation and the “prime threat” of refugees: “It can be seen as a 
case of malignant maladaptation in which a species, like infected tissue in the organism of life, 
multiplies out of control, affecting everything else” (n. pag.).  Tickell’s crass analogy shows that even 
in the twenty-first century the old trope of unfit and somehow artificial populations continues to 
exert a depressingly tenacious influence. Such a conception of populations in these countries as 
“artificial” has the corollary effect of licencing the view of them as either a contagion or an invasive 
threat to Western society.  
 
 Thus, in Malthusian and anti-technological literature, overpopulation and 
contagion/invasion are seen as the logical and inevitable consequence of technology which weakens 
and degenerates the developed nations by decadence, whilst at the same time it allows the 
unsustainable growth of more primitive nations who might eventually overspill their boundaries and 
invade in a process of reverse colonialism. In the next section of this chapter I will explore some 
examples of this tendency with reference to Raspail’s Saints. I start with a brief synopsis and 
discussion of the novel. I go on to demonstrate how the metaphors, tropes, and schemata of the 
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novel can be seen in anti-technological works generally, especially the perennial Western fear of 
reverse colonisation and the need for strict separation of different cultures and peoples.67  
 
The one thing your struggle for their souls has left them is the knowledge that the 
West – your West – is rich. To them, you’re the symbols of abundance . . . After all 
your help – all the seeds, and drugs, and technology – they found it so much simpler 
just to say, ‘Here’s my son, here’s my daughter. Take them. Take me. Take us all to 
your country’. And the idea caught on. You thought it was fine. You encouraged it, 
organized it. But now it’s too big, it’s out of your hands. It’s a flood, a deluge. And it’s 
out of control. (Saints 27) 
 
 Saints is a novel about invasion. Specifically, it is a novel about the invasion of France by poor slum-
dwelling Indians who over-spill their tenements and commandeer ships to find the promised land of 
the West, but more generally and symbolically the invasion of the West by “a third world burgeoned 
into multitudes” (introduction xiii). It recounts the events leading up to the landing of the flotilla on 
the beaches of southern France, the erosion of culture and loss of will that fatally undermines the 
Western world and leads to its colonisation by the innumerable poor of the third world. Monsieur 
Calgues, representing the old, reactionary and discredited Westerner, is a retired professor living in a 
beachfront house who records these events. Paralysed by decades of “propaganda” about the 
equality of all human life, “a limitless script in that ongoing cinema of the masses,” the decadent 
inhabitants of France and other wealthy nations equivocate and gnash their teeth, but are unable to 
take the decisive steps needed to repel the invasion (83). Meanwhile, thanks to Western aid and 
technology, the population of the poorer countries has swelled to overflowing and eventually the 
                                                 
67 For a discussion of the perennial Western concern of invasion from the East in literature, and its links to 
Malthusianism, see Mathew Connelly, “To Inherit the Earth: Imagining World Population, from the Yellow Peril 
to the Population Bomb” in Journal of Global History (2006) 1, pp. 299–319. Connelly’s discussion is particularly 
relevant to this chapter as he observes the way in which such concerns fed into broader societal anxieties such 
as the need to prevent degeneration and preserve Western civilisation in a pure form, something I discuss on 
my own terms later in this chapter.  
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inhabitants decide to seek the Western paradise they have heard of: “the Third World had started to 
overflow its banks, and the West was its sewer” (260). They commandeer a fleet of aging Western 
ships and vessels and set sail for the West. Originally written in French, the novel was published in 
English by white supremacist, John Tanton, a long-standing colleague of Population Bomb author, 
Paul Ehrlich.68 The reverse colonisation of the West is inexorable and total, but a symbolic last stand 
is made at the end of the novel by Calgues and a few remnants of the old Western world, such as 
Monsieur Machefer, the irascible editor of a newspaper condemned for its racist, reactionary 
opinions; Colonel Dragases, the last officer in the French army willing to try to resist the invasion; the 
Duc d’Uras, the local noble and landowner; and a handful of others. Faced with the fall of Western 
civilisation, they decide to make a symbolic last stand in a remote hamlet, the simple rural existence 
representing all that they lost long ago (“My heart is in The Village” Calgues records [285]). 
Temporarily secure in the isolation of the village, life once again makes sense, with a clear hierarchy 
and sense of purpose established. The two loyal man-servants of the Duc d’Uras form the peasantry 
of this fragile arcadia. Though this feudal scene is only a brief respite from the chaos now rampant 
outside, all enjoy a last few days of camaraderie and humour, united against the common enemy of 
the invader: 
 
The colonel drove the truck back, all flags flying. They sang out their chorus of ‘No, 
no regrets,’ and Machefer dredged up a little ditty from his past. A tune about a duke 
that met with great success. Especially when the Duc d’Uras took one of the 
Springfields and, aiming it out the window while the truck rolled on full tilt, mowed 
down a trio of Ganges bastards, scampering off by the side of the road. Shot dead, 
through the heart. Great rifle to take on an African safari . . . . (300) 
                                                 
68 From 1975 to 1977 Tanton had been President of Paul Ehrlich’s Zero Population Growth movement, before 
leaving to form FAIR, the Federation for American Immigration Reform, an anti-immigrant population group 
which Ehrlich and his wife were senior advisors to for a number of years before it was revealed that FAIR 
received funding from the Pioneer Fund, a eugenicist foundation dedicated to proving IQ differentials between 
races (Southern Poverty Law Center, “Federation for American Immigration Reform”).  
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 Underlying Saints is an atavistic loathing and horror of the “the other”, the utterly alien and 
seemingly limitless population of the Third World. They are described in terms of an inexorable 
cancer spreading across the globe and also as loathsome human sewage. Significantly for my 
analysis, they are also seen paradoxically as both vastly inferior and sub-human, and yet at the same 
time at least potentially superior. This seems to be a deep-seated and enduring facet of the Western 
apprehension of the unknowable Eastern “other” which concerns itself with the fear that out of the 
ferment of such perceived over-breeding an evolutionary superior being may emerge to challenge 
Western Supremacy. In Saints, this is depicted in simplistic terms as a misshapen monster on the 
shoulders of a giant: 
 
Way back, behind the backmost women in the crowd, a giant of a man stood 
stripped to the waist, holding something over his head and waving it like a flag. 
Untouchable pariah, this dealer in droppings, dung-roller by trade, molder of manure 
briquettes, turd eater in times of famine, and holding high in his stinking hands a 
mass of human flesh. At the bottom two stumps; then an enormous trunk, all 
hunched and twisted, and bent out of shape; no neck, but a kind of extra stump, a 
third one in place of a head, and a bald little skull . . . . (23-4) 
 
But this is merely a crudely reductive reworking of similar anxieties already extant in Western 
literature, and appears to have been taken at least in part from EM Forster’s depiction of a native in 
his 1924 novel, A Passage to India: 
 
Almost naked and splendidly formed, he sat on a raised platform near the back, in 
the middle of the central gangway . . . He had the strength and beauty  that 
sometimes comes to flower in Indians of low birth. When that strange race nears the 
dust and is condemned as untouchable, then nature remembers the physical 
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perfection that she accomplished elsewhere . . . This man would have been notable 
anywhere; among the thin-hammed, flat-chested mediocrities of Chandrapore he 
stood out as divine, yet he was of the city, its garbage had nourished him, he would 
end on its rubbish-heaps. (193) 
 
As this similarity suggests, the real anxiety such works express is the fear that although the 
burgeoning population which technology “artificially” creates might be mostly inferior and 
degraded, there is always the possibility that by sheer weight of numbers some serious threat might 
emerge from such a seething cauldron to upset the established order. In his description of the giant 
holding aloft the deformed dwarf “like a flag”, Raspail merely instantiates this theme. 
 
The paradoxical figure of the evolutionarily superior human arising from what was perceived 
to be a more primitive genetic base is, of course, a common theme: it pervades Bram Stoker’s 
Dracula, for example.69 As with Dracula and other earlier fictional treatments of this type, the threat 
posed by this figure lies partially in his (it is almost always a male figure) aggressive, primitive nature, 
but in anti-technological fiction it is technology which is fostering the mutation in the lower, 
excluded people at the same time that it is leading to degeneration in the technologically advanced 
society70. I looked at the themes of technology leading to degeneration in an earlier chapter, where I 
noted that part of the anti-technological narrative of degeneration was a eugenicist one of 
technology allowing the survival of the less fit, thereby acting (in the narrative) as a counter-
evolutionary force. What I am pointing to here is in many ways the obverse of that: it is the belief 
that as technology (including medical knowledge and agricultural technology) removes the 
purportedly “natural” checks on population in more “primitive” nations, the seething cauldrons of 
humanity there will throw up a creature with an intelligence and physique equal or superior to any 
                                                 
69 See John Glendening, The Evolutionary Imagination in Victorian Novels: An Entangled Bank (2007).  
70 Svitavsky’s study of the fin de siècle writer, MP Shiel, analyses many of these aspects and provides interesting 
parallels to my analysis of anti-technologism here. See William L. Svitavsky “From Decadence to Racial 
Antagonism: M.P. Shiel at the Turn of the Century” in Science Fiction Studies Vol. 31, No. 1 (Mar. 2004).  1-24.  
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Western one, yet still possessing primitive and atavistic traits. It embodies a contradictory and 
dualistic role as both an avatar of primitive nature and a consequence of technology’s disruption of 
nature.71 A further feature of this figure in anti-technological literature is that this threat comes from 
those populations, classes, or ethnic groups which present the most immediate threat to the stable, 
white, Western hegemony. In lurid contrast to the supressed sexuality and restrained demeanour of 
polite, advanced society, this figure represents the primitive and rampantly fertile nature of the 
population from which it comes. Thus, for example, John Brunner’s novel about an overpopulated 
world, Stand On Zanzibar (1968), has the figure of “the mucker,” a product of the teeming 
developing world’s adoption of Western technologies and way of life. Visiting a university in a 
developing nation, Donald Hogan, a Western visitor is confronted with such an assailant: 
 
This is a classic portrait of the mucker phenomenon. The victim is a thin youth a little 
above average height for his ethnic group, sallow, black-haired and dressed in 
conventional garb spotted with fresh blood . . . His breathing is violent and exhalation 
is accompanied by a grunt – haarrgh ow haarrgh ow! His muscular tensions are 
maximised; his right sleeve has split from the pressure of his biceps. He has a 
convulsive grip on his phang [scimitar] and all his knuckles are brightly pale against 
his otherwise sallow skin . . . He has a conspicuous erection (445. Italics in original).  
 
The “mucker” here is a product of the rapidly industrialising Asian country of Yakatang (a thinly 
disguised fictionalisation of Indonesia) which is “one of the most crowded areas on the face of the 
globe” (436-7). The introduction and adoption of Western science and technology have enabled an 
exponential increase in the population of non-Western societies, and vastly augmented their power, 
but this raises new fears: such populations are only a couple of generations away from a “natural” 
                                                 
71 Compare with Saints where “We are told that that the hardiest races are the ones pruned down by natural 
selection . . . very shortly . . . there will pour out over the soil of France a flood of hungry, scrawny creatures, 
but solid and healthy no less, and ready to pounce with all their might” (166). 
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state and so are seen as still retaining some essence of primitive vitality and aggression that may rise 
to the surface at any time and, on a global level, pose a threat to stability.  
 
Of course, this anxiety can be seen as the obverse of fears of degeneracy and decline in 
Western society caused by technology as I discussed in previous chapters (and will be discussing 
with reference to Neo-Malthusianism later in this chapter). This is at first glance paradoxical, 
because technology stands accused of leading to both degeneracy and advancement. In analysing 
and resolving this paradox, it is useful to refer once again to negative classicism and the idea of the 
rise and fall of civilisations as laid out by Spengler, Ortega, and others. To generalise for a moment 
here: this view perceives technology as both cause and effect of the imperialist motive, birthing an 
expansionary drive and is thus – crucially – unsustainable in the long run, successful as it may well be 
in the short to medium term. As my previous chapter on Tolkien’s Rings argued, the twin forces of 
imperialism and technology are seen as initially overpowering, but if they can just be endured and 
resisted they will ultimately collapse under the weight of their own entropy; the pattern of 
technological advancement is therefore conceptualised as rapid expansion followed after an interval 
by equally rapid internal decay and collapse. As Arthur C. Clarke put it, “. . . Empires – like atomic 
bombs – are self-liquidating assets” (qtd. by Kilgore 118). Overpopulation is thus the numerical 
human aspect of this unsustainable technological and imperialist drive, the “population bomb” is the 
inflationary aspect of technology’s expansionist drive made manifest. The crucial thing to take from 
this conceptual view for my purposes here is the idea of directionality and reversal implicit in such a 
structural view of history. The expansionary momentum of technology combined with imperialism is 
inevitably followed by an equal and opposite momentum. Expansion leads to collapse; advancement 
to decline. Thus the motif of the West as a land ripe for exploration and exploitation by others is a 
recurring theme in anti-technological literature because it speaks to this directionality and reversal. 
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We can see this clearly expressed, I believe, in Brian Aldiss’ Earthworks (1965) which tells the 
story of Knowle Noland, an escaped English convict in a degraded and overpopulated world. Noland 
finds himself caught up in a scheme to bring about the “re-birth” of culture and civilisation by 
instigating a global war. In Earthworks the consequence of Western technologism is an 
overpopulated world where the West is exhausted both culturally and agriculturally, and Africa is 
now the land of “virile young peoples whose technologies often surpassed those of Europe and 
America” (22). The trope of blood and soil is here reprised on a global scale and related to neo-
Malthusian imperatives of food production versus human reproduction.  Noland finds employment 
as the captain of a freighter taking sand from Africa to replenish the exhausted soils of the West as 
“only in Africa is the soil still fertile and the people still relatively vital” (inside jacket). The schemata 
of technological overreach and collapse here is predicated on humanitarian grounds, but is no less 
catastrophic for that: the export of Western technology to non-Western nations has led to global 
overpopulation, and the West’s attempt to feed the starving nations leads only to the exhaustion of 
its soils, whilst its inhabitants, significantly, become emasculated (literally as well as figuratively) by 
their own technology: 
 
Countries like America and Australia-Zealand overproduced to feed the other parts 
of the world, but they only got their own lands into a mess by so doing. Once land 
gets in a state, once it begins to deteriorate, it is hard to reverse the process. Land 
falls sick just like people – that’s the whole tragedy of our time. Then came the big 
birth pill crisis, when the long-term effects of progestagen [sic] made themselves felt, 
and then the land wars that left the nations of Africa politically in the lead. (28) 
 
The technology which once served the West so well has now led to its downfall. Its citizens have 
deviated from the natural order and so inevitably become degenerate and effete; the West, we are 
told, has become “spiritually and agriculturally bankrupt – perhaps the two must always go 
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together” (124). 72 Conditions in Western nations have now deteriorated to a third world level of 
subsistence (in a reversal of the historic order, what were the third world nations are in the 
ascendant). The novel ends with Noland being persuaded that the only answer to this madness is to 
join an elite group called the “abstainers” dedicated to radically reducing the global population and 
help them instigate a World War by (in a rather convoluted and bizarre plot twist) assassinating the 
putative President of the African nations. Noland initially recoils at this – he knows the future 
president to be a peacemaker, a just and good man who has done much for his people – but ends up 
being convinced by the argument and assassinating the man anyway; the horror of the West’s 
current predicament, he recognises, is just too grotesque to be allowed to continue.  As Justine, one 
of the leaders of the group tells him: 
 
“Think of the cities, Knowle – you lived in them most of your life, think of the 
degraded rabble that inhabits them, divorced from the earth and from any natural 
and lovely thing . . . . Shouldn’t a system that has brought such things about go 
toppling into the dust?”. 
 
“We’re not really assassins . . . We’re midwives. A new way of life has got to 
come, and the sooner the old one goes, the better”. (154-5) 
 
The expressed hope is that the world war will be an Armageddon, a war so finally cataclysmic that 
not only will the global population be massively reduced, but all civilizational and technological 
structures will collapse, leaving the world to the “travellers” (as the novel calls them) who have 
adopted an hierarchical, quasi-medieval existence of living off the land.  The “natural order” is 
restored by an act of war that will end technological civilisation (which has caused the West to 
                                                 
72 Even the name of the protagonist seems to be a less than subtle indication of the lack of patriotic pride 
Westerners take in their native soil and their subsequent disconnection from it: Knowle Noland – Know No 
Land.  
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degenerate to the point where Africa, with its fertile soil and people, is ascendant) and restore the 
links between people and the land, culture and agriculture, blood and soil.  
 
What I would like to do now is look briefly at the schematic directionality and symbolism of 
the anti-technologism in Aldiss’ story and how it is mirrored in Raspail’s novel. In Saints the armada 
that sets sail from the third world to the first symbolises the old fear of reverse colonisation. The 
West has grown soft and complacent on the expropriated wealth of the third world, but the 
inevitable corollary to this is the export of its knowledge and technology to the third world – at least, 
enough to upset the balance between births and deaths. Hearing of the abundance of the first world 
and the failing of its resolve, the unhappy inhabitants of the under-developed nations eventually 
seize control of its ships – symbols of Western technology and expansionism – and commandeer 
them to seize and expropriate, in an almost perfectly symmetrical inversion of colonialism.  
 
In Earthworks, this symbolism of reversal is achieved by the ships carrying the fertile sand of 
Africa back to the spent soils of the West. Whilst superficially this may seem to be a continuation of 
imperialist expropriation, it is made quite clear that the tables have now turned and it is the West 
which is being exploited by Africa, forced to beg for every boatload of sand it buys. The horror of 
Earthworks, as with Saints, lies ultimately in the thought of reversal, of the West being reduced to 
the status of third world dependent. This is made utterly explicit when Noland returns to England 
and is horrified at the sight of “tiny withered things tending rows and rows of withered plants” like 
backwards peasants in a poor nation (134). The idea of reversal is then thrust upon the reader and 
made unavoidable: 
 
But the people, the people from whom I had sprung! Eagerly I turned to them, to 
realise for the first time how brutalized they had become . . . more and more the 
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people were looking like machines. A starved body shows its joints and tendons and 
stanchions in a manner hardly distinguishable from an ordinary robot. 
 
But robots do not break out with those awful skin diseases. Robots do not 
develop stomachs and legs distended by beri beri. They never have running sores or 
scurvy. Their spines do not curve, nor their knees buckle with rickets. (135) 
 
In a final identification of the West reduced to a grotesque likeness of its darkest apprehensions of 
the third world, even the act of reproduction is reduced to an inhuman animal urge that only 
deepens their immiseration: “. . . as if that anxious jerking of the loins by which they begot 
duplicates of themselves was a part of a universal death agony” (136). Horror at the degraded state 
of humanity is combined with disgust for their inability to control the urges which led to such 
overpopulation and degeneracy. This same fear and loathing can be seen in Saints, the difference 
lying in the overtly racist tone where, for example, the President of France confides his revulsion at 
the lack of control of third world nations: “They rant and rave at the UN, they treat themselves to 
jets, and coups d'état, and even wars, and epidemics. And still they reproduce like ants. Not even 
their deadly famines can seem to keep them down. It’s frightening! (150-1). In both novels, of 
course, “these people” have effectively conquered the West, and completed the reversal of fortune, 
reducing Westerners to starving chattels and peasants. The only difference being that in Earthworks 
the murder of the putative leader of a unified African Union is a last desperate act that gives some 
hope for an end to the  inversion, and a restoration of normality. 
 
 The real fear, then, underlying the combination of Neo-Malthusianism and anti-
technologism in literature seems to be this idea of reversal, of the living standards, diet, and densely 
crowded nature of the non-Western world being visited on the Western world that had battened on 
it for so long it had grown fat and soft. I have chosen a few texts that most clearly illustrate this, but 
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the anxiety can, I believe, be clearly seen in many others. Harry Harrison’s Make Room! Make Room! 
(1966)¸ for example, is set in the overpopulated world of 1999 (a world imagined as having seven 
billion inhabitants, approximately the same as we have today in 2014), in which the citizens of New 
York are reduced to living almost entirely on rice and vegetables, suffer from third world diseases 
such as kwashiorkor and beri beri, and peddle rickshaws around the city just to earn enough to avoid 
outright starvation. The symbolism is again quite blatant and unmistakable – the inhabitants of the 
greatest city in the West are reduced to living like Indian slum dwellers. Certainly, as Harrison 
revealed in a recent article in 2006 the genesis of the book came from the widespread concern at 
the time over the population in India and other developing nations: 
 
 The idea [for the book] came from an Indian I met after the war, in 1946. He told 
me, 'Overpopulation is the big problem coming up in the world' (nobody had ever 
heard of it in those days) and he said 'Want to make a lot of money, Harry? You have 
to import rubber contraceptives to India’. I didn't mind making money, but I didn't 
want to be the rubber king of India! But I started reading a bit about overpopulation, 
and got the idea for the book. It stayed in my head as I watched the population trend 
going the wrong way. The thing took about eight years to write because I had to do a 
lot of research which was worth it. (Harrison 78) 
 
Harrison’s comments about the genesis of his book reveal once again the way in which the post-
World War Two concern over the growth in population in less developed countries influenced 
literature. Many writers of fiction negotiated the widespread fears of overpopulation, and wittingly 
or unwittingly identified the fear of reversal as the deep-seated anxiety that gave impetus to the 
discussion. Just as Huxley worried about the Arabs and other “monsters” acquiring knowledge of 
Western technology to add to their numerical superiority, Harrison, Aldiss, and others express the 
same fear (albeit in less vehement terms) of a surging and newly powerful non-Western world 
126 
 
claiming their fair share and forcing a dramatic decline in Western living standards if the twin threats 
of promiscuous technology and “overpopulation” were not managed carefully.  
 
I hope that what is becoming clearer in the course of this chapter is the structural 
importance of directionality and reversal in anti-technologism and the relationship this has with 
Neo-Malthusianism and fears of differential population growth. At this point, I would like to 
foreground this key aspect of the current chapter by examining Aldous Huxley’s last novel, Island. I 
locate Island (1962) as a utopian work in the sub-genre of the “lost world” fantasy, using the analysis 
developed by John Rieder in Colonialism and the Emergence of Science Fiction (2008). As Rieder 
observes, the Lost Race sub-genre blends fantasies of colonial expropriation with a satirical inversion 
of contemporary society. It explores fears of decay and contamination at home, whilst indulging in 
fantasies of easy abundance abroad.  Rieder observes that although the integration of foreign 
people and lands into the global economy promises to bring abundance, “the assimilation of those 
territories, products, and people into modernity can also be decried as contagion [thus] the colonial 
narrative of progress always threatens to reverse itself into the threats of racial miscegenation and 
cultural degeneration” (52). My immediate goal here is to argue that Island is a modern day Lost 
World fantasy that negotiates fears over the decline of Western dominance by postulating a utopian 
alternative to the Western technological way of life for developing nations. Reprising established 
fantasies of a return to the organic form, this alternative envisages “development” in non-material 
terms, and stresses quality not quantity, in an attempt to limit growth in both population and power. 
Thus, Island, as with the other Neo-Malthusian, anti-technological works I have looked at in this 
chapter, deals with anxieties of reverse colonisation, though it does so negatively; that is to say, it 
negotiates such concerns by imagining a way of forestalling the rising differential in power between 
a declining West and a rising East.  
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In 1958, four years before Rachel Carson brought the dangers of indiscriminate pesticide use 
to wider public awareness, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World Revisited used DDT as an example of 
how he saw technology leading to situations where good intentions have unintended consequences. 
As I remarked in the introduction, the anxiety over degeneration of the population, and the rise of 
the masses, supposedly inferior genetically but vastly superior in numbers, was projected from the 
urban centres of Britain and America in the 1920s and 30s to the industrialising non-Western nations 
in the Post-World War Two decades. Hence, Huxley in 1958 situates his concerns about 
overpopulation in the developing world by beginning with a quick summary of the situation in the 
Western world: 
 
And now let us consider the case of the rich, industrialized and democratic society, in 
which, owing to the random but effective practice of dysgenics, IQ’s and physical 
vigour are on the decline. For how long can such a society maintain its traditions of 
individual liberty and democratic government? Fifty or a hundred years from now our 
children will learn the answer to this question. (29) 
 
Having warned of the continuing degenerative threat technology posed to Western society, Huxley 
then turned his attentions immediately to the problem of the developing nations, where 
insecticides, medicines, and other scientific advances were reducing deaths from disease and illness 
and allowing a vastly increased, but purportedly genetically inferior population to spring up: 
For example, we go to a tropical island and with the aid of DDT we stamp out malaria 
and, in two or three years, save hundreds of thousands of lives. This is obviously 
good. But the hundreds of thousands of human beings thus saved, and the millions 
whom they beget and bring to birth, cannot be adequately clothed, housed, 
educated or even fed out of the island's available resources. Quick death by malaria 
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has been abolished; but life made miserable by undernourishment and over-
crowding is now the rule, and slow death by outright starvation threatens ever 
greater numbers. 
        And what about the congenitally insufficient organisms, whom our medicine and 
our social services now preserve so that they may propagate their kind? To help the 
unfortunate is obviously good. But the wholesale transmission to our descendants of 
the results of unfavourable mutations, and the progressive contamination of the 
genetic pool from which the members of our species will have to draw, are no less 
obviously bad. We are on the horns of an ethical dilemma, and to find the middle 
way will require all our intelligence and all our good will. (29) 
 This dilemma, Huxley claimed, was “the price that Western man has had to pay and will go on 
paying for technological progress” (30). The example he gives here of technology’s self-defeating 
nature was expanded upon a few years later in his final novel, Island. The work explored in fiction 
many of the concerns Huxley had raised previously regarding the “dilemma” of technology’s 
dysgenic and Malthusian effects.  
 
Set on the fictional island kingdom of Pala, the novel outlines some of Huxley’s ideals for the 
less developed nations. Pala is seen through the eyes of Will Farnaby, a disillusioned British 
journalist who finds respite from the “millions of maggots” he has to rub shoulders with in London 
only by taking day trips out to the country to wander in the woods and look at the wildflowers; only 
there, surrounded by nature, can he feel clean and whole again (101). Arriving on the island, Farnaby 
finds a small nation that has rejected both capitalism and communism and the “wholesale 
industrialization” that they bring (109). As one of the school teachers on the island explains to 
Farnaby, the West is committed to its technological lifestyle and can’t be expected to change that 
now, but Pala has decided to choose a different path of controlling fertility, eugenics, and taking a 
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more spiritual approach to development. “If the politicians in the newly independent countries had 
any sense” he tells his Western visitor, “they’d do the same”: 
 
You people [in the West] have no choice . . . you’re irretrievably committed to 
applied physics and chemistry, with all their dismal consequences, military, political 
and social. But the underdeveloped countries aren’t committed. They don’t have to 
follow your example. They’re still free to take the road we’ve taken – the road of 
applied biology, the road of fertility control and the limited production and selective 
industrialization which fertility control makes possible, the road that leads to 
happiness from the inside out . . . . (210-11. Emphasis in original) 
 
This anti-materialist form of progress starts in Pala with education, with ecology being central to 
children’s education from a young age, by playing games such as “Evolutionary Snakes and Ladders” 
and “Mendelian Happy Families” which will teach them about the need for population control, 
selective breeding and respect for nature (210). Instead of industrialization and the uncontrolled and 
artificial growth in population and consumption it brings, the Palanese are interested in “improving 
the race” by artificial insemination with “the germ plasm of a better stock” (188). At the start of his 
stay on the island, Farnaby recalls the “terrifying” population growth in countries like India and 
China and bitterly reflects that “one starts with doing things that are obviously and intrinsically good 
[such as] keeping babies alive . . . healing the sick, preventing the sewage from getting into the water 
supply” but sadly such misguided efforts only lead ultimately to “increasing the sum of human 
misery and jeopardizing civilization” (80-1). He praises the Palanese decision to choose eugenics 
(“applied biology”) which will lead to a more fulfilled and intelligent population. By contrast, the 
indiscriminate use of technology in the West will undoubtedly lead to it becoming (literally) a world 
of morons with an average IQ around 85 points within a century: “Better medicine – more 
congenital deficiencies preserved and passed on” (188).  
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Intrinsic to the dynamics of Huxley’s novel is his concern which I alluded to earlier in this 
chapter that the technology which had given the West its standard of living had given the rest of the 
world only TVs and radios that showed glimpses of this cornucopia “which they are too 
simpleminded to be able to criticize” (Huxley “The World Population Problem” 325). In Island, this 
fear is voiced by the Palanese Ambassador, who comments that “So long as it remains out of touch 
with the rest of the world, an ideal society can be a viable society. Pala was completely viable, I’d 
say, until about 1905” (58). At that point, he observes, it wasn’t that Pala changed, but that the rest 
of the world changed: “Movies, cars, aeroplanes, radio” made the evidently desirable cultural 
isolation of nations from each other impossible. The spread of mass communication and travel 
means that everyone in the world was able to see how the West lives, and to succumb to the 
temptation to pursue the Western lifestyle. We are back to the ideal of the noble savage, 
uncorrupted by knowledge and hence shame at their primitive state. Ignorance, particularly 
ignorance of Western technology and lifestyle, is hence portrayed in terms of a paradisiacal 
innocence which somehow guarantees a bountiful, prelapsarian utopia. This theme forms the 
narrative spine of the novel: early on Huxley foreshadows the inevitable fall of Pala that closes the 
work, by introducing a Western shopping catalogue given to Murugan, the effeminate son of the 
ruling monarch, by Colonel Dipa, the assertive military ruler of neighbouring Rendang: 
 
What an odd kind of present from Hadrian to Antinous! He looked again at the 
picture of the motor bike, then back at Murugan’s glowing face. Light dawned; the 
Colonel’s purpose revealed itself. The serpent tempted me and I did eat. The tree in 
the midst of the garden was called the Tree of Consumer Goods, and to the 
inhabitants of every underdeveloped Eden, the tiniest taste of its fruit, and even the 
sight of its thirteen hundred and fifty-eight leaves, had power to bring the shameful 
knowledge that, industrially speaking, they were stark naked. (134. Emphasis in 
original) 
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The implication is obvious: the island Eden of Pala can enjoy the fruits of tending to the tree 
of life (improving the race and so forth) as long as it can resist the temptation to eat the fatal fruit of 
the tree of knowledge and the loss of innocence that comes with it. Western technology works by 
seducing people who are “too simpleminded” to be able to criticize it intellectually with images of a 
life of relative ease and prosperity, in contrast to their life of honest toil in the fields. Huxley’s ideal 
in Island is that the less developed nations might be persuaded to choose not to industrialise, not to 
pursue the Western way of life, but to remain essentially agrarian. In so doing, their population will 
be kept “naturally” in check, and not pose a threat to their neighbours (and, of course, to the West). 
His fear is that technology’s insidious influence is for all practical purposes unstoppable, and when 
the rest of the world sees how the West lives they will be unable to resist the seductive ease and 
comfort of such a way of life and will, as Ehrlich put it “rock the boat” and threaten global stability. 
 
Pala is effectively a lost world. As per Rieder’s analysis, it is extremely isolated geographically 
and hence culturally and also has one of the key defining features of the sub-genre, in the scientist-
narrator, played by Farnaby, who interprets the lost world in terms of its colonial past. Though 
Farnaby is a journalist not a scientist, he still fulfils a quasi-scientific role by observing, questioning 
and noting the practices and rituals of the natives. He also situates the country by reference to its 
philosopher-king, Dr Robert McPhail, a Western doctor who, in conjunction with the monarch, gave 
laws to the new country. Farnaby’s references make clear the pivotal role of this benevolent 
Westerner in not only setting laws, but steering science and education in the right direction; that is 
to say, away from large-scale infrastructure and development and towards small scale mixed 
agriculture, ecology (with strong moral overtones), and eugenic breeding. To relate this directly to 
my ongoing discussion in this thesis of anti-technologism’s tendency towards the organic form, 
Huxley wants to draw lessons regarding human societal organization and ethics (a “natural order”) 
from nature. Palanese children are taught “true ecological fables with built-in, cosmic morals” and 
shown pictures of environmentally degraded landscapes to show them what happens to those who 
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try to go against the natural order of things. Confronted with such images, the hope is that “. . . it’s 
easy for the child to see the need for conservation and then go on from conservation to morality” 
[my emphasis]. The underlying lesson is clear in terms of the order of things: “Treat Nature well, and 
Nature will treat you well. Hurt or destroy Nature, and Nature will soon destroy you” (212). 
Certainly, Island has an environmental moral to the story, but it is one that is harnessed to the idea 
of organic form under the leadership of a benign (though not, it should be noted, democratically 
elected) leadership. Thus, though Island is progressive in its ecological awareness and its emphasis 
on the development of consciousness, it is decidedly colonialist and reactionary in implicitly 
advocating an administrative regime that denies agency to the inhabitants of the island, supposedly 
for their own good. 
 
 As David Bradshaw has noted in his essay “Huxley’s Slump: Planning, Eugenics, and the 
‘Ultimate Need’ of Stability” (1995) the belief in the need for putatively benign administration of the 
masses by the elite was a hallmark of the work of many British writers and intellectuals of Huxley’s 
era.73 Certainly, Huxley’s Island follows in the “lost world” fantasies of earlier British writers such as 
HG Wells who in his A Modern Utopia (1905) argued that “the resources of the world and the energy 
of mankind, were they organised sanely, are amply sufficient to supply every material need of every 
living human being” if only things were rationally ordered by those who knew best (117). As I have 
argued previously, it is important to note the significance of this administrative element in anti-
technologism, as in my analysis anti-technologism is not necessarily against technology per se but is 
concerned with the democratic availability of technology and the potentially negative 
repercussions.74  
                                                 
73 See also Joanne Woiak for an analysis of Huxley’s Brave New World which situates it not as a satire against 
eugenics but rather against the dysgenic effect of modern living and the triumph of mass culture. Joanne 
Woiak “Designing a Brave New World: Eugenics, Politics, and Fiction”. The Public Historian. Vol. 29. No. 3 
(Summer 2007). 105-129.  
74 John Carey’s work The Intellectuals and the Masses contains two chapters on Wells – “H.G. Wells: Getting Rid 
of People” and “H.G. Wells Against H.G. Wells” – which explore both Wells’ Neo-Malthusianism and his 
ambivalence regarding technological progress. I have drawn on Carey’s analysis here in this part of this chapter. 
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The role of scientist-narrator, then, combined with the figure of the Western philosopher-
king, is crucial here in staking a claim for the need of enlightened Western guidance in the 
development of the under-developed nations. It must be noted that Huxley’s island is not to be 
preserved intact in pristine condition – the extraction and export of natural resources such as gold 
are still envisaged – but this extraction of natural resources is not accompanied by large-scale 
industrial development that might give the nation military or economic power of any kind. For 
example, the odious (and notably effeminate) Murugan has hopes that industrialisation will mean 
the building of factories to manufacture insecticides because “if you can make insecticide . . . you 
can make nerve gas” and wants industrialization to make the nation powerful so that it is respected 
(46).  This “bad-blooded little demi-god” represents the threat of a client state that has aspirations 
to independent power, and thus is presented as being outside of the natural order of the island; 
because of his Western education and experience of its way of life, he is both contaminated and 
contaminate, and in a significant sense now artificial and foreign to his own land (41). Whereas 
everyone else on the island is culturally insular and Buddhist with the pleasingly peaceful and non-
threatening attributes that implies Murugan is cosmopolitan, having been educated in Europe and is 
keen on Western entertainment. Tellingly, he is also Muslim and proud, rather than Buddhist and 
humble: “If one knows one is doing the will of Allah – and I do know it Mr Farnaby – there is no 
excuse for nervousness” (23). Perhaps it might be stretching the point too far to suggest that 
Murugan’s militant Islamism is a vestigial remainder of Huxley’s antipathy and fear toward the Arabs 
which he expressed in his letter of June 1925. Nevertheless, it is clear that Murugan is the 
personification of the threat of contamination and reverse colonialism that discovery and 
subsequent integration of the lost world implies.  
 
There is a duality in direction here, of course. In penetrating the lost world of Pala, Farnaby 
has gained the opportunity to draw from a well-spring of primitive purity and shake off the “maggot-
world” of degenerate Western life. However, the ability to cross the boundaries between these two 
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worlds implies that it is also possible for the inhabitants of Pala to travel to the Western world – and 
bring knowledge of it back with them . This may have unforeseen consequences, as indeed it does in 
the novel: experiencing the technologically advanced Western way of life has utterly corrupted 
Murugan and will contaminate and eventually (at the very end of the novel) lead to the downfall of 
this island Eden. Thus the chance to shape this developing nation into a suitably non-threatening 
polity has been lost forever, reinforcing the trope of the lost world as a parable of the need for 
benign Western hegemony in the ordering and development of the non-Western world for its own 
good. From Farnaby’s traumatic and perilous entry to Pala by climbing up the cliff face, to the 
denouement of Colonel Dipa’s installation of Murugan as a puppet ruler, the Edenic motif serves to 
underline the desirability and urgency of maintaining the lost world in isolation to prevent such 
contamination. In this Island shows its debt to the trope of the lost world and the neo-colonial 
fantasy of expropriation. As Rieder observes of such fantasies: 
 
The ordeal of entry registers the discontinuity between the adventurer’s world 
system and the isolated territory they have penetrated. Thus the ordeal of entry is 
often matched by a cataclysmic departure that seals the place off from return, 
emphasizing that the singularity of the opportunity that presents itself to those who 
can cross the boundary between the two realms depends on maintaining their 
separation. (52) 
 
Such strict separation and administration is necessary in order to prevent contamination, and the 
paradisiacal theme of a prelapsarian balance of nature is often invoked in anti-technologism to 
justify this, particularly with reference to the threat of overpopulation caused by the introduction of 
modern medicines and facilities. This reinforces the ideological link between anti-technologism and 
Neo-Malthusianism, the fear of the loss of hegemony, reverse colonisation and invasion, and the 
reversal of living standards where the West becomes as the countries it formerly exploited. Because 
135 
 
anti-technological Neo-Malthusianism deals with such anxieties, it is my contention that it is always 
concerned with questions of cultural purity, immigration, and race. In the last section of this chapter 
before the conclusion, I want to sketch out some of these connections using Daniel Quinn’s Ishmael 
as an example. 
 
Daniel Quinn’ Ishmael (1992) is a novel concerned with arguing one essential point: that 
there are natural limits and laws that govern the world, and that humanity’s attempt to circumvent 
these with technology is fatally misguided. For example, the most important law or limit the novel is 
concerned with is the limit on human population. The story takes the format of a Socratic dialogue 
between a majestic mountain gorilla and an inquisitive young man, who discovers that he is able to 
communicate telepathically with the gorilla. By leading and gently prodding the young man the 
gorilla hopes to instigate a fundamental change in how the young man perceives the world and its 
priorities. One such priority is the idea that increasing the availability of food to forestall starvation 
in the world’s poor is desirable and morally required. Thus, just as Vogt, Ehrlich, Hardin, and others 
had argued that sending food shipments to starving countries was self-defeating, so the eponymous 
interlocutor and teacher of Ishmael lectures his student that exporting technology or the fruits of 
technology to other regions is a defiance of natural laws that will have devastating repercussions: 
 
“Every increase in food production is answered by an increase in population 
somewhere. In other words, someone is consuming Nebraska’s surpluses – and if 
they weren’t, Nebraska’s farmers would stop producing those surpluses pronto”. 
 
“True”, I said, and spent a few moments in thought. “Are you suggesting that 
First World farmers are fuelling the Third World population explosion?” 
 
“Ultimately”, he said, “who else is there to fuel it?” (139) 
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The problem identified here can be seen as a failure of separation. The technology of the advanced 
world is being used in a way which is upsetting the balance of nature in another, less advanced part 
of the world. The underlying fear is essentially the same as that seen in Raspail’s Saints and in 
Huxley’s Ape and Essence (1949) as well as Aldiss’ Earthworks: by shipping food and technology to 
foreign lands, we in the West are allowing the population to become artificially inflated to 
devastating proportions and sooner or later the burgeoning population will burst its banks and flood 
the West. Because technology offers to subvert (for a time, anyway) the natural limitations on 
population growth, not only must the export of technology or its fruits to less advanced countries be 
prohibited, but conversely, the immigration of people from less advanced lands to the West must 
also be prohibited. Only in this way can population be controlled and cultural integrity preserved. 
 
 Of course, such an argument explicitly stated would not be acceptable in modern literature 
and would be rightly reviled. Instead, Ishmael justifies the exclusion of other cultures, races, and 
peoples, on the more acceptable grounds of maintaining cultural diversity, for which population 
control is purportedly a necessity. Controlling population and maintaining the crucial separation 
between cultures is thus portrayed not as a Western administrative project for the less developed 
nations, but an already extant ideal which less technologically advanced people instinctively knew 
and followed but which we have fallen away from. It is, in other words, presented as a reversion to 
the natural order, and as such implicitly propounds the idea of organic form as discussed in the 
introduction. Analysing this argument for cultural separation helps to explicate the way in which the 
balance of nature link between anti-technologism and Neo-Malthusianism is always nativist in 
conception, it is worth looking at this justification in a little detail and extrapolating from it to draw 
out some of the underlying assumptions. 
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In the novel, Ishmael hands his student a copy of a work entitled The American Heritage 
Book of Indians and draws his pupil’s attention to the existence of all the different tribes of Native 
Americans before the arrival of European settlers. He asks his pupil to think about how the existence 
of so many different tribes “served to limit their growth” (140). Ishmael then draws an analogy with 
modern America asking what happens when people in the more densely populated Northeast of 
America get tired of living there, to which his pupil replies that they simply move to less crowded 
regions of the country. Ishmael’s point is therefore made: the “gushing wellspring of growth” in one 
region is allowed to flood into other regions rather than the natives of that region having to limit 
their own population. They can do this, because the boundaries between regions are easily crossable 
both territorially and culturally thanks to technological advancements such as the automobile and 
the aeroplane as well as television and the internet (141). By contrast, the Native American tribes 
had to limit their population because each tribe had its own culture which it jealously guarded and 
therefore “those cultural boundaries were boundaries that no one crossed by choice” (141). The 
dialectic which follows this claim bears quoting at some length, because it so neatly illustrates the 
way in which anti-technological Neo-Malthusianism relies on nativism and the idea of the separation 
of cultures in order to maintain a ‘balance of nature’ that preserves the world as it is:  
 
“True. On the other hand, the Navajo could cross the Hopi’s territorial 
boundary without crossing their cultural boundary”. 
 
“You mean they could invade Hopi territory. Yes, absolutely. But the point 
I’m making still stands. If you ever crossed over into Hopi territory, they didn’t give 
you a form to fill out, they killed you. That worked very well. That gave people a 
powerful incentive to limit their growth” (141-2) 
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Ishmael stresses that of course this was no utopian system, and that ferocious wars sometimes 
broke out in defence of boundaries; he argues that this actually meant the system worked properly, 
because in a non-technological world without surveillance and border controls “you want them [that 
is, outsiders] to know exactly what they’ll be in for if they don’t limit their growth and stay in their 
own territory” (142). But as Ishmael explains to his pupil, limiting population requires not just that 
territorial boundaries be inviolate, but that cultural boundaries are also preserved: 
 
“Yes, I see. They limited each other”. 
 
“But not just by erecting uncrossable territorial boundaries. Their cultural 
boundaries had to be uncrossable too. The excess population of the Narranganset 
couldn’t just pack up and move out west to be Cheyenne. The Narranganset had to 
stay where they were and limit their population”. 
 
“Yes. It’s another case where diversity seems to work better than 
homogeneity”. (142) 
 
As Ishmael warns his pupil, those who refused to accept that this separation was necessary were 
defying nature and deserved what they got. After all, he warns rather ominously, such separation is 
a law of nature and therefore “Those who threaten the stability of the community by defying the law 
automatically eliminate themselves” (144).75 Thus, executing immigrants from other cultures and 
races who attempt to migrate into your territory is defended as a natural act that preserves diversity 
in contrast to a technological, homogenised and cosmopolitan culture.  
                                                 
75 The context of this quote allows for some ambiguity of reference here: it can feasibly be read as suggesting 
that ecological disaster will overtake civilisation as a whole if it doesn’t alter its ways. However, the broader 
context of “diversity” (interpreted as cultural purity) implies at least a correlation of this issue with the 
question of civilizational collapse. 
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This perverse definition of diversity being equivalent to cultural purity is a recurrent feature 
of anti-technological literature. In Brunner’s Stand on Zanzibar, for example, an African character in 
the novel expresses a desire to return to her native country because she is “sick of France and the 
French who aren’t French any longer, but some sort of horrible averaged-out Common European 
mongrels” (308). The dual applicability of such sentiments is obvious: they can be used to justify 
protection of vulnerable cultures, or to justify the exclusion of others from a society. In Ishmael, 
Quinn employs this argument by using the supposedly pre-technological Native Americans as an 
example which shows how such cultural exclusion is, in his view, the “natural” way societies would 
be organised before technology.  
 
It’s obvious that Quinn’s device of the Native American example is just that: a device to 
make the idea of ending immigration and enforcing cultural purity seem more natural and therefore 
palatable. There is of course no “gushing wellspring of growth” in the United States, the reference 
would seem to be a transparent reference to Mexico and Mexican cultural influence in America. I 
want to refer here to my previous chapter and the right-wing “ecological” idea of the foreign as 
pollution. In Quinn’s identification of American Indian tribes and culture with specific locales we 
have a biogeography similar in some important respects to Tolkien’s in The Lord of the Rings. The 
irredentist trope licences exclusion and even persecution on the grounds of what is supposedly 
natural, conflating biology and geography with politics and culture. As the foreign is not native, it is 
unnatural, artificial, and is effectively pollution that must be kept out; if need be, it must be 
expunged. This thought is necessarily sublimated in Post-World War Two anti-technological 
discourse and literature, but the frequent reference to growth (especially population growth) as a 
“cancer” belies this sublimation. As Edward Goldsmith, editor of the staunchly anti-technological 
journal The Ecologist argued in 1971, “the ever-growing chaos associated with the uncontrolled 
proliferation of culturally undifferentiated people must set a further limit to economic growth” 
(“Limits of Growth in Natural Systems” 56-7). Under the subheading “Multi-Ethnic Societies” 
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Goldsmith went on to prosecute the case for cultural and ethnic purity in what he claimed was 
accordance with nature, proposing that “what is today regarded as prejudice against people of 
different ethnic groups is a normal and necessary feature of human cultural behaviour, and is absent 
only among members of a cultural system already far along the road to disintegration” (61). The 
seemingly indefensible is made defensible by appeal to supposedly immutable natural laws, defiance 
of which will only lead to greater tragedy. The eugenicist Garret Hardin’s now famous formulation of 
“the tragedy of the commons” in his essay “Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor” is 
perhaps the best known example of this argument. But Raspail makes the same argument from a 
more visceral position of fear and loathing; Brunner, Aldiss and others from a more apprehensive 
and bleak perspective. However it is framed, the diffusion of technology as the catalyst for disaster, 
and the eventual reversal of fortunes is a recurring schemata in such fears which, I believe, shows 
the underlying anxiety motivating such anti-technological Neo-Malthusian literature.  
 
In The Environmental Revolution: A Guide for the New Masters of the World (1970) Max 
Nicholson, co-founder with Julian Huxley of the World Wildlife Fund and Director-General of the 
Nature Conservancy until 1966, explicitly linked technology with the so-called population 
“explosion”, declaring that: “To live during the technological revolution and the population explosion 
is to be a conscript, forced to sweep the streets of a slum civilisation” (38).76 Nicolson’s bitter 
condemnation of technology and population growth anticipates the quote from Petti Linkola which 
opened this thesis as it accuses technology not only of fuelling rampant over-population but also of 
cultural dilution and degradation, turning Western society into a “slum civilisation”.  In this chapter, I 
have argued that this connection stemmed ultimately from fears of relative Western decline and 
degeneracy as the rest of the world caught up technologically and numerically. As the diffusion of 
                                                 
76 I say “so-called” because, as Connelly (2008) points out, it was well known among demographers that 
following industrialisation and the introduction of modern science and medicine, populations boomed, but 
then evened out and started a long decline. This phenomenon, known as the demographic transition, was a 
demonstrated fact, yet an atmosphere close at times to hysteria still attended the rise in population of non-
Western nations.  
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technology and technological knowledge to less developed nations was deemed responsible for this 
anti-technological literature warns of the consequences of such diffusion.  Simultaneously it also 
calls for a return to a more ‘natural’ way of life in the advanced nations to ward off the threat of 
degeneracy. Such concerns are displayed quite clearly in Nicholson’s introduction to what is 
ostensibly an environmental text: 
 
As nature is man’s ancestral home and nurse, and as landscape is his modern mirror, 
the achievement of a fresh recognition by mankind of the potential for the renewal 
and for the healing of a sick society through creative intimacy with the natural 
environment could bring a transformation of the kind and scale which our 
degenerate and self-disgusted, materialist, power-drunk and sex-crazed civilisation 
needs. The lesson is plain that without some immensely greater and more enduring 
inspiration and support than everyday affluence and hollow success any human 
civilisation must totter. A civilisation which through its own intellectual advances has 
gone far to cripple supernatural religion as a living force has probably no option but 
to return in some form to the wilderness from which religion itself sprang. (The 
Environmental Revolution 17) 
 
Like Linkola, Nicolson’s theme is ostensibly environmental, yet in actuality is at least as much about 
restoring “proper” morals to society as it is to the protection of the environment. Technology and 
urbanism are seen as enabling individualistic materialism which has led to degeneracy and a decline 
in morals and cultural values. The environment in such texts is in reality a mirror for the author to 
hold to society, a way of arguing for the organic form, for the need to prevent the repugnant 
softness Orwell feared would result from a technological society. 
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In his complaint, Nicholson is clearly echoing a longstanding argument which Thoreau had 
already famously encapsulated in his essay “Walking” (1849): that civilised man requires some 
degree of contact with the wild to prevent enervation, effeminacy, and decay: 
 
The West of which I speak is but another name for the Wild; and what I have been 
preparing to say is, that in Wildness is the preservation of the world. Every tree 
sends its fibres forth in search of the Wild. The cities import it at any price. Men plow 
and sail for it. From the forest and wilderness come the tonics and barks which brace 
mankind. Our ancestors were savages. The story of Romulus and Remus being 
suckled by a wolf is not a meaningless fable. The founders of every state which has 
risen to eminence, have drawn their nourishment and vigor from a similar wild 
source. It is because the children of the empire were not suckled by the wolf that 
they were conquered and displaced by the children of the northern forests who 
were. (“Walking” 71)    
 
The concern over the diffusion of technology and the growth of the world’s population, then, can be 
seen as the necessary corollary to this fear. As I showed earlier in this chapter, anti-technological 
literature very often deals with contradictory themes of the other as both inferior and at least 
potentially superior, encompassing the evolutionary threat of the lesser races overtaking the West. 
As I argued, because it negotiates such fears of reversal there is often a clearly directional motif in 
anti-technological literature. I used Raspail’s Saints in this chapter, as I wanted to demonstrate how 
the themes of technology, over-population, cultural decline and invasion, or reverse colonisation 
were all related in anti-technological literature. Saints offers a very obvious example from which to 
draw these distinctions out and it also shows how such fears set up a necessarily competitive and 
antagonistic worldview which very frequently relies implicitly or explicitly on racial notions of 
supremacy and inferiority. In this schema, the diffusion of technology to less developed peoples 
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perverts the natural (and therefore “right”) state of affairs, the “balance of nature” and therefore 
leads ultimately to inversion – in other words, reverse colonisation.  
 
Thus the invasion of the West that is the end result of Western shipments of food aid to 
starving Africans and Asians in Huxley’s Ape and Essence (1948) is seen as not only a logical outcome, 
but predestined from the very first shipment: 
 
And meanwhile, on the other side of the world, the black men have been working 
their way down the Nile and across the Mediterranean. What splendid tribal dances 
in the bat-infested halls of the Mother of Parliaments! And the Labyrinth of the 
Vatican – what a capital place in which to celebrate the lingering and complex rites 
of female circumcision! We all get precisely what we ask for. (28. My emphasis) 
 
Though the fruits of technology may be shared with other countries with the best possible 
intentions, the results of such failure of separation are ultimately the same here as Forster, Spengler 
and others saw for imperialism: expansion and growth followed inevitably by contraction, decline, 
and finally collapse. 
 
Such a belief, of course, raised extremely disquieting and unsettling ethical questions for 
many. The use and adoption of technology in less developed nations offered the possibility of easing 
pain, lowering infant mortality, feeding the hungry and improving everyday life for many hundreds 
of millions. But if the end result of such efforts was simply to enable the population of less 
developed nations to grow to “unsustainable” proportions and subsequently to threaten (Western) 
civilization, were such attempts fatally misguided? As I have shown in this chapter, such concerns 
regarding differential population growth in less developed nations almost invariably tied in with 
themes of cultural separation and stability. To many people concerned with such questions, it must 
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have seemed a terrible moral dilemma. If only there was some way to simply press a reset button 
which would resolve these complex issues without guilt or reproach. In the next chapter I look at 
anti-technological fantasies of catastrophe as resolution and rebirth, as a guilt-free way of exploring 
in fiction the erasure of such troubling people and problems.  
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Chapter four. Purification and Rebirth: Anti-technologism and catastrophe. 
 
We’re Greek now boy, it’s as hard for us as it was for them, and if we can make 
something beautiful out of it it’ll be like what they made, that fine carved line pure 
and simple. 
Kim Stanley Robinson, The Wild Shore (297). 
 
In the previous chapter, I looked at how the fear of overpopulation in anti-technological literature 
was closely related to anxieties of reverse colonisation and the subsequent desire for cultural and 
even ethnic isolation. In a world in which technology was making the exchange of ideas and cultures 
and the movement of people ever more fluid and frequent, this desire must have seemed to some  
both more urgent and ever more unachievable. Whilst people around the world enjoyed the 
benefits of Western technology and proliferated, it seemed to some that at home people had 
become decadent and effete, dissipating themselves in the hollow amusements that 
cosmopolitanism and technology brought in a manner that recalled the fall of ancient civilisations 
due to luxury and degeneracy.77 Just as the spoils of empire in ancient Rome had brought first 
plenty, then luxury, then inevitable degeneracy and decline, so technology and Western imperialism 
– the Spenglerian drive – had undone Western civilisation, rotting it from within. All that now 
awaited, it seemed, was the inevitable slow decline of Western civilisation. For who could 
reasonably expect that people act against their own interests in their lifetime, to ensure the 
continuation of Western hegemony into the seemingly distant future? The inexorable logic of the 
Spenglerian organicist view of history invited despondency: if it was the nature of civilisations to 
                                                 
77 One does not have to look very far for examples of contemporary reworkings of negative classicism. Ronald 
Wright’s A Short History of Progress (2004) functions as both an attack on the liberal ideal of scientific progress, 
and as a defence of negative classicism. Wright mentions HG Wells and William Morris as two writers who 
asked the question “What if the degradation of the slums caused degradation of the human race? What, 
exactly, was the point of all this economic output if, for so many people, it meant deracination, misery, and 
filth?”. “No doubt many will say that we stand here to prove those gloomy Victorians wrong”, Wright declares, 
“But do we?” (121). For Wright and others, progress seems to always imply degeneration of some kind. 
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grow, to expand, and then to decline – to fall into senescence and eventually disappear – what could 
be done to alter this? 
 
 In this chapter, I look at a significant response in anti-technological literature to this sense of 
Western decline. I look at how anti-technologism takes one of the oldest ideas – that of catastrophe 
as purging and rebirth – and seeks to reapply it to modern times, sweeping away the abstract 
complexities and uncomfortable issues of the modern world and replacing them with new 
certainties licenced by the need for simple survival. I want to develop on the idea that anti-
technologism relies on the Spenglerian organicist conception of history, and argue that in anti-
technological literature catastrophe serves a necessary role of purgative, expelling the gross luxuries 
and foreign influences that decay and dilute society, and allowing a purer, more cohesive society and 
culture –  a revivified culture – to go forward once more. In other words, as I see it catastrophe in 
anti-technological literature is a wiping clean of the historical palimpsest; or as the reset button 
being pressed on a culture that is perceived to have lost its vitality. Hence, as I will be exploring in 
this chapter, there are two important aspects or facets of catastrophe in anti-technological 
literature: sacrifice and purification, leading to revivification of the culture and the subsequent 
renewal of fertility. Sacrifice provides recognition of, and atonement for the greed and folly of past 
imperialist ventures, and purification sloughs off of the foreign luxuries and refinements that 
originally cast their spell on the people and led to imperial adventuring and the quest for 
technological advancement. Once these corrosive influences have been burnt away in the fires of 
catastrophe, and proper atonement made, the next stage of the cycle is a revivification of culture as 
an affirmation of the rightful inhabitants’ proper relationship with the land they live on. This being 
done, the final stage in the anti-technological catastrophe cycle is the return of fertility which is the 
final signifier that the culture, the people, and the land are once again in a healthy equilibrium. 
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 I start by looking at what is now very much a forgotten play: JB Priestley’s A Summer’s Day 
Dream (1949) as I believe it offers a nearly perfect example of these desires in a relatively short text 
that allows for clear and unequivocal exposition of some key issues mentioned above. I identify the 
themes of catastrophe as cleansing, and show how the idea of sacrifice and atonement is tied in with 
the idea of purification and the revivification of culture and society as part of a necessary completion 
of a cycle that acknowledges the organic nature of civilisations, whilst at the same time seeking to 
deny this same thing by the deus ex machina of the catastrophe as rebirth. These themes identified 
and explicated, I go on to show how they recur again and again in anti-technological literature, using 
another fictional exploration of a possible post-nuclear holocaust world, Pat Franks’ 1959 novel Alas, 
Babylon. I also look at the example from the 1970s of Edmund Cooper’s fantasy of catastrophe and 
the subsequent rebirth of upper-middle class British culture into an entirely depopulated word, The 
Overman Culture (1970).78 I then choose to look at a much more recent example of catastrophe in 
anti-technological literature, James Howard Kunstler’s World Made by Hand (2008). This will give a 
broadly representative look at the anxieties I want to discuss here, showing an essential continuity 
from 1949 to 2008. Kunstler is particularly useful and salient to my thesis here, because he has 
written non-fictional works propounding his theory of civilisation and collapse which offer 
interesting insights into the motivations and beliefs underlying his fiction. Most saliently for the 
purposes of this chapter’s analysis, I believe his non-fiction work demonstrates explicitly the 
influence and evolution of the Spenglerian conception of history and civilisation and how this has 
been resurrected in recent years by reference to imperatives that reference ecology, but which are 
ultimately concerned more with cultural degeneration than ecological degradation. 
 JB Priestley’s short play A Summer’s Day Dream, first performed in 1949, is an early look at a 
post-atomic war scenario. Set in the south of England in the summer of 1975, it looks at how life in 
England might be a mere fifteen years or so after a nuclear war brings conventional life there to an 
                                                 
78 Cooper’s nod to HG Wells’ creation of the Overman in the title of his work shows not just the continuing 
influence of Wells and other writers who explored anxieties about technology and degeneration, but the 
continuation, in sublimated form, of such worries well into the second half of the twentieth century and, I 
would argue, into the twenty first.  
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end.79 Unlike later treatments, however, Priestley’s post-nuclear holocaust England is a merry place 
where the ephemera of the modern world have been done away with and the (vastly-reduced) 
population has “plenty to eat, plenty to drink and live like kings” (120). In this post-atomic scenario, 
life has more or less returned to a feudal, agrarian system, and everyone seems much happier for it. 
Priestley’s play further testifies to my contention that anti-technologism is not a reaction to either 
the threat of nuclear war or environmental disaster, but merely makes narrative use of them. In this 
early scenario, technological society has destroyed itself, showing that unnatural forms of society 
that deviate from the organic form are ultimately unsustainable. England has returned to a feudal, 
hierarchic society, and the inhabitants, in Priestley’s play, do not want their new-found stability 
threatened. The play is set in what was the mansion of a noted industrialist, now a pleasingly 
weathered and dilapidated farmhouse; the industrialist is now a convert to the joys of the simple 
life. Forced to live without the material comforts of technological society and to return instead to a 
rural, hierarchical and patriarchal society, the inhabitants of Priestley’s post-holocaust England 
awaken as if from a dream to discover a meaningfulness and sense of contentment that was 
previously lacking.  
 
It is genuinely difficult for the modern reader not to read the play as a parody of the cosy 
catastrophe style of writing that Brian Aldiss identified in post-war British writing (Billion Year Spree). 
Everything is as it should be, and everyone is blissfully, amiably content in their newly imposed 
isolation. As the play opens, for example, the patriarch, Stephen Dawlish, and his loyal servant, Fred, 
are enjoying a pipe and a pint of beer when Dawlish’s wife bustles in to inform them that  “I’m 
baking that lovely piece of ham – and a big rabbit pie – and then there’s plenty of . . .” (106). 
Everyone is thrilled to be working in the fields, or cleaning the house, and there are always lashings 
of beer and cake after tea. This is no post-Hiroshima horror of radiation sickness and distraught 
                                                 
79 As the play is a short one, published without line numbers I refer to page numbers in the edition indicated. 
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survivors struggling through the aftermath, but instead a release from a sick and artificial world and 
a return to the traditional, hierarchical world. 
 
This bucolic bliss is threatened, though, by the arrival of three foreigners, representatives of 
industrial corporations intending to mine the white chalk of the rolling English hills to make synthetic 
substances for industrial use (an obvious and clumsy piece of symbolism, even for Priestley). These 
three foreigners, an American, a Russian, and an Indian (“a mighty nice, clever young fellow, though 
Asiatic of course”) are clearly types – caricatures of their respective cultures – and represent not 
only the still industrialised world, but at a deeper level the problem of colonial guilt and the threat of 
reverse colonisation (112). When the American outlines his plans to “dump five to ten thousand 
Chinese on these hills” to mine the chalk, and build “bungalows . . . cafes, dance halls, T-V-Palaces” 
he is quite obviously proposing the colonisation and exploitation of what is now a simple, agrarian 
society (129). The problem (and Priestley is quite open in his delineation of it) is how can the 
inhabitants of a post-colonial power reasonably complain about being colonised? As Heimer, the 
American, remarks, as the debate gets ever more heated: “You’ve got something here the whole 
world needs, so we’re going to make use of it. Nothing new about that. You British used to do it all 
over the world”. Chris Dawlish, the grandson of the patriarch, launches an impassioned response to 
this accusation: 
 
“I’m not old, Mr. Heimer. But I know what my grandfather means, and I feel as he 
does. You don’t understand. This isn’t just a piece of land, just something to pull a 
living out of. It’s our home. It’s part of us. We love it. To us, it’s just as if you proposed 
to excavate our bones and nerves and tap our lifeblood, and then mash them all up 
with chemicals to make your synthetic muck”. (150) 
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This speech not only shows the survival of the old tropes of blood and soil in the immediate post-war 
years, but also the rejection of the imperialist as a destroyer who threatens stability with 
cosmopolitanism in the name of progress. Priestley returns to this theme throughout the play in a 
forthright and unapologetic manner. The ancestral connection to the soil is the tether that binds the 
people to the land, and the land to the people. Modern technology alienated the inhabitants to the 
primacy of the relationship between culture and agriculture for a time, but they have atoned for that 
in the most suitable way – with blood - and now the mystical relationship is reaffirmed, deeper than 
ever.  
 
Ultimately it is this connection to the soil and to the ancient culture of the land that saves 
them from the threatened re-industrialisation and the reverse colonisation that would accompany it. 
In what is, it has to be said, a rather jejune denouement to the play, the foreigners decide that the 
cultural and ancestral connection the inhabitants have to the soil is too sacred to be exploited for 
mere profit and they depart, leaving the natives to their rural idyll. The conclusion the audience is 
invited to draw from the play as a whole is that it is the enforced return to the land that has 
redeemed Dawlish the industrialist and by extension all the other inhabitants. Conversely, it is their 
subsequent care and the (re)connection they forge with the land that saves it from exploitation. This 
theme speaks to the organicist conception of civilisation which underpins the ideas the play 
explores. There is continual reference to an ancient, semi-mythic racial past that underpins the 
sense of rejuvenation that is the dominant tone of the play. There is a palpable sense throughout 
that the apocalypse was a blessing in disguise, purging and burning away the gross and synthetic 
materialist elements of society and culture, and clearing the ground for the green shoots of an 
ancient culture to once more bud and grow again. The previously materialistic, alienated and sick 
inhabitants of England discover, following the enforced reconnection to the land brought by nuclear 
war, discover an innate sense of Englishness that is rekindled by reconnection with the soil and local 
culture, one that affirms ancient racial ties to the land that reach back to the Celts. There is an eerie 
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and quite ostentatious sense of a recently invoked and reawakened genius locus here, an animating 
spirit that makes those who dwell there feel as though “we men and women are part of a great 
procession of beings, many of them infinitely stronger and wiser and more beautiful than we are” 
(185). Indeed, it would be hard to find a clearer example of Monaco’s definition of the reactionary 
consciousness in literature.  
 
All of this affirms a nativist ideal of the validity and essentiality of the ties between people, 
food, and land. In the course of an argument over whether materialist science is a boon for mankind 
or a pernicious threat, the Indian scientist, Dr Bahru, is forced to admit that he too feels this strange 
animating spirit here, though he does not feel the same thing back in the East.  Margaret’s response 
stakes out a racial and spiritual claim to the land, affirming a connection with far distant ancestors 
whose presence was supressed by the babble of voices and influences when science, technology and 
industry ruled the land, but who have now returned: “The Celts have never died. They were only 
silent for a little time while the smoke was thick over the cities. And now it has cleared again” (166).  
 
 Catastrophe, then, brings not the ruin and anarchy it might rationally be expected to bring, 
but rather a rightful return to a previous way of life that was simpler, more self-contained, and – 
crucially – deeply rooted. Perhaps it would be more precise and more useful to say that it brings a 
revivification of the native society and its culture. Frequent mention is made in the play of the 
inhabitants devising and enjoying their own entertainment, all of which is, of course, pleasingly 
traditional and local. Following a day’s satisfying and rewarding labour in the fields, the inhabitants 
enjoy nothing more than folk dancing, playing the fiddle, performing plays, and reciting poetry. 
These recreations are very much part of their relationship with the land and provide profound 
meaning for the inhabitants, a meaning which the siren cacophony of modern life had alienated 
them from. The exchange between Dawlish and his granddaughter gives a flavour of the way in 
which this return to tradition regenerates the culture and infuses it with meaning: Rosalie, the 
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granddaughter, tells Dawlish that she was going to give a poetry recital later that evening, but now 
that the foreigners will be arriving, she might not: 
 
ROSALIE: “Perhaps they don’t like poetry. They’re not English” 
STEPHEN: “Well, we can see my dear. There was a time when I didn’t care for it”. 
ROSALIE: (Smiling.) “What was wrong with you?” 
STEPHEN: “I think I was ill. Most of us were. But I didn’t know it”. (110) 
 
The enjoyment of poetry is seen as characteristically English, and a sign of a healthy, right-thinking 
society. Modern entertainments such as TV are seen as foreign and enslaving, stultifying and 
confusing the people, making them sick and alienating them from their own culture and land. As 
Dawlish observes a little later on, life before global nuclear war was hectic, unfulfilling, and left little 
time for reflection or contemplation. “Then came – catastrophe and ruin – and since then,” he 
amiably remarks, “I’ve been able to stay here all the time – and eat well, sleep well, enjoy my 
surroundings and have plenty of time to think” (117). The prospect of redevelopment and 
reindustrialisation, complete with all the bungalows, cafes, TVs, and newspapers fills them with 
horror. Of course, as Dawlish admits, industrialisation starts with the desire to make life easier and 
more pleasant for most people, but “it all ends . . . in a hopeless muddle of values” (145).  
 
 To be fair to Priestley, it would not be reasonable to read the play entirely as though it were 
some kind of simplistic propaganda for traditional English values written without any understanding 
of recent history. As noted, Priestley seems almost anxious to identify some of the ethical dilemmas 
raised by the reversal the play explores. In the foreword to the published text of the play he records 
that he took “a great deal of time and trouble” over this short play “which was re-written several 
times”. It is, Priestley comments, a type of “fantastic comedy, in which, however, certain values 
come up for discussion . . . [and] is not, as some reviewers appeared to think, a political-economic 
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manifesto” (99). The foreigners, as I commented on earlier, are types, but still not entirely without 
nuance, and are not unsympathetically portrayed. It is rather the “muddle of values” that science 
and technology had brought about to which Priestley seems to be pointing. Significantly, as is often 
the case with anti-technologism, technology is not repudiated entirely, but all technologies which 
might lead to the dissemination of external ideas, cultures, or ideologies are repudiated. Thus, there 
is electricity for light which is generated by a wind turbine, but no newspapers beyond a hand-
printed local village circular, and no TV, radio, or cinema. Such things, it is understood, were diluting 
the cultural and native spirit of the country, and Priestley invites his audience to consider whether a 
return to what they might see as a primitive society, or at least, the adopting of certain of their 
values, might not in fact revitalise their own society: 
 
STEPHEN: “We don’t look after machines all day to pay for other machines to 
entertain us half the night. We find we can do without a lot of things that were 
beginning to make slaves of us”. 
 
HEIMER: “It sounds okay, but they could talk like that on the Congo”. 
 
STEPHEN: “I’ve never been on the Congo, but probably they had some good sensible 
ideas about life there”. 
 
HEIMER: “Maybe, but however you look at it – it’s a narrow life”. 
 
STEPHEN: “Perhaps life is best when it’s narrow – but deep and high. The spirit 
expands upwards, not sideways”. (142. Emphasis in original) 
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The motif of direction, of expansion, here is significant because it conceptualises the 
technological, industrial way of life in Spenglerian terms in which culture is conceptualised as the 
expression of the collective soul of a people, and therefore narrow and deep. Civilization – the 
outwards expression of culture – expands across the face of the earth, and is therefore 
conceptualised as wide and shallow. As Spengler puts it “the energy of culture-man is directed 
inwards, that of civilization-man outwards” (28)80. The agrarian life, then, is identified with genuine 
culture, that is to say native culture which is organic. It comes from within the local community and 
is shaped by, and related to the local environment (compare with Spengler’s conceptualisation of 
environment shaping race, as noted in the chapter on Tolkien). In this conception, technological 
culture does not come from within, but emanates, in imperialist fashion, radially from a centre. 
When Irina, the scientist from the communist Soviet Union asks Fred, the faithful bailiff of Dawlish’s 
estate, “is cultural life organized from a centre?” he replies “No. We don’t have anything organized 
from centres” (137). The permeation of Spenglerian tropes is further demonstrated in the 
connections made between technology and imperialism, again in a similar way to that which I 
explored in my chapter on Tolkien: “just as the armies of mad conquerors blindly marched, so, 
blindly and with furious mad energy, you tear down, lay waste, build, set machines in motion” (145). 
The outward, externalising drive of imperialistic ‘civilisation man’ is repudiated and refuge is sought 
in isolation and a desire for self-containment. 
Typically in anti-technological literature, following this sweeping away and purging of what 
had become a dissipated and degenerate civilization, there is a period of atonement, where the land 
is tended with the blood and sweat of the rightful inhabitants, before finally fertility returns. 
Margaret Dawlish, matriarch of the family, informs the foreigners more than once that “You left us 
                                                 
80 This is a conception which permeates the work, but see in particular the section on “Cultures as Organisms” 
in The Decline of the West where Spengler talks of culture standing in an almost “mythical relation to the 
Extended, the space in which and through which it strives to actualize itself” (74). Culture, as soul, is perceived 
as having depth, civilization as extension. It is worth noting here that under Spengler’s conception, only culture 
can “grow” in a real, organic sense. Civilizations do not grow, but expand. This ties in here, and in other 
chapters, with the idea of real, organic growth versus artificial, synthetic growth – or to put it in Spenglerian 
terminology, expansion.  
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nothing but the bare thorn and our bleeding hands; but now our hands are healed and the thorn is 
beginning to flower” (126). At the end of the play, with the threat of foreign colonisation and 
development seen off, the “local news” is once again as it should be: “hay looking good – corn 
harvest promising – one or two nice girls getting married – nobody down with ulcers or delirium 
tremens” (188). Just as Tolkien ended Rings with the restoration of fertility following the removal of 
technology from the Shire, so, towards the end of A Summer’s Day Dream there is the restoration of 
fertility now that technology has wrought its own destruction and the people have returned to a 
proper, hierarchical and rural way of life. In both texts, as in other anti-technological works, the 
reappearance of fertility marks the restoration of the natural order, the return to a putatively proper 
way of life. 
 
The play closes with a mystical, but unequivocal, reaffirmation of a vitalistic culture based on 
connection to the soil: 
 
MARGARET: “We are nourished by this planet’s clay and the flame that comes from 
beyond the stars”. 
 
STEPHEN: “And I have lived long enough to understand at last that what is neither 
clay nor flame, neither Earth nor Spirit, can only leave us famished and frustrated. 
(He pauses.) Send down your roots and lift your faces to the sun and stars”. (191) 
 
The themes of the play – a tired and degenerate cosmopolitan culture being purged by 
catastrophe; atonement and a renewed claim to the land; and finally the return of fertility – are 
common tropes in anti-technological treatments of catastrophe. However, whilst the overall themes 
are frequently held in common, the representation of them varies and is sometimes sublimated. 
Though the contours of these ideas can often be discerned, there are often (as I will discuss in the 
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course of this chapter) other overlaying concerns and themes that obscure them. Pat Frank’s 1959 
post-nuclear holocaust classic, Alas Babylon, is a good example of this. Frank’s primary concern in 
the novel is to alert people to how easily a catastrophic nuclear war could erupt, and the totality of 
the consequential aftermath at time when jingoistic triumphalism was still prevalent. But underlying 
the novel’s depiction of the travails and triumphs of post-atomic life in the small town of Fort 
Repose, the same themes can be detected. Retired Navy Admiral Sam Hazard provides a fairly 
transparent outlet for the authorial voice in the novel with his scholar’s detachment and expansive 
view of history and current affairs. The ultimate cause for the enforced return to the Neolithic age 
can be found, he explains, not in Pentagon records or the White House, but in Edward Gibbon’s 
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire: 
 
There are odd similarities between the end of the Pax Romana and the end of the Pax 
Americana which inherited Pax Britannica. For instance, the prices paid for high 
office. When it became common to spend a million dollars to elect senators from 
moderately populous states, I think that should have been a warning to us. For 
instance, free pap for the masses. Bread and circuses. Roman spectacles and our 
spectaculars. Largesse from the conquering proconsuls and television giveaways from 
the successful lipstick king. To understand the present you must know the past. (236) 
 
Once again, the decadence and degeneration of empire are burned away by catastrophe and, 
following suitable (if involuntary) sacrifice, a revival of local cultural life occurs, signalling the 
beginning of the new cycle. Before the destruction of the cities people had sat there “painlessly 
absorbing visual pabulum on television” and mindlessly imbibed other mass distractions. But now 
“all this was ended. All entertainment, all amusements, all escape, all information again centered in 
the library” (189). It is the library that provides the local knowledge that enables life to resume, 
knowledge of the land, such as where salt could be found, that reintroduces the necessary 
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relationships and period of atonement that must come. The directionality is altered, and instead of 
looking outwards, beyond the local community, people once more look inwards and affirm local ties. 
The anomie of modern materialism is swept away, and with re-emergence of authority, of hierarchy, 
comes stability and meaning. 
 
Similarly in Edward Cooper's cult classic The Overman Culture, concerns over the renewal 
and revivification of culture are explored. Cooper's novel is set ten thousand years into the future 
after a series of global wars have wiped out the human race. The only survivors are a small group of 
children, unaware of the past, and artificially reared and brought up by androids in a make-believe 
world. Surrounded by robots that almost perfectly resemble humans, and inhabiting a recreation of 
London during the blitz, the children grow up amidst a strange pastiche of British culture: Winston 
Churchill and Queen Victoria stroll through the park arm in arm, whilst jet fighters and laser beams 
battle Zeppelins overhead. The great and the good of a thousand years of British history walk among 
the children; they are their teachers, classmates, and friends; they converse with them whilst out 
walking or cycling around the famous landmarks and monuments of London. The hero of the story, 
Michael Faraday, begins to suspect that all is not as it appears in this world, and sets out to uncover 
the truth. Eventually he and his friends discover the artificial nature of their world and rebel against 
it, horrified to discover that the adults they had thought of as parents, relatives and teachers were in 
fact mere automata, not people.  
 
This act of rebellion, the smashing of the machines that guarded them and kept them safe 
triggers a pre-programmed response. Having reached a level of maturity sufficient to indicate that 
they are capable of their own decisions, they are taken to the central control room where they are 
told, by a recreation of William Shakespeare, that the world they inhabit is a synthesis of a culture 
long since vanished, a recreation designed to capture and transmit the concentrated high points of 
their culture from the morass of relativism and degeneracy from which it had sunk to a distant 
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future where it would be the sole surviving culture in an uninhabited world. The central irony of The 
Overman Culture, then, is that the technology which had led to the destruction of a degenerate 
society is utilised one last time in order to ensure that white, Anglo-Saxon culture survives 
Armageddon and that only when the children reject the technology that supposedly keeps them safe 
and comfortable will they be truly free and ready to begin “the overman culture”. 
 
In a chamber designed to recreate exactly the great reading room of the British Library, the 
figure of William Shakespeare admits that the children do not, in fact, inhabit the real London, but 
rather a recreation of it on an island  ". . . that was once called Tasmania. You are the only human 
beings on the entire planet, and you were especially developed for this project. You are the 
Overman culture" (173). The entire vision, the children are informed, was the project of Dr Julius 
Overman, who foresaw the wars and catastrophes that would inevitably follow from the breakdown 
in order and morality in the modern, technological world, and wanted to seed a "second human 
race" with what he believed was the right genetic and cultural heritage (166). A plaque records 
Overman’s vision which demonstrates again how themes of destruction and hoped-for revival link 
not to scientifically determinable causes (such as pollution or species extinction) but rather are tied 
to a moral and cultural collapse: 
 
I was born in the year 1977 in London, England, to which corrupt and 
decadent country I shall not return until time and the Will of God have wrought great 
and cleansing changes. The world is evil and is bent upon a course of great 
destruction . . . But shall mankind be utterly destroyed because of the evil that exists 
today? . . . I have caused this chamber to be built in a small and yet unspoiled land 
far from my natural home. I have gathered genetic material on the advice of 
scientific men of good will, and I have caused it to be preserved here. (173-4) 
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In keeping with the anti-technologist desire for cultural and even ethnic purity, the robot informs the 
children that "the sperm and ova he [Julius Overman] had preserved were from British donors of 
Caucasian stock" (185). The second human race will thus be one whose genetic make-up and cultural 
heritage is absolutely uniform, solving at a stroke all the tiresome problems of ethnic and cultural 
diversity, interchange, and multiculturalism which plagued the machine age. "Cleansing changes" 
have indeed been wrought not just on England, but on the whole world. There are no other 
oppressed races, chafing at the yoke, no insidious foreign cultures permeating and corrupting 
Western society and no native inhabitants of Tasmania or elsewhere to upset the smooth institution 
of the revived culture.  
 
 In this version of the Spenglerian organic cycle, the stages are writ large, and the return of 
fertility that follows the end of the old cycle and the beginning of the new is absolutely all-
encompassing in scope. This time, there will be no threat extant to the integrity of the new race and 
culture for a very, very long time. The machines have obligingly spent the last ten thousand years 
helping to restore and preserve "the ecological balance of the planet" as well as "as much as possible 
of the literature, achievements and history of man" so that the world they re-inhabit will be as near 
perfect as possible; the balance will be completely restored so that fertility may return (184). 
Fittingly, the namesakes of the British scientist and British author, Michael Faraday, and his partner, 
Emily Bronte, enact the final stage of this cycle - the revivification of culture and the return of 
fertility – in a speech located (with heavy symbolism) on top of a hill overlooking a vista of virgin land 
and sea, the artificial city in which they were raised behind them. As the patriarch of the new human 
race, Michael lays out his vision of a unified world at peace with itself: 
 
Mankind has a second chance. We are the waymakers, the advance guard of a new 
humanity. The way we live, the actions we take, will decide whether intercontinental 
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ballistic missiles or space ships lift off Earth a thousand years from now. We have to 
create a world in which there are no nations but only one people. (189) 
 
Emily answers his speech with appropriate ingenuousness, confirming her role as mother of the 
race: “’I want to have your children.’ said Emily, hardly understanding what she meant. ‘I want to 
have many of your children’" (189). This rousing speech about creating a world in which there are no 
nations and only one people conveniently overlooks the fact that this is already de facto the case – 
there are now no nations, no different cultures or races, but "only one people". In Cooper's 
apocalypse, catastrophe brings the ultimate realisation of the Spenglerian cycle. There is now, 
through no fault of the survivors, no degenerate culture, no dangerous influences, no other 
threatening races competing for resources, but one culture, and one people now free to repopulate 
the planet. As with Priestley's play, catastrophe – though superficially portrayed as being viewed 
with regret - is surreptitiously viewed as a golden opportunity to resolve many of the besetting 
complications of the technological age. Importantly, the realisation of this re-setting through 
catastrophe absolves the survivors of any guilt or complicity regarding the wiping out of foreign 
cultures and races. There are no troubling images of emaciated figures scratching at the window of 
Western society, no upsetting stories on the evening news. The survivors are presented with a world 
in which such unpleasant realities have been almost magically erased, with the added bonus that 
their experience of catastrophe has atoned for any lingering sins of their ancestors.  
 
Cooper’s novel illustrates once again the essential distinction at the heart of anti-
technologism: technology is not necessarily rejected in its entirety, but the more problematic 
outcomes that stem from it have to be worked out and resolved first.81 The perceived corrosive 
                                                 
81 A theme Cooper explores in more detail in his novel, The Cloud Walker (1973) in which a future England has 
rejected technology entirely and returned to a medieval, feudal existence. The hero of the novel is fascinated 
by legends that humanity once flew through the air, a fascination which almost results in him being burnt as a 
witch. It is only the threatened invasion of England by ruthless foreigners that saves him, demonstrating at the 
same time that some level of technology is necessary to safeguard national sovereignty.   
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effect of technology on social conformity and moral fibre that technology has to be decisively 
resolved. There is a clear separation between on the one hand technology as a tool, carefully 
administered and controlled by responsible people, removed from everyday life, and on the other 
hand technology that saturates society and is open to all, which leads to cheap diversions and ease, 
sloth, and dissipation. In anti-technologism this distinction is presented as a choice between 
technology as a servant and technology as a master. In The Overman Culture, for example, it takes 
the format of a perennial riddle, the "Overman legend", for the children to solve: "The problem is 
this. Shall men control machines or shall machines control men?" (150). However, a strong case 
could be made that the real distinction being argued for in anti-technological literature is not 
between technology as a servant or master, but rather between technology that is exclusive and the 
preserve of a sober and responsible few, and technology that is accessible and open to all, radically 
democratic and employable by anyone, an aspect of technology and reaction against it noted by 
Moorcock (1988). Thus, anti-technological literature seems to propound a vision of technology that 
is hermetic, with very clear divisions between technology and society, and especially technology and 
culture. Faraday solves this problem in the novel by rejecting the machine's offer to help artificially 
inseminate and raise a second generation of children, declaring that "it can help us to build farms, 
houses, laboratories. But it must not create another culture - another generation” (189-90). This 
time, not only must there be absolute, total unity and purity of culture, but the distinction between 
a saturating technology and a carefully managed technology must be made from the very beginning.  
Technology, in its place, has an important role to play in this "Overman Culture" but the demotic and 
democratic aspects of it must be controlled or curtailed.  
 
Cooper's fantasy of catastrophe as cleansing, washing away utterly a corrupt and decadent 
culture is an extreme example that serves as a useful case study that highlights key aspects which I 
am interested in exploring in this chapter, as well as more generally in this thesis. The Overman 
Culture presents a version of the anti-technological narrative that is simplistic and one that is 
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extrapolated to its furthest limits, but in doing so it throws into relief certain aspects of anti-
technologism's sublimated yearning, not necessarily for catastrophe itself, but for a decisive event or 
break that would allow resetting and purifying the culture without guilt. The novel achieves this level 
of decisiveness, this totality of separation, by virtue of the sheer passage of time between the 
catastrophe that brings about the end of the effete culture and the rebirth of the new. It allows for 
the previous culture to serve solely as a backdrop, more or a less a caricature of itself, something 
winked at in Cooper's novel, which has Queen Victoria driving her hover car around the grounds of 
Buckingham Palace, or strolling arm in arm with Winston Churchill through Hyde Park. The cultural 
high points, the great men and women, and great achievements are backlit to throw fantastic 
shadows on this distant future, their purpose to inculcate a sense not just of a great and proud 
heritage, but also of great expectation for the new and utterly unified human race and culture. 
Faraday’s launching speech, situated with Nietzschean symbolism on the highest hill in the vicinity, 
acknowledges this expectation, laying out a thousand-year vision for the new race which has all the 
room and resources it could wish for. With no competing cultures or races to threaten it, the ultra-
British, ultra-white culture that is propagated in the unspoilt environs of Tasmania is expected to 
flourish and progress without deviation towards a glorious future. 
 
The same yearning for simplicity, and isolation from alien cultures and influences can be 
seen in James Howard Kunstler's World Made by Hand (2008), a story of America “sometime in the 
not-distant future” after the crystallisation of what Kunstler refers to as the long emergency: 
declining levels of oil and other sources of energy that will have seismic effects on the modern 
world, effectively forcing a return to a simpler, more regional way of life (inside jacket). From the 
perspective of Robert Earle, a former software executive turned carpenter, the novel explores many 
of the ideas Kunstler has about a reborn America following the collapse of a modern world that has 
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become over-reliant on complex technology.82 Described on the inside fly-leaf as depicting “a 
surprisingly lyrical, tender, and hopeful new America struggling to be born” and showing that the 
future “is not necessarily something to fear”, the novel presents a picture of a community emerging 
from the collapse of the modern world, returning to its roots, and finding a new sense of identity 
and purpose by returning a way of living that is consonant with the natural order.  
 
As I’ve spent significant time so far in this chapter explicating and exploring the structural 
elements of catastrophe in the anti-technological novel, I want to use my discussion of Kunstler’s 
novel to look at how the anti-technological use of catastrophe as a “reset button” for civilization 
expresses an intensely conservative mood that yearns for simplification in the face of what is 
perceived to be a dangerously over-complex modern world, and does so whilst professing what is 
ostensibly a progressive, ecologically aware agenda (this crossover, or confusion, between ostensible 
progressivism and underlying reactionary politics is, as I observed in the introduction to this thesis, a 
notable aspect of anti-technologism). My intention in this section is to show how Kunstler’s novel 
puts forward a vision of a new world which is essentially a return to a much older one as way of 
illustrating how anti-technological literature uses catastrophe as a means of avoiding uncomfortable 
or unpleasant issues that arise from its desire for a return to a society based on what it sees as the 
natural order. This return to the natural order is portrayed as both necessary and proper once the 
expansive force of technology has been seen to have failed. To resume and expand on a metaphor 
from previous chapters, in this vision, catastrophe is the bursting of the inflationary bubble of 
technology and the “unnatural” ways of life it sustained, and the reassertion of eternal and 
undeniable societal norms. It is therefore always viewed in anti-technological literature as a 
                                                 
82 Kunstler’s basic premise, both in this work of fiction and in his non-fictional work, is that modern technology 
and modern civilization require vast amounts of energy which in turn depend on the infinite supply of a finite 
and steadily declining fuel source (oil, gas, coal, and so on). It is his contention that renewable energy cannot 
hope to supply anything like the amount of energy required to keep modern civilization running in anything 
resembling its current state. The long emergency he speaks of is not so much one thing as a convergence of 
problems with the technological world and its unsustainability which coalesce to cause it to collapse from 
within. Once again, though, as my analysis here shows, though the immediate references are environmental, 
Kunstler’s real animus seems to be against materialism and cultural decline. 
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vindication, the point of the Spenglerian cycle at which “the whole pyramid of cultural man 
vanishes” (Spengler 251).  
 
In World Made by Hand, then, we see that old patterns are resumed as though they are the 
only correct and authentic way of life. This return proves the eternal verity of organic form, only 
briefly masked by the glossy chaos of the technological world. For example, a town hall meeting is 
described: 
 
All the trustees were men, no women and no plain laborers. As the world changed, 
we reverted to social distinctions we’d thought were obsolete. The egalitarian 
pretenses of the high-octane decades had dissolved and nobody even debated it 
anymore, including the women of our town. A plain majority of the townspeople 
were laborers now, whatever in life they had been before. Nobody called them 
peasants, but in effect that’s what they’d become. That’s just the way things were. 
(101) 
 
As this extract shows, the return to conservatism and a clearly delineated hierarchy is depicted as 
both necessary and more or less right or proper. The idea of equality promulgated in the 
technological era was a “pretence”. Women have returned to their previous purely domestic role 
and are no longer treated as equals in the workplace. The “peasants” are apparently not unhappy 
with their lot – indeed, the happiest and best fed of all are those who live in the demesne of a 
powerful landowner who runs his estate on overtly feudal lines. The loss of technology means a 
return to manual labour, and a division of labour between peasants and administrators, men and 
women. Once again, the professed ideal of an anti-capitalist guild socialism apparently necessitates 
a reversion to feudality and patriarchy.  
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 Just as the loss of technology means a return to distinctions of class and gender in Kunstler’s 
world, so it also means the recognition of the need for separation of race and culture. For reasons 
not fully explained, the decline in availability of the means to power a technological society leads to 
a breakdown in harmony between the different races and cultures, both on a regional and global 
level. The act that “tank[s] the whole U.S. economy” and precipitates a return to regionalism 
effectively ending the technological way of life is a bomb going off in Los Angeles, an “act of jihad 
[that] was extraordinarily successful” in ending the globalisation that was an integral aspect of the 
technological lifestyle (23). An “especially vicious” strain of “Mexican flu” which wipes out a large 
proportion of the population also leads to people withdrawing from trade with others outside their 
own communities (7). On a national and regional level there are also repeated pointed references to 
“trouble between the races”, something which preoccupies Kunstler in his non-fiction work as well 
(8). As society returns to a more localised, agrarian economy, it is understood that the “pretenses” 
of the technological world, such as a successful multicultural society are unravelled. Because of their 
racial and cultural homogeneity (being almost entirely white, Anglo-Saxon) Union Grove and 
Washington County have been spared such inter-ethnic violence. When Earle meets a member of a 
quasi-Amish Christian sect who tells him they are fleeing “race trouble” in the more populous areas, 
the brother notes approvingly that “I haven’t seen any black folks or Spanish in Union Grove” and 
tentatively asks him: “You got any sir?” (148-9). Earle reassures him that they had very few non-
white families before the catastrophe and those few have already left, though it is left unclear 
whether this is voluntarily or they have been driven out: “There was a fellow named Archie Basiltree 
who worked in the Aubuchon hardware store when we first came. The store is gone and so is 
Archie” (149). In Kunstler’s vision of an America reborn along its previous colonialist, agrarian lines 
there will apparently be a clear division between the races and cultures just as there will be a clear 
division – again, supposedly of necessity – between the roles of men and women, and labourers and 
landowners. The egalitarianism of modern civilization will be shown to have been a brief chimera. 
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In a recent interview promoting his latest book on the problems of the technological age, 
Too Much Magic: Wishful Thinking, Technology, and the Fate of the Nation (2012), Kunstler discusses 
what he sees as the unavoidable truth that the different races just can’t get along, a truth briefly 
escaped because of the relative ease and abundance of modern society. Pressed by the interviewer 
on why he thinks that people will default to racial or cultural divisions in the event of the modern 
technological world collapsing, Kunstler doesn’t explain why he thinks society will divide along these 
lines, instead choosing to launch an attack on what he sees as the delusion that multiculturalism in 
America has been a success: 
 
I think we should be concerned about the ethnic situation in the USA. My own, um, 
“group of people” shall we say, you know, progressive centrists and the so-called 
liberals and democrats, have been deluding ourselves for years that we’re living in a 
successfully multi-cultural society. And there are elements of it that I think have been 
successful, but it’s hardly nirvana and there are huge populations of aggrieved people 
in this country. They just haven’t acted out. Much. At least, for the last twenty years. 
(Staggs) 
 
Kunstler’s rejection of multiculturalism seems to be based on a belief that people’s natural 
instinct is to identify along racial and cultural lines, and that sustainable, successful societies require 
homogeneity, as TS Eliot argued in After Strange Gods, as I noted in my introduction. This ideal has 
become so accepted and pervasive that it is noticeable how even the more nuanced anti-
technological treatments of catastrophe such as Kim Stanley Robinson’s The Wild Shore (1984) deal 
in essentially the same ideas. In Robinson’s story, the idealisation of homogeneity and simplicity is 
not foregrounded to anything like the same extent as Kunstler’s, but the separation along cultural 
and racial lines, and the sense of the catastrophe as being the result of being “so far from the earth 
that we couldn’t figure out how to live off it” are undeniable (295).   
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The example of The Wild Shore shows, I believe, how the tropes of anti-technologism diffuse 
into the wider literary and intellectual world. I see Robinson’s questioning of technology as arising 
from a concern over the ecological and psychological impacts of technology, rather than from a 
reaction against change. Even so, there are still some aspects of anti-technologist ideology in his 
writing, such as the way in which the simpler life portrayed in The Wild Shore is viewed as being a 
resetting or return to a way of life that is somehow more authentic and natural than modern society. 
There is still a sense in the novel that humanity in the modern world was degenerating, and lacked 
meaning and direction. In his endnotes to a collection of anti-technological short stories which he 
edited, Future Primitive: The New Ecotopias (1994), Robinson comments that “I think the stories 
reveal everywhere their writers’ belief that the societies they depict are preferable to the boxed 
existences of modern urban life – preferable because of their engagement with the world, and 
because of the tremendous infusion of meaning back into the lives of their characters – in part 
because of the return of the hardship and danger which seems so un-utopian to us,” a stance to 
which he is clearly sympathetic (346).83 The short stories selected for the volume all depict “future 
primitive” worlds that explore a return to a more primitive lifestyle following the collapse of the 
technological world. Whilst I want to remain focussed on Kunstler’s novel here, and not diverge into 
a discussion of Robinson’s work, I think it illustrates again how collapse and catastrophe are 
perceived as offering a return to simplicity and self-sufficiency which implies cultural isolation 
whether prescribed or de facto. Not all treatments of the theme are as forthright as Kunstler’s, but 
there is a broad theme of revitalisation through simplification in them that is striking. I believe that 
this demonstrates the sublimated worries about degeneration (cultural, moral, and physical) which 
underlie anti-technologism and show that the ideals and themes it propounds have diffused into 
more general literature and popular culture.  
 
                                                 
83 Note how such a view ties “meaning” to a rejection of progress and a rather Nietzschean view that meaning 
involves a rejection of materialism and an acceptance – even an embracing – of hardship and danger. 
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The concern over degeneration in anti-technological treatments of catastrophe is very clear 
in Kunstler’s non-fictional works such as Home from Nowhere (1998) where he rails against the 
commercial “trashiness” of modern America, which he argues is leading to a downwards spiral of 
degeneracy. The pursuit of such dissipations such as watching television, shopping, microwaved 
snack foods, and kinky sex are, he claims, leading to the population degenerating physically, 
mentally, and culturally into a nation of “overfed clowns, crybabies, slackers, deadbeats, sadists, 
cads, whores, and crooks” to such a degree that it “call[s] into question the value of technological 
progress itself” (82). The technological world, Kunstler charges, has led to a debased culture of 
instant gratification that is reflected in the ugliness of our physical surroundings which “seem 
designed to enable us to dwell in a condition of ever-diminished humanity”. Such sloth, indulgence, 
and degeneracy, he warns, invite catastrophe because they are contrary to the natural order: 
 
Why this should be so has something to do, I suppose, with the self-correcting 
mechanisms of the teleologic [sic] process that we call nature, or the ever-unfolding 
universe, which seeks at many levels to maintain a course towards evermore self-
aware intelligence, or grace, and in so doing tends to punish craven stupidity of the 
kind evinced by American culture in the late twentieth century. In other words, we’re 
getting what we deserve. (81-2. Emphasis in original) 
 
Once again at the bottom of anti-technologism, beneath all the narratives about declining energy 
supplies or environmental degradation, there lies an argument (if we can call it that) over the 
preservation of culture that collapses into moralism and charges of degeneracy and depravity. It is 
notable that the anti-technologist works dealing with catastrophe all depict life in modern 
civilization as confused and confusing, a welter of different voices and influences, with the implicit 
suggestion that these are foreign influences drowning out the native “voice”. Thus in Summer’s Day 
Dream Margaret speaks of the babble of modern life drowning out the sound of the ancient Celts 
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who are the true ancestors and inhabitants of the land. In Alas, Babylon it is the TV corroding the 
identity of the people who are unified after catastrophe in and by the town library, repository of 
local knowledge. In World Made by Hand the silencing of the TV and radio enable people to hear the 
sounds of their land once more and “follow the natural cycles” (37). Thematic polarities are set up 
between simplicity and righteousness at one end of the spectrum, and complexity and decay at the 
other. Running parallel with this, and integral to it, is a polarisation between bewildering complexity 
and foreign influences, and simplicity and homespun values. Such thematic polarisations mirror a 
conception of catastrophe as a chain of events that can be directly traced back to the decadence of 
the modern world. The proximate causes of collapse in World Made by Hand all speak to a 
weakened and diluted culture in its final days, under siege from within and without: jihad-inspired 
bomb attacks in the cities, “Mexican flu” and “race trouble”. These proximate causes are themselves 
the effects of declining oil production (leading to tensions between America and the oil-producing 
countries of the Middle East) and climate change (warming leads to the spread of virulent new 
diseases from warmer, poorer countries such as Mexico). However, declining oil production and 
climate change are themselves the result of a civilisation addicted to the ease and abundance of 
technology. Hence the ultimate cause of catastrophe, when the chain is followed all the way back, is 
seen to be the decadence of Western society. Technology and imperialism are thus revealed to be 
two symptoms of the same disease, and therefore the “crumbling of society’s touchstones” is 
ultimately of one piece with “the wrath of the earth’s weather” caused by “our gleeful avarice” (64).  
 
 Catastrophe, then, becomes a nodal point between the decayed and degenerate culture and 
the reborn and revitalised one. As the root of decay was the ease brought by technological 
imperialism, with its concomitant reflux of foreign influences, the re-born culture must necessarily 
reject all external influences along with all useless luxuries and diversions. Catastrophe is both an 
undeniable indictment on the degeneracy of the previous society and the birth point of the new, 
purified society. Thus it holds a particular fascination for anti-technologism because it marks both an 
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end point and new beginning in the Spenglerian cycle of decay and rebirth. It is therefore regarded 
ambiguously in anti-technological literature as it is feared in the immediate sense but longed for as 
well for what it promises; its approach is prophesised and decried as a judgement from nature on a 
degenerate society and falling standards, but longed for as it heralds the death of a decayed 
civilisation and the rebirth of culture.  
 
Without wishing to cast aspersions on the authors themselves, or to presume any connection 
with their personal political beliefs, it must be noted that this holds many similarities, thematically, 
with the fascist conception of decadence and renaissance in society, what Cyprian Blamares terms 
“the paradoxical mood of ‘palingenetic’ cultural pessimism” (168). This form of cultural pessimism, 
according to Blamares, came out of widespread concern amongst intellectuals at the close of the 
nineteenth century that the enormous gains in science, technology, and medicine came at the cost 
of morals, spiritual values and a sense of direction that ultimately undermined society to the point of 
collapse. One response to this was absolute pessimism – the belief that Western society would 
continue to weaken internally until finally conquered by more primitive (and therefore more vital) 
outsiders. The second response, which he identifies as palingenetic cultural pessimism, held out 
some hope in the form of a cleansing catastrophe which enabled Western society to return to its 
roots and reaffirm its vitality. In this view, 
 
The current crisis presaged a new phase of civilisation based on a revitalizing vision of 
reality that would enable morality and the social order to be regenerated, a 
presentiment that induced the paradoxical mood of ‘palingenetic’ cultural pessimism 
- that is, pessimism about the viability of the present combined with an unshakeable 
belief in an immanent transformation and rebirth. This second response to 
decadence has an affinity with the many pre-modern cosmological myths that 
conceive historical time to be not linear but cyclic, passing from a golden age to an 
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age of depravity and back to a new creation, often after a major cataclysm has wiped 
out a world become dissolute. (168)  
 
As Blamares goes on to observe, before World War Two decadence was normally signified by 
materialism, cosmopolitanism and aesthetic modernism. Since then, however, the indicators of 
decadence for the fascist or proto-fascist palingenetic outlook have changed and “since 1945 further 
signs for fascists of the encroaching decadence are the rise of multiculturalism, globalization, 
consumerism, the Americanization of society, and the looming ecological crisis” (168). All these 
features, as I have sought to make clear in the course of this chapter, are recurrent motifs in the 
anti-technological imagining of catastrophe. Anti-technologist authors, such as Kunstler, seem to 
return to these themes and link them in with a general sense of confusion and decline, one which 
catastrophe mercifully wipes away. The worlds depicted in the novels I have examined in this 
chapter are above all worlds in which one common culture is unquestionably prevalent and there 
are no tiresome arguments about right and wrong. It is also, quite clearly, a world which is both new 
and at the same time a return. It resembles Victorian agrarianism far more than any modern day 
world, both in substance and politics, and in doing so recaptures the sense of spiritual purpose and 
clarity of societal vision.  
 
 The anti-technological view of catastrophe, then, can be seen as concurrent with Blamare’s 
theory of the fascist palingenetic view of history, in that it utilises catastrophe as a nodal point which 
performs the twin roles of drawing the curtain on a decayed culture whilst raising the curtain on a 
simplified and revivified culture. I want to explore the thematic similarities between anti-
technologism and fascism, particularly with regards to the idea of “creative destruction”. Just as 
fascism glorified the violence and sacrifice of war as a cleansing prelude to a purified culture and 
society, so I believe anti-technologism draws on the same themes. I believe this is an aspect of anti-
technologism’s view of materialism’s degenerative effect on society, as I alluded to in my 
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introduction. Thus, anti-technologist literature often deals in fantasies of personal and cultural 
renewal through the violent destruction of materialism, whether the impersonal destruction of 
catastrophe or the personal renunciation of material goods and the embracing of hardship and 
danger as a kind of spiritual redemption.  
 
In the chapter that follows on anti-technologism and the fascist aesthetic I explore these 
connections in greater depth, but first I want to examine a variant strand of anti-technologism that 
also explores fantasies of renewal through the rejection of materialism, the embrace of danger and 
hardship, and the idea of cleaning violence or “creative destruction”. I define this strand as anarcho-
libertarian anti-technologism and I see its fundamental difference to administrative anti-
technologism lying in its rejection of any form of administrative or ameliorative approach to the 
perceived degenerative or homogenising effects of technology. Anarcho-libertarian anti-
technologism, as I analyse it, looks to nature to perform the supposedly necessary tasks of weeding 
out the weak and unfit in society, maintaining a vital and cohesive culture and society, and 
preventing degeneration. For this reason it tends to be more hard-line and fundamentalist than 
administrative anti-technologjsm and more openly advocates and celebrates an ethos of destruction 
of materialist civilisation in the hope of bringing about a revivified culture that obeys the strictures 
of organic form. The analysis of these trends will, in turn, create groundwork for the final chapter’s 
discussion of anti-technologism and the fascist aesthetic. 
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Chapter Five: Wildness and Wilderness: Edward Abbey and Anarcho-Libertarian Anti-
Technologism. 
 
What I am writing about, what I have always written about, is the idea of human 
freedom, human community, and the real world that makes them both possible and 
the new technocratic industrial state which threatens the existence of all three. 
 
Edward Abbey, letter to Karen Evans, 18th June 1984 (Postcards 156). 
 
All things organic are dying in the grip of organization.  
An artificial world is permeating and poisoning the natural. 
 
Oswald Spengler, Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life (47). 
 
So far in this thesis I have advanced a theory of anti-technologism that locates it as an administrative 
impulse formed in reaction to the societal changes wrought by increasing use of and access to 
technology: rising living standards and decreased mortality, mass travel, communication, and 
entertainment. I have situated it as the survival, in sublimated form, of an established anxiety over 
degeneration, cosmopolitanism, and loss of cultural cohesion in increasingly urban and mechanised 
Western societies. Such a reaction was typically formed and articulated by literary and intellectual 
elites. Their concern was primarily with stability, with an implicit but still very substantial stress on 
the need for hierarchy, and the restoration or instillation of what was seen as a natural balance.  
Immanent in this reactionary mood was the belief (whether voiced or implicit) that technology had 
upset or removed natural limits and balances on society, allowing the survival of the unfit and the 
growth of a restive urban population. Whether it was expressed by the eugenic movement prior to 
the Second World War, or the “Limits to Growth” Neo-Malthusian concern about resources 
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afterwards, the unnatural growth that technology enabled was a common factor and was perceived 
as dangerously disruptive to this balance or order. Restoration of this natural balance, and the 
reassertion of proper controls by responsible members of the administrative class, was seen as 
imperative if society was to be prevented from spiralling downwards into degeneracy and chaos. 
 
  In this chapter I look at a variant stand of anti-technologism, one that identifies and 
concerns itself with many of the same problems that administrative anti-technologism does, but 
which differs in that it rejects an administrative or technocratic solution to the technological 
problem. I shall refer to this strand of anti-technologism as anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism 
and, as I mentioned at the end of the last chapter, its main distinguishing characteristic is that it 
looks to nature to maintain a putative natural balance or harmony both between people within 
society and (more importantly) between people and nature itself. To put it another way, it seeks to 
“read off” truths about the nature and organization of human society and culture from observations 
and idealisations of the natural world. As I have noted before in this thesis, the idea that there is a 
necessary balance or harmony to be maintained and which technology had sundered is a central 
aspect of anti-technologism in general. But whereas administrative anti-technologism, in recognising 
what it sees as a disharmony, seeks a reformist solution, a re-structuring of society, anarcho-
libertarian anti-technologism sees administrative and reformist solutions as simply more of the same 
kind of thinking which led to the problem in the first place. Some anarcho-libertarian anti-
technologists advocate extreme anarcho-primitivism (a literal return to the Neolithic age) others 
place the emphasis instead on reducing the need for institutional, geographically widespread 
governance by looking to a return to society based (supposedly) more closely on nature and the 
organic form to render obsolete the functions of a centralised government.  
 
The essential difference between administrative and anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism 
which I will be exploring in this chapter can be summarised like this: though both strands of anti-
175 
 
technologism reject what they see as the artificiality and unsustainability of a highly technological 
society, as well as its degenerative attributes, and seek to pattern human society along putatively 
more natural and organic lines, administrative anti-technologism seeks to do this by fiat and 
administration – a managerial solution to the ills of modern society – whereas anarcho-libertarian 
anti-technologism believes that such attempts are themselves technocratic and that the only 
realistic way forward is to return to a much simpler state of society where government above a very 
basic, local level will be unnecessary. To take the example of perceived overpopulation in the 
modern world, which both strands of anti-technologism are concerned with: whereas administrative 
anti-technologism tends to propose a bureaucratic and ameliorative response (usually greater birth 
control, especially in “undesirable” sections of the population), anarcho-libertarian anti-
technologism tends to the belief that such managerialism would be unnecessary in a more “natural”, 
less technological society because the ratio of births to deaths would return to sustainable levels by 
natural processes of attrition.84  
 
Perhaps it is for this reason that anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism is often quite 
fundamentalist and nihilistic, especially in response to reformism which it tends to view with 
suspicion as a perpetuation of modern civilisation. Anti-technologist author Derrick Jensen, for 
instance, when asked by The Ecologist in 2004 what book he would give to politicians and industry 
leaders replied “one that explodes” – his point being that bureaucratic and intellectual attempts to 
reform society were structurally invalid and merely served to perpetuate modern civilisation (Jensen 
n. pag.). On reading the manifesto and other writings of Ted Kaczynski (better known as the 
“Unabomber” for his practice of placing bombs at universities and airports) writer and essayist Paul 
Kingsnorth comments that despite the deaths, maiming, and injuries caused by Kaczynski’s bombing 
campaign, he identifies with the latter’s desire for “revenge” against the technological world to such 
                                                 
84 Anarcho-primitivist John Zerzan, for example, argues that “expanding population was not a cause of 
agriculture but its result; this suggests a basic dynamic of the population problem . . . [therefore] it may be that 
we can only solve the planet’s overpopulation problem by removing the root cause of basic estrangement from 
each other” (Zerzan, “No Way Out” 199).  
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an extent that he worries that Kaczynski’s manifesto “might change my life” (Kingsnorth “Dark 
Ecology” n. pag.). He notes as particularly compelling Kaczynski’s argument that a revolutionary 
movement “dedicated to the elimination of technological society” is needed and that in its 
reformism “the political left is technological society’s first line of defense against revolution” 
(Kingsnorth “Dark Ecology” n. pag.). Indeed, as the thrust of Kaczynski’s argument in the manifesto is 
that reformist movements only serve to perpetuate a civilisation that has become too advanced for 
its own good, it provides an excellent reference for understanding the anarcho-libertarian anti-
technologist philosophy. Similarly, John Zerzan’s reply when asked if he was really “against 
civilisation” (the title of an anthology of writing critiquing modernity which he edited) also illustrates 
the revolutionary and nihilistic nature of anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism very clearly. The 
interviewer asks Zerzan “you mean you’re being literal when you say we have to go back to the 
Stone Age?” Zerzan replies: 
 
Absolutely, otherwise it's just talk. We have to dismantle this whole mess, and start 
thinking practically, start regaining the skills we once had as people on this planet. 
We're just becoming more and more dependent on technology, which drains 
everything away – it drains community away, it really drains experience away, it 
drains meaning away. (Sampath n. pag.)  
 
Whilst Zerzan often attacks technology on the grounds of ecological damage, it is notable that often, 
as in this example for instance, he bases his argument for the dismantling of technological society on 
ground of cultural vitality, social cohesion and personal fulfilment. The return to the state of nature, 
then, is at least as much about the type of culture and society Zerzan and others think desirable as it 
is about environmental concerns. 
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Of course, anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism, as I analyse it in this chapter, encompasses 
a spectrum of opinions on modern society that ranges from Zerzan’s preference for a return to the 
Stone Age to Kirkpatrick Sale’s bioregionalism and calls for the revivification of local culture. Some of 
its proponents also seem to be rather vague on the level of “dismantling” that would be required. 
Edward Abbey, whose work I focus on in this chapter, sometimes recommends merely outlawing 
certain artefacts of technology, whilst at many other times he seems to be calling for a near-
Neolithic level of existence. Nevertheless, the common factor in anarcho-libertarian anti-
technologism is the belief that nature (or at least their reading of nature) provides the perfect model 
for society and that all attempts to ameliorate or improve it are misguided and – as Zerzan’s 
response above argues -  serve only to separate human society and culture from the source of its 
vitality. As I observed previously, where administrative anti-technologism seeks societal remedies to 
technology’s perceived perversion of Darwinian selection, anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism 
looks directly to natural selection to perform this function and therefore places the stress on a 
society where such natural selection can still operate. Given this proclivity, it will be part of the 
argument of this chapter that anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism may be further characterised by 
its preoccupation with strength over weakness as morally “right” and with action over intellect. 
 
 I will begin this chapter by elaborating on this analysis of anarcho-libertarian anti-
technologism and argue that once again we can see the long shadows of Spengler’s influence being 
cast over aspects of late twentieth century thought. I then turn my focus on to the writings of 
iconoclastic American writer Edward Abbey to consider how some of these aspects of anarcho-
libertarian anti-technologism are translated into literature. As part of this analysis I argue that 
Abbey’s writing provides an excellent example of how anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism’s 
reliance on nature as both ideal state and analogue for human behaviour tends to collapse into a 
kind of quasi-Nietzschean cult of action, where instinct, action, and animalistic passion are morally 
superior by virtue of their perceived naturalness and lack of artifice. I then link this back to the 
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Spenglerian idea of the vital and healthy culture being one that is based on a close relationship to 
the local soil and environment and in light of this I close with a consideration of anarcho-libertarian 
anti-technologism’s use of the “bioregional” ideal.85 I attempt to draw out some of the implications 
of the bioregional vision within the context of my analysis here because I think it will serve to clarify 
the role of some crucial underlying themes of anti-technologism, such as the stress it places on 
authenticity and meaning. As these are broad themes, I will only have space in this current chapter 
to offer a sketch or outline of some of the characteristics of anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism as 
I see it, but I hope that much of the work done here will prove useful as background to my next 
chapter which focuses on anti-technology and the fascist aesthetic. 
 
Finally, before beginning my analysis, I would like to offer a very brief defence of the term 
“anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism”. It must be said that this definition is not one used (as far as 
I know) by those whom I see as writing from this viewpoint. Typically, writers and thinkers such as 
Edward Abbey, John Zerzan, Derrick Jensen, Kirkpatrick Sale, Chellis Glendenning, Stephanie Mills 
and others would be more likely to describe themselves as anarcho-primitivists, some of them as 
Deep Ecologists, and a few of them – such as Kirkpatrick Sale and Chellis Glendenning – simply as 
neo-luddites.  I include under this rubric those writers and essayists whose anti-technologism is 
characterised by deep scepticism towards administrative or reformist critiques of society and the 
belief that, as Stephanie Mills puts it, that any valid critique “would be more concerned with the 
Whole [sic] than the parts and has to proceed from the premise that death and pain, short life spans, 
and no bread without sweat must be accepted” (Glendenning, Mills and Sale n. pag.). Not all 
anarcho-libertarian anti-technologists critiques see the ideal society as a necessarily brutal one – 
                                                 
85 By way of defining the bioregional ideal, Andrew Dobson’s Green Political Thought (2007) comments that 
“the guiding principle of bioregionalism . . . is that the ‘natural’ world should determine the political, economic, 
and social life of communities” (92). Just as the different climates and topographies of the natural world 
determine the biota there, so bioregionalism proposes that it should similarly determine the characteristics of 
the particular human societies and cultures that inhabit them. Sale, who more than anyone else has 
popularised and advanced the ideal, writes that “It is in the diligent study of those laws [of nature] that we  can 
best guide ourselves in reconstructing human societies for a bioregional world” (Sale Dwellers in the Land 49). 
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indeed, many see it as far less brutal than modern society – but I think that Mills’ argument (that 
attempts to alter nature to ameliorate the human condition are misguided) is characteristic of the 
philosophy.  
 
I want to begin, then, by referring to an argument made by Martin Lewis in his book Green 
Delusions (1994) in which he explores some of the foundational concepts and assumptions that 
underlie a belief in the superiority of the natural state. Lewis notes that such a belief in the 
superiority or desirability of humanity existing in a primal or natural state almost invariably tends to 
run contrary to modern scientific and ecological understanding, in that it perceives the natural state 
to be one of near perfect equilibrium. He comments that, in this view, “the natural world 
encompassed primal humanity as just another species, thus maintaining balance. But when human 
beings discovered technology, unity was rent. A single species now separated itself from, and in the 
process began to destroy, the rest of nature” (45).86 Therefore, in this rather simplistic and 
prelapsarian view, a dichotomy is created: the natural world is seen as near perfect stasis and 
balance, and technology represents change and hence deviation from the original state. As 
technology became more complex and more pervasive, and in so doing increasingly altered the 
environment, so the technological “world” and the people within it drifted further and further away 
from the putatively natural state even as they appropriated the resources of the natural world to 
sustain themselves. Hence it will be clear why, so far as Deep Ecology and also anarcho-libertarian 
anti-technologism is concerned, there can be no reformist answer to modern civilisation because 
any such attempt would be by definition administrative and technocratic, and would therefore be 
merely another form of technological thinking.87  
                                                 
86 The science of ecology has long eschewed the idea of nature as essentially stable and harmonious, and 
instead has adopted a view of nature that emphasises dynamic disequilibrium and continual change. See 
Daniel Botkin Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (1990).  
87 Bramwell, in The Fading of the Greens (1994), defines Deep Ecology as “an approach to environmental issues 
first formulated by Arne Naess in 1972, but implicit in ecologism from its inception. It is apocalyptic, anti-
political and anti-reform. It has adopted principles of biological equality, and emphasises the role of humanity 
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In this conception, then, modern urban life is seen as an unnatural technological “bubble” 
that progressively degrades humanity whilst at the same time it ensures an increasingly artificial and 
unsustainable life within the synthetic cocoon of modern civilisation, one predicated on the ruthless 
exploitation and destruction of the natural world outside its borders. Because anarcho-libertarian 
anti-technologism prefers the laws of nature to society’s laws as a solution to the perceived ills of 
the technological world (see above), and wants to reject modern civilisation more or less in its 
entirety, it has a marked tendency towards a geographical imagination. That is, in perceiving the city 
and its environs (not just suburbia but also any areas farmed on an industrial scale to supply the 
cities) as being within the technological bubble, and the wilderness – pristine nature – as lying 
outside, it sets up a directional tension between them, with the technological city and its attendant 
pollution at one end, and wilderness and purity at the other. This schema enacts the desire to leave 
the city as technosphere behind and re-enter the wilderness as inhabitant, rather than visitor or 
invader.  Thus Theodore Roszak in Where the Wasteland Ends (1972) compares the unnatural 
growth of technological society to a bloodsucking octopus, declaring that “the artificial environment 
taken as a whole . . . stretches out tentacles of influence that reach thousands of miles beyond its 
already sprawling perimeters. It sucks every hinterland and wilderness into its technological 
metabolism” (167). John Landau’s attack on civilisation in his 2005 essay “Civilisation and the 
Primitive” similarly demonstrates this tendency when he characterizes civilisation as “the machine, 
fragmentation, the violation of integrity into coordinated parts. It is homelessness, exiled 
everywhere, therefore colonizing all it sees (“Civilisation and the Primitive” 111).  
 
In fiction, this tension described or imagined in directional, geographical terms can be seen 
in Abbey’s describing technology’s alien presence in the wilderness as though it were sentient and 
monstrous, a pernicious urban presence invading the wilderness. For example in The Monkey 
Wrench Gang he describes the power-line pylons “marching league on league in lockstep like 120-
                                                                                                                                                        
as a participant in nature rather than as nature’s steward. Hence its anti-humanism. The deep ecology vision of 
humanity is as a natural disaster, something like an exterminatory virus” (161).  
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foot outer-space monsters across the desert plains” as the “blazing cities feed on the defenseless 
interior” (26). Modern civilisation is the “global kraken, pantentacled, wall-eyed and parrot-beaked, 
its brain a bank of computer data centers, its blood the flow of money, its heart a radioactive 
dynamo, its language the technetronic [sic] monologue of number imprinted on magnetic tape” 
(172). Abbey and Roszak’s use of a blood-sucking octopus as metaphor for the modern city is 
disturbing given the history of such an image in far-right anti-Semitic propaganda. As I noted in my 
introduction, the Nazi demonization of the Jews relied substantially on the use of biological 
metaphors that identified them with the unnatural growth and cosmopolitanism of urbanism and 
machine civilisation, and thus portrayed them as a parasitical growth on “natural” German society, 
purportedly rooted in the soil. Whilst I do not think either Abbey or Roszack deliberately intended 
any straightforwardly anti-Semitic slur in the use of such imagery, I think it speaks to the appeal and 
persistence of the tropes of natural and unnatural growth, and consequently of natural populations 
identified with the soil and unnatural and degenerate populations identified with urbanism and 
deracinated cosmopolitanism. 
 
That the vast majority of people seem happy enough to remain within the artificial 
environment of the city is seen as evidence for the degenerative and corrupting influence of the 
modern technological world. A Manichean duality is set up between the supposedly corrupt and 
artificial modern world and its uniform mass of inhabitants, and the wilderness outside with a few 
hardy adventurers who willingly embrace the ennobling hardships of a life outside the technological 
bubble. Those who have embraced nature and have chosen to live close to the wild are therefore 
seen as somehow more vital and fully realised because they held to be existing on their own terms, 
and because of their own intrinsic quality, rather than being reliant on the artificial world of 
technology for survival. Such a belief stems from a clearly detectable bias towards biological 
determinism and Social Darwinism in Abbey’s thought. In A Voice Crying in the Wilderness (1989) for 
example, he offers the apothegmatic thought that perhaps homosexuality and androgyny (in other 
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words, a lack of red-blooded masculinity of the kind Abbey saw in himself) were the result of 
overpopulation and urbanism fostered by the imperialism of modern machine civilisation, suggesting 
that “homosexuality, like androgyny, might be an instinctive racial response to overpopulation, 
crowding, and stress. Both flourish when empire reaches its apogee” (81).88 Therefore, for Abbey, 
the wilder, more challenging, and more sparsely populated the terrain, the nobler, more vital and 
more heterosexual its inhabitants. For example, in Desert Solitaire (1968) Abbey debates the virtues 
of people inhabiting different topographies and contends that there is “a superior breed in the 
deserts”, pointing to the Bedouin, Mongols, and Apaches as proof of this superiority. “As for those 
others,” he asks, “the wretched inhabitants of city and plain, can we even think of them, to be 
perfectly candid, as members of the same race?” (243-4). 
 
Of course, such representations, and the tendency to base ideas of vitality and legitimacy 
based on a relationship with the wild earth, bear obvious debts not only to generalised Nietzschean 
elitism but also to the influence of Spengler and his view of “type-true people, born of and grown on 
the soil”. It is not altogether surprising, therefore, to see anarcho-libertarian anti-technologist 
writers and thinkers such as Derrick Jensen and John Zerzan acknowledging a debt to such a deeply 
conservative thinker as Spengler. In his essay, “Why Primitivism?” (2002) Zerzan, though admitting 
that Spengler was “nationalist and reactionary”, calls The Decline of the West “the great masterwork 
of world history” and argues that we need to revisit his theory of an “artificial world [that] is 
permeating and poisoning the natural” to understand why modern civilisation is, in Zerzan’s view, 
unsustainable: 
                                                 
88 Obviously there is an element of intentional shock value in this statement, as in much of Abbey’s writing. Yet 
it would be a grave mistake to simply write off such statements as pour epater les bourgeoisie. In Epitaph for a 
Desert Anarchist (1994) James Bishop argues that the whole point of the comic element in Abbey’s writing was 
to allow him to say the inexcusable, the outrageous. Bishop cites as evidence Abbey’s admittance in one of his 
last interviews before his death that he wrote the way he did and said what he said simply because “I like 
provoking people. I’ve been willing to be dismissed as a crank and a crackpot simply for the pleasure of saying 
exactly what I really do believe” (qtd in Bishop 12).  
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Especially relevant here are Spengler’s judgments, so many decades ago, concerning 
technological development and its social, cultural, and environmental impacts. He 
saw that the dynamic, promethean (“Faustian”) nature of global civilisation becomes 
fully realized as self-destructive mass society and equally calamitous modern 
technology. The subjugation of nature leads ineluctably to its destruction, and to the 
destruction of civilisation. “An artificial world is permeating and poisoning the 
natural. The Civilisation itself has become a machine that does, or tries to do 
everything in mechanical terms.” Civilized man is a “petty creator against Nature.” 
“...This revolutionary in the world of life...has become the slave of his creature. The 
Culture, the aggregate of artificial, personal, self-made life-forms, develops into a 
close-barred cage”. (n. pag.) 
Similarly, Jensen exemplifies the attractiveness for anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism of this 
organicist view of civilisation when he presents his case that technological civilisation has reached 
the end of its cycle:  
Years ago I read Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West. It’s a long book from which I 
really only remember one image. I think Spengler would be pleased at which one. 
Culture is like a plant growing in a particular soil. When a soil is exhausted . . . the 
plant dies. Cultures . . . are the same. The Roman Empire exhausted its possibilities 
(both physical, in terms of resources, and psychic or spiritual), then hung on 
decadent – I mean this in its deeper sense of decaying, although the meaning having 
to do with debauchery works, too – for a thousand years. Other empires are the 
same. The British Empire. The American Empire. Civilisation itself has continued to 
grow by expanding the zone from which it takes its resources. The plant has gotten 
pretty big, but at the cost of a lot of dead soil. (Endgame Vol. 1 89) 
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Jensen and Zerzan’s tribute to Spengler in forming their own theories on civilisation demonstrates 
the way in which the theory and associated lexicon of the organic theory of history became 
embedded in anarcho-libertarian anti-technologist thought. It provided a theoretical basis and a 
language for dividing the world – and to a greater or lesser extent the people within it –t into natural 
or artificial. The depiction of technological civilisation as a relentlessly expansionary force invading 
and feeding on the putatively “natural” world in anarcho-libertarian anti-technologist thought owes 
much to the continuing influence of Spengler’s cyclic, organicist theory of history.  
 I would like to turn now to an examination of how some of these themes are translated and 
represented in the works of Edward Abbey. Like Zerzan, Sale, Glendenning and other anarcho-
libertarian anti-technologists Abbey believed that, in its origin at least, the primitive human society 
based on a primal unity with nature was the ideal. Deviation from this ideal, he believed, had led to 
deviation in human behaviour and morality. “Primitive or traditional societies”, he wrote to a 
correspondent in 1984, “have been organized . . . on natural and therefore decent principles [and] it 
is only in modern times, as I see it, that is, in the last five thousand years, that the drive to dominate 
nature and human nature has perverted and now threatens to destroy the sound, conservative, 
sustaining relationships of men and women”, about as clear an endorsement of the organic form as  
it is possible to imagine (Postcards 158). Abbey wrote largely to advance this view of society –one 
based of putatively “natural” principles of “decency” – as an alternative to what he saw as the 
corrupt, degenerate, and stifling technological society. In so doing he used the geographical 
metaphor of the natural and artificial worlds of wilderness and the city to illustrate these themes. I 
think this led to a great deal of confusion amongst readers and critics who failed to read a deeper 
meaning beneath his representations of wilderness, a confusion that exasperated Abbey as an irate 
letter to his publisher regarding a proposed introduction to one of his novels demonstrates: 
It is quite false to say that I am a writer whose primary and exclusive concern is 
“wilderness preservation”. I cannot for the life of me understand where he got that 
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idea. If my books have a common theme, it would be something like human freedom 
in an industrial society; wilderness is merely one among (many) means towards that 
end. (Postcards 81) 
Abbey’s protestation here that wilderness was only one possible route to personal liberty in 
industrial society is sparked largely by his eagerness to shake off the much-resented tag of “nature 
writer”. But even so, his point is well made: Abbey was deeply invested in defending the wilderness 
of the American South-West in his writings, but that was part of a much deeper defence of what he 
saw as the human need for wildness as a source of vitality and wilderness as a place of freedom and 
cultural and psychic regeneration. 
 Abbey saw a necessarily close relationship between personal liberty and a healthy culture, 
and believed that human spontaneity and creativity sprang from an intimate knowledge and 
relationship with their local soil, their local environment. In his essay “Science with a Human Face” 
(1979) he advances a critique of technological society which draws on the organic metaphor in 
criticising the alienating nature of modern society: 
The denunciation of science-technology that I have outlined here, simple-minded 
and oversimplified though it may undoubtedly be, should be taken seriously at least 
as an expression of the fear and detestation millions now feel for the plastic-
aluminium-electronic-computerized technocracy rapidly forming around us, 
constricting our lives to the dimensions of the machine, divorcing our bodies and 
souls from the earth, harassing us constantly with its petty and haywire demands. 
What most humans really desire is something quite different: liberty, spontaneity, 
nakedness, mystery, wildness, and wilderness. (126-7) 
 Modern technological civilisation is seen here as arid and inorganic, and at the same time 
relentlessly expansionary, “rapidly forming around us” and “divorcing our bodies and souls from the 
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earth”. The directional tension anarcho-libertarianism anti-technologism tends towards is evident 
here in the Spenglarian polarities set up between inorganic city and organic nature, between “beat 
and tension, blood and intellect . . . the countryside in bloom [and] the city of stone” (Spengler 250). 
Abbey rails at what he sees as the oppressive and expansionary nature of technology, crushing 
organic life and exiling us from the earth. 
 However, the Spenglerian organicist conception of history provided more than just a lexicon 
for Abbey and other anarcho-libertarian anti-technologists, it also provided hope because all 
civilisations went through the organic cycle of growth, maturity, senescence and finally death. The 
faster a civilisation expanded, the sooner it must use up its energy (both material and psychic) and 
become brittle, fall into decay, and finally collapse. This seems to have been the basis for Abbey’s 
“optimism” that technological civilisation must crumble relatively soon and give way to revivified 
human societies and cultures, as I think is evident from the following passage in The Monkey Wrench 
Gang: 
When the cities are gone, he thought, and all the ruckus has died away, when 
sunflowers push up through the concrete and asphalt of the forgotten interstate 
freeways, when the Kremlin and the Pentagon are turned into nursing homes for the 
generals, presidents and other such shitheads, when the glass-aluminum skyscraper 
tombs of Phoenix Arizona barely show above the sand dunes, why then, why then, 
why then by God maybe free men and wild women on horses, free women and wild 
men, can roam the sagebrush canyonlands in freedom – goddammit! – herding the 
feral cattle into box canyons, and gorge on bloody meat and bleeding fucking 
internal organs, and dance all night to the music of fiddles! banjos! steel guitars! by 
the light of a reborn moon! – by God yes! Until, he reflected soberly, and bitterly, 
and sadly, until the next age of ice and iron comes down, and the engineers and the 
farmers and the general motherfuckers come back again.  
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Thus George Hayduke’s fantasy. Did he believe in the cyclical theory of 
history? Or the linear theory? You’d find it hard to pin him down in these matters. 
(107) 
Whilst the novel is something of a comic romp, and therefore the rhetoric is deliberately exuberant 
and overblown, what comes through very clearly is the idea of wilderness as vitality, of the renewed 
contact with nature bringing about a revivification of the human spirit that is supressed and stunted 
in the grey canyons of the cities. Hayduke is depicted as a larger-than-life Don Quixote type of 
character, but this augments rather than detracts from Abbey’s message here: Hayduke’s 
boisterousness and his refusal to engage with the compromises and complexities of reformist ideals 
are of a piece with his irrational, intuitive and exuberant nature which seeks a direct connection with 
wildness and nature unmediated by reason and ideology. Like Abbey, Hayduke’s philosophy is one of 
action not contemplation. 
 
There is a clear contrast being made in Hayduke’s fantasy between the technological world, 
which is seen as arid and desiccated, qualities Spengler attributed to the intellect in the world-city of 
late civilisations – “intelligence is the replacement of unconscious living by the exercise of thought, 
masterly, but bloodless and jejune” – and the natural, non-technological world (250). It is also 
expansionary and imperialistic, prone to the reflux that was the fate of all such inflationary 
adventures, the skyscrapers of Phoenix recalling the fate of Shelley’s Ozymandias of course, but also 
referencing Spengler’s declaration in Man and Technics that “This machine-technics will end with the 
Faustian civilisation and one day will lie in fragments, forgotten -- our railways and steamships as 
dead as the Roman roads and the Chinese wall, our giant cities and skyscrapers in ruins like old 
Memphis and Babylon” (67). The technological world of concrete, asphalt, glass and aluminium 
spreads outwards, covering the land, but eventually the natural world breaks through and 
sunflowers push up through the concrete, reaching towards the sun, as the people dance “by the 
light of a reborn moon”. In Hayduke’s fantasy, the death of civilisation marks the rebirth of culture, 
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which is envisaged as instinctual, vitalistic, and Dionysian, at least until civilisation rises again and the 
Spenglerian cycle repeats itself. 
 
So, just as the return of poetry in Priestley’s A Summer’s Day Dream marked the return of 
health and vitality to the people and culture after television and radio had been silenced, so the 
absence of techné, and the return of putatively “native” music through an essentialist connection 
with the wilderness signifies the rebirth of culture in Hayduke’s fantasy. Instead of the “heavy rock 
electric jungle sound [and] the industrial beat of hard-core imitation-Negro music” of “the rootless 
ones” of degenerate modern culture, there are the supposedly traditional instruments of Anglo-
Saxon American culture, -- the fiddle, the banjo, and the steel guitar – which signify reconnection 
with the land and the subsequent rebirth of what is held to be a genuine culture (Abbey, “Telluride 
Blues” 123). Tellingly, Abbey employs the same phrase in The Monkey Wrench Gang, when the 
character of Doc berates his girlfriend for playing “that god-damned imitation-Negro music again . . . 
that slave music” (49). Abbey’s intention here seems not to be so much denigrating indigenous 
African American music (though he clearly despises it) but rather its influence on white, Anglo-Saxon 
American culture. The repetition between his essay and his later novel demonstrate the extent to 
which Abbey uses the comic elements in his fictions as a foil with which to express his own beliefs 
and opinions.  
 
The sense of musical vitality in Hayduke’s fantasy contrasts with Abbey’s criticism of jazz, 
which he saw as a bastard musical genre from the city slums which had been taken up by the 
dissipated and rootless urban aesthete. This, he felt, was not true American music, grounded in a 
culture shaped by its landscapes, but a rootless music that reflected the characteristics of its 
originators in the slums of the artificial world: 
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The music of boredom, bored people. The urban ennui. Big-city music. American? 
The American Negro loose in the slums. Crafty, cunning, subtle, arid music. Cool and 
dry. No emotion, no passion. No blood and guts. The mechanical meter. (Shuffle-
dance.)  The industrial rhythm. Classicism, factory-style. (Confessions 168) 
 
The technological world, then, is identified with a soulless rationality which manifests itself in a 
predilection for degenerate art and culture which is ultimately “arid” and sterile because it is 
divorced from any meaningful connection with a particular landscape or environment. It is, to use 
Spengler’s terminology, the music and culture of the weary world-city at the end of its cycle, frozen 
and spent. In our unhealthy fascination with the scientific and the technological, Abbey felt, we had 
forgotten our animalistic, instinctive side which was necessarily rooted in and shaped by the natural 
world around us. “Be true to the earth, said Nietzsche” Abbey reminded his readers at the end of 
“Science with a Human Face” and not to some intellectual or philosophical abstraction (128). And for 
Abbey this truth meant embracing a natural world that was one of “blood and guts” where instinct 
and emotion, not cold rationality, were the means to forging a meaningful connection to our own 
wild nature. 
 
We get a clear sense of this ideal in Desert Solitaire (1968) where Abbey recounts seeing a 
rabbit on one of his hikes and how he was seized with an irrational urge to pick up a stone to see if 
he could kill it as a test of his ability to survive unaided in the wild. The stone hits the rabbit and after 
a brief spasm, and some blood loss, the rabbit dies. Abbey is at first surprised, but then pleased by 
the feeling that he has in some mystical way asserted his place in the wilderness by this act: 
 
For a moment I am shocked by my deed; I stare at the quiet rabbit, his glazed eyes, 
his blood drying in the dust. Something vital is lacking. But shock is replaced by a mild 
elation . . . I continue my walk with a new, augmented cheerfulness which is hard to 
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understand but unmistakable. What the rabbit has lost in energy and spirit seems 
added, by processes too subtle to fathom, to my own soul. I try but I cannot feel any 
sense of guilt. I examine my soul: white as snow. Check my hands: not a trace of 
blood. No longer do I feel isolated from the sparse and furtive life around me, a 
stranger from another world. I have entered into this one. We are kindred all of us, 
killer and victim, predator and prey. (34) 
 
This passage provides an excellent example of anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism’s geographical 
imagination in literature. In demonstrating his essential wildness through the act of killing Abbey 
asserts his right to step out of the modern, technological world and into the natural one. It 
transforms him from being “a stranger from another world”, allowing him to “enter this one”. 
Instinct is preferred over rationality, and action over intellect. Questions of the ethics of killing 
animals, or of ecological stewardship fall away here, suddenly redundant.  Instead, a type of 
Lawrencian vitalism obviates concerns over stewardship and justifies the act of killing when 
performed in a state of nature, and this is implicitly contrasted with the artificiality of life in a state 
of techné. Abbey’s claimed contentment in this passage stems from what he believes is the 
alignment of human wildness with natural wilderness, and it is important to observe that the most 
significant impression we get from Abbey’s description of the killing is one of harmony between 
human and nature. Just as the act of herding feral cattle into box canyons for slaughtering in The 
Monkey Wrench Gang is seen as a fulfilment of humankind’s wild nature, the killing of a rabbit is a 
claim to be part of the natural world on its own terms. It is not the protection or stewardship of 
nature that is being celebrated here, but the assertion of survival of the fittest, of the laws of nature 
as a revitalising force. 
 
This ideal of harmony not through peaceful co-existence, but through assertion and 
enactment of supposedly natural roles seems to be fundamental to anarcho-libertarian anti-
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technologism. The anarcho-primitivist poet and writer Gary Snyder, for example, in The Practice of 
the Wild (1990), argues that although we should try to not cause needless harm, “Coyote and 
Ground Squirrel do not break the compact they have with each other that one must play predator 
and the other play game”. In fulfilling their natural roles as predator and prey they merely remain 
true to their own nature and “such are the lessons of the wild” for humanity that the technological 
world has forgotten (4).  Indeed, his biographer James Callaghan suggests it is entirely possible that 
Abbey invented the encounter with the rabbit in order to illustrate what he believed was a deeper, 
more important truth (Cahalan 105).  
 
 In describing this act of killing as a kind of communion with nature, Abbey shows 
that as well as Spengler’s organicist vision of history, he was also influenced by supposedly 
Nietzschean ideals of natural elitism and the virtues of action over intellect89. In discussing the 
qualities of the Übermensch Nietzsche argued that the superiority of the truly noble man lay in his 
ability, his willingness, to accept and embrace the animal side of his nature: 
 
[I]n the wilderness they make up for the tension which is caused by being closed in 
and fenced in by the peace of the community for so long, they return to the innocent 
consciousness of a wild beast, as exultant monsters, who perhaps go away having 
committed a hideous succession of murder, arson, rape, and torture in a mood of 
bravado and spiritual equilibrium, as if they had simply played a student’s prank, 
convinced that poets will now have something to sing about and praise for quite some 
time. At the centre of all these noble races we cannot fail to see the beast of prey, 
the blond beast avidly prowling around for spoil and victory. This hidden centre needs 
release from time to time, the beast must out again, must return to the wild (23). 
                                                 
89 Abbey mentions Nietzsche approvingly a few times in his writings, and seems to have some familiarity with 
his texts, but he would also have picked up many of the Nietzschean tropes from Robinson Jeffers, a poet 
Abbey greatly admired, and whose “inhumanist” poetry was saturated in both Spenglarian and Nietzschean 
motifs and imagery. See Arthur Coffin Robinson Jeffers: Poet of Inhumanism (1971). 
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It would be going entirely too far to claim that Abbey similarly condoned violence against others on 
the same grounds. Indeed, given his anti-imperialist convictions, a quite convincing case could be 
made that the opposite was the case. But what is apparent in his writings is the way in which he 
seems to feel those who can break out of what he sees as the prison of modern scientific rationality 
and embrace the wildness within human nature are somehow superior to those who remain within 
the accepted parameters of modern technological society because they are more true to themselves 
and the earth they stand on. Therefore, Abbey’s wild man has licence, by virtue of his embrace of 
internal wildness, to disregard all intellectual contradictions, a recurrent and perhaps essential motif 
in The Monkey Wrench Gang. Such licence is essential, because in their efforts to rescue the 
wilderness from techné, the gang must utilise the instruments of technology: the phone, the car, 
and the chainsaw for example, which of course is something of a paradox. Thus, when Bonnie 
questions the environmental impact of using a chainsaw, Doc Sarvis is quick to curtail any debate: 
“Forget all that. Our duty is to destroy billboards” (MWG 44). Similarly, when Hayduke curses the 
traffic in his way, then reflects that he too is in a car as thus is adding to the traffic he reviles, he 
dismisses such niceties by asserting “. . . I’m here on important business. Besides, I’m an elitist” 
(MWG 27). As with much of Abbey’s writing, the comic element should not be forgotten in analysis, 
but that being said, it is necessary to once again remark how the larger than life comic element in his 
fiction also serves as cover for what would otherwise be simply unacceptable. Thus, in this 
conception, though the members of the monkey wrench gang are indeed children of a technological 
society they also perceive themselves to be more fully realized individuals who scorn the boundaries 
and rules of modern civilisation as being only for the weak, and therefore the take it upon 
themselves to scorn complexity, compromise and reflection and pursue a program of action. 
 
Following this ideal, in The Monkey Wrench Gang the gang is formed beside a blazing camp 
fire underneath a towering mountain plateau where “the men swore to one another the pledge of 
eternal comradeship, sealing the oath with bourbon, and blood drawn from the nick of Hayduke’s 
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buck knife” (224). Against this suitably wild backdrop, the men of the gang each assert their essential 
wildness by connection with what is fierce and wild and natural and therefore “real” as opposed to 
the artificial and technological. They pursue resistance to the incursions of the artificial world not by 
the intellectual routes of debate or raising popular opposition but by action in the form of 
destruction. Indeed, the sole woman in the gang, Bonnie Abzug an intellectual from New York City, 
seems to have the role in the novel of pointing out contradictions in the gang’s approach to 
sabotaging technological society, and proposing alternative, reformist solutions to technological and 
environmental problems, interjections which are invariably cut short by her male companions who 
have no patience for intellectual contemplation. She is notably absent from the blood-brother 
ceremony, though, we are told, she is “tacitly included” (224). By contrast, Hayduke imagines the 
purely sensory aspects of bringing about the end of technological civilisation through sabotage: 
“masochistic machinery, steel in pain, iron under unnatural duress, the multiple images of what he 
called ‘creative destruction’” (225). Only that which is primal and natural is “real” and the rest is 
simply a mass of intellectual wanderings which may be disregarded. “River, rock, sun, blood, hunger, 
wings, joy – this is the real” as one of the characters in the novel reflects, punning rather obviously 
on the homonym of week and weak: “all the rest is transcendental transvestite transactional 
scientology or whatever the fad of the day, the vogue of the week . . . Ask the hawk. Ask the hungry 
lion lunging at the starving doe. They know” (61). And once again, the speech of the character here 
is made to frame the opinion of his author. “What do I believe in?” Abbey asked rhetorically 
elsewhere, responding in his own voice: “I believe in sun. In rock . . . I believe in blood, fire, woman, 
rivers, eagles, storms, drums, flutes, banjos and broom-tailed horses” (A Voice Crying in the 
Wilderness 7).  
 
The rejection of intellectualism and reformism here, and the rejoicing in intuition, emotion 
and above all action highlights the way anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism grounds cultural 
vitality and meaning in people and society fulfilling putatively “natural” roles which require no 
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reflection or interpretation but which are direct, visceral responses to life lived in direct contact with 
the wilderness. This was a scenario Abbey depicted at some length in his novel, Good News (1991), 
about a post-apocalyptic America where “whites and Indians” band together to make a new way of 
life “with skills and savvy resurrected from the pre-industrial past” (back cover). Thus though the 
title of the novel is intentionally ironic – the Good News is the arrival of apocalypse and the end of 
technological civilisation – it is also, for Abbey, an optimistic one, as it signals the death of the old, 
calcified technological culture and the possible birth (though unrealised at the end of the novel) of a 
new, vibrant one based on a close identification with the local environment. In his essay, “Theory of 
Anarchy” (1988) he predicts that such a scenario will happen within a century and that this was “the 
basis of my inherent optimism”. Abbey’s hope was that following the collapse of modern civilisation 
the cycle could begin again and people would revert to “scattered human populations modest in 
number that live by fishing, hunting, food gathering, small-scale farming and ranching, that gather 
once a year in the ruins of abandoned cities for great festivals of moral, spiritual, artistic, and 
intellectual renewal, a people for whom the wilderness is not a playground but their natural native 
home” (“Theory of Anarchy” 28) 
 
Again, as with Hayduke’s flight of fantasy, the return to a markedly more primitive lifestyle is 
heralded not as regression, but instead as a renewal, reflecting the influence of the organicist 
metaphor. The absence, and rejection, of techné  (the cities are not just “ruined” but “abandoned”) 
allows for a far closer alignment of humanity with the natural local environment (wildness and 
wilderness) and this connection gives their habitation of an area legitimacy, it will be their “natural 
native home”.  
 
Here we come back to the idea of “natural” and “synthetic” populations and cultures which I 
first mentioned in my introduction before exploring the idea further in my chapter on Tolkien, and 
which I have also alluded to earlier in this chapter. “Natural” populations and cultures are those 
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legitimised by a nativist connection to their local environment. Indeed, one only has to think of the 
character of John Vogelin, the hero of Abbey’s early novel, Fire on the Mountain (1962), to see this 
realised. Vogelin steadfastly rejects all modern technology, owning a dusty ranch without electricity 
or piped water and is distinctly territorial in nature, mounting armed guard against government 
incursions on to his land, whether accidental or deliberate. He ends up in an armed stand-off with 
the authorities after refusing to cooperate in the compulsory purchase of his land by the 
government. As the pressure mounts on him to sell an old family friend attempts to reason with him, 
asking who can really be said to truly own the land: is it him, the government, the Native Americans, 
or “the man who stole it last”? Vogelin’s reply spells out his claim and stakes out his legitimacy 
according to proximity to the earth, and more than that, according to identification with this 
particular soil: “I am the land . . . I’ve been eating this dust for seventy years” (40).  
 
Abbey’s grounding of cultural identity and vitality in close identification with the local 
environment mirrors the more general tendency of anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism towards 
bioregionalism, as well as pointing to the dangers of such a way of thinking. Bioregionalism can be 
seen as the survival of the Spenglerian idea that “a race has roots” and that “race and landscape 
belong together” and as such is fraught with potentialities that require, at the very least, careful 
thinking through (254). For example, in his presentation on the bioregional ideal to the Schumacher 
Society in 1983 Kirkpatrick Sale welcomed what he saw as an increasing urge to separatism in 
Europe, citing “the Croatians, Serbs, Macedonians, and the Montenegrins in Yugoslavia” among 
other examples such as the Catalans and Basque people in Spain. Sale saw the “retribalization” of 
European society as not only a hopeful sign but also as representing a return to organic form. For 
Sale, the growing unrest in the Balkans and elsewhere was “an organic, I would argue an inevitable, 
response to the disintegration of the contemporary order” which proved the practicability and 
desirability of the bioregional ideal: 
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What is so interesting in this amazing process is the clear expression of the 
bioregional idea. For though it has long been acknowledged that the cultural aspects 
of these separatist movements are grounded in their special regional histories, from 
which they take their obvious and cherished differences of language and dress and 
music, the fact is that their political and social characters are every bit as rooted in 
the long, intimate, and knowledgeable association with their particular bioregion and 
its history. And the truths these movements embody, the apparently unquenchable 
truths, are in every case the product of the land they hold sacred. (“Mother of All: an 
Introduction to Bioregionalism” n. pag.) 
 
Sale’s celebration of such separatism as a “clear expression of the bioregional idea” only a few years 
before horrific fighting and ethnic cleansing broke out in the Balkans starkly demonstrates at least 
some potential dangers of tying cultural validity and authenticity too closely to a particular land.  
 
Furthermore, because bioregionalism carries with it the assumption that each culture and 
society should be shaped by  its particular local environment, it implies that questions of global laws, 
human rights, and other similar standards which spring from the enlightenment concept of 
universalism are invalid. Thus, each bioregion would have its own customs, laws, rules and – to the 
extent that they would need them at all – government. As Sale explains to his audience, this is an 
integral aspect of the bioregional theory: 
 
I feel I must add here a note that may be painful for those whose allegiance to the 
precepts of fragmentation and diversification tends to crumble halfway through. 
Bioregional diversity means exactly that. It does not mean that every region of the 
Northeast or of North America or of the globe will build upon the values of 
democracy, equality, liberty, freedom, justice, and other suchlike "desiderata." It 
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means rather that truly autonomous bioregions will likely go their own separate ways 
and end up with quite disparate political systems—some democracies, no doubt, 
some direct, some representative, some federative, but undoubtedly all kinds of 
aristocracies, oligarchies, theocracies, principalities, margravates, duchies, and 
palatinates as well. And some with values, beliefs, standards, and customs quite 
antithetical to those that the people in this room, for example, hold dearest. 
(“Mother of All: an Introduction to Bioregionalism” n. pag.) 
 
Thus, though anarcho-libertarian anti-technologists like Sale are, on the face of it at least, against 
centralised, technocratic government, the bioregional vision recognizes that some limited forms of 
government may arise as a societal response to environmental conditions in a particular bioregion.90  
 
Problematically, though, because of the way it wants the shape of human societies to be 
largely an outcome of their local environment, the bioregional vision’s only substantive response to 
disagreements within communities is further separation and isolationism. Without the allegiance to 
the universalist enlightenment ideals of such “desiderata” as equality and justice, bioregionalism 
seems trapped in a reductive loop of fragmentation, as the following passage from Abbey’s “Theory 
of Anarchy” suggests: 
 
If Lebanon was not so badly overpopulated, the best solution there – as in South 
Africa – would be a partition of territory, a devolution into self-governing, 
independent regions and societies. This is the natural tendency of any population 
divided by religion, race, or deep cultural differences, and it should not be restrained. 
                                                 
90 In bioregional theory such determining environmental conditions would include factors such as climate, 
precipitation and terrain. A bioregion suited to small scale farming might give rise to one form of governance; a 
bioregion suited to pastoralism, another; and a bioregion suited to hunting, still another.  
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The tendency runs counter, however, to the love of power, which is why centralized 
governments always attempt to crush separatist movements (27). 
 
Abbey’s suggested remedy to the problems of apartheid echoes Aspinall’s putatively naturalistic 
solution to cultural and ethnic differences which I discussed in my introduction. It also demonstrates 
that because anarcho-libertarian anti-technology looks to nature to render obsolete the function of 
centralised government it lacks any clear and coherent response to societal tensions beyond 
fragmentation, migration, or war. Furthermore, because of this theoretical lacuna, there is always 
the risk that the bioregional vision can be read backwards. That is to say that value judgements 
about different cultures, societies, and even populations, may be made on the basis of the area they 
inhabit. By extension, then, there is also the danger that in relating a culture’s and a population’s 
identity to a close affinity with the territory it inhabits it can also imply that that culture or 
population’s worth is based on its affinity to its local soil, and that without this affinity it loses both 
worth and authenticity. Considering the works of Edward Abbey we can see this perception 
recurring frequently in his treatment of ethnic minorities. In the last part of this chapter I want to 
focus on this problematic relationship between bioregional identities, worth, and authenticity in 
Abbey’s thought and writing.  
 
I noted at the beginning of this chapter Abbey’s argument that there was “a superior breed 
in the deserts”, and his pointing to the Mongols, Apaches, Bedouin, and others as evidence to 
substantiate his assertion. Of course, Abbey’s claim is completely fallacious, but it demonstrates how 
the Spenglerian idea of landscape acting on race survives in the bioregional idea. Consider his 
treatment and representation of Native Americans in his essays and in his fiction: in “The BLOB 
Comes to Arizona” (1977) Abbey notes that the Navajo have been there for thousands of years but 
that despite owning large chunks of property they are still amongst the poorest sections of the 
community there. Though he admits that there are various factors to blame for their poverty, he 
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asserts that “basically it comes down to the fact, observed all over the world, that the descendants 
of hunters and warriors do not make good clerk-typists or computer tapers” (149). Having been 
shaped to be hunters and warriors, by their close relationship with their environment since their 
arrival, they do not possess the analytical skills needed for Western civilisation. Previous to this 
essay, in Desert Solitaire, he had gone into a little more detail in attempting to explain the 
predicament of the primitive hunter in the modern world: “the average Navajo suffers from a 
handicap more severe than skin color, the language barrier or insufficient education: his acquisitive 
instinct is poorly developed. He lacks the drive to get ahead of his fellows or to figure out ways and 
means to profit from other people’s labor” (106).  
 
As Native Americans according to Abbey, are genetically and culturally unsuited for life in modern 
civilisation it follows that their traditional lifestyle of hunting and gathering is the best one for them 
as it was the one for which they are adapted. Left to the traditional life, they are perfectly happy and 
healthy, because their lifestyle and numbers perfectly complemented the bioregion they lived in. 
Abbey seems to subscribe to the notion that the primary consideration for culture and society is the 
community’s relationship with the soil rather than the development of the individual.  
 
 As Martin Lewis notes, bioregionalism is suffused with the belief that people who have lived 
in continuous and primal contact with a particular environment for many generations have not just 
different ways of thinking but even a different consciousness to modern people (46). He quotes 
Carolyn Merchant’s claim (1989) that for the Native American hunter “the primal gaze of locking 
eyes between the hunter and the hunted initiated the moment of ordained killing when the animal 
gave itself up so that the Indian could survive . . . for Indians engaged in an intimate survival 
relationship with nature, sight, smell, sound, taste, and touch were of equal importance, integrated 
into a total participatory consciousness” (Green Delusions 20). This tendency to believe that different 
people have a qualitatively different form of consciousness is, Lewis observes, a troubling one as it 
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has long been a staple of racist propaganda that the European mind is uniquely analytical and 
therefore more advanced and better suited to civilisation. As Lewis remarks, though Merchant and 
others would “reverse the moral signs and hold the mimetic consciousness of native Americans 
superior, the very distinction remains invidious” (56). Non-civilized peoples are seen as enjoying a 
close and satisfyingly authentic relationship to the territory they inhabit, and venerated for this, but 
only so far as they remain within their context. Outside of their assigned parameters of “dwellers on 
the land” their supposedly innate authenticity and superiority in this respect may be swiftly 
discounted.91 
 
In Abbey’s bioregionalism in particular this authenticity is indeed swiftly discounted and the 
primitive who leaves the natural world for the artificial one of the city can become seen by 
implication almost as a non-person in that he or she lacks even the identity of the person born to 
technological civilisation; the displaced primitive is seen as especially rootless as he or she belongs 
neither to the natural world of the wilderness, nor to the artificial world of the technosphere. The 
deracinated primitive is an object of pity and contempt in Abbey’s essays and novels in a similar 
manner to the way that complements the venerations accorded tomthe “genuine” primitive is 
accorded veneration. A passage in The Monkey Wrench Gang provides an excellent example of this 
perception. A group of Native Americans observe Seldom-Seen-Smith and the rest of the gang 
sabotaging equipment but decline to help. Removed from their “proper” environment and 
acculturated to the civilised world these Native Americans no longer have any interest in protecting 
their ancestral lands from despoliation. They have become thoroughly artificial and superficial 
figures, identified only by the things they consume just as I noted, in a previous chapter, that rural 
                                                 
91 In this we can see quite clearly that bioregionalism, like anti-technologism, lies squarely within the counter-
enlightenment tradition. It sees the individual as both a product and an integral part of their culture and 
geographic environment. Thus, the individual who moves outside of their original geography, or who casts off 
the traditions and customs of their culture loses part of their personality, their human “soul” so to speak, and 
in consequence they lose something of themselves. See Sternhell (2010), especially his chapter on “The 
Intellectual Foundations of Nationalism” 274-314 where he discusses the counter-enlightenment perception of 
the nation in historical and ethnic terms rather than political and judicial or legalistic (274-314).  
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workers who fled the countryside for the city became contemptuously associated with tinned food 
and white bread, symbols of their artificiality: “the Indians giggled. To hell with them – Stone Age 
Savages riding around in pickup trucks, eating Rainbo bread and Hostess Twinkies, wearing bolo ties, 
their TVs tuned to Mister Rogers’ Neighbourhood every fucking afternoon” (217). Smith, on the 
other hand, as someone whose love of the wilderness around him has given him a deep sense of 
identification with it, seems to have absorbed the genius of the place and even walks “like an old-
time prewar pre-pickup truck Indian with a steady loping stride” (347). Thus the place of “dwellers in 
the land” has, by identification with the land, been transferred.  
 
 It can be seen, then, that the ideas of authenticity and identification with the land play an 
important role in Abbey’s bioregionalism. As I commented on earlier in this chapter, embracing the 
wild, fierce side of human nature is seen by Abbey as more real and authentic because more natural 
as opposed to the abstraction of the artificial technological world. The characters of The Monkey 
Wrench Gang are therefore true dwellers in the land because of their embrace of wildness and 
wilderness and their ardour in defending it from the incursions of the artificial world. The novel 
enacts the geographical tension between natural and artificial worlds in a literal sense. It was a 
working out for Abbey of an image he had long held since his days as a postgraduate student writing 
his thesis, “Anarchism and the Morality of Violence” (1959). “My favorite melodramatic theme:” he 
wrote in his journal of 1951, “the harried anarchist, a wounded wolf, struggling towards the green 
hills, or the black-white alpine mountains, or the purple-golden desert range and liberty” (8). In the 
defence of the real, the natural, against the artificial, authenticity is granted by identification with 
the territory. But this identification with wilderness must be more than intellectual to satisfy Abbey, 
it must be mediated through action. Thus it is the anarchist as Miltonic Satan, who defies the 
supposed heaven of the city and is cast out to the wilderness “a wounded wolf”, there to find 
liberty. An entry from Abbey’s journal of 1973, whilst he was writing The Monkey Wrench Gang, 
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demonstrates the relationship in his thinking between action, authenticity, and identification with 
territory: 
 
I’m tired of ‘hippies,’ ‘freaks,’ that whole sick crew. I find, more than ever, that I 
respect only men – and women – who can act, who can do good things well, who are 
responsible to others, who are honest in all ways, who really care about this earth we 
live on. Letting your hair grow is not good enough; nor does wearing a headband 
make an Indian. I’m tired of soft weak passive people who can’t make anything – 
except babies (Confessions 249). 
 
In the novel, Abbey has the character of Doc Sarvis frame this thought for him. Sarvis criticises the 
theorising of the “hippy degenerates” that befriend Bonnie Abzug, his lover. Defending the place of 
discussion and debate Abzug protests that at least “they don’t do any harm”.  Sarvis cuts her short 
by remarking that “I’m tired of people who don’t do any harm. I’m tired of soft weak passive people 
who can’t do anything, or make anything. Except babies” (144). Once again New Yorker Abzug is 
made to be the mouthpiece of East Coast intellectualism, and once again Sarvis is made to frame 
Abbey’s response forestalling debate and mandating action. Though there is indeed an element of 
Dionysian comedy running throughout The Monkey Wrench Gang this is no way detracts from the 
seriousness of the ideas and ideals conveyed in the novel, which are very clearly and identifiably the 
ideas and thoughts of the author. 
 
 In summary, then, I have used Abbey’s writing as a detailed exemplification of the way 
anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism identifies many of the same problems as administrative anti-
technologism, but it rejects the administrative or reformist approach to resolving them. Instead it 
wants society to be regulated by nature, and so seeks to read off ideas about the formation of 
societies and cultures from nature. In a sense it can be seen as a form of abdication, a refusal to 
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recognize the legitimacy of any technocratic approach, and it is this refusal which I think accounts for 
the sense of nihilism, both in anarcho-libertarian anti-technologist philosophy and in literature, as 
my analysis of Abbey’s writing has tried to illuminate. Anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism, as I 
analyse it, is a fundamentalist creed and as such scorns reformism. Since its project is the elimination 
of modern civilisation as we know it, this means that the only philosophically coherent response it 
can offer is destruction. In his essay, “We Have to Dismantle All This” (2002), Zerzan offers the 
following formulation of this nihilistic vision: “our answer must be qualitative, not the quantitative, 
more-of-the-same palliatives that actually reinforce what we must end” (160).  
 
It is for this reason, I believe, that many of Abbey’s works, though often a celebration of 
independence and free will, are ultimately nihilistic with the only triumphs being – rather ironically 
perhaps – purely symbolic. The Monkey Wrench Gang is a novel about the destruction of the 
symbols of technology’s incursion into the wilderness that ends with the gang once more fleeing the 
forces of techné, deeper into the wilderness. His earlier work, The Brave Cowboy (1956) is a work 
about a ranch hand who refuses to engage with techné in any form (whether as artefact or as 
governmental organisation) and cuts down fences as part of a one-man crusade against the modern 
world. Though he successfully eludes the police after getting arrested, and escapes on horseback, he 
cannot escape the modern world and in a rather simplistic metaphor is killed mere metres from the 
wilderness that promises freedom by a collision with a tractor-trailer carrying toilets. Good News 
ends with the victory of “the Chief” (symbolising the forces of technology, progress, and oppression) 
and the heroic death of Jack Burns, killed trying to assassinate the man who is slowly but surely 
bringing order (techné) to the post-apocalyptic chaos. Fire on the Mountain, as I observed earlier, 
ends with the death of the protagonist, though he triumphs after death by his ashes being returned 
to his own soil, completing the cycle of “earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust”. Even his thinly-
veiled autobiographical novel, The Fool’s Progress (1988), is a work where progress and technology 
have triumphed and the only victory over them, such as it is, lies in acts of destruction (such as 
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Henry Lightcap, Abbey’s alter-ego shooting the refrigerator before abandoning his home).  All these 
novels enact elements both of the geographical imagination of anarcho-libertarian anti-
technologism in their plots, the incursion of the artificial world on the natural world, and all of these 
novels, in their scorn for reformist accommodation and compromise, are left with flight, and action, 
in the form of destruction, as the only possible responses. 
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Chapter Six: Meaning and Modernity: Anti-technologism and the Fascist Aesthetic. 
  
We were eating breakfast in the house on Paper Street, and Tyler said, picture 
yourself planting radishes and seed potatoes on the fifteenth green of a forgotten 
golf course. 
You’ll hunt elk through the damp canyon forests around the ruins of 
Rockefeller Center, and dig clams next to the skeleton of the Space Needle leaning at 
a forty-five-degree angle. We’ll paint the skyscrapers with huge totem faces and 
goblin tikis . . . 
Chuck Palahniuk, Fight Club (124). 
 
In the previous chapter I used the works of Edward Abbey as a means to explore what I saw as the 
anarchist-libertarian strain of anti-technologism. Among other aspects, I discussed the importance of 
the bioregional ideal – the view that a population derived its culture and society from a close 
relationship with its local soil and that this was the basis of a just claim to that soil – and I noted how 
this tended to lead to factionalism and to a belief in the virtues of destruction as a necessary prelude 
to creation. I concluded that the primary difference between administrative and anarcho-libertarian 
anti-technologism was that the latter took a much more radical view of technology that saw it as 
inherently corrupting and corrosive to society, no matter who controlled it, whereas the focus of 
administrative anti-technologism’s anxieties was the particular effect of technology upon the urban 
masses.92 I observed how, in taking this absolutist approach to technology, anarcho-libertarian anti-
technologism pursued fantasies of a return to primal nature. The world thereby envisaged, as I 
noted, set up a much more extreme opposition between the world of nature (including human 
nature) and the purportedly unnatural, artificial and stultifying world of technology and civilisation. 
Of course, all anti-technologism relies on this false dichotomy of natural and artificial ways of living 
                                                 
92 Of course, such distinctions should be seen as positions along a spectrum rather than absolute categories.  
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to some extent, but as I observed, anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism maps this distinction onto 
the landscape and opposes primal wilderness with a few quasi-Nietzschean inhabitants to a 
degraded and cosmopolitan urban culture and city which has lost all vitality. I cited as an example of 
this perception a scene in The Monkey Wrench Gang in which Hayduke indulges in a Spenglerian 
fantasy about a post-technological word in which once mighty skyscrapers stand empty and 
abandoned, their desiccation symbolic of the bleeding away of meaning and vitality that 
accompanied the demise of the civilisation that had erected them.  
 
 In this chapter, I want to look at some of the thematic similarities between anti-
technologism and fascism. Whilst I don’t believe there is any simple equivalence between the two, I 
believe that they are both responses to anxieties regarding the stability and sustainability of mass 
society and mass democracy. In particular, as I locate anti-technologism firmly within the counter-
enlightenment tradition of irrationalism and the reactionary consciousness, I am interested in the 
similarities between fascism’s rejection of materialist philosophies (such as laissez-faire capitalism 
and communism) and anti-technologism’s rejection of materialism in the search for societal and 
cultural meaning beyond the cash nexus. I focus on one text only in this chapter – Chuck Palahniuk’s 
Fight Club (1996) – because of the way in which its rejection of technology and technological society 
is so intimately and symbolically bound up with the rejection of materialism. I am further interested 
in exploring how this rejection of materialism in both fascism and anti-technologism licences 
violence and destruction as the means to a supposed realignment of society with “true” nature. I will 
return to these themes and an account of how I intend to explore and analyse these parallels and 
themes in this chapter shortly, but first I think it is necessary to provide some background to the 
analysis of this chapter in order to link the work that will be undertaken here to some broader 
themes of anti-technologism. I will begin by returning briefly to a discussion of the symbolism of 
Hayduke’s decayed skyscrapers in order to show how this vitalistic aspect of anti-technologism ties 
in with what I see as the similarities between anti-technology’s rejection of materialism and 
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embrace of irrationalism and fascism’s intellectual and ideological roots in a similar rejection of 
materialism and embrace of irrationalism. 
 
The symbolism of Hayduke’s Spenglerian fantasy of the decayed skyscrapers is picked up 
briefly by David Edward Tabachnick in “Heidegger’s Essentialist Responses to the Challenge of 
Technology” (2007). Tabachnick, responding to Andrew Feenberg (1999), explores Heidegger’s 
ideology of technological essentialism in order to draw out and analyse their implicit themes.93 
Tabachnick notes that Hayduke’s fantasy of a “post-technological world [is] similar to Spengler’s”, 
and compares it to both Theodore Kaczynski’s anti-technological manifesto, Industrial Society and its 
Future (1995) and to the image of a post-technological world in Chuck Palahniuk’s novel Fight Club. 
Tabachnick characterises these three anti-technological images as representative of what he calls 
“aggressive essentialism” and defines this in much the same way as I define anarcho-libertarian anti-
technologism: the belief that technology itself (as differentiated from the availability of technology) 
is so corrupting that it must be destroyed before any meaningful reconstruction of society can begin 
(494). He notes that these fantasies reject reformism – there are no attempts to ameliorate the 
impact of technology, no sense that it might be managed so as to minimise its negative 
consequences. In that respect, he argues, these responses to technology move from anarchist to 
totalitarian ideologies:  
 
In these depictions, there is no effort to humanize technology. They are post-
apocalyptic, post-holocaust scenarios unlike anything described by eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century critics of science. While certainly more anarchist than fascist, 
                                                 
93 Feenberg defined technological “essentialism” as a theory that “attributes an autonomous cultural force to 
technology that overrides all traditional or competing values” and identified Heidegger as an extreme 
essentialist (qtd in Tabachnick 487). Tabachnick’s response was to argue that “the very fact that Heidegger saw 
a possibility of transforming our relationship with technology through Nazism highlights the fact that his 
essentialism is not determinism” (492). In essence, his argument is that Heidegger’s admiration for fascism’s 
vitalistic politics proves that his philosophy of technology was not entirely deterministic.  
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they share in the same vicious defiance of the Nazis94 and the violent atavism of the 
twenty-first century Taliban and Jihadist movements. Heidegger’s “Russia and 
America” is Hayduke’s “the Kremlin and the Pentagon.” Durden’s “Project Mayhem” 
is Osama Bin Laden’s September 11th. (494) 
 
Whilst Tabachnick is incorrect in asserting that such images are qualitatively different from earlier 
depictions (Richard Jeffries’ 1885 novel After London would certainly sit alongside these 
comfortably), his observation that they rather counter-intuitively employ a totalitarian ethos to 
ostensibly promote what they claim would be a fairer, less oppressive society is astute. Indeed, given 
that Abbey was heavily influenced by Heidegger, whom he saw as “the most important philosopher 
of the twentieth century”, it is hardly surprising that Abbey’s anarchism often seems to appropriate 
such essentialist themes of destruction and regeneration in his response to technology (214).95 
Although numerous objections could be made to the equivalences Tabachnick suggests here, his 
insight that the anti-technological dystopias portrayed in these works merge anarchism with fascism 
in an effort to reinvest the world with meaning through destruction is, I think, an important one. 
Anarchic figures in anti-technological literature such as Abbey’s Hayduke and Palahniuk’s Tyler 
Durden often seem to encompass the apparent polar opposites of anarchism and fascism within one 
literary character. That is, they somehow manage to represent the extremes of both free-wheeling 
rebellion and adherence to precepts of extreme discipline and self-sacrifice for the greater good as 
                                                 
94 Of course, as well as vilifying technology in a generalised sense, the Nazis also fetishized it in specific 
manifestations for its brute power. Tabachnick’s reference here is a little crude perhaps. As I mentioned in the 
introduction, Nazism, like fascism generally was capable of maintaining an almost schizophrenic attitude 
towards nature and technology that allowed it to label certain things and certain people “natural” or native, 
and others unnatural and artificial. Thus Walter Benjamin in “Theories of German Fascism” (1930) complains, 
with regard to this specific topic, that “It must be said as bitterly as possible: in the face of this ‘landscape of 
total mobilization’ the German feeling for nature has had an undreamed of upsurge” (126). The fascist attitude 
towards technology and nature was utterly contradictory, but no less sincere for that. As Staudenmaier (1995) 
observes, “it would be a grave mistake . . . to see these [ecological] themes as mere propaganda, cleverly 
deployed to mask Nazism’s true character as a technocratic-industrialist juggernaut” (17).  
95 This quote is taken from Abbey’s 1987 letter to Rowohlt Verlag, the German publishers of The Monkey 
Wrench Gang, in which he asked them to restore the twenty-first chapter that had been inadvertently left out 
and which Abbey considered “thematically central” to the novel, as it juxtaposed “the domination of Nature, 
the natural world” with “the domination of human nature by our excessive, uncontrolled and inhuman 
technology” (Postcards 213-4).  
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they see it. As I will show in this chapter with reference to Fight Club, they also exemplify anti-
technologism’s violent rejection of materialism, its preoccupation with destroying the symbols of 
desiccated civilisation in the hope of cultural rebirth.   
 
 Like Tabachnick, Suzanne Clark (2001), a critic interested in representations of male violence 
in American film and literature, has also pointed to the symbolic continuities between the characters 
of Hayduke from The Monkey Wrench Gang and Tyler Durden from Fight Club. She situates these 
characters within a context of male rebellion against a consensual, feminised culture beginning with 
Ken Kesey’s RP McMurphy in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1962), with his rebellion “through 
fighting, sex, fishing, and gambling” against the oppressively maternal figure of Nurse Ratched 
(Kasey 417). Clark claims that “the sociopathic, anarchic McMurphy prefigures later heroes of green 
politics and anarchism who put their bodies on the line for masculine freedoms . . . after McMurphy 
and Hayduke, Fight Club’s Tyler Durden is a recognizable type” (417). Though she does not pursue it, 
I find her linking of “green politics” and anarchism in this context intriguing. Pace Clark, I would 
suggest that rather than Green politics as it is normally understood (a broadly New Left affiliation 
which views contemporary politics and society through the lens of ecological and environmental 
issues) the characters in these novels actually reference a much older strain of conservationism (and 
conservatism) which speaks to notions of vitalism through unmediated experience of, and contest 
with, the forces of nature.  
 
In a literary context, then, I would situate the characters by reference to Ernest 
Hemmingway, Robert Bly, Robinson Jeffers, and Edward Abbey with their emphasis on a view of 
nature that emphasises masculine stoicism and the legitimacy of violence as consonant with the 
supposed laws of nature and the so-called survival of the fittest. In a political sense, I would argue 
that, contra Clark, the ideology these characters reference is not Green politics – which emphasises 
the need for consensus and expands huge intellectual energy in argument and rhetoric to ensure 
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that consensus – but rather older notions from the interwar years of vitality, and the struggle against 
degeneration in a decadent and cosmopolitan age. As I argued in my introduction, these much 
longer established notions regarding technology, nature, vitality, and degeneration continue to this 
day to have an influence on progressive politics and “romantic protest” but they should not be seen 
as consonant with it.  
 
I see figures such as George Hayduke and Tyler Durden as not just survivals from the 
ideologies of a previous era, but their reinvention within a modern idiom.96 As Johann Hari 
perceptively pointed out regarding Palahniuck, “there is a longing throughout his novels, reminiscent 
(disturbingly) of Martin Heidegger, for the authenticity of nature, of the pre-human, of the animal.”97  
Of course, this speaks to the tensions between civilisation as ascendancy from the savage, and 
anxieties over whether such an ascendency might entail degeneracy and effeminacy – the 
Spenglerian organic cycle of culture and civilisation writ large once again. Thus, as Philip Armstrong 
(2008) has pointed out, continued (mis)readings of Darwin led, in the first half of the twentieth 
century, to what Armstrong terms therio-primitivism, attempts by modernists such as Wyndham 
Lewis to “cut through the corrupt impedimenta of civilization” and reconnect with the animal and 
the savage (143).98 In his interview with Palahniuk, Hari suggests that the goals of Fight Club’s Project 
Mayhem to bring about “a prematurely induced dark age” and thereby “force humanity to go 
dormant or into remission long enough for the Earth to recover” might be goals that resonate with 
                                                 
96 I should perhaps note here for the avoidance of any confusion that it is not my argument that this was the 
intention of the authors in drawing up these characters, but that the qualities and ideas that these characters 
represent draw on a broad spectrum of ideals which have been carried over from an earlier era. 
97 Certainly, like Abbey, Palahniuk is conversant with Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. He draws on it in his 
essay “You Are Here” in a way that shows he is quite familiar with Heidegger’s philosophy of technological 
essentialism. 
98 John Carey points out that Modernists like Lewis adopted such primitivist affectations in large part because 
they saw the technological modern world as effeminate, lacking the ruthless vigour and cruelty of nature (as 
they saw it). For Lewis, as Carey summarises it, the twentieth century was “undergoing a new kind of cultural 
decay, attributable to the erosion of traditional male values by the female”. Such a process, he felt, had always 
been incipient, but “had not become troublesome or assertive until the modern period, when the advent of 
mass democracy had inaugurated a wholesale feminization of Western cultural values” (Carey 186). As Carey 
observes, Lewis’s disgust at the softness and degeneracy of modern mass democracy led him to enthusiastic 
support of fascism in general and Hitler in particular, dismissing the Nazi’s anti-Semitism as “a mere bagatelle” 
(qtd in Carey 196). 
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the author and many others in contemporary American society. Though Palahniuk denies too close 
an identification with the violent achievement of this desire envisioned in the book, he does admit 
that he sympathises with the ideal: 
 
Palahniuk does not endorse this view himself. “It’s a real natural thing to blame 
everybody else. It’s very [Jean-Paul] Sartre – hell is other people. That’s one 
reaction. You conclude that the solution is to get rid of human beings. I am worried 
about over-population, but I don’t think that killing everyone is the solution.” We talk 
about the Society for the Voluntary Extinction of Man – a group that argues that 
human beings should all voluntarily sterilise themselves in order to allow the planet 
to recover from our thrashing of it. “They have a huge internet presence,” 
he explains. “I love those guys”. (Hari) 
 
Like Abbey, Palahniuk seems to use the dark humour of his work as a way of putting authorial 
distance between himself and the controversial ideas he explores, both in his fiction and in his 
essays and interviews. Fight Club explores one possible project of “get[ting] rid of human beings” to 
enable a regeneration of the world in its depiction of “Project Mayhem” and its mission to destroy 
modern civilisation, but it does  so at a certain ironic distance. Like Abbey, Palahniuk uses such 
distance to explore issues of cultural decadence and regeneration that might otherwise be 
unacceptable in a post-holocaust world that is painfully aware of the vast impulsive power behind 
such ideals. The schizophrenic imagining of Tyler Durden as alter ego, can therefore be seen as a 
further placing of distance between the writer and the ideas which the novel explores.  
 
 Though this discourse in Fight Club and anti-technologism more generally is viewed through 
the prism of ironic distance, it still clearly displays the same anxieties and preoccupations with the 
degenerative materialism of technological society, anaesthetising and emasculating the “true” 
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savage (male) spirit by removing physical danger and hardship. The deracinated metrosexual IKEA 
modernity of Fight Club with its packaged, processed food stands in as a marker for the loss of 
cultural vitality and superficiality of technological modernity: “a house full of condiments and no 
food” the narrator reflects, gazing on the ruins of his yuppy apartment. The “hoardings, brittle 
houses” and “cosmopolitan modernism” that Williamson, in his semi-autobiographical recounting of 
the years preceding World War Two, railed against as the markers of a culture being drained of 
meaning by commodification are echoed in Palahniuk’s narrator’s apartment with its pseudo-
indigenous furnishings: “my clever Njurunda coffee tables . . . my Haparanda sofa group with the 
orange slip covers designed by Erika Pekkari, it was trash now” (43). The symbolic denunciation in 
earlier works (such as Orwell’s or Williamson’s) of modernity’s superficiality as false and rotten is 
reproduced in Fight Club. The affectless insomniac existence of the narrator, where everything is “a 
copy of a copy of a copy” is only broken by the willing destruction of his apartment (21). Fittingly, 
after the narrator has destroyed the trappings of modernity he moves to a rambling Victorian villa 
which is falling apart; the superficiality of modern life is stripped away to reveal the decay 
underneath. The reader is unsure as to which is more real: the narrator’s life before his breakdown 
and move to the old Victorian villa, or his life afterwards. If his experiences after the breakdown are 
illusory, the schizophrenic fantasies of someone cut off from reality, they certainly seem no less real 
than the alienated and pointless existence of office work and consumerism beforehand. 
 
Therefore, just as characters such as George Hayduke and Tyler Durden manage to 
encompass seemingly dichotomous politics, they also manage to encompass and transfuse 
ideologies from previous eras into more recent times. It is, I will argue, an integral part of the fascist 
aesthetic in anti-technologism that it has this Janus-faced quality, this ability to contain seemingly 
contradictory ideas and put them to use. In the course of this chapter, I will discuss how the fascist 
aesthetic relies on syncretism and paradox for its appeal, and will consider how this is reflected in 
anti-technological literature in general. In particular, I want to draw attention to the way in which 
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the fascist aesthetic in anti-technological literature is used to pursue ideas about authenticity and 
rootedness that are based on drawing non-material (or, more accurately, anti-materialist) 
distinctions between cultures and societies. By use of the fascist aesthetic, I will argue, anti-
technologism inveighs against what it sees as the atomisation inherent in modern, liberal 
democracies with their materialism which disconnects people from nature and community, giving 
them a false sense of individual identity, outside of ethnic and cultural contexts. As the cadets of 
Project Mayhem are lectured: “our culture has made us all the same. No one is truly white or black 
or rich, anymore. We all want the same. Individually we are nothing” (134). The novel depicts the 
inhabitants of twenty-first century metropolises as so thoroughly deracinated and homogenised by 
their consumerist existence, which allows them to “choose” a lifestyle and sub-culture to identify 
with, that they have no sense of racial or historical past to draw on. Fight Club embodies the fascist 
aesthetic of violence as a force that transcends divisive materialist distinctions of class and status 
and binds people together tightly in shared identity and purpose: 
 
“You have a class of young strong men and women, and they want to give 
their lives to something. Advertising has these people chasing cars and clothes they 
don’t need . . .”. 
“We have to show these men and women freedom by enslaving them, and 
show them courage by frightening them”. (149) 
 
 In this chapter I want to look at this very specific aspect of anti-technologism, its use of what 
I shall refer to as the fascist aesthetic. I use this term to clearly differentiate it from fascist politics as, 
although there are obviously important links between the two, it is the use of the fascist aesthetic in 
anti-technological literature that I am interested in here rather. By “fascist aesthetic” I mean the use 
of fascistic themes, images, and ideologies in literature or film regardless of the ideology of the 
work. Central to this aspect of my analysis here is an explication of the way in which pursuit of the 
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irrational, as a response to the perceived hyper-rationality of modernity, has a dangerous internal 
logic of its own which unchecked can (and often does) lead to the countenancing of the previously 
unacceptable. The fascist admiration of violence as a cutting through the “corrupt impedimenta of 
civilization” is the same primitivism, the same rejection of rationality and materialism that animated 
the violence of Fight Club. 
 
 In arguing this particular point I am following Zeev Sternhell, who argues that the fascist 
admiration for violence and brute force arose from its rejection of enlightenment rationalism and 
Marxist materialism in favour of vitalism and an emphasis on instinct as a response to the decadent 
materialism of modernity: 
 
Marxism was a system of ideas still deeply rooted in the philosophy of the eighteenth 
century. Sorelian revisionism replaced the rationalist, Hegelian foundations of 
Marxism with Le Bon’s new vision of human nature, with the anti-Cartesianism of 
[Henri] Bergson, with the Nietzschean cult of revolt, and with Pareto’s most recent 
discoveries in political sociology. The Sorelian, voluntarist, vitalist, and antimaterialist 
form of socialism used Bergsonism as an instrument against scientism and did not 
hesitate to attack reason. It was a philosophy of action based on intuition, the cult of 
energy and élan vital. (24) 
 
As Sternhell’s analysis indicates, although fascism began as an attempt to infuse the anti-capitalist 
popular appeal of socialism with the integrative force of nationalism, its jettisoning of materialism 
and rationalism led to fascism becoming a psychological approach to politics rather than an 
economic and rationalistic one. Hence it became concerned with vitalistic themes of cultural 
regeneration reached through rejection of materialism and the embrace of irrationalism and 
violence, “the cult of energy”. In terms of Monaco’s definition of the reactionary consciousness, 
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therefore, fascism “rebels against loneliness and anomie, against rationalism and materialism, and 
against the artifices of human progress and technology” (Monaco 91).  
  
 What Sternhell’s analysis makes clear is that fascism arose as a response to fears of 
modernity’s disintegrative force. His definition of it as an attempt “to rectify the most disastrous 
consequences of the modernization of the European continent and to provide a solution to the 
atomization of society, its fragmentation into antagonistic groups, and the alienation of the 
individual in a free market economy” closely echoes Monaco’s definition of the reactionary 
consciousness, as noted above (6). Hence, as Mosse summarises in the introduction to Masses and 
Man: Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality (1980) nationalism and fascism should be 
understood not as simplistic rejections of modernity and technology, but rather as attempts to 
contain their contradictions by reference to non-materialistic factors such as a mythologised past. 
Just as Sternhell points out that fascism and nationalism did not reject technology and industrialism 
as such but rather were concerned with redressing their supposedly corruptive and degenerative 
influence on the masses and society, Mosse argues that 
 
[i]ndustrialization was kept subordinate to an anti-industrial ideology, treated as 
technological advance rather than as leading to a new perception of the world . . . . 
The frightening process of scientific and industrial change was embedded in pastoral, 
historical, or sacred traditions, perceived as a means to an end that would transcend 
industrial society; indeed, ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century there 
have been those who sustained both the industrial ideal and its moral rejection. (3) 
 
The similarity between this analysis of fascism, William’s discussion of organic form in Culture and 
Society and later in The City and the Countryside, and my analysis of anti-technologism are, I hope, 
obvious. Just as anti-technologism is not equivalent in any simplistic way to the rejection of 
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technology, but is instead a sublimation of fears and anxieties regarding its potentially degenerative 
effects on society, so fascism’s apparent anti-modernism, its appeal to a mythologised past, to 
nature, to history and to race are not a flat rejection of technology or science but rather an attempt 
to divorce them from their tendency towards egalitarianism, social and geographical mobility, and 
emancipation.   
 
In this struggle to contain the perceived contradictions of modernity, fascism, like anti-
technologism, employed the mythology of civilizational decline and resurgence. As Roger Griffiths 
(2002), one of the most respected researchers of fascism, has noted, whilst there is still 
disagreement amongst scholars on many aspects of fascism, there is a broad consensus regarding its 
core dynamic as an ideology which relies on and manifests the idea that “a perceived period of 
decadence or degeneracy is imminently or eventually about to give way to one of rebirth and 
rejuvenation in a post-liberal new order” (23, 15). Fascism thus relies on a cyclic view of history, 
which (as Orwell noted of Yeats’s fascism in the example I cited in the introduction) has the dual 
benefit of both denying the liberal ideology of progress and of licencing a sense of elitism among the 
inner circle who can divine and thus claim to lead the nation out of decline and through destruction 
to rebirth. All of this, of course, speaks to the Spenglerian sense of a culture that, in becoming a 
civilisation, has lost touch with its roots and so is in decline. Thus, along with the theme of decline 
and regeneration an aesthetic of destruction and creation is often pursued in the hope that in 
destroying the old civilisation a new one will rise up phoenix-like out of the ashes (the idea of the 
Nachkrieg or runic, anti-rationalist, regenerative war Benjamin analyses in “Theories of German 
Fascism”). Hence fascism requires a leader who is utterly transcendent, who can claim to contain 
this ideal of purging, of going through a personal cycle of struggle and dissolution so as to be reborn 
in a purified and strengthened form to lead the people. The gross and the materialistic must be 
purged and cast aside, because in fascist ideology the leader is essentially a spiritual figure identified 
with the nation’s rebirth. 
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 Turning now to Palahniuck’s Fight Club (1996). I want to make a threefold argument that 
the novel employs the fascist aesthetic of spiritual regeneration through violence and the violent 
renunciation of materialism, that it does so as an exploration of a possible response to the perceived 
alienation and anomie of modern technological society which rejects liberal reformism, and that in 
so doing Fight Club embodies the deep motivational drives that underlie both fascism and anti-
technologism. That is to say, I will contend that Fight Club is a very sophisticated attack not on 
technology in terms of artefact, but rather on technological society and the assumptions which 
underpin it: the ideology of progress, of material comfort, of individualism as freedom. Certainly, 
there are symbolic destructions of technology throughout the novel – the blowing up of computers 
and skyscrapers for example – but these destructions of artefacts are clearly secondary. Fight Club is 
an anti-technological novel because it rejects technological society, because it explores the utter 
rejection of liberal modernity and embraces anti-materialism, irrationalism and the cult of violence, 
energy, and élan vital as a means to catastrophe (the unmaking of civilisation) and so to a spiritual 
and ultimately a cultural rebirth. Anti-technologism’s use of the fascist aesthetic, I will argue, is 
unusually clear in this novel. Though there is no sense of nationalism and no appeal to a 
mythologised past in Fight Club, the novel’s extreme rejection of technological society and the 
liberal, democratic beliefs that underpin it, and its embrace of irrationalism and violence as a 
transcendent force through which a sense of group identity can be found, brilliantly employ the 
fascist aesthetic in attacking the perceived alienation of modern technological society.99 
 
 In analysing Fight Club I take it as self-evident that the novel has obvious and undeniable 
fascistic overtones: how could it not when the members of the revolutionary army that is Project 
                                                 
99 The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right (2002), citing Sternhell, notes that Social Darwinism 
was one of the most influential ideologies influencing the formation of both fascism and the rise of racist 
ideology in general in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Though there is no detectable 
nationalism or appeal to a mythical past in Fight Club, the idea of a natural elite self-identified by membership 
in a group dedicated to violence as a transcendent force united beneath a spiritual leader prefigures the 
themes of group identity and superiority that gave rise to nationalism and racism (120-1).  
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Mayhem are instructed to shave their heads and provide “Two black shirts. Two black pair trousers. 
One pair of heavy black shoes” and “one heavy black coat” for their clothing? (127-8). Given this, the 
task is therefore to analyse these overtones and ask what role they play in the work. Why does the 
novel make use of the fascist aesthetic? What does it provide, and what does it imply? The proposal 
I put forward below can be summarised quite simply. I argue that fundamentally Fight Club is a 
denunciation of safe modernity and its hyper-rationalism where risk and danger have been reduced 
to vanishing point – the consequence of which is that for many people there are no meaningful 
consequences in their lives. Fight Club answers the logic of technological society – liberalism, 
capitalism, democracy, and individualism – not with a rational response, but with an irrational one. It 
rebuts the materialism of modern technological society not with an alternate form of materialism 
(socialism instead of capitalism, for example) but with anti-materialism, undercutting the entire 
project of modernity as material progress. As the symbolic figure of the mechanic puts it in the 
novel: “we don’t have a great war in our generation, or a great depression, but we do, we have a 
great war of the spirit. We have a great revolution against the culture. The great depression is our 
lives. We have a spiritual depression” (149). 
 
The diagnosis of modernity the mechanic makes here is decidedly not a materialist one: 
Tyler Durden is no progressive reformist seeking fairer pay and conditions. Rather, the diagnosis is 
explicitly a spiritual one: society has become safe, stale, and sterile and no materialist, rationalist 
approach will rectify that and bring meaning back to modernity. No reformist agenda that accepts 
the materialist basis of modern society can succeed in reinvesting meaning into society. Before 
genuine change can come, the narrator’s rationalistic, materialistic world of capitalist modernity 
must be utterly destroyed before anything meaningful can be created. It is in these two concepts – 
in the power of irrational spiritualism versus rational materialism, and in creation through 
destruction – that the dynamic of the fascist aesthetic operates in Fight Club. 
 
219 
 
In offering this reading of Fight Club, I should make it clear that though I argue strongly that 
it can and should be viewed as employing the aesthetics and thematics of fascism this does not 
imply a reading of authorial sympathy or proselytization for fascist ideals in any simplistic, 
straightforward way. I am concerned to argue, though, that in attacking the perceived atomisation 
and alienation of technological modernity the novel clearly demonstrates that the anxieties that 
anti-technologism explores in sublimated form are identifiable with the anxieties that gave rise to 
fascism and that both can be seen as modernity struggling to contain its own contradictions. 
Following my analysis of the aesthetics of the novel, I propose a reading of the novel that locates it 
as a work of inversion in which rationality is revealed to be irrational, much like the utopian dystopia 
Aldous Huxley portrayed in Brave New World. If the end result of the enlightenment project of 
rationalism as the guiding force for humanity is a sterile, safe existence that is little different to that 
of a lab rat, is further “progress” really rational? “Perhaps self-improvement isn’t the answer” 
Palahniuk’s narrator ponders, “maybe self-destruction is the answer” and in this we have a set of 
contradictions which is actually an antinomy, within the confines of the novel at least (49). It forms a 
hermeneutic circle in which the completely irrational is the only rational response and which 
therefore requires the reader to accept the basic premise of the novel in order to make sense of it. 
As such, it works as a commentary on the irrationality of modernity even whilst admitting its own 
artificiality as a work of fiction. Just as Abbey’s presentation of The Monkey Wrench Gang as a comic 
romp allowed him to use it as a vehicle to explore and indeed express unacceptable opinions, so 
Palahniuk’s use of irony and contradiction in Fight Club create space for the exploration of 
unacceptable ideas. Thus, whilst Palahniuk is (presumably) not advocating a fascistic agenda in the 
novel, he is certainly using the fascist aesthetic in the novel to attack the foundational premises of 
modern technological society. In short, then, I offer an analysis of the novel that sees it as an attack 
on the materialistic enlightenment conception of modernity that explores a response so extreme 
that it is framed within the context of a psychotic break from normality, just as the twentieth 
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century’s experiment violent and bloody experiment with fascism can be viewed as a psychotic 
break from the continuing rationale of modernity’s progress. 
 
One final note before beginning my analysis of the text: because of the extraordinary 
success and influence of the filmed version of Fight Club I feel it may be necessary to remark on the 
differences between the novel and the film. With the exception of the film’s alternate, Hollywood 
ending (which I come to later in this chapter) the difference is mainly one of mood and the portrayal 
of the narrator and his complicity in the events described. In the film, there is a sense that the 
narrator is a passenger on a journey that increasingly repulses and horrifies him until the point at 
which it forces the realisation of his identity as “Tyler Durden”. The novel differs significantly from 
the film as there is little or no sense of revulsion or disapproval on the narrator’s part over the 
actions of his alter ego, Tyler Durden. The importance of this is that it is fundamental to the much 
darker, more vicious and visceral mood of the novel, in which the narrator is complicit in the 
machinations of Durden. In the novel, Durden is more the fantasy of the narrator than his 
nightmare, a way for the narrator to allow himself to transcend his own limitations. There is not the 
sense of shock or disapproval in the novel which there is in the film version but rather a sense of 
satisfaction in cutting through the “corrupt impedimenta of civilization” and finding an inner, primal, 
and “true” self through violence.  
 
To cite just one example for now. In the scene where the narrator and Marla, his girlfriend, 
walk around the garden where the herbs and flowers for Durden’s soap making are grown, the novel 
hints at a far more macabre form of recycling than simply stealing liposuctioned fat from the 
dumpsters behind medical facilities: 
 
Tufts of hair surface beside the dirt clods. Hair and shit. Bone meal and blood 
meal. The plants are growing faster than the space monkeys can cut them back . . . 
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In the dirt is a shining spot of gold, and I kneel down to see. What’s going to 
happen next, I don’t know, I tell Marla. 
It looks like we’ve both been dumped. 
In the corner of my eye, the space monkeys pace around in black, each one 
hunched over his candle. The little spot of gold in the dirt is a molar with a gold filling. 
Next to it surface two more molars with silver amalgam fillings. It’s a jawbone. 
I say, no, I can’t say what’s going to happen. And I push the one, two, three 
molars into the dirt and hair and shit and bone and blood where Marla won’t see. 
(135-6) 
 
As this scene shows, not only is the figure of the narrator complicit in the novel in a way in which he 
isn’t in the filmed version, there is a much deeper current of menace running beneath the surface of 
the novel which is largely elided by the film which focuses on the fist fights of the initial “fight club” 
but plays down the seriousness and intensity of “Project Mayhem”. Though the mission of Project 
Mayhem is nodded to in the film, the violence is purely directed against property, whereas in the 
novel there is no real distinction drawn (as I will show) between violence towards property, and 
violence towards people. Both are utilised as “the motive force of history”.  
   
In “Fascinating Fascism” Sontag reviews The Last of the Nuba (1973), Leni Reifenstahl’s then 
recently published collection of photographs and commentary on a primitive Sudanese tribe. 
Riefenstahl was famous as the director whose masterpiece Triumph of the Will (1935) had been an 
extraordinarily powerful piece of propaganda for the Nazi regime. In publishing the collection of 
photos of the Nuba, Riefenstahl had perhaps hoped to re-establish herself as an auteur whose work 
for the Nazis had been an unfortunate accident of history. Sontag, however, detected a strong sense 
of the fascist philosophy, what she famously identified as the fascist aesthetic, in Riefenstahl’s 
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photographic collection, and set out to explicate how this work was in its own way as fascistic as any 
of her films from the Nazi era. 
 
 One aspect of the representation of the Nuba which Sontag singles out for attention is the 
focus on virility and health via struggle. This can be seen as an ideal which stems from the 
Rousseauian notion of the noble savage, but as Sontag observes, “what is distinctive about the 
fascist version of the old idea of the Noble Savage is its contempt for all that is reflective, critical, and 
pluralistic”. Riefenstahl eulogised the wrestling matches that were central to Nubian society, and 
commended the way the men fought not for material gain but “for the renewal of the sacred vitality 
of the tribe” (qtd in Sontag). Riefenstahl’s photographs of the Nuba are, even today, striking in their 
depiction of tall, physically perfect Nubian men, muscles gleaming under a sheen of sweat. This 
celebration of the culture of physical combat, Sontag argues, fulfils two criteria of the fascist 
aesthetic inasmuch as it glorifies physical aggression as a unifying and revitalising force for a society 
whilst at the same time relegating women to their ideal role in fascist society as “merely breeders 
and helpers, excluded from all ceremonial functions”. The corollary to this is a culture which is 
seemingly indifferent to the loss of life of any individual (because the possibility of death is 
something they live with every day) but where paradoxically “[the] most enthusiastic and lavish 
ceremonial is the funeral. Viva la muerte” (Sontag). The fascist society, then, in its exultation of 
physical combat, must be seemingly indifferent to the life of any individual (because they struggle 
and die for the greater good) whilst at the same time indulging in the exultation of the dead warrior 
as a means to further unify and inspire. 
 
 Seen in this light, the cult of physical combat in Fight Club clearly tallies with Sontag’s 
analysis of the fascist aesthetic. Of course the novel glorifies physical combat and the sense of virility 
and health that comes with it. But in its exultation of the dead warrior as exemplar it goes beyond a 
sense of masculine camaraderie and exhibits the cult of death that Sontag sees as characteristic of 
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fascism. For example, after one fight club member is shot and killed by police whilst on an 
assignment for Project Mayhem, he ceases to be merely another black-shirted “space monkey” and, 
in death, assumes an identity and stature guaranteed by his falling in battle, an identity proudly 
affirmed by the other men gathered to fight in each “chapter” of fight club: 
 
In every fight club, tonight, the chapter leader walks around in the darkness 
outside the crowd of men who stare at each other across the empty center of every 
fight club basement, and this voice yells: 
 
“His name is Robert Paulson.” 
And the crowd yells, “His name is Robert Paulson.” 
The leaders yell, “He is forty-eight years old.” 
And the crowd yells, “He is forty-eight years old.” 
He is forty-eight years old, and he was part of fight club. 
He is forty-eight years old, and he was part of Project Mayhem. 
 
Only in death will we have names since only in death are we no longer part of 
the effort. In death, we become heroes. (178) 
 
This is the celebration of death as the ultimate achievement because the ultimate heroic individual 
sacrifice for the common good. In a similar vein to Sontag, Umberto Eco identifies in fascism’s 
idealisation of death what he calls “a cult of heroism” which is “strictly linked with the cult of death. 
It is not by chance that a motto of the Falangists was Viva la Muerte . . . the ur-fascist hero craves 
heroic death, advertised as the best reward for a heroic life. The ur-fascist hero is impatient to die” 
(7).  
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It is this death that Fight Club’s narrator craves without knowing why prior to the formation 
of fight club. Every time he flies across country on business, the narrator fantasises about a 
spectacular death. “I prayed for wind shear effect” he tells us, “I prayed for pelicans sucked into the 
turbines and loose bolts and ice on the wings . . . I prayed for a crash” (26). He fantasises about 
transcending the anomie of modernity through images of violence and death. Forced to enact the 
ruthless calculus of late capitalism (“A times B times C equals X. This is what it will cost if we don’t 
initiate a recall”) the narrator invents a hero who answers such cold hyper-rationalism instinctively, 
with violence (30). In a revealing scene that takes place before the narrator recognises that he and 
Tyler Durden are one and the same, he is confronted at work by his boss after using the office 
photocopier for personal use. He fantasises about a shooting rampage, whilst his boss berates him: 
“with thirty shots, our totally fucked hero could go the length of mahogany row and take out every 
vice-president with a cartridge left over for each director” (98). The narrator’s fantasy here 
exemplifies the fascist aesthetic of “heroic” death as final proof of innate superiority over the 
paradoxically weaker but temporarily more powerful oppressor type. It revels in the fascist dualism 
of a victimised elite, kept from their rightful positions of power by the underhanded machinations of 
those weaker than them. As Eco notes, this dualism is a staple of the fascist aesthetic and its focus 
on heroic redress against claimed historic victimisation where, “by a continuous shifting of rhetorical 
focus, the enemies are at the same time too strong and too weak” (7).  Because of this, fascist 
campaigns against the “other” are always total, as the enemy have shown themselves to be 
underhanded and crafty, and cannot be allowed to remain a threat. In the novel (though not in the 
film) the narrator kills his boss in a suitably anti-technological act by booby-trapping his computer 
with home-made napalm, exterminating all trace of him.100  
 
                                                 
100 Again, this is just another example of how the novel differs from the film. In the film, the physical violence is 
limited to the fist fights and any violence outside of the clubs is purely against property, not people. The novel 
does not make this distinction and the violence in pursuit of a spiritual rebirth is utterly ruthless. 
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 As a mere cog in the corporate machine, then, Palahniuk’s narrator feels his existence to be 
pointless, and longs for a heroic – or at least dramatic – death to give some meaning, some kind of 
distinction to his life. There is a feeling throughout the novel that the hyper-rational world of 
modern capitalism has made the world safe, clean and comfortable, but in doing this it has drained it 
of meaning, because there is nothing left to struggle for that has any real consequence. Between 
bouts at fight club, the narrator changes slides during a presentation whilst his boss tells Microsoft 
how he came to decide on a particular shade of cornflower blue for the icons he designed, a scene 
heavy with the sense of utter pointlessness. During the presentation, the narrator notices Walter, 
one of the young Microsoft executives present who has “perfect teeth and clear skin” but whom he 
recognises as a recent member of fight club and he realises that Walter is looking at the bruise on his 
face and the blood on his lips, “and maybe Walter’s thinking about a meatless, pain-free potluck he 
went to last weekend or the ozone or the Earth’s desperate need to stop cruel product testing on 
animals, but probably he’s not” (55).101 Like the narrator, Walter from Microsoft has abandoned 
abstract ideals for the visceral, shared experience. The immediacy and instinctiveness of fight club is 
contrasted with the bloodless rationality required in solving the complex problems of modern 
technological society. Though modern life is not without consequence in a broad sense, the 
consequences are beyond the horizon of immediate personal experience. The human figure is 
dwarfed by the scale of modern society. 
 
With this loss of consequence and meaning comes anhedonia, and the deadening of all 
visceral feelings. Society becomes atomised, people become alienated, unity and cohesion are lost, 
and underneath the smooth technological façade of perfection finally reached, decay has set in 
because “nothing is static. Even the Mona Lisa is falling apart” (49). The novel re-enacts the fascist 
                                                 
101 The sense of animus against environmentalism is a recurrent theme in the novel which I see as a conscious 
effort on Palahniuk’s part to differentiate his attack on modernity and materialism from the environmentalist 
critique. Like Abbey’s writings, Palahniuk’s attack on modernity is popular with many environmentalists, as 
shown by Johann Hari’s admiring interview with him (Hari mainly writes on environmental and Green issues), 
but like Abbey his rejection of materialist, technological modernity is grounded in an older, more vitalist ideals, 
as I noted at the beginning of this chapter.  
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aesthetic of creation from destruction, the belief that “only after disaster can we be resurrected” to 
rise like a phoenix from the wreckage (70). Fascism sought to counter what it saw as the crushing 
rationalism of modern materialism with irrationality in the form of violence, of destruction, just as 
the narrator’s alter ego wants to reverse the enlightenment privileging of materialism over will. The 
point which must be recognised here is that it is that much of fascism’s and anti-technologism’s 
contradictory nature stems from their attempts to somehow re-infuse modern society with the 
supposed meaning of pre-industrial society. As I argued earlier, it is not the technological artefact 
that fascism denied, but the centrifugal tendencies of technological society. Thus, just as Mosse 
argued that fascism subordinated industrialism to an anti-industrial ideology in order to re-forge a 
sense of national unity and organic identity so Umberto Eco in “Ur-Fascism” (1995) comments that: 
 
even though Nazism was proud of its industrial achievements its praise of modernism 
was only the surface of an ideology based upon Blood and Earth . . . the rejection of 
the modern world was disguised as a rebuttal of the capitalistic way of life, but it 
mainly concerned the rejection of the [Enlightenment] spirit of 1789 . . . in this sense 
Ur-Fascism can be defined as irrationalism. (n. pag.) 
 
The use of violence and irrationalism as a unifying and transcendent force in literature, then, is the 
employment of the fascist aesthetic, and one which anti-technologism makes full use of, particularly 
anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism.  
 
 We see this trope of violence as a transcendent, anti-materialist force exemplified in the 
novel when the narrator’s alter-ego, the expression of his subconscious, urges him to tell the 
detective on the phone the truth about the destruction of his apartment: “‘’I’m breaking my 
attachment to physical power and possessions,’ Tyler whispered, ‘because only through destroying 
myself can I discover the greater power of my spirit’” (110). This “spirit” is the will-to-power, the 
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fascist rejection of materialist individualism as a means of accessing the higher, spiritual life of the 
hero. The first act of this personal regeneration, then, is the rejection of materialism, the trappings 
of rational modernity in an overly theatrical act of pure destruction that symbolises the triumph of 
the will over reason: the utter annihilation of the narrator’s apartment by home-made explosives. 
The renunciation of the modern, materialistic way of life must be total, and it must be an act of 
symbolic destruction to show the supremacy of will over rationalism and materialism.  
 
This symbolic act of material destruction prepares the way for the second act of personal 
regeneration. This regeneration involves the endurance of pain, signifying the cleansing of the leader 
as well as the acceptance that it is only through such acts of violence that anything worthwhile can 
be achieved. The purification comes from realising that to achieve anything truly great the narrator 
must be willing to accept that he will have to cause pain, to sacrifice the lives of others in order to 
make something truly meaningful. As Durden explains, soap was discovered as a result of human 
sacrifice; after the bodies of the victims were burnt, their fat ran into the water: “Without their 
death, their pain, without their sacrifice . . . we would have nothing” and therefore “It was right to 
kill those people” (77-8. My emphasis). In its rationality, in its desire to avoid pain and injury to 
overs, to pursue safety and comfort, modernity denies the validity of sacrificing the lives of others 
for the greater good, it cleaves to the enlightenment ideal of the sovereign individual whose rights 
cannot be overridden in the name of society or the greater good. But to remake society the narrator 
must first disabuse himself of this pretension and accept that violence and the sacrifice of others is 
sometimes necessary.  
 
  Following these acts of personal destruction and re-creation, and of pain and purification, 
the next stage is the remaking of society. The Sorelian ideal of violence as the motive force of history 
and the aesthetic of creation from destruction are clearly evident in the sexual imagery of power and 
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death as vitalistic forces of creation. After Project Mayhem is formed, Tyler tells the black-shirted 
recruits to go out and purchase guns. He then instructs them: 
 
“The explosion blasts a metal slug off the open end of the shell, and the barrel of the 
gun focuses the exploding powder and the rocketing slug,” Tyler said, “like a man out 
of a cannon, like a missile out of a silo, like your jism, in one direction.” 
 
When Tyler invented Project Mayhem, Tyler said the goal of Project Mayhem 
had nothing to do with other people. Tyler didn’t care if other people got hurt or not. 
The goal was to teach each man in the project that he had the power to control 
history. We, each of us, can take control of the world. (122. My emphasis) 
 
Tyler Durden is here revealed to be the perfect type of fascist dictator, someone for whom the 
pursuit of regeneration and revitalisation licences any extreme of violence and destruction.  His 
insistence on the supremacy of the will to power over materialism is encapsulated in his phallic 
references to a gun as something that focuses energy in one direction. The material power within 
each person is nothing, he implies, without direction and focus, thus the will to power must precede 
materialism just as intention must precede action. The discipline and uniformity of Project Mayhem 
are a means of focusing that energy for political ends, a point which belies readings of Fight Club as 
anarchist or straightforwardly anti-capitalist. This is made perfectly clear by the apostolic figure of 
the mechanic, when he tells the narrator that focussing the will to power is all that is really needed 
to gain actual power: 
 
The mechanic starts talking and it’s pure Tyler Durden. 
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“I see the strongest and smartest men who have ever lived,” he says, his face 
outlined against the stars in the driver’s window, “and I see these men are pumping 
gas and waiting tables. . .”. 
“If we could put these men in training camps and finish raising them”. 
“All a gun does is focus an explosion in one direction”. (149) 
 
What else is this if not a statement summarising the most basic definition of fascism, the binding 
together of the people under a single will, as signified by fascism’s symbol, the fasces, or bundle of 
rods tied tightly together to represent strength through unity under one leader?  Through pain, 
sacrifice, and discipline, the atomised individuals of modern materialist society will be bound 
together into a weapon that can be used to end the old, sick civilisation and usher in a new age 
under the laws of nature and survival of the fittest. 
 
The sequence of indoctrination towards this binding together is perfectly clear in the novel. 
First, the connection with others on a visceral, emotional level through fight club, implying 
membership and belonging in a spiritual brotherhood, albeit one that merges elements of eastern 
spiritualism to violence (though of course this itself was a popular theme of fascist syncretism). 
Through this brotherhood, the members are broken down and remade, destroyed and recreated, 
just as the narrator has been, and just as society will be. They are taught to despise material 
possessions, and to value only the triumphs that come through pain and suffering. Again, the 
symbolism of Durden’s soap made from human fat (the same fat which is also turned into high 
explosive) is important here, signifying the cleansing and purifying of society’s gross materialism. 
Finally, through discipline, identification with the corps, and regimentation (the shaving of hair, 
wearing black shirts and heavy black boots) they are bound into a fasci di combattimento – a league 
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of combat or “Fight Club” - that has one single purpose: to bring an end to the decadent materialist 
civilisation that has exhausted its possibilities and must be ended before a new culture can begin.102 
 
Fight Club, then, as I analyse it here, is a transgressive novel that broaches the late twentieth 
century taboo against fascism in order to reveal the underlying tensions and contradictions it sees as 
inherent in modern technological society. Materially, the narrator of Fight Club has everything a 
person could reasonably expect: a warm, comfortable home, a well-paid job, and plenty of material 
possessions. Spiritually though, he is empty, a vacuum, alienated from those around him, so that all 
the comforts, all the material wealth have come to mean nothing. Indeed, they further distance him 
from others as he retires every night after to work to clean his apartment and browse the IKEA 
catalogue alone. Not only is this seen as emasculating (the “IKEA nesting instinct”) but as I pointed 
out at the beginning of this chapter, it functions as a marker of the inauthenticity of cosmopolitan 
modernity. In a paradox of materialist individualism, the purchase of material comforts serves only 
to bleed identity from the nameless narrator still further. Already nameless and faceless, a drone, he 
is stripped even of the characteristics of ethnicity, culture, and even gender, the very type of the 
utterly atomised individual. Analysed by reference to modernity’s own precepts, this existence is 
perfectly sane, perfectly rational. To voluntarily reject this safe, materially comfortable life for 
uncertainty and possible destruction would, apparently, be the act of a madman, thus the narrator, 
in rejecting materialism, is by definition “mad”. Yet, the novel asks, for all his transgressions and 
violence, how can we condemn the narrator as insane when modern technological society relies on 
the implicit acceptance of the violence caused by technology? Not only violence against the soul, in 
terms of anomie and alienation, but the real, physical tally of violence and injury embodied in the 
production of technological artefacts based on the profit principle?  
 
                                                 
102  “Fasci di Combattimento” was Mussolino’s first fascistic party or group. The Routledge Companion to 
Fascism and the Far Right (282). 
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Palahniuk draws our attention to this supposed equivalence when his narrator, at his 
workplace in the corporate headquarters of some unspecified automobile manufacturer, is 
approached by his boss who demands to know why he has been using the office photocopier to print 
copies of the rules for fight club. Instead of justifying or apologising for his unauthorised use of office 
equipment, Palahniuk’s narrator ironically cautions his boss that whoever wrote those rules “sounds 
like a dangerous psychotic killer” who “could probably go over the edge at any moment in the 
working day and stalk from office to office with an Armalite AR-180 carbine gas-operated 
semiautomatic” (97). The narrator’s threatened use of technology in this unacceptable form is 
compared to technological society’s implicit acceptance of the violence embodied in a system where 
artefacts are manufactured primarily for profit: 
 
 What I don’t have to say is I know about the leather interiors that gets so hot 
it sets fire to the maps in your glove compartment. I know how many people burn 
alive because of fuel-injector flashback. I’ve seen people’s legs cut off at the knee 
when turbochargers start exploding and send their vanes out through the firewall 
and into the passenger compartment. I’ve been out in the field and seen the reports 
where CAUSE OF FAILURE is recorded as “unknown”. (99) 
 
The equivalence drawn here between unacceptable personal violence and the supposedly tacitly 
accepted violence inherent in modern, capitalistic technological society forces the reader to reflect 
on whether the narrator is truly insane or is merely responding to an insane system and way of life 
that, in seeking to escape from the hardships of life in the pre-technological natural world, merely 
replaces personal violence with institutionalised violence.  
 
In drawing such equivalences, Fight Club, like anti-technologism in general, seeks to uncover 
and reveal what it sees as the artifices and contradictions of technological society by contrasting 
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them with life before technologically advanced societies emerged. For all its cleverness and adroit 
use of irony, at its most basic level the novel recapitulates the concern that in attempting to escape 
the hardships of life in nature we are deviating from a natural and therefore “correct” way of living 
to which ultimately we will have to return. Thus, in the chapter following the narrator’s 
confrontation with his boss, we have the following passage: 
 
We [Marla and the narrator] go upstairs to her room, and Marla tells me how 
in the wild you don’t see old animals because as soon as they age, animals die. If they 
get sick or slow down, something stronger kills them. Animals aren’t meant to get 
old. 
Marla lies down on her bed and undoes the tie on her bathrobe, and says our 
culture has made death something wrong. Old animals should be an unnatural 
exception. (103) 
 
Here Marla contrasts the popular misconception of the survival of the fittest as a law of nature with 
“our [modern] culture”. Her claim that in nature if an animal gets sick or slow “something stronger 
kills them” perfectly captures the central ethos of the fight club where physical supremacy is 
contested and decided. The narrator’s dominance of his boss through the implicit threat of deadly 
violence, and his alter ego’s use of violence, machismo and force of will to impose his will on the 
members of fight club and Project Mayhem are therefore presented as at least “natural” in that they 
observe the law of survival of the fittest and the dominance of the stronger over the weaker. Thus, 
the real aim of the campaign to smash technological civilisation described in the novel is the wiping 
away of the artifices of modern machine civilisation in an attempt to regain ethical clarity and 
revitalise society by once more realigning it with nature: 
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  “Imagine,” Tyler said, “stalking elk past department store windows and 
stinking racks of beautiful rotting dresses and tuxedos on hangers; you’ll wear leather 
clothes that will last you the rest of your life, and you’ll climb the wrist-thick kudzu 
vines that wrap the Sears Tower. Jack and the beanstalk, you’ll climb up through the 
dripping forest canopy and the air will be so clean you’ll see tiny figures pounding 
corn and laying strips of venison to dry in the empty car pool lane of an abandoned 
superhighway stretching eight-lanes-wide and August-hot for a thousand miles”. 
 
  This was the goal of Project Mayhem, Tyler said, the complete and right-
away destruction of civilization. 
  
  What comes next in Project Mayhem, nobody except Tyler knows. The 
second rule is you don’t ask questions .(125) 
 
The imagery here, contrasts the artifices of modern civilisation – the department store windows and 
the beautiful dresses and tuxedoes – with the supposed organic wholeness, ethnical clarity and most 
of all authenticity of a life lived in acceptance of nature’s laws. Accepting these laws, of which the 
first is the survival of the fittest and the dominance of the weak by the strong, therefore justifies and 
requires acceptance of Durden’s fascist leadership, not on rational or intellectual grounds of the 
common good, but simply in virtue of his supposed supremacy and force of will.  
 
Seen from this perspective, the fascist leadership of the narrator as Tyler Durden is, 
paradoxically, a liberation, as Durden promises to emancipate humanity from the “false” comforts of 
materialistic modern society and lead them back to a world in which they will be truly, authentically 
“free” in the sense that they will engage with the world as an individual based on their own 
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strengths rather than as a cog in the machine of technological society.103 Therefore, Palahniuk’s 
creation of Tyler Durden can be seen as a Zarathustrian figure, trying to teach the Overman, or 
Übermensch, to the contented masses. Zarathustra warns of the approach of the “last men” who 
identify happiness as merely the absence of want, he cautions that the time is coming when the 
spirit of man may be crushed by the ironing out of all difference, all striving and struggle, and 
therefore humanity must reject the deadening attractions of soulless comfort and ease and seek 
salvation in chaos and struggle. By his flight to madness, then, the narrator actually finds 
redemption, and transcends the rationality of modernity, a central message of Fight Club as 
Palahniuk revealed in an interview: 
 
Interviewer: “What is the one thing you truly want people to get out of Fight Club 
and your other books?” 
 
Palahniuk: “That we need to be more comfortable and accepting of chaos, and things 
we see as disastrous. Because it is only though those things we can be redeemed and 
change. We should welcome disaster, we should welcome things that we generally 
run away from. There is a redemption available in those things that is available 
nowhere else”. (Kleineman, “Chuck Palahniuk – Author of Fight Club”.  n. pag.) 
 
Seen from this perspective, the narrator’s flight from the crushing rationalism, sterile safety, and 
oppressive “equality” of modernity into irrationality and madness is a psychotic break which 
ultimately proves to be his salvation. The fascistic attributes of Tyler Durden and Project Mayhem 
which have aroused so much critical ire are therefore morally ambiguous within the context of the 
novel as a work of literature. They are presented as both a disaster for the narrator and a 
                                                 
103 A premise also reprised by the Wachowski brothers in their 1999 film The Matrix, which posed the question  
of whether a life of artificial ease and comfort would be preferable to a life of genuine hardship and struggle.  
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redemption which ultimately enables him to more fully realise his humanity. The narrator’s 
encounter with Tyler Durden leads, via mental breakdown and psychotic break, to the destruction of 
his home, the loss of his job, and his descent into fascism with its glorification of violence as a means 
to achieving radical changes in short order. But this utter disaster, seemingly complete in its 
catastrophe, actually contains within it the seed of the change the narrator needs to stop existing 
and begin living as a human being on an emotion level, having real connections with other people. 
We’re told en passant at the beginning of the novel that somehow all the madness “is really about 
Marla Singer” (14). But the narrator is unable to form the emotional bond required to truly connect 
with others. He can’t feel anything at this point, and neither can Marla who likewise clings to the 
pathos of the support groups for vicarious catharsis: 
 
All her life she never saw a dead person. There was no real sense of life because she 
had nothing to contrast it with. Oh, but now there was dying and death and loss and 
grief. Weeping and shuddering, terror and remorse. Now that she knows where she’s 
going, Marla feels every moment of her life. (38) 
 
This is ironic, of course. Marla only feels her life by contrast with the death and suffering she sees at 
this point. But the connection, however tangential with the unpleasant facts about the human 
condition at least serve to begin to break down the neurasthenia of safe and clean modern 
civilisation. As the narrator tearfully confesses when he believes he is momentarily about to die in  
the lights of an oncoming truck: “My tiny life. My little shit job. My Swedish furniture. I never, no, 
never told anyone this, but before I met Tyler, I was planning to buy a dog and name it ‘Entourage’. 
This is how bad your life can get. Kill me” (146).  
 
The narrator’s anhedonia, his inability to feel pleasure or indeed any kind of real, human 
connection obviously drives the narrative of Fight Club. To note this is merely to state the obvious (“I 
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want you to hit me as hard as you can”) but it still needs to be stated, as it highlights the paradoxical 
way the novel works (Marla can only feel life in the presence of death, being physically attacked is 
the only opportunity the narrator has to feel connection to another human). The fascist aesthetic in 
the novel, then, is merely the supreme ambiguity, the supreme irony, that it would take induction 
into the disciplines and sacrifices of a fascist brotherhood to make people realise that by their own 
volition (or more accurately, lack of volition) they are prisoners of civilisation. Fascism and the fascist 
aesthetic are absolutely necessary to Fight Club precisely because they are ideologies or themes 
based on irrationalism and paradox: “We have to show these men and women freedom by enslaving 
them, and show them courage by frightening them” (Palahniuk 149).  
 
 Indeed, there may be indications of this deliberate ambiguity within the text. It is 
unfortunate that the film has so far surpassed the novel in both the popular and the critical 
imagination that most journal articles refer primarily to the film. This, I believe, has led to these 
ambiguities and subtleties being missed from critical interpretations. Henry Giroux’s condemnation 
of Fight Club for what he sees as its patriarchal, quasi-fascist content is a prime example. For Giroux, 
Fight Club is “a morally bankrupt and politically reactionary film” that should be reviled for its 
“proto-fascist politics” (17 & 22). Amongst the work’s defenders, there is the same focus on the film 
to the effective exclusion of the novel. Gary Crowdus, for example, rebuffing those critics whom he 
claims “became absolutely apoplectic about what they perceived to be its ‘fascist’ politics” argues 
that such critics “seem to wilfully ignore the film’s inherent criticisms of Tyler’s terrorist actions, 
which is consistently expressed through Jack’s voice-over narration and the privileging of his 
increasingly condemnatory point of view” (48).104 This focus on the film is a shame, because the 
                                                 
104 “Jack” is the putative name or label given to the nameless narrator of the work which comes from the 
narrator’s habit of reading out Reader’s Digest articles on health where an organ is described in the first 
person: “I am Jack’s liver” for example. Later on, the narrator describes his emotional state using the same 
template. No critic, so far as I am aware, has considered the irony inherent in having this most alienated 
individual “named” by this use – that is, by the consideration that an organ only has meaning and use by 
reference to its function within the larger body. These, and other biological metaphors for alienation and 
belonging in the book (and the movie for that matter) seem to have gone entirely unconsidered. 
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novel contains complexities that the film cannot translate. The narrator, as I have shown, is a far 
more complicit character in the novel than in the film. It is ironic then that even while focusing on 
the film to the exclusion of the novel, criticism of the film has seen little symbolism in Durden’s 
splicing of pornography into family movies whilst working as a projectionist. This, I will now argue, is 
a mistake, as the symbol of the projector is an important one in the novel as it builds on and 
reinforces the idea of irrational interlude which provides the structure of the work.  
 
In splicing in graphic pornographic stills of genitalia into idealised family movies, Durden is 
once more forcing on others an interlude of “reality” into the safe, sanitised depiction of life that the 
audience is viewing; he forces the realisation that ultimately we are animals with physical needs and 
visceral desires which must be repressed in order for complex societies to work. I noted at the 
beginning of this chapter that the use of the unreliable narrator, the idea of the psychotic break, and 
the extremely bleak humour of the novel are all devices that serve to give authorial distance from 
the ideas the work explores. But in the context of Fight Club and the pursuit of the irrational, such 
devices also work on another level as a commentary on the text as a manic interlude in our own 
lives. As I also argued above, we have to invest on an emotional level in Fight Club in order to 
understand it. We are forced to accept, at least on a temporary basis, that violence can be a way of 
connecting with others, that fascism, with its anti-materialism and emphasis on society as an organic 
whole, held and might still hold immense attraction for the alienated in modern society as it did in 
the first half of the twentieth century. Thus, just as fascism was a psychotic break in the rationalism 
of the twentieth century, just as the narrator’s descent into it in the book was a manic interlude in 
his life, and just as Durden’s intentionally distressing splicing of hard core pornography into idealised 
family films was an irrational hiatus, so the novel itself is an irrational episode that we have to 
consider on its own terms, as it challenges the strictures of rationalism, probity, and acceptable 
boundaries that govern the rest of our lives.  
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It is important to realise the nature of Durden’s single-frame splicing, as I believe that as I 
stated above, it is analogous to the novel’s interruptive nature in the consciousness of the reader. 
This part of the novel has been criticised as an imposition of patriarchal male power on the rest of 
society, an exultation of pornography as affirmation of phallic male supremacy. In a sense, this is not 
incorrect, but I believe it is woefully superficial. It leaves unspoken so much of the transgressive, 
paradoxical nature of the work which the projectionist symbolises. To unfold my meaning here, 
consider the following description of Durden as transgressive projectionist: 
 
This is one of those pet adventures, when the dog and cat are left behind by 
a travelling family and must find their way home. In reel three, just after the dog and 
cat, who have human voices and talk to each other, have eaten out of a garbage can, 
there’s the flash of an erection.  
Tyler does this. (30) 
 
Durden’s splicing of the erection into the movie here is irrational in that it interrupts the narrative of 
the film on a subconscious level (its appearance is too brief to be consciously registered), and yet 
ironically it has its own rationale in that it forces an image of humans as just another species of 
animal into a narrative that anthropomorphises animals that sanitises and neuters them. Tyler’s 
splicing here thus anticipates the narrator’s pathetic admission later in the novel that he had 
considered buying a dog and naming it “Entourage” as a substitute for human relationships and the 
respect of his peers. Durden’s intrusion of humanity’s essential animalistic nature into 
anthropomorphic idealisations therefore prefigures not only the subsequent intrusion of each 
meeting of fight club as an animalistic interlude in the sanitised existence of modern humanity, but 
also the intrusion of the novel’s irrational and fascistic narrative into the reader’s construction of 
what is acceptable. Similarly, in refusing to play his part as a projectionist in propagating the myths 
that sustain modern society, Durden intrudes personal will and volition into the smooth running of 
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the corporate machine, turning the tools of technological society against itself just as Abbey’s 
monkey wrench gang used technology in their battle with machine civilisation.   
 
Considering the use of the fascist aesthetic in Fight Club within the broader context of anti-
technologism, I think it is apparent that it manifests dissatisfaction with what Zeev Sternhell and 
others have characterised as the enlightenment project, the goal of peace, prosperity, and equality 
reached through rationalism and material advancement. In that sense Fight Club, as I mentioned 
earlier, may be situated with reference to such works as Huxley’s Brave New World as it rebels 
against a kind of somnambulant, neutered consumerist existence where happiness is equated 
merely with the avoidance of pain and need. In this respect, the opposition of spiritualism and 
emotion to materialism and rationalism that anti-technologism makes is readily apparent. This can 
be a noble and morally praiseworthy project, but because of its irrationality it can also be an 
extremely dangerous one, as the fascist experience shows. Thus, whilst Fight Club may seem to be 
a rejection of tradition, with Durden’s rhetoric of ending civilisation and denying the validity or 
importance of history, in actuality it enacts a longing for a previous era which it perceives as 
having more meaning, an era before welfare and widely available white collar office work. In this 
respect Fight Club highlights the way that anti-technological literature is often, superficially at 
least, a literature of revolt but which at the same time enacts a semi-supressed desire for a 
return to what are seen as simpler times. It is the eruption of the reactionary consciousness into 
the anti-capitalist and anti-materialist dialogue of progressive politics, the dark, irrational side of 
the rejection of material wealth and comfort as a measure of progress.  
 
In its neat embodiment of these contradictory longings, Fight Club is the perfect example 
of the use of the fascist aesthetic in anti-technological literature. Perfect, in that it is not just 
transgressive but in the final analysis perfectly ambiguous: a point nodded to in the last words of 
the novel after the narrator has made the realisation that Durden was his irrational projection of 
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his supressed needs and “killed” him by shooting himself. In a final, parting irony of the novel 
that the film elides for the traditional Hollywood romantic ending, the narrator is placed in a 
mental institution until he recovers his sanity and reason. Clearly he is not being held criminally 
responsible for the murders and acts of terror committed by or under the leadership of his 
schizophrenic alter ego, Tyler Durden. As soon as he has been rehabilitated, the narrator can 
retake his place in modern society. If he wants to.  
 
But I don’t want to go back. Not yet. 
Just because.  
Because every once in a while, somebody brings me my lunch tray and my 
meds and he has a black eye or his forehead is swollen with stitches, and he says: 
“We miss you Mr. Durden.” 
Or somebody with a broken nose pushes a mop past me and whispers: 
“Everything’s going according to the plan.” 
Whispers: 
“We’re going to break up civilization so we can make something better out of the 
world.” 
Whispers: 
“We’re looking forward to getting you back.”  
-- Ending of Fight Club (207-8). 
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Conclusion. 
 
In this thesis, I have tried to delineate the characteristics, motivations, and anxieties of a cultural and 
literary trend which I identifed as anti-technologism. My concern throughout has been first to 
analyse and explicate this particular strain of antipathy towards technology, and second, to consider 
how it seemingly embodied – or at least facilitated – a convergence of progressive and reactionary 
ideals and motivations. I identify anti-technologism as a manifestation of sublimated fears over the 
rising power of the masses, both in sheer numerical terms as well as in terms of their access to 
power and influence on culture. I considered a range of texts from the 1930s to the present day to 
show how these concerns became translated from a discussion about degeneracy, cosmopolitanism, 
and the restless urban masses, to a more abstracted narrative which identified technology as the 
root cause of the perceived malaise. What I would like to do now is to draw together my analysis of 
anti-technologism and situate it within a broader cultural and literary framework. 
 
 One of the most striking features of anti-technologism uncovered in this thesis is its reliance 
on an organicist and vitalist view of society and history. In this, it can be clearly related to negative 
classicism as analysed by Patrick Brantlinger and culture as analysed by Raymond Williams. For this 
reason, anti-technologism tends towards the apocalyptic, as it perceives culture and civilisation in 
organic, Spenglerian terms as having a limited life-span composed of genesis, growth, maturity, 
senescence, and dissolution or death. Thus, technology is never seen as merely changing society and 
culture, but is invested with greater potency because it is seen as the product of the final stages of 
civilisation.  
 
Such a cyclic and organic view of culture and civilisation obviously implies a very complex 
and contradictory view of technology and technological society. It is seen as both final flower of 
civilisation and the culture which produced it, but also as its promised and encapsulated dissolution 
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or death. Perhaps “dissolution” hits the mark more nearly here, as the dissolution of the old, 
calcified civilisation is held to contain the seed of a renewed, vibrant culture based once more on a 
close relationship with the living soil. Thus, anti-technological texts from Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings 
to Palahniuk’s Fight Club see the destruction of one world as heralding the promise of a new one. 
This is seen most obviously in those texts which I examined in my chapter on anti-technologism and 
catastrophe. All of the texts considered in that chapter – JB Priestley’s A Summer’s Day Dream, Pat 
Franks’ Alas, Babylon, Edmund Cooper’s The Overman Culture, and James Howard Kunstler’s World 
Made by Hand – are noticeably elegiac in their recreation of an idealised and solidly conservative, 
stable, and hierarchical society of a type that never actually existed, but is always held to have 
existed (as, for example, analysed by Raymond Williams in The Country and the City). Thus, there is, 
as with negative classicism in general, a generalised ambivalence in anti-technologism towards the 
idea of the collapse of modern technological civilisation, as it represents both death and incipient 
renewal.  
 
This contradiction – of both desiring and fearing the decline and collapse of modern 
technological civilisation realises a further contradiction or paradox, which is anti-technologism’s 
position on intellectualism and instinct. Intellectualism and abstraction is seen as the human 
counterpart of the shift from organic culture to petrified civilisation: “Culture and Civilization – the 
living body and the mummy of it” Spengler claimed in The Decline of the West (250)105. 
Intellectualism is seen as a form of malaise, a petrification of the human spirit which leads to 
childlessness and subsequent depopulation and decline (as I discussed in my chapter on Tolkien). 
The salient feature of all new worlds in anti-technological fiction – whether actualised in fiction or 
fantasised – is their fertility and vitality, which is figured as essentially Dionysian in its overflowing 
vitality. This fertility is the reassertion of organic culture over petrified civilisation; it is a sign that the 
cycle has been completed and growth can begin again. Hayduke’s fantasy of “wild women” and 
                                                 
105 See my chapter on anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism for analysis of this aspect of anti-technologism. 
My chapter on Tolkien also contains relevant analysis here.  
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hunting for red meat “under the light of a reborn moon” in Monkey Wrench Gang; Emily telling 
Michael “"I want to have many of your children" in Cooper’s The Overman Culture; and the crop of 
fair-haired children in the Shire after Sam has spread the seed and soil from Galadriel around, all 
very clearly tie intellectualism and rationality with sterility and decline, and instinct with fertility and 
renewal. Hayduke, the hard-drinking, multiple-gun-carrying ex-Green Beret is the antithesis of the 
modern liberal intellectual; Emily vouches her promise of fertility “hardly even knowing what she 
meant”; and Sam Gamgee is, of course, the very type of Spenglerian eternal peasant fictionalised.  
 
Yet, by the same token, at other times anti-technologism seems to also castigate instinct and 
bemoan what it sees as the decline in intelligence in machine civilisation, as in Huxley’s Island. Hence 
we have, for instance, the figure of the “mucker” in Brunner’s Stand on Zanzibar with his 
“conspicuous erection”, bloodied weapon, and bulging biceps, barely articulate. How, then can 
instinct be both affirmative in anti-technologism, and yet terrifying and disgusting? As I observed in 
the introduction to my thesis, as well as in my chapters on Tolkien and on over-population, anti-
technologism sets up a distinction between “true” fertility and artificial and unsustainable fertility. 
“True” fertility, as I have just considered, is identified with instinct, but it should be observed that 
this instinct is closely bound in with identification with the native soil. A deep and lasting 
commitment to the soil must be affirmed in some meaningful way, whether by action, affirmation, 
or ritual. By extension, as the texts cited above exemplify, there is “true” instinct – rising from a life 
lived in close harmony with the native soil – and artificial instinct, a perversion engendered by mass 
culture and communications.106 Natural instinct is identified with procreation, family, community, 
and culture, whereas the “artificial” instinct of the cosmopolitan city and the technological world is 
coarsely sexual and grossly materialistic.  
                                                 
106 This artificial instinct is not the same as Marxist “false consciousness”, though it has similarities.  Where 
Marxist false consciousness is predicated on economic grounds, and is concerned with the misleading and 
alienation of the workers to their true status in society, this artificial instinct is concerned with themes of 
uprooting and dislocation and how this leads to unrest and discontent in people lacking community, culture, 
and hierarchy. 
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In terms of representation, then, natural instinct in anti-technologism is identified with the 
peasant, intimately connected with the soil and cycles of growth, and artificial instinct with the 
urban masses: formless, cultureless, and undifferentiated, a product of the modern city, whose 
instincts are gross and carnal. Thus, intellect and instinct in anti-technologism are intimately bound 
up with ideas of sterility and fertility, petrification and renewal. Intellectuals are excoriated because 
their tendency towards abstraction, to seek universal laws and axioms, undermines culturally 
specific beliefs that bind society together in a fixed hierarchy. The masses are held responsible for 
their own base desires which have estranged them from their “correct” place in the hierarchy and 
the intellectual is condemned for instigating the undermining of cultural norms that bind a culture 
and a people together. Culture gives way to civilisation, civilisation gives rise to intellectualism, and 
intellectualism undermines culture, so that rather than a “people” and culture there are only the 
cities and the masses. 
 In this respect, anti-technologism’s roots in negative classicism and degeneracy panics are 
very clearly apparent, which goes some way towards elucidating its paradoxical and even 
contradictory nature, as I discussed in my introduction and in my first chapter. In regard to anti-
technologism’s negative classicism, in my thesis chapters I have focused almost exclusively on 
Spengler, yet if we consider another of the classic works of negative classicism, Jose Ortega Y 
Gasset’s The Revolt of the Masses (1932), we can see how the key ideas of anti-technologism fit the 
mould of negative classicism in other texts as well. Ortega makes an interesting accusation, in that 
he accuses the scientist and technician of being, in their specialisation, the very type of the “mass 
man” because they deny and ignore the authority of tradition and culture and so typify the 
“demoralisation” of modern civilisation. In this tendency of modern civilisation to deny authority and 
tradition, Ortega believes, can be found the genesis of the modern barbarian, the “mass man” of 
liberal democracy and technicism, and, as a consequence of this, civilisation’s eventual and 
inevitable destruction. Hence anti-technologism, following negative classicism, is both repulsed and 
yet fascinated by the spectre of collapse and barbarism. The decline in standards (which is of course 
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a subjective assumption) that leads to barbarism is fiercely condemned, as standards must be 
upheld and venerated, yet at the same time the modern “barbarians”, in their vitality and disdain for 
intellectualism and abstraction, seem to contain the vitalist qualities which hold out the hope of 
cultural renewal.  
 
So, for example, Ortega spends much of The Revolt of the Masses condemning and deriding 
the idea of democracy as according to him the masses, in their barbarism, can only act through 
violence. Yet, in identifying what he sees as the normalisation of violence in modern civilisation, he 
claims that “it [the normalisation of violence] has reached its full development, and this is a good 
symptom, because it means that automatically the descent is about to begin” (116). The rise of 
violence, and the return to savagery, therefore, is both feared and welcomed, as it heralds 
(ultimately) cultural renewal and revitalisation. In anti-technologist fiction this is represented in the 
idea of the savage or barbarian as repository of essential humanism and vitality. Thus, Huxley’s 
savage, John, in Brave New World is the repository of The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, 
the discovery of which awakens in Bernard Marx the realisation that he is a vital, natural creature, 
and that reproduction and renewal should, in all senses, spring from nature. Crucially, just as the 
savage doesn’t really comprehend Shakespeare but rather recites it as though the words themselves 
were instinct with some preternatural power, so Marx responds to Shakespeare not intellectually, 
but instead on an almost instinctive, incantatory level: 
 
The strange words rolled through his mind; rumbled, like talking thunder; like drums 
at the summer dances, if the drums could have spoken; like men singing the Corn 
Song, beautiful, beautiful, so that you cried; like old Mitsima saying magic over his 
feathers and his carved sticks and bits of bone and stone . . . it talked to him; talked 
wonderfully and only half-understandably, a terrible beautiful magic, about Linda; 
about Linda lying there snoring . . . . (114). 
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The implicit message here illustrates Ortega’s paradox: the civilisation of Brave New World has 
advanced too far to appreciate “high” or “true” art because such appreciation of them requires an 
instinctive response. It has become a civilisation that has left behind and cast off its culture; in 
advancing too far it has degenerated. Culture, Huxley seems to suggest, reminds us of our essential 
humanity, our closeness to nature and our own wild nature. In reawakening Bernard Marx’s 
realisation of his own sexual nature, it is also reawakens an appreciation of culture. Of course, this is 
not to argue for Huxley as some sort of primitivist, advocating a return to the Neolithic, but rather to 
emphasise how closely Huxley’s ideals in this respect parallel Orwell’s in the sense he fears that the 
removal of struggle and pain from everyday life might not lead to human advancement but to an 
atrophy of the soul and to the type of affectless dystopia the novel describes. 
 
Linda, meanwhile, is reminiscent of Ortega’s scientist as archetypal “mass man” in her 
compartmentalised and specialised knowledge. She remains impervious to the magic of Shakespeare 
and culture, deeming it uncivilised nonsense. When questioned by one of the savages about her role 
in the modern technological world she is unable to provide any substantive answers, because she 
herself doesn’t have any. A mere cipher, a cog in the machine, Linda does not even know where the 
bottles of chemicals she uses in embryology are from, as this knowledge is outside her speciality. 
“It’s the Chemical Store people who make them, I suppose,” she responds uncertainly, “Or else they 
send to the factory for them. I don’t know. I never did any chemistry. My job was always with the 
embryos” (113). Huxley’s savage, as Bernard Marx comes to see, is infinitely preferable in his holism, 
his vitality and even his violence, compared to the affectless scientism and compartmentalisation of 
the technological world in which he lives. As Carey notes, it is the savage’s “contempt for mass 
values” a contempt endorsed by nature herself, that Huxley is keen for us to recognise here (89). 
 
Ortega is at pains to emphasise that the “mass man” he warns of, the new barbarian, is not 
like the barbarians of old, outside the gates of civilisation but rather “is an automatic product of 
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modern civilisation” and so already within the gates (101). He or she is, for Ortega, the result of both 
over-abundance (thanks to modern technology, science, and medicine) and egalitarianism, the belief 
that the common mass man or woman is entitled to the abundance they find around them by right, 
when really (Ortega asserts) such abundance is the result of the struggle and labour of those few 
who far surpass the common mass of humanity. Thus for Ortega, modern machine civilisation “may 
be summed up in the two great dimensions: liberal democracy and technism” (107). Ortega  defines 
“technism” in the sense that he uses it here as a technology that arises from “the union of capitalism 
and experimental science” which recognises no limits to its seeking for knowledge, and no superior 
authority or wisdom (107). This union, of capitalism, experimental science, and liberal democracy, 
Ortega asserts, has brought about the “mass man” in both a quantitative sense (enabling the steep 
rise in population from 1800 onwards) and a qualitative sense inasmuch as people in such a society 
come to view themselves in scientific and legalistic terms, rather than cultural and hierarchical 
terms. Therefore, “the rebellion of the masses” he declares, “is one and the same thing as the 
fabulous increase that human existence has experienced in our time” (125).  
 
For Ortega, then, the denial of the authority of tradition, the repudiation of hierarchy, and 
the specialisation of science, in service to speculative capital, these are the characteristics of the 
modern, technological world. As people cease to view themselves in an organic sense, as part and 
product of a soil and culture, and start to see themselves instead in metaphysical and legalistic terms 
as citizens with inalienable rights and duties they – crucially – see themselves as complete in and of 
themselves without reference to their geographical and cultural roots. This, Ortega warns, is the 
“self-satisfied man” and his appearance on the scene is a signal that it is time “to raise the alarm and 
to announce that humanity is threatened with degeneration” (102).  This is the counter-
enlightenment position that all anti-technological texts take, that the self-interest of the masses in a 
liberal society will ultimate result in chaos. Thus, the testimony of Dr Julius Overman in Cooper’s The 
Overman Culture is that England has become “corrupt and decadent” as has the world, and that the 
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only possible response is to wait “until time and the will of God have wrought great and cleansing 
changes”, which in this case is the war and subsequent ecological disaster that wipes out all other 
cultures and ethnicities except the carefully preserved genetic material of “British donors of 
Caucasian stock” (173 & 185). It is the ultimate cause of the disaster that overtakes civilisation in 
Huxley’s Ape and Essence, as it is in Kunstler’s World Made by Hand. In all these works, as in anti-
technologism generally, the real enemy is not technology itself but the masses in secular, 
individualistic liberal democracy that are perceived to be pursuing their own selfish desires in the 
absence of any cohesive structure or cultural tradition. 
 
Anti-technologism is the expression of the desire to try and ameliorate this threat inherent 
in mass democracy by a heartfelt but ultimately futile attempt to “fix” people and society in place, to 
prevent urbanisation, cosmopolitanism, and degeneration by locating individuals not just in terms of 
their status within the hierarchy, but also geographically, by reference to their locale. Hence, as the 
discussion above pointed to, anti-technologism condemns the intellectual precisely because of their 
intellectualism – that is, their dealing in abstract concepts that are (at least in theory) axiomatically 
true independent of culture, ethnicity, or nationality.107 Ortega’s charge that the intellectual 
“demoralised” society stemmed from his belief that the intellectual’s universalism undermined 
belief in, and allegiance to, tradition and authority. This belief informs anti-technologism as well. 
Anti-technological works such as Edward Goldsmith’s The Stable Society (1978) typify this belief in 
attacking universalism as a dissolvent of culture and society.  Citing the example of Zeno from 
ancient Greece, Goldsmith, in The Stable Society condemns attempts to fix meaning independent of 
specific cultural and societal referents and warns of the inevitable result of universalism: “their 
message was world citizenship and the universal brotherhood of man. Needless to say, it failed” 
(Goldsmith 48).  
                                                 
107 This is not to say that intellectuals do not or cannot consider culture or ethnicity of course. But such 
considerations are conducted with the belief that certain concepts and laws are “true” or valid independent of 
society or culture.  
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 In this perception we can see how anti-technologism has its ultimate roots in the counter-
enlightenment. It decries the abundance and ease brought by science, technology, and liberal 
democracy as ultimately pernicious and self-defeating, and stresses the importance of hierarchy, 
cultural, and tradition in people’s self-identity. Most of all, it decries the universalism of the 
enlightenment and rationalism, and in opposition, stresses the importance of cultural and historical 
specificity. It rejects the intellectual’s search for universal laws, universal axioms, and – most of all – 
universal rights. My analysis of anti-technologism and overpopulation (especially, for example, in my 
discussion of Huxley’s Island) shows how a central feature of this aspect of anti-technologism was its 
conviction that science and technology are self-defeating when they are unmoored from any 
allegiance to culture and authority.  
 
Acknowledging this, I have argued throughout my thesis that, for the less essentialist 
administrative strain of anti-technologism at least, it isn’t so much that all technology was bad per 
se, but rather that unrestricted access to technology proves dangerous. Perhaps, in view of the 
above discussion, I can now refine that position further and argue that for administrative anti-
technologism, technology and liberal democracy combined are dangerous. Liberal democracy is seen 
as unmooring science and technology and its use from considerations of obligation and hierarchy, 
and allowing it to be indiscriminately used and applied without any reference to any cultural or 
traditional context. Anti-technologism’s attack on technology and the technological society is 
therefore also an attack on the undifferentiated individual. That is to say, an attack on the individual 
perceived as uprooted from a specific cultural context, and without regional provenance, 
agglomerated in the city into what is perceived as an unstable and inchoate mass. Orwell’s repeated 
reference to “real food” with “provenance” as contrasted with tinned food of no determinate 
provenance in Coming Up For Air functions as a marker for this idea, as I explored in my first chapter. 
As I noted there, Carey’s analysis of tinned food as a literary symbol showed how it functioned as a 
representation of the soulless urban masses. The literary and cultural elite view of the masses as 
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soulless and therefore effectively dead (or at least less than human) was a common trope in the 
literature of the first half of the twentieth century, and anti-technologism carries that trope forward 
into the second half of the century. In situating human identity with reference to particular cultures, 
ethnicities, or societies, anti-technologism implicitly denies the liberal enlightenment ideal of 
universalism, the belief that someone’s individuality and personhood is innate to them and not 
simply predicated on their belonging to a particular culture or ethnicity. Though this has the benefit 
of recognising the importance of society and culture to self-identity, it often leads to a reductive 
view of the urban, cosmopolitan individual as “de-cultured” and even lacking in identity or soul. 
 
 The supposed tragedy that anti-technologism points to, then, is that in following a promise 
of political self-empowerment and material progress the individual in modern, democratic 
civilisation sheds all cultural and hierarchical ties and in so doing loses his identity and, ultimately, 
their “soul”. Yet, in a world which was growing more and more democratic, populous, and shaped by 
technology and mass culture, making this argument became increasingly fraught with the risk that 
the writer would be charged with elitism (though in fact, that is often exactly what the writer was 
arguing for, whether they realised it or not). Furthermore, in the second half of the twentieth 
century, in societies struggling to come to terms with the horrors of fascism, such elitism and 
condemnation of the masses was increasingly unacceptable. In the aftermath of the gas chamber 
and the concentration camp, portraying a section of humanity as soulless and without any real 
identity was of course to invite widespread condemnation. In this historical context, the existence of 
elite literary and cultural appropriations of the masses as akin to tinned food and other mass-
produced, machine-made articles served a crucial function as displaced metaphor, as I explored in 
my chapter on Orwell. Like the masses they represented, such artefacts of machine civilisation were 
viewed as mediocre and paltry, the triumph of quantity over quality. Indeed, as I made clear in my 
first chapter and elsewhere, early movements involved with anti-technological themes, such as AJ 
Penty’s Guild Socialism, with its emphasis on quality over quantity, owe much to eugenic theory and 
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its influence, a pseudo-science founded on the mistaken belief that quantity must naturally displace 
quality. 
 
However, rather than a replacement of technological artefact (for instance a tin of food) for 
the individual in modern machine civilisation in any straightforward, simplistic fashion I believe the 
displacement was more subtle, because mostly unconscious, and consisted largely of supposed 
characteristics of the degraded masses being mapped on to technology, technological society, and 
technological artefacts. For instance, the inexorable and horrific fertility and growth of the 
scientifically engineered super-grass in Ward Moore’s novella Greener Than You Think (1947) is an 
excellent early example of this tendency. The artificially engineered grass cannot be said to directly 
represent or symbolise the masses in any straightforward way, but in its characteristics and 
attributes – each blade of grass individual and yet indistinguishable from the mass, its fertility and 
seeming imperviousness to all attempts to contain its power, its uselessness and yet ultimate 
success and triumph – it stands in for mass man in the modern age. This is a point reinforced in 
Moore’s novella both by repeated references to a decline in standards as the grass advances on 
society, and by the fact that the hapless villain of the story (a struggling salesman who by chance 
comes into possession of the discovery of the grass) consolidates his power and wealth by forming 
“Consolidated Pemmican and Allied Industries” a tinned food company that purchases food 
worldwide “to process and ship back in palatable, concentrated form” (125). 
 
Technology and the technological artefact in anti-technologism, then, can be said to parallel 
the conception of the masses in both negative classicism and in associated fiction of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Just as Carey (following Williams) observes that the figure 
of the peasant was a popular one in literature (as it represented to a largely metropolitan literary 
elite the ideals of rootedness, vitality, and contact with nature, and most of all acceptance of 
hierarchy), so anti-technologism, in an era without peasants, looks instead to the figure of the 
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primitive as the survival of Spengler’s “eternal peasant” as a way of denying the individualism of the 
urban masses in modern liberal society. 
 
To elaborate on this idea, I wish to consider Carey’s comments on Virginia Woolf’s 
description of an old beggar woman outside a London subway station in her Mrs Dalloway’s 
Daughter (1925). Woolf’s description runs to several pages and meditates on how “through all the 
ages – when the pavement was grass, when it was swamp, through the age of tusk and mammoth, 
through the age of silent sunrise – the battered woman – for she wore a skirt  . . . stood singing of 
love – love which has lasted a million years” (qtd. in Carey 37). As he points out, this aestheticisation 
of the woman,  
 
Is a way not of describing but eliminating old women who beg outside Regent’s Park 
Tube Station. By converting her into a peasant or super-peasant, timeless, 
immemorial, mixed up with soil and tree-roots, Woolf deprives the woman of the 
distasteful social reality which she would possess as a member of the mass asking for 
money. The beggar disappears in a primitivist cosmetic haze. (37) 
 
In the same manner, anti-technologism’s appropriation of the primitive serves not so much to 
elevate the primitive, but rather to deny the existence and individuality of the urban masses. Edward 
Abbey’s admiration of the Native American, as I showed in my chapter on anarcho-libertarian anti-
technologism, was very brittle, and any deviation from an approved “authentic” lifestyle was met 
not just with condemnation but also with derision.  The primitives in Abbey’s work, and in other anti-
technological works are not individuals, but types. This is so because the primitive’s real function, for 
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Abbey, for Robinson Jeffers, and for anti-technologism in general, is to vouch for the validity and 
rightness of a way of life antithetical to modern civilisation and actually existing liberal democracy.108 
 
Tolkien’s hobbits are, of course, another prime example of this elevation of the peasant as 
an embodied rejection of the masses, a point not lost on Michael Moorcock who notes acerbically 
that peasants “are always sentimentalized in such fiction [fantasy] because, traditionally, they are 
always the last to complain about any deficiencies in the social status quo” (183). As Moorcock 
further points out, Tolkien’s orcs are conversely portrayed as the “Mob . . . the worst aspects of 
modern urban society represented as a whole by a fearful, backward-yearning class” (185-6). The 
Hobbits in Rings want largely the same thing as the masses – their aspirations are simply plentiful 
food, cheap beer, and tobacco to smoke – and yet their rootedness and acceptance of their lowly 
but honourable place in the hierarchy redeem them. Their sense of place, of tradition and hierarchy 
(with genealogical records kept and memorised) and respect for authority, are seen to give them a 
sense of identity which of course is utterly lacking in the Orcs who represent the unstable and 
grasping urban masses of the world. It is in the organicism of the peasant and primitive, that anti-
technologism locates their identity and by comparison, highlights the lack of identity or soul in the 
modern urban masses.  
Given the prevalence of such fundamentally reactionary attitudes in anti-technologism and 
anti-technological literature, both as discussed here and analysed in the body of the thesis, the most 
immediately pressing question would seem to be how such works came to be viewed as forming 
part of a progressive canon of counter-cultural literature. Undoubtedly, a large part of this stems 
                                                 
108 By this I mean modern liberal democracy as it actually exists now in the world with all its imperfections, 
rather than any utopian aspiration. This is no petty distinction: accepting the validity of liberal democracy 
requires accepting that people have short-term goals, that they care about themselves and their family more 
than others, and that they don’t always espouse the “correct” views on the issues of the day. To claim to 
believe in liberal democracy but only on the basis of people holding the “right” views is specious and, of 
course, neither democratic or liberal. The appeal of primitive, agrarian, post-apocalyptic or quasi-medieval 
worlds in anti-technologism is they enact a world shorn of the supposed fantasies of liberal democracy in a 
highly technological society. As I discussed in my consideration of Kunstler’s World Made by Hand in the 
chapter on anti-technologism and the Catastrophe. 
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from historical circumstance, where technology was seen to be employed in horribly asymmetric 
wars such as Vietnam, a conflict that epitomised the scenario of a distant, militaristic empire 
projecting its power across the world on to a largely undeveloped society and country. This historical 
circumstance led to a popular mood against such militarism and anti-technologism’s isolationism 
had resonance to a world and a generation which identified technology with imperialism. Spengler’s 
condemnation of the expansionary drive behind “Faustian” civilisation and imperialism as its final 
stage, and E M Forster’s isolationist, “Little Englander” condemnation of the imperialist as a 
“destroyer” must have seemed particularly prescient in the latter twentieth century, especially when 
seen outside of the context in which they were formed. Hence the anti-imperialistic tendencies of 
anti-technologism, as I discussed in my third chapter. 
 
 Other fundamental themes of anti-technologism also played a large part in ensuring that 
works which, on analysis can be seen to embody some particularly reactionary ideals, came to be 
seen as progressive works, and to have influence on progressive politics. Reactionary obsession with 
resources and population, for example, became a theme which was echoed decades later in the 
growing environmental movement. Famine in England (1938), and Alternative to Death (1943) by 
the fascist admirer, Gerard Wallop, ninth Earl of Portsmouth, and Road to Survival (1949) by the 
eugenicist William Voigt (also discussed in my third chapter) traded on notions of racial superiority 
and fears of immigration and even potential reverse colonisation, but this animus was skipped over 
by later readings in favour of their more overt message regarding the mismatch between resources 
and population. Thus, the xenophobic and eugenicist beliefs which underpinned these texts were 
sublimated but not extinguished in readings by later generations (Desrochers and Hoffbauer 78-9). 
Similarly, Weston A. Price’s concern with “general physical degeneration” caused by processed food 
and other degenerative influences in modern society as part of his wider effort in “preventing race 
decay and deformities” were played down in later readings which tended to focus instead on more 
acceptable readings which emphasised nutritional arguments over the supposed nutritional and 
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environmental benefits of organic food (5).109 Authors such as Paul Ehrlich, Garrett Hardin and 
others, along with writers such as Julian and Aldous Huxley, carried forward pre-war preconceptions 
and prejudices regarding fit and unfit populations, and the necessity of resource allocation and 
rationing, into the nascent post-war environmental movement.110 
 
Indeed, it is difficult to ascertain now the extent to which the far-right reactionary politics of 
many leading members of earlier groups with an anti-technological bent, such as the Soil 
Association, helped to a significant degree to shape some of the fundamental concepts of the 
modern environmental and Green movements (and hence, an important aspect of modern, 
progressive politics and culture). Pondering this, Philip Conford is drawn to the conclusion that it 
would be unwise to believe that they didn’t have a considerable impact: 
 
Tracy Clunies-Ross has suggested that the organic school of the 1930s and ‘40s was 
something quite distinct from the [organic] movement which emerged as part of the 
wider environmental movement of the 1960s and ‘70s, following the publication of 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. Yet it seems inherently improbable that a well-
organised group of energetic, dedicated and fluently articulate propagandists should 
fade away and have no impact on people concerned with the same issues less than 
two decades after. (211)111 
                                                 
109 Price’s arguments can be found reproduced in any number of New Age and alternative or countercultural 
books. Though the overt references to race and dysgenics are largely omitted, the identification of modern 
processed foods as degenerative is still very prevalent, showing the continuance of themes of organic form 
versus urban degeneration into contemporary discourse.  
110 For the influence of the Huxleys, Hardin and other eugenicists on post-war culture see Allan Chase The 
Legacy of Malthus: The Social Costs of the New Scientific Racism (1977). For the continuing involvement of the 
Ehrlichs (Paul and his wife Anne) in xenophobic anti-immigration movements, see the section on“Nativists and 
Environmentalists: A Timeline” in the publication “Nativists, Environmentalism, and the Hypocrisy of Hate”at 
the Southern Poverty Law Centre http://www.splcenter.org/greenwash-nativists-environmentalism-and-the-
hypocrisy-of-hate/greenwashing-a-timeline. 
111 Conford’s hypothesis here seems to be borne out by anecdotal evidence. For example, Robert Lamb’s 
history of the Friends of the Earth (FoE) movement in the UK quotes one of their early directors, Tom Burke, as 
saying that in the early 1970s “ideas like Green weren’t in anyone’s mind. There was no theory, nothing to 
theorise about, just bad things happening . . . but Environment was driven out of a population, resources, 
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Similarly, Janet Biehl (1995) has pointed to the numerous and important links, both ideological and 
personal, between post World War Two fascism and the early years of Germany’s Green Party, the 
first in Europe.112Britain’s Green Party, which began as the “Movement for Survival” (named after 
The Ecologist’s hugely influential “Blueprint for Survival” manifesto) was co-founded by Edward 
Goldsmith of The Ecologist, who himself provided a living link between the reactionary politics of 
early associations such as the Soil Association, later more left-wing, progressive movements such as 
the British Green Party, and (contemporaneously) Far Right organisations such as the French 
Nouvelle Droite (Krebbers et al.). 
 
All of these factors – horror at the development of nuclear weapons and other technologies 
of war, the pre-war strain of isolationist anti-imperialism, the xenophobic or eugenicist warning of 
resource depletion and famine that predated later environmentalist warnings, and the closeness in 
chronology between earlier conservation movements and the latter social justice and 
environmentalist movements – came together. They had the net effect that, along with a 
commitment to greater fairness, justice, equality, and a sense of stewardship towards the 
environment, post-war progressive movements very often adopted ready-made some beliefs and 
preconceptions which had been formed decades earlier, by people and institutions who shared their 
distaste for laissez-faire capitalism and industrial growth, but whose politics beyond that mutual 
ground were almost entirely antithetical to the post-war progressive movements.  Though works like 
Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) or The Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth (1972) were a spur to 
environmental and progressive movements, the “explosive mixture of conservative values, 
enshrined in an agriculturally based world-view, and the more radical finite resource economists and 
scientists had already formed” (Bramwell Ecology in the Twenty First Century 120). The ideological 
                                                                                                                                                        
pollution tradition” (qtd in Lamb 80). In yet another example of Edward Goldsmith’s pervasive influence on 
early Green politics, his “Blueprint for Survival” manifesto provided this missing theoretical structure and was 
hailed by Burke as “the seminal document for the birth of the modern environment movement. It created a 
framework of ideas for the first time” (qtd in Lamb 45).  
112 Janet Biehl, “’Ecology’ and the Modernization of Fascism in the German Ultra-Right” in Ecofascism: Lessons 
from the German Experience (1995). 32-73. 
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worldview that stressed cultural and agricultural integrity, purity, and self-containment, was already 
extant and waiting to be discovered by those who believed that trade with other countries 
(especially less developed ones) inevitably involved exploitation and who stressed the values of self-
reliance and self-sufficiency.  
 
To cite just one example of this “explosive mixture” will be sufficient to show not just how 
deeply the reactionary values of the old Right percolated down to the “New Left” and Green 
movements, but also how anti-technologism was absolutely fundamental to this crossover. As I 
noted in the introduction, the British Green Party was formed by a small group of people centred 
around Ecologist  owner and editor, Edward Goldsmith, and was founded as a result of his extremely 
successful publication of “Blueprint for Survival”.113 As historian of the British Fascist movement, 
Graham Macklin, notes in Very Deeply Dyed in Black (2007), the Ecologist’s editorial staff in its early 
years was the same team that had edited the Soil Association’s Mother Earth journal under the 
editorship of British Union of Fascists’ Agricultural Secretary, Jorian Jenks, thus ensuring a continuity 
of ideals between the two publications. As editor of Mother Earth, Jenks had propounded an “anti-
modernist philosophy embracing land reform, the paramountcy [sic] of agriculture, the 
subordination of mechanisation to organicism, the localisation of economies and a cultivation of a 
consciousness of the ties of blood and soil” (Macklin 65). As the Soil Association began the slow 
march towards political respectability, repudiating its fascist past by hiring Left-Wing American 
environmentalist Barry Commoner to replace Jenks, these ideas, and the editorial team which 
espoused them found a new home in The Ecologist, “The Journal of the Post Industrial Age”.  
 
 Yet, despite these circumstantial factors, the apparent disparity in politics is so great that it 
seems there must surely be some common ideological ground, some arena of discussion, which 
allowed reactionary ideals regarding culture and race (for which, as this these has argued, anti-
                                                 
113The party was originally called The Movement For Survival, before changing its name to The People’s Party 
and then later to the Green Party (Bramwell Ecology in the Twentieth Century 120-1).  
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technologism is a vehicle) to be propagated and appropriated by later progressive movements. What 
was it that allowed the fascist ideology of Jenks and his ilk to be passed on, barely modified, and 
presented in a new journal as though it were voicing some new alternative, progressive agenda? 
How could an icon of the New Left literary scene such as Ted Hughes be such an admirer of Henry 
Williamson that he spoke at his funeral when even his (Williamson’s) old university seemed anxious 
to disown him? And how was it that the work of “a supporter of [Spanish fascist leader] Franco” like 
Tolkien came to be inspirational as an alternative for the counter-cultural movement of the 1960s 
and 70s? (Veldman 1).  Most of all, why was the common ground an antipathy towards technology 
and the technological society? 
 
Answering this brings me back to the points first raised in my introduction about Monaco’s 
definition of the reactionary consciousness and Sternhell’s conception of the counter-enlightenment 
tradition in Western culture and society, as well as William’s references to this dichotomy in 
Western civilisation in Culture and Society. These theses deal with reactions to modernity – perhaps 
it would be better to say that they deal with an alternative or reactionary modernity, which 
emphasises historical tradition, cultural context and tradition in opposition to ideals of universalism, 
individual rights, and liberal democracy.114 Throughout this thesis, I have shown how anti-
technological literature is deeply invested in these themes of cultural identity, vitality, and renewal, 
and how it sees the mobility and ease of technology and the liberal democracy it makes possible as 
injurious and dissolving of community and cultural cohesion. In the conclusion so far, I have already 
considered how anti-technologism builds on a history of negative classicism and its themes of 
degeneration, decline and hoped-for renewal. 
 In the second half of the conclusion I want to discuss the thematic connections between the 
tradition of romantic protest, as defined by Veldman, and anti-technologism, and show how both 
                                                 
114 Implicit in Monaco’s work, and explicitly stated in Sternhell’s is the realisation that the reactions to 
modernity they analyse are in themselves products of modernity. Williams’ work, which has a more literary 
focus, locates culture itself as the product of the tensions between these two modernities.  
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can be located within the same counter-enlightenment tradition. Specifically, in light of the work 
done in this thesis, I want to consider how romantic protest’s emphasis on cultural and spiritual 
aspects of society, and its concern with community and tradition in an age of rapid change, resulted 
in a convergence between reactionary conservatism and progressive ideology. My ultimate aim in 
this final section will be to argue that anti-techhnologism in literature belongs to the counter-
enlightenment tradition which, in the final analysis, relies on arguments from tradition and 
authority, based on false analogies with the natural world.  
 
In the introduction to her work on the relationship between fantasy literature and post-war 
alternative progressive politics, Veldman gives a definition of post-war romantic protest that situates 
it within a mood of disenchantment and alienation with the perceived rationalism, scientism, and 
uniformity of the modern world:  
 
The fantasies of Lewis and Tolkien, the campaigns against the British H –bomb, and 
the warnings of the early Greens were fundamentally romantic . . . They shared a 
suspicion of technology and technocracy and a reluctance to recognize empiricism 
and pragmatism as paths to truth. Together they affirmed that the past should serve 
as a guide for the future. They also insisted that reality extended beyond the material 
realm and that nature was a living entity worthy of respect. Fundamental to these 
postwar romantics was the faith that community had once existed, that it had 
disappeared from postwar Britain, and that it needed to be restored. (3) 
 
The same themes of suspicion of technology and intellectualism, of anti-materialism, and a search 
for community and roots that transcends the modern world all illustrate how closely Veldman’s 
definition of romantic protest tracks Monaco’s definition of the reactionary consciousness. Though it 
is hard to imagine more diametrically opposed political ideologies than old Toryism and the New 
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Left, Fascism and the Green party, nevertheless, the fact remains that they are ideologies shaped by 
reaction to a perceived loss of community and cultural identity engendered by technological 
efficiency, liberal democracy, and materialism.115 
 
 Viewed from this perspective, anti-technologism, and anti-technological literature can be 
seen as enacting a desire for a renewed feeling of community, and for cultural differentiation and 
identity and a repudiation of the materialism, expansionary drive, scientism, and unrestrained thirst 
for knowledge that came be identified with the horrors of World War Two and the militarisation that 
followed it. This repudiation helped spur the environmental movement that was and is such an 
important part of post -World War Two progressive politics, perhaps just as much as a growing 
realisation of the damage pollution and unrestrained “development” were doing.116 What is certain 
is that the spectacle of heavily militarised global superpowers facing off on a global stage, whilst 
entire countries, cultures, and peoples were trampled under the feet, disgusted many people who 
also turned away from the seemingly corrupt philosophies they espoused (Capitalism and 
Communism) and looked to putatively more “authentic” pre-modern cultures which were 
subsequently re-imagined as innocent of the crimes and corruption of modern societies and 
nations.117 
                                                 
115 The argument that post-war progressive and Green politics in the UK were shaped in reaction against 
materialism and a perceived loss of identity is largely the argument of Veldman’s work, especially pages 180-
201 (“E P Thompson and the New Left”) so I do not reproduce it here. However, whilst it would go beyond the 
bounds of this thesis to explore it here, it is relevant to consider in this context Sternhell’s assertion that “[in 
the counter-Enlightenment tradition] ’materialism’ is the classic code word for the rejection of liberalism and 
democracy, the autonomy of the individual, and the conception of society as a group of individuals governed 
by laws that they provided for themselves” (Sternhell The Anti-Enlightenment Tradition 217). Of course, anti-
materialism does not always have to imply anti-democratic values, but as Williams and others have shown, 
most anti-democratic movements invoke anti-materialism, however hypocritically. Thus, as I hope my thesis 
has shown, there is always the danger that progressive movements that emphasise anti-materialist themes 
may unwittingly advance reactionary ideals. 
116Once again, it will be noticed that I do not reference the nuclear arms race in this context. This is because, 
whilst no doubt significant, I see the concern over nuclear weapons as an intensifier rather than an originator 
of such concerns. The animus against technology that I deal with in this thesis existed before nuclear weapons 
appeared, and I believe would have continued to exist even if they had never been invented.  
117 The classic case here is that of genocide which is often held up as the ultimate expression of the horror of 
modernity’s alienation from humanity by such writers as Edward Abbey. Such an accusation conveniently omits 
the memory of such genocides as those perpetrated by the like of Genghis Khan, Attila the Hun, and the 
261 
 
 In the search for uncorrupted culture, and a worldview which stressed the virtues of self-
sufficiency and self-containment as opposed to exploiting, invading, or even trading with other 
countries, the reactionary challenges to technology, liberal democracy, and speculative capitalism 
(according to Ortega and Spengler the three main causes of the West’s decline) offered a seductively 
appealing message. Such reactionary, Right-wing texts condemned imperialism and foreign 
adventuring, unrestrained capitalism (often with thinly disguised references to Jewish control of the 
banks), globalisation, and cosmopolitanism. They spoke instead of the conservative values of self-
reliance, tradition, community values, authority, agrarianism, nature, and most of all “harmony” and 
“stability”. Such writings mixed attacks on capitalism and technology with paeans to nature, the 
“natural order” and cultural differentiation, in a way that superficially at least resembled 
multiculturalism or at least an appreciation of other culture’s right to exist and express themselves. 
They identified cultural differentiation with biological diversity and technology with an urban, 
cosmopolitan critical aspect which was degenerative and homogenising.  
 
 A striking example can be found in the following passage from Ludwig Klage’s 1913 speech, 
“Man and Earth”, written for the German back-to-nature wandervogel youth movement, 
republished in 1980 as an early text accompanying the program of the German Green party, and 
translated into English in 2013 as part of a “repackaging” of Klages and his work under the title The 
Biocentric Worldview: 
 
Make no mistake: “progress” is the lust for power and nothing besides, and we must 
unmask its method as a sick, destructive joke. Utilizing such pretexts as “necessity”, 
“economic development”, and “culture”, the final goal of “progress” is nothing less 
than the destruction of life. This destructive urge takes many forms: progress is 
devastating forests, exterminating animal species, extinguishing native cultures, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Crusades. At the same time, it re-imagines pre-modern cultures in a particularly patronising fantasy of childlike 
innocence and harmlessness.  
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masking and distorting the pristine landscape with the varnish of industrialism, and 
debasing the organic life that still survives. It is the same for livestock as for the mere 
commodity, and the boundless lust for plunder will not rest until the last bird falls. To 
achieve this end, the whole weight of technology has been pressed into service, and 
at last we realize that technology has become by far the largest domain of the 
sciences. (Klages n. pag.) 
 
Klages goes on to condemn speculative capitalism, over-consumption, and most of all Christianity 
(which, like Spengler, he identifies as the source of the imperial drive behind technological 
expansion), all of which anticipate by many decades the post-Second World War counter-cultural 
revulsion with science, militarism, and consumer culture. The essence of Klages’ attack is that the 
destruction of wild nature and animal species is an inevitable and foreseeable result of the nature of 
modern technological society. In its determinism, it charges modern liberalism, science, and laissez-
faire capitalism as being the antithesis of culture and tradition, destroying in decades what took 
hundreds or even thousands of years to develop. Like Spengler and Ortega, Klages saw liberalism, 
mass democracy, and scientific inquiry as standing in opposition to the values of tradition, authority, 
and historical and cultural context. The abstract, universal laws of the Enlightenment were for him 
not liberating, but flattening, removing all distinctions of class, gender, status, hierarchy and culture. 
The destruction of biological diversity, Klages argued, was only the most visible outcome of the 
Enlightenment worldview which sacrificed the “real” differences of history, tradition, and culture in 
the name of abstract ideals such as equality and egalitarianism.  
 
Klages’ condemnation of technology conflates biological diversity with cultural diversity, and 
thereby sets up cultural differentiation and heterogeneity as an unquestionable good in its own 
right, one which technology destroys: 
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The roll call of the dead, which could be inscribed here, even were it to be restricted 
to the most important names, would far exceed the list of fallen animals. It will 
suffice to commemorate a few prominent victims: where are the popular festivals 
and sacred customs, which for uncounted millennia served as perpetual springs for 
myth and poetry? Where is now the rider on the meadow who sows the precious 
seeds? And where can we find the procession of the Pentecostal bride and the torch-
bearer running through the cornfields? Where is now the intricate richness of 
traditional costume, in which every folk could express its own nature, on its own 
landscape? The rich pendants, the multicolored bodices, the decorated waistcoats, 
sashes adorned with precious metals, and the light sandals? (Klages 1913) 
 
This polemic against science anticipates by decades many of the charges of Lynn White’s famous 
1967 essay “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis” – written following a conversation with 
Aldous Huxley (1203) – in which he affixes the blame for pollution and technological imperialism on 
the door of a supposedly Western imperialist worldview, but it also anticipates the bioregionalist 
philosophy which I discussed in my chapter on anarcho-libertarian anti-technologism. Klages’ 
conflation of biodiversity with cultural diversity, his veneration of traditional identification with the 
land and his condemnation of technology and modernity all anticipate Sale’s bioregionalism. This is 
not to suggest that Sale takes his cue from Klages, but rather to show the patterns of conformity and 
continuance between various counter-enlightenment ideologies that stress cultural and 
environmental links above individual self-determination.  Klages’ speech, then, seems to be an 
extraordinarily precocious avocation of some important progressive ideals many decades ahead of 
time. This despite the fact that Klages was “throughout his life politically archconservative and a 
venomous anti-semite” described by historians as a “Volkish fanatic” and “an intellectual pacemaker 
for the Third Reich” whose work “paved the way for fascist philosophy in many important respects” 
(Biehl 11).  
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The importance of Klages’ speech for my focus, though, lies in the kind of appeal it makes in 
the course of attacking technology and the technological society. More than anything else, the 
speech relies on the implicit belief that diversity and difference are not only desirable (a sentiment 
many of us would subscribe to) but somehow sacred as well. It relies on the belief that such cultural 
differences must be preserved at all times and crucially that external differences such as national 
costume, song, and speech – are expressions of the qualitatively different nature of the people 
shaped by the soil and their relationship with it: “Where is now the intricate richness of traditional 
costume, in which every folk could express its own nature, on its own landscape?”. The appeal of 
Klages’ speech, and the fact that it seems to anticipate many of the concerns which would only take 
centre stage decades later, demonstrates that it is precisely in the rejection of critical, rational 
modernity and the search for deeply felt “authentic” ways of life in nature based on non-ration 
intuition or emotion, that anti-technologism – like romantic protest – provides such fertile ground 
for cross-pollination of reactionary with progressive ideals and ideologies. 
 
As my fifth chapter made clear, the analogy between ecological and cultural diversity, 
central to Klages’ rhetoric, is a staple of anti-technologist argument, for it uses pseudo-ecological 
justifications to pass ethnic and cultural judgements, particularly with reference to ethnic tension in 
urban areas. Goldsmith, in his “Limits to Growth in Natural Systems” essay of 1971, demonstrated 
this conflation of nature and society by informing his readers on supposedly ecological grounds that 
“the ever-growing chaos associated with the uncontrolled proliferation of culturally undifferentiated 
people must set a further limit to economic growth” (Goldsmith 60-1). Similarly, the passage from 
Daniel Quinn’s Ishmael which I cited in the chapter on anti-technologism and overpopulation also 
uses analogy to try to conflate three very separate issues – biological diversity, indigenous 
communities, and xenophobia. Likewise, “futurologist”, academic, and novelist W. Warren Wagar 
(1989) makes a very similar argument in his fictional history of the future which reveals even more 
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clearly how concerns about overpopulation, and allusions to community and cultural diversity in 
anti-technologism employ the biological metaphor to justify exclusion: 
 
The word was therefore passed from community to community that, although 
everyone had the right in the new era to reproduce to their heart’s content, 
responsibility to the biosphere dictated restraint. Communities that exceeded the 
carrying capacity of their land found gates closed everywhere when they tried to 
export their human surplus. (A Short History of the Future 262) 
 
Anti-technologism, then, by identifying and then continually reinforcing an analogy between 
biological and cultural diversity allows legitimate concern for biodiversity to be applied to critiques 
of culture and society. 
 
As the noted biologist Stephen Jay Gould put it, “nature has no automatically transferrable 
wisdom to serve as the basis of human morality” (225). Yet the appeal to nature to justify exclusion 
in the search for some putatively “authentic” pre-existing culture appears to be perennial; anti-
technologism, in its organicism and disdain for the supposedly synthetic and artificial, allows the 
conflation of good with purity, and cosmopolitanism with pollution and contamination. Though 
these are typically archconservative themes, it is obvious how much the themes of romantic protest 
identified by Veldman – a suspicion of technology, an instinctive anti-rationalism, an organicist 
tendency to view nature in holistic terms, an emphasis on the importance of community cohesion, 
and a reverence for tradition and cultural provenance – were in sympathy with a pre-existing 
ideology that stressed irredentism, and respect for tradition. The well-established tendency of this 
ideology to decry speculative capitalism (as contrasted with capitalism based on owning agricultural 
property and produce) certainly did not harm its appeal. 
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However, as I have emphasised throughout this thesis, though anti-technologism draws on 
themes of antipathy towards aspects of modernity it is itself a product of modernity, a reaction to 
the effects of the shift from rural to urban life, from rootedness to mobility, and from artisanship 
and cottage industry to industrial manufacturing. In a recent comprehensive study on the ideology 
of genocide historian Ben Kiernan observes that technological change very often generates “a 
concomitant ideological reaction” against that very change, and that such “antimodern thinking, 
whether politically invented by leaders or authentically summoned by supporters accompanies 
genocide and fuels it” (26). Kiernan’s point supports Monaco’s analysis of the reactionary 
consciousness in modern European culture and illuminates the (literally) reactionary nature of anti-
technologism: the democratising and emancipatory aspects of technology disrupt many of the 
traditional structures and hierarchies of society, and conversely engender a search for continuity, for 
something authentic and lasting that can stabilise a society seemingly in flux. The desire for a return 
to the apparent authenticity of the past, then, manifests itself in “neotraditional ideologies” that are 
“not based on material progress but reacting to it and masking it” (26). In other words, technological 
advances drive change (urbanisation, emancipation,  gender equality, liberal democracy, mass 
communication and entertainment) that causes a reaction, a concern that such a state of affairs is 
somehow against nature and must necessarily come crashing down (Kunstler’s “egalitarian 
pretenses of the high-octane decades” which disappear when the technology that sustains them can 
itself no longer be sustained).118  
Kiernan’s observation, together with Monaco’s analysis of the reactionary consciousness, 
helps illuminate the paradoxical and seemingly contradictory nature of anti-technologism: 
paradoxical, because ultimately (as I proposed in the introduction and earlier in this conclusion) it is 
not technology itself per se that is really being discussed but the search for authenticity, tradition, 
                                                 
118 Similarly, in an essay for The Ecologist entitled “Social Disintegration: Causes” Goldsmith argued that 
technology, liberal democracy, and welfare were the essential causes of societal breakdown. For example, he 
blames “the proliferation of tinned and frozen foods” and domestic appliances for the breakdown in the basic 
unit of the family, as well as “the development of an educational system in which women acquire the same 
information and are provided with the same social and economic aspirations as the men [which] has led to a 
further disintegration of the family” (259).   
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and stability in a changing society. In this search, progressive ideals run the constant and very real 
danger of finding common cause with traditional Toryism and even Far Right ideologues, because 
the progressive ideal of cohesive communities with authentic culture (that is, their own culture 
specific to their region rather than cultural ideals received from mass communication and 
entertainment) are akin to the traditional Tory aristocratic ideal of disdain for speculative or 
industrial capitalism, as Martin Weiner and others have shown. The “organic” conception of society 
propounded by such as Ruskin in the nineteenth century, stressed “interrelation and 
interdependence” so emphatically because, as Williams succinctly put it in Culture and Society, “the 
common enemy” was Liberalism rather than Capitalism or Communism (140). Terms such as 
“interdependence”, “stability”, and “balance” are clearly not radical but deeply conservative terms 
which unavoidably condition how we think about society and have the effect institutionalising and 
justifying inequalities and injustices under the rubric of “diversity” or “natural order”. 
 
In the final analysis, then, the anti-democratic ideals of reactionary writers and thinkers such 
as negative classicists like Spengler and Ortega have an influence that is often largely 
unacknowledged and thus difficult to ascertain, requiring careful unfolding of their ideas and tracing 
of influences through different writers and different texts, something I have simply not had sufficient 
time to do here beyond initial observations of influence on a handful of writers. But what I hope this 
thesis has made abundantly clear is that the theme of resistance to technology proves over and over 
again, in a wide range of contexts, to be in essence a protest against mass democracy, against the 
ideal of liberal democracy and against the ability of people to decide what is in their own best 
interests. Anti-technologism in literature, as I have analysed it in this thesis, is a reaction not against 
the artefacts of technology themselves but rather against the perceived chaos of modern secular 
liberal democracy, which is held to lack any cohesive bond beyond a common self-interest.  
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Rejecting the enlightenment ideals of universal reason, universal rights, and the sovereign 
individual in favour of cultural or ethnic specificity based on a false analogy with nature, does not 
lead to a utopia of happy, cooperative communities, but to exclusionary ideologies and practices 
that figure the “other” as pollution or contamination and indulge in apocalyptic fantasies of cultural 
renewal following a destruction of civilisation that is overtly decried and yet secretly longed for. The 
writers I examine in this thesis are not morally repugnant fanatics who wish to see civilisation 
destroyed in their hatred of humanity, but rather well-meaning people who believe that just as the 
root of modernity’s problems lie in materialism, which they see as cutting people off from both wild 
nature and their own nature and leading to alienation and ennui. Accordingly, they look instead for 
answers to these perceived ills in their opposites: in spirituality rather than materialism, in instinct 
and emotion rather than rationalism and intellectualism, in nature rather than society or politics, 
and in acceptance of the need for order rather than self-interest as an organising force. Sadly, in 
their search for answers, they struggle or fail to resist the appeal of dividing people into spurious 
subjective categories and drawing conclusions about what is natural and what is unnatural in 
society. Anti-technologism is in many respects the dark underbelly of romantic protest. Its attacks on 
technology and the technological society are a displacement of fears and concerns regarding 
materialism, the masses, and the sustainability of modern liberal democracy. It allows for expression 
and exploration of anxieties which would otherwise be unacceptable in modern society.  
 
I would like to close with a quote from Walter Benjamin’s 1930 essay “Theories of German 
Fascism” which I mentioned in my final chapter on anti-technologism and the fascist aesthetic. As 
the dark clouds of fascism and World War Two were already gathering on the horizon, Benjamin 
reviewed War and Warriors (1930) by Ernst Junger, a militarist and former wandervogel naturalist 
whose writings endowed war with an element of mysticism and nobility as a “primal experience”.119 
                                                 
119 Bizarrely, after the Second World War, this most conservative and militaristic of figures became something 
of a risqué countercultural icon in Germany and elsewhere, writing of his experiences taking LSD with its 
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Using his review as a platform for commenting on the broader anti-technological animus of his own 
era, Benjamin issued a bleak warning of the consequences of where such a train of thought was 
heading: 
All the light that language and reason still afford should be focused upon that “primal 
experience” from whose barren gloom this mysticism of the death of the world 
crawls forth on its thousand unsightly conceptual feet. The war that this light exposes 
is as little the ‘eternal' one which these new Germans now worship as it is the “final” 
war that the pacifists carry on about. In reality, that war is only this: the one, fearful, 
last chance to correct the incapacity of peoples to order their relationships to one 
another in accord with the relationships they possess to nature through their 
technology. If this corrective effort fails, millions of human bodies will indeed 
inevitably be chopped to pieces and chewed up by iron and gas. But even the 
habitues of the chthonic forces of terror, who carry their volumes of Klages in their 
packs, will not learn one-tenth of what nature promises its less idly curious but more 
sober children, who possess in technology not a fetish of doom but a key to 
happiness. (128) 
 
I trust that the work of this thesis has shown that though it might spring from entirely 
understandable and even laudable intentions, we should at least be aware of the attraction of a 
literature of irrationality and mysticism that denigrates rationality, intellectualism, science and 
technology in the name of authenticity or intuition, that privileges cultural specificity and historical 
tradition over universal rights extended to each individual regardless of their place in their culture.  I 
hope it has shown that apocalyptic scenarios of modernity are in fact sublimated fantasies of cultural 
exclusion and revitalisation, and most of all that the need to argue the case for modernity, for 
                                                                                                                                                        
inventor, Albert Hofman, and authoring an anti-technological novel The Glass Bees (1957) which warned of a 
dystopian future where technology crushed individualism and heroism.   
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secular liberal democracy, and even for technology is an important argument that needs to be made 
now, just as it needed to be made in Benjamin’s era. 
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